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     Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis examines the origins, selection process, training, promotion and 
general performance, at battalion and regimental level, of combat officers of the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Forces of the First and Second World Wars. These were easily 
the greatest armed conflicts in the country’s history. Through  a prosopographical  
analysis of data obtained from personnel records and established databases, along with 
evidence from diaries, letters, biographies and interviews, comparisons are made not 
only between the experiences of those New Zealand officers who served in the Great 
War and those who served in the Second World War, but also with the officers of other 
British Empire forces. 
 During both wars New Zealand soldiers were generally led by competent and 
capable combat officers at all levels of command, from leading a platoon or troop 
through to command of a whole battalion or regiment. What makes this so remarkable 
was that the majority of these officers were citizen-soldiers who had mostly volunteered 
or had been conscripted to serve overseas. With only limited training before embarking 
for war, most of them became efficient and effective combat leaders through 
experiencing battle. Not all reached the required standard and those who did not were 
replaced to ensure a high level of performance was maintained within the combat units. 
 Casualties were heavy among the battalion officers, especially with platoon 
commanders. The constant need for replacements during both wars led to the promotion 
of experienced non-commissioned officers from the ranks who had proven their 
leadership abilities in the turmoil of fighting on the frontline. Such measures further 
enhanced the performance of the New Zealand divisions, where a team ethos, reflective 
of the character of New Zealand society, was embraced. The opportunities for 
promotion on merit at all levels, regardless of previous civilian social class or 
occupation, provided a sense of egalitarianism seldom found in professional military 
forces.  This, together with the familiarity between the officers and other ranks within 
the regional-based infantry battalions that formed the foundations of the forces, led to 
a preferred style of leadership that the New Zealanders responded well to. It was the 
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officers who provided this leadership in the cauldron of battle who helped forge the 













































In 2003 I enrolled at the University of Canterbury as a mature student to study 
for a degree in history. After eighteen years in the New Zealand Police, and with a 
young family, I considered it time that I re-evaluated my career options. I had always 
been a prolific reader of history and my thirst for historical knowledge remained 
unquenched, so undertaking a programme of formal study was the obvious option for 
me to take. During my undergraduate study I was fortunate enough to enrol in British 
Isles Rebellions in the Eighteenth-Century, a course taught by Emeritus Professor John 
Cookson, which sadly, due to his retirement, is no longer available to students at the 
University of Canterbury. This course introduced me to the 1798 Irish Rebellion, a 
revolt which I had previously known very little about but which now intrigued me, 
especially due to my Irish ancestry. Thus, the decision to conduct a study of the military 
history of Ireland during the period 1793-1815 for my Masters thesis proved a natural 
choice in that it combined my longstanding interests in military and Irish history. 
Following the completion of my MA in 2008 it was Professor Cookson who suggested 
the Officer Corps of the New Zealand Army as a suitable subject for a PhD thesis when 
I was at a loss as to what my topic would be. I remain heavily indebted to him, especially 
as he stepped in to be my senior supervisor in the last years of my study, and the support 
I have received from him has been extraordinary. I have found researching the wealth 
of primary source material fascinating, while gaining a greater appreciation of the 
experiences and sacrifices made by the citizen-soldiers who fought for New Zealand 
and the interests of its allies in the two world wars.  
In this thesis I have attempted to provide a balanced analysis of the performance 
of the front-line combat officers of the New Zealand expeditionary forces, while 
comparing the similarities and contrasts concerning the officer corps of both major 
conflicts. I have also attempted to provide a greater understanding of how the amateur 
civilian volunteers and conscripts, with limited military experience, became seasoned 
combat leaders who played a not insignificant part in fighting and defeating armies led 
by professional officers. From reading the diaries and letters of the officers and enlisted 
men written while on active service, it is evident that most had a determination to 
succeed in defeating the enemy. A strong sense of national identity and duty to ones 
mates and unit was prevalent among the New Zealanders. Junior officers recorded that 
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the fear of letting their troops and their battalions down inspired them in their leadership 
where they were expected to lead by example. Not all officers proved capable, but the 
majority who did ensured that the New Zealand divisions of both conflicts evolved into 
veteran combat formations. Until now there has been no in-depth study of the combat 
officers at battalion and regimental level of the New Zealand expeditionary forces and 
this work rectifies that. 
Over the years of my research I have been fortunate in receiving assistance and 
support from numerous people. Apart from John Cookson, I am also indebted to 
Professor Philippa Mein Smith, who as my initial senior supervisor provided sound 
guidance, encouragement and critique that ensured the improved structure of the thesis. 
She allowed me the flexibility I needed to complete the work while balancing family 
commitments. I would also like to acknowledge the support and advice I received from 
Dr Chris Pugsley who agreed to act as adjunct advisor on this project. His knowledge 
of New Zealand military history, especially for the Great War, is astounding. Thanks 
must also go to Judy Robertson, office administrator of the Department of History, for 
her welcoming smile and helpful manner that has ensured my time studying history has 
remained hassle free in the ten years or so I have been studying in the History 
Department. I would also like to acknowledge the dedication and professionalism of 
the other academic staff in History who have provided me with enthusiasm and support 
throughout my time at Canterbury. 
Others I wish to thank who have assisted my research include: Pete Connor, 
Lieutenant-General Rhys Jones, Geoff Martin, Peter Scott, Emeritus Professor Ewen 
McCann, Matt Pomeroy, Barry O’Sullivan, Dolores Ho and the staff of the 
Kippenberger Military Archive and Research Library, Mary Slatter and the staff of the 
New Zealand Defence Force Library, the staff of the New Zealand Defence Force 
Archives, Trentham, as well as the staff of Archives New Zealand, Wellington. I am 
indebted to Sandy Thomas, Haddon Donald, Harold Todd and my uncle, Jack Collins, 
for sharing their wartime experiences and thoughts with me. I would also like to thank 
Jane Campbell for not only supplying me with transcripts of Denver Fountaine’s 
unpublished wartime letters and photographs, but for also allowing me to quote from 
them in this thesis; this work is greatly enriched by the originality this material has 
provided. I would also like to acknowledge Chris Hewitt and Graeme Wilson from the 
Selwyn District Council who have graciously allowed me flexibility in working hours 
to complete this thesis in the six months leading up to submission. I must also thank my 
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parents, Brian and Claire Stack, who have not only encouraged me in my academic 
studies, but who have also provided financial support.      
Undoubtedly, my greatest thanks must go to my wife, Susanne, whose support 
and sacrifice has ensured that I have been able to take my passion for history to the 
highest level. She encouraged me to follow my dream when others questioned my 
sanity in relinquishing ‘a perfectly good salary’ to lead the impoverished life of a 
student with a young family. However, the student lifestyle has ensured that I have been 
able to combine study with quality family time with our children, Seamus and Niamh. 
They have unavoidably been indoctrinated with my views of historical issues. Thus, it 
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     Introduction 
 
In the one hundred years since the formation of the New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force to serve overseas in the Great War, little has been written concerning the battalion 
and regimental officers who provided the essential leadership of this large military 
body, and of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Second World War. This 
silence has been due mainly to the generations who lived through and experienced these 
conflicts not wanting to dwell on the sacrifice New Zealand society suffered during 
these periods as they preferred to focus on the future. The anti-war sentiment that 
followed the First World War helped to limit the literature on the war experiences of 
New Zealanders to regimental histories and a few autobiographies. Most returned 
soldiers, including the officers, believed that only those who had shared the experiences 
of war could understand what they had been through. Many had practised self-
censorship and sanitised their descriptions of their war experiences in letters home to 
families, mainly focusing on the mundane life out of the trenches and frontline in an 
effort to reduce the worry families had for their loved ones serving overseas. 
 In the last twenty years there has been an increase in the output of studies of 
New Zealand military history. Until the 1970s the official and unofficial war and 
regimental histories, mostly written by officers who had either served in the specific 
units or campaigns, followed the pattern where military history was conceived as a 
history of military operations, comparatively limited in exploration of the relationships 
between military forces involved and the societies out of which they came. In 1961 
British historian Sir Michael Howard signalled a change in this pattern with his book 
on the Franco-Prussian War where he included a broader approach by looking at how 
the armies of the two belligerents reflected the social structures of the two nations.1 
This approach gained academic and international acknowledgement and was adopted 
in academic journals and periodicals such as War and Society and Armed Forces and 
Society. Such an approach has specific relevance to obtaining a greater understanding 
of the New Zealand expeditionary forces which were raised from civilian volunteers 
                                                 
1 Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871 (London, 
1961) 
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and conscripts.  However, the anti-war protests of the 1960s and 1970s, resulting from 
the country’s involvement in the Vietnam War, stifled public enthusiasm in 
acknowledging New Zealand’s fairly constant involvement in the main conflicts of the 
twentieth century. This has since been replaced by a growing appreciation of the impact 
war has had on individuals and families, and indeed New Zealand society. The public 
thirst for a greater understanding of New Zealand’s military past has led to a flurry of 
monographs, autobiographies, biographies, diaries and general histories being 
published. Notable works such as Christopher Pugsley’s Gallipoli: The New Zealand 
Story in 1984, followed by John McLeod’s book Myth and Reality: The New Zealand 
Soldier in World War Two in 1986 sparked interest and debate over long-held images 
of the New Zealand soldier in both wars. Since that time historians, notably Ian 
McGibbon, John Crawford and Glyn Harper, have added further major contributions. 
This thesis builds on their work, filling the gap in the historiography of the two world 
wars by providing an analysis of the lower levels of combat command by officers within 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces that has so far not been examined in-depth. 
 Much of the evidence analyzed in this work was obtained through a 
prosopographical approach to the abundant primary sources that identify the officers of 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces and therefore make it possible to study them as 
coherent groups. Such sources were personnel records from the New Zealand Defence 
Force Archives and Archives New Zealand, along with data obtained from published 
Gradation Lists and Embarkation Rolls, cross-referenced with the Cenotaph database 
of the Auckland War Memorial Museum and Studholme’s 1928 book, Some Records 
of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force.2 Not all these records were complete, but 
there was sufficient material available to provide sizable samples of over three hundred 
officers from each of the expeditionary forces. These databases, which are included as 
appendices to this thesis, are a useful historical source in their own right. The thesis’s 
subsequent analysis of the make-up and experience of the junior combat officers within 
the New Zealand forces, breaks entirely new ground.  
Other primary sources examined included the recorded experiences of soldiers  
from privates through to major-generals. Evidence obtained and analysed from a post-
                                                 
2 Lt-Col John Studholme, Some Records of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force: record of Personal 
Services during the War of Officers, Nurses, and First–Class Warrant Officers; And Other Facts 
Relating to the N.Z.E.F. –  Unofficial But Based on official Records (Wellington, 1928) 
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World War Two survey of senior officer of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
conducted by Major-General Howard Kippenberger and the previously unpublished 
wartime letters of Colonel Denver Fountaine are examples of primary sources that have 
hitherto received little or no attention. From these and other such material a theme 
became clear that the New Zealand military forces which served overseas during the 
First and Second World Wars were generally led by competent officers at all levels. 
This was despite the fiscal restraints on defence spending by the New Zealand 
government in the 1920s and 1930s that limited officer recruitments and training during 
the inter-war years. 
 
 In 1986 John McLeod published his MA thesis which became the controversial 
book Myth and Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War II.3  McLeod’s study 
challenged the traditional sanitised images of the Kiwi citizen-soldiers during the 
Second World War where the New Zealanders saw themselves as superior soldiers to 
other nationalities and natural leaders of men. These images had emerged in the First 
World War and were reinforced in the next. McLeod successfully exposed the myth of 
a totally egalitarian army in that he argued that initially officer commissions were 
generally only offered to those whose socio-economic status and level of education was 
relatively high.4 He also examined the relationships between officers and the ordinary 
soldiers to explain the 2nd New Zealand Division’s distinctiveness within the army. 
However, although he formed some sound conclusions regarding the composition of 
the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force and of the experience of the average soldier 
during the war, his work on the officer corps was limited. New Zealand military 
historians such as Christopher Pugsley5 and Glyn Harper6 agree that McLeod’s work is 
valuable as the first attempt to analyse the officer corps. However, they also believe 
that further in-depth study is required to gain a greater understanding of leadership 
within the New Zealand military forces.  
                                                 
3 John McLeod, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War Two (Auckland, 1986) 
4 Ibid., pp. 156-159 
5 Christopher Pugsley, Interview with author, 16 March 2009 
6 Glyn Harper, ‘A New Zealand Way of War and a New Zealand Style of Command?’ in  Born to 
Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders, eds. Glyn Harper & Joel Hayward (Auckland, 2003), 
pp. 27-38 
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 In 2003 Glyn Harper and Joel Hayward published their book Born to Lead? 
Portraits of New Zealand Commanders.7 This was a collection of biographical essays 
of a small selection of senior New Zealand officers that focussed on commanders from 
divisional down to battalion level, rather than a study of the officer corps at all levels. 
In recent times there has been a myriad of books published8 regarding the experiences 
of officers during both conflicts but these tend to be based on diaries and letters of 
individuals, therefore biographical or autobiographical, rather than a study of the corps 
as a whole.   
 The intention of this thesis is to provide a substantial study of combat officers 
within the two expeditionary forces to fill the gap in the current historiography. This 
proved to be the most formative and active period for New Zealand military forces, 
when the Kiwis carved out a reputation as hardy and effective fighters. This work 
concentrates not only on the commanders who directed the combat regiments and 
battalions, but also the platoon, company, troop, squadron and battery officers who 
physically led the rank and file in battle, and who were, arguably more instrumental 
than senior officers in forging the citizen-soldiers of the New Zealand forces into elite 
combat formations. It particularly focuses on their recruitment, training and experiences 
as a way of redressing the little attention they have received from historians. 
  This thesis builds on McLeod’s work by testing his conclusions through 
analysis of comprehensive data sets covering topics not previously examined, such as 
religion, marital status and promotion within the various elements of the army. The 
thesis is more expansive in that it considers both the First and Second World Wars. It 
identifies differences and trends regarding recruiting, formation, training, relations with 
other ranks, experiences and overall performance. It particularly focuses on the 
recruitment, training and experiences of junior officers, who provided most of the front 
line leadership. 
The thesis also identifies characteristics of the style of leadership that New 
Zealanders preferred or responded well to. This was done by analyzing the recorded 
experiences and opinions of both officers and enlisted men in an attempt to attain a 
                                                 
7 Glyn Harper & Joel Hayward (eds.), Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders 
(Auckland, 2003) 
8 Glyn Harper, Kippenberger: An Inspired Commander New Zealand Commander, Paperback edition 
(Auckland, 2005);  Jock Vennell, The Forgotten General: New Zealand’s World War 1 Commander 
Major-General Sir Andrew Russell (Auckland, 2011), John Crawford (ed.), The Devil’s Own War: The 
First World War Diary of Brigadier-General Herbert Hart (Auckland, 2008)  
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balanced conclusion, while also comparing the New Zealand experience to those of 
Australia, Canada and of Britain. These nations all appear to have followed the same 
training practices of the British Army. However, there were some unique features of 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces that determined the relationships between  
officers and enlisted men that fed into their combat performance. These national 
characteristics both hindered and assisted the performance of officers and the military 
forces. It is only through this comparison with other similar armies that a better 
understanding can be gained concerning the performance in leadership and level of 
professionalism of the New Zealand officers on the international stage.  
It is very important to cover various periods of the two wars. The data from 
personnel records and Embarkation Rolls shed light on the background of the individual 
officers and give some indication as to the recruiting of officer candidates from the 
civilian population. Education can be assumed to be an important factor in officer 
selection. But there is also the question of whether vacancies in the commissioned 
ranks, as the wars progressed, were made up largely from NCOs, breaking down 
whatever social exclusiveness the officer corps possessed. Did leadership skills and 
battle experience come to count for more? This is examined in Chapter 2 which relates 
to officer selection and promotion. 
It is also important to point out that the term ‘officer corps’ in relation to the 
New Zealand military forces differs from the definition used by other armies at the time. 
Sandy Thomas rightly stated that New Zealand never had an officer corps comparable 
to those in large professional armies, such as the German Army.9  He argued that in his 
knowledge and experience, German officers owed their honour and duty first to the 
professional officer corps to which they belonged, rather than to the regiment they 
served in.10 In his opinion German officers considered themselves ‘like gods’, and had 
an air of superiority that ensured a degree a separation from their troops.11 Thomas 
states this was not the case with New Zealand officers, whose loyalty was always to the 
battalion or regiment in which they served.12 This attitude is in keeping with British 
Army tradition.13 But close civilian relationships between the officers and men should 
                                                 




13 G.D. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the 
British Army in the era of the First World War (London, 2000), pp. 130-132 
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be expected in armies formed from citizen-soldiers. The question is whether such 
relationships were more intense in New Zealand forces than in the British Army. This 
issue is addressed in the chapters which concern battalion officers and their 
relationships with their men. 
The standards of what determined a good officer changed from the beginning 
of the Great War in 1914 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. As in Edwardian 
Britain and throughout the Empire, initially officers in the New Zealand Staff Corps 
and Territorial Force were expected to be well-educated gentlemen who lived by 
traditional codes of social and moral conduct.14 A sense of personal and collective 
social-class duty to the King and Empire, fostered by stories of imperial heroic martial 
exploits, saw the New Zealand officer corps at the beginning of World War One consist 
of middle-class men who saw duty, stoicism and bravery as the mark of a quality 
officer.15  
The rigours of modern mechanised warfare proved that such notable qualities 
were not enough to make a competent and effective officer. A more professional 
approach to leadership was required. Simon Robbins summed the situation facing the 
British and Empire forces at the beginning of the Great War:  
 
[The] Army was to a great extent an amateur facing a professional army, and those in command, 
in fact in all ranks from general to lance-corporal, had to train their men and fight at the same time. But 
by 1917-1918 all ranks, including generals had learned to compete on equal terms.16 
 
    The performance of combat officers in the two New Zealand expeditionary 
forces can be measured by their style of leadership and ability to command and inspire 
their men. The principles of effective leadership were universal and traditional traits 
remained; a bearing of competence and self-confidence, moral and physical courage, 
decisiveness and initiative, dependability and endurance, responsibility for actions and 
decisions, while remaining loyal to fellow officers and subordinates.17 But modern 
warfare meant combat officers now also had to be technically and tactically 
                                                 
14 Christopher Moore-Beck, Playing the Game: The British Junior Infantry Officer on the Western 
Front 1914-18 (Solihull, West Midlands, 2011), pp. 206-208 
15 Ibid. 
16 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: Defeat into Victory (Oxford 
& New York, 2005), p. 18 
17 Robert A Fitton (ed.), Leadership: Quotations from the Military Tradition (Oxford & Boulder, 
Colorado, 1990), pp. 325-332  
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knowledgeable to achieve success with minimal casualties. Such leadership qualities 
were essential in establishing an esprit de corps within formations at every level of 
command.18 It is recognised that to achieve this constant training was essential. Besides 
focusing on improving the technical skills of themselves and their men, just as essential 
was the fostering of a team culture within the units they level, whatever level of 
command; especially during the Second World War, where small units often became 
isolated and left to their own devices due to the mobile nature of some campaigns.  
Good officers needed to lead by example in maintaining high standards in their own 
performance, to continually show care for the welfare of their troops, and to share the 
dangers and hardships of their soldiers.19 The analysis of the training and leadership of 
New Zealand officers is examined in chapters 3 to 8. 
It is the intention of this thesis to answer a number of key questions relating to 
the combat officers of the Dominion’s expeditionary forces during the two major 
conflicts of the twentieth century: 
 
1. What provisions made for officer selection, training and promotion 
within the two expeditionary forces, under what influences, and with 
what results? 
2. Were these regimes and experiences unique to New Zealand officers 
in comparison to those of other British imperial forces? 
3. What differences, if any, were there regarding the above between the 
two New Zealand expeditionary forces, and how did they come 
about?  
4. How did officer-men relations within the expeditionary forces affect 
the combat effectiveness of the divisions; and were there any 
differences between the two New Zealand forces and those of other 
allied Dominions? 
5. How did the different leadership styles of the officers of combat units 
affect the overall performance of the formations they were fighting 
in?  
 




Ultimately, what this thesis attempts to provide is a holistic study of the officers 
who physically led and directed the troops of the front line fighting units of the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces during the First and Second World Wars. It identifies the 
strengths and weaknesses within the officer corps at battalion and regimental level and 
provides an analysis as to why these occurred. It is important to move away from a too 
idealistic view of New Zealand soldiery. What this study seeks to identify are 
characteristics and a style of command and leadership that New Zealanders responded 
well to or preferred from their officers. It is intended that this study will build on the 
work of other historians by providing an original contribution to New Zealand military 
history through a wider and more in-depth examination of the officers who led the 
combat units of the Dominion’s expeditionary forces.. Until now, apart from several 
celebrated individuals such as Charles Upham, Sandy Thomas and Moananui Ngarimu, 



































Since the 1980s there has been a growing awareness within the New Zealand 
public of the sacrifices made by young Kiwis in going to war for their country, 
especially in regard to the First and Second World Wars. This has led to an increase of 
publications on New Zealand’s military history, including books recounting personal 
experiences that add a more human touch that express the ordeals of war that 
individuals faced. Such literature ranges from official unit histories, monographs of 
various campaigns and wars, biographies and autobiographies of prominent officers, as 
well as publications of wartime photographic collections and maps. These have 
generally made up a corpus of conventional military history in focusing on either 
individual soldiers, especially generals and heroes, or specific campaigns or battles.  
In contrast, this work has taken a fresh approach by identifying and analysing a 
specific, but sizable, element within the New Zealand expeditionary forces to gain a 
greater understanding of the human aspect in the make-up of leadership within these 
civilian-soldier forces. In doing so, this work provides a significant contribution to New 
Zealand’s ‘army and society’ history; an aspect of New Zealand’s military history that 
has seen little development until now. This is the first comprehensive study of the junior 
officers who played such a crucial role in leading their fellow citizen-soldiers into 
combat and by studying them we can also gain a greater understanding of the society 
from which they came. To analyse the culture, efficiency, command and leadership of 
the combat officers of the New Zealand Army expeditionary forces that served overseas 
during the two conflicts it was essential to have an in-depth knowledge of the New 
Zealand military forces and an understanding of their experiences in the campaigns in 
which they fought. To achieve this it was necessary to become fully immersed in the 
ever-increasing primary and secondary literature relating to this country’s military 
history. 
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  Initially, my reading for this study was focused on two prominent New Zealand 
military historians, Glyn Harper and Christopher Pugsley, both of whom had been 
serving army officers. Their major works, which generally follow the old directions in 
military history, provided a thorough overview of the New Zealand military forces 
during the two main conflicts. Harper’s work included: Dark Journey: Three Key New 
Zealand Battles of the Western Front,20 Born to Lead?: Portraits of New Zealand 
Commanders (edited with Joel Hayward),21 Kippenberger: An Inspired  New Zealand 
Commander,22 Spring Offensive: New Zealand and the Second Battle of the Somme,23 
and Images of War: World War One  - A Photographic Record of New Zealanders at 
War 1914-1918.24 Pugsley’s publications included: Gallipoli: The New Zealand 
Story,25 Anzac: The New Zealanders at Gallipoli,26 The Anzac Experience: New 
Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War,27 and Scars on the Heart: Two 
Centuries of New Zealand at War.28 These historians focused on providing accounts of 
military actions, operations and campaigns, but provided more searching expositions 
than what the official histories of the First and Second World Wars offered. Associated 
with this focus on military operations is an interest in generalship, and therefore military 
biographies. John McLeod, a serving officer at the time of his writing, took a different 
stance with his book, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand Soldier in World War II.29 
McLeod’s work challenged the perceptions of the New Zealanders fighting in the 
expeditionary force during the Second World War, especially in relation to them being 
natural soldiers and leaders. McLeod’s work, along with several chapters in Harper’s 
and Hayward’s Born to Lead? come the closest to dealing with the officers who 
physically led their troops into battle.  
 Through their works, both Pugsley and Harper have made major contributions 
to New Zealand military history, albeit mostly concentrating on generalship and 
                                                 
20 Glyn Harper, Dark Journey: Three key New Zealand battles of the Western Front (Auckland, 2007)  
21 Glyn Harper & Joel Hayward (eds.), Born To Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders 
(Auckland, 2003) 
22 Glyn Harper, Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand Commander, paperback ed. (Auckland,2005) 
23 Glyn Harper, Spring Offensive: New Zealand and the second battle of the Somme (Auckland, 2003)  
24 Glyn Harper (ed.), Images of War: World War One - A photographic record of New Zealanders at 
War 1914-1918 (Auckland, 2008)  
25 Christopher Pugsley, Gallipoli: The New Zealand Story, 2nd. ed.(Auckland, 1990) 
26 Christopher Pugsley, Anzac: The New Zealanders at Gallipoli (Auckland, 1995) 
27 Christopher Pugsley, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World 
War (Auckland, 2004) 
28 Christopher Pugsley (ed.), Scars on the Heart: Two Centuries of New Zealand at War (Auckland, 
1996) 
29 John McLeod, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand soldier in World War II (Auckland, 1986) 
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military campaigns and operations. They have challenged the limited historiography, 
primarily based on official war histories that developed after the two conflicts and have 
provided the public with a greater understanding of the New Zealand military 
experience in the two world wars. Pugsley was the first historian to identify Colonel 
William Malone as a competent battalion commander whose inspired leadership led to 
the Wellington Infantry Battalion capturing the strategic height of Chunuk Bair at 
Gallipoli in August 1915. Prior to Pugsley publishing his research, Malone had been 
blamed by his superior officers for the loss of the position, even though he died 
defending it. Harper has followed Pugsley in concentrating on researching the New 
Zealand experience of the Great War, although he holds a more critical view of Major-
General Andrew Russell, the commander of the New Zealand Division on the Western 
Front, than Pugsley. Russell and Malone had remained relatively unknown by the 
current generations of New Zealanders until Pugsley and Harper published their work.   
  Another respected New Zealand military author, John Crawford, provided an 
insight into the experiences of a Kiwi officer in the Great War with The Devil’s Own 
War: The First World War Diary of Brigadier General Herbert Hart,30 which he had 
edited. Crawford, with Ian McGibbon, produced New Zealand’s Great War: New 
Zealand, the Allies and the First World War,31 which provided a readable overview of 
the Dominion’s military participation in the conflict. The Maori experience was 
presented by reading Wira Gardiner’s Te Mura O Te Ahi: The Story of the Maori 
Battalion,32 Chris Pugsley’s Te Hokowhitu A Tu: The Maori Pioneer Battalion in the 
First World War,33 and Monty Soutar’s  Nga Tama Toa: The Price of Citizenship – C 
Company 28 (Maori) Battalion, 1939-1945.34 
This thesis expands on the study of New Zealand’s senior military commanders 
by Glyn Harper and Joel Hayward. In their book Born to Lead? Portraits of New 
Zealander Commanders, they not only furnished a collection of biographical essays of 
the most prominent senior officers of the New Zealand Army in the twentieth century, 
but they also examined the question as to whether there was a distinctive New Zealand 
                                                 
30 John Crawford, The Devil’s Own War: The First World War Diary of Brigadier-General Herbert 
Hart (Auckland, 2008) 
31 John Crawford & Ian McGibbon (eds.), New Zealand’s Great War: New Zealand, the Allies, and the 
First World War (Auckland, 2007)  
32 Wira Gardiner, Te Mura O Te Ahi: The Story of the Maori Battalion (Auckland,1992)  
33 Christopher Pugsley, Te Hokowhitu A Tu: The Maori Pioneer Battalion in the First World War 
(Auckland, 1995) 
34 Monty Soutar,  Nga Tama Toa: The Price of Citizenship – C Company 28 (Maori) Battalion, 1939-
1945 (Auckland, 2008) 
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style of command. By comparing the New Zealanders forces to those of Britain, the 
United States and Australia, they concluded that New Zealand has an informal style of 
command that favours a practical approach while avoiding ceremony where possible. 
This thesis provides evidence to support their argument, but it does so by focusing on 
the battalion and regimental officers of combat units who physically led their troops 
through the cauldron of battle and who shared the experiences of defeat and victory 
with them, including the physical and emotional effects of such ordeals. 
 
  
   Methodology – Creating Sample Lists 
 
To gain a greater understanding of the type of person considered most suitable 
to be commissioned as an officer an examination of the officer personnel records at 
Defence Force Archives, Trentham was essential. Ultimately, this proved very fruitful. 
However, there were some difficulties in this process as there is only a limited amount 
of available surviving primary source material. Fortunately copies of New Zealand 
Army Officer Gradation lists were able to be obtained from the Defence Force Library 
in Wellington. However, in regard to the Second World War, these lists were only 
available for 1940, 1943, 1944 and 1945. Some of these lists were incomplete and later 
comparison with Embarkation Rolls revealed a number of names had been incorrectly 
recorded. 
Insufficient identification on Gradation Lists also created further problems. To 
create a sample list for New Zealand Defence Force Archives, full names and serial 
numbers were required to ensure proper identification of individual officers. This 
information was not provided on the Gradation Lists. However, this issue was rectified 
by examining Embarkation Rolls that are held on microfiche in the Macmillan Brown 
Library at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. The originals are held at the New 
Zealand Defence Force Library, Wellington.  
Restricted access to the NZDF Archives created further difficulties. Due to the 
number of researchers wanting access to the Archives and to the demands on staff 
assisting in accessing personnel files, access is usually limited to one researcher at the 
unit at one time. This ensured that access could not be gained to the unit until late April 
2009 due to the large sample of 350 files required, which required a significant number 
of hours for staff to retrieve, and the waiting list of researchers. The lack of consistency 
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in the presentation and information provided in the annual Gradation Lists also led to 
some confusion when attempting to identify specific units within the Expeditionary 
Force.  
From the available official Gradation Lists from the Defence Force Library, 
Wellington, officer lists were created for 1940, 1943 (3rd NZ Division in the Pacific) 
and 1945. These years were chosen to help identify trends or differences for each period 
of the war, from the creation of the Expeditionary Force in September 1939, the height 
of mobilization in 1943, through to the return of the majority of the troops in late 1945 
after the war had ended. The list selection process varied and was determined by what 
information was available. List selection for 1940 was done by selecting five 2nd 
lieutenants and five 1st lieutenants from each of the 11 infantry battalions, along with 5 
lieutenants from the artillery, Divisional Cavalry, Engineers and Signals. Most of the 
infantry battalions were recruited on a regional basis where the majority of the recruits 
were already enlisted in Territorial regiments. The 18th, 21st and 24th battalions were 
recruited from the Northern region of Auckland, North Auckland, Waikato and Bay of 
Plenty. The 19th, 22nd and 25th Battalions were from the central region of Wellington, 
Taranaki, Manawatu, Hawke’s Bay and the Wairarapa. The 20th, 23rd and 26th battalions 
were recruited from the Southern region which included the whole of the South Island. 
The 27th (Machine Gun) battalion comprised specially trained machine gunners who 
were recruited from throughout the country. The 28th (Maori) battalion was recruited 
on a tribal basis, with each company of over 100 men representing tribal regions.  The 
battalion A company was recruited amongst Nga Puhi of North Auckland, while B 
Company was predominantly from Te Arawa of Rotorua, with C Company recruited 
from Ngati Porou from the East Coast.35 
By sampling from each infantry battalion in 1940 a comprehensive snap shot of 
the junior officers and platoon commanders within each front line infantry unit of the 
newly raised battalions was obtained. This was done in an effort to identify any 
differences or trends in the officer selection process, and specifically whether there was 
any obvious bias toward certain social groups within the local communities and varying 
provinces. The results are analysed in chapter 2 concerning officer selection and 
promotion.      
                                                 
35 Gardiner, p. 30 
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Gaining accurate data for the mid-war years proved more difficult. The 1943 
Gradation List was incomplete as it did not have the lists for the 2nd NZ Division 
infantry units based in the Mediterranean which made up the bulk of the New Zealand 
military forces serving overseas. However, it did provide a comprehensive list of the 
officers serving in the short-lived 3rd NZ Division in the Pacific theatre. The 
significance of this is that almost all junior officers from this formation who later served 
with the 2nd NZ Division were required to revert to NCO rank before being considered 
suitable for promotion in the Mediterranean.36 
The third sample was taken from the 1945 Gradation list which differed again 
from the way the previous Gradation lists had been recorded. This list referred solely 
to officers serving with the New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean. Officers were 
listed by what region their unit was from instead of being listed with individual 
battalions. This saw officers serving in the 18th Armoured Regiment, and the 21st and 
24th infantry battalions being placed on the Northern Region list, those from the 19th 
Armoured Regiment, and the 22nd and 25th infantry battalions were recorded on the 
Central Region list, while officers from the 20th, 23rd and 26th infantry battalions were 
grouped together on the Southern Region list.   
There were a number of issues that had to be addressed when creating the 
Second World War samples. The first significant problem to be faced was that most of 
the gradation lists held by the New Zealand Defence Force Library were incomplete, 
even though the library had all the known available gradation lists. This then limited 
what years could be examined. These returns provided only limited personal details of 
officers, such as surname, initials, rank, and the unit the officer belonged to. The 
gradation lists only recorded officers on strength at one given time and did not include 
enlisted men. These lists were an obvious starting point but other primary sources 
needed to be found to find essential data.  
The official Embarkation Rolls of troops leaving New Zealand to serve in the 
Expeditionary Force provided such detail. Fortunately, the Macmillan Brown Library 
has a complete list of Embarkation Rolls for World War 2. The Embarkation Rolls are 
a complete list of every member of the New Zealand Army who left New Zealand to 
serve overseas during the war. It took several weeks of laborious work going through 
every list to obtain the full name of individual officers on the lists created from the 
                                                 
36 W.B. ‘Sandy’ Thomas, Interview, 6 June 2010 
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Gradation lists. Although the data was easily obtained from the early rolls, due to 
officers from the Main Body being commissioned in New Zealand prior to embarkation, 
this proved more difficult for the 1945 sample list. Most of those officers had been 
commissioned overseas and had embarked from New Zealand as either privates or non-
commissioned officers. This then required a significant amount of cross-referencing 
between the Gradation lists and Embarkation Rolls to ensure correct personal details 
were obtained for each individual officer selected. The Embarkation Rolls proved 
fruitful in that they also provided personal details such as the individual’s serial number, 
previous occupation, marital status, place of enlistment, and details of their next-of-kin. 
In late April 2009 research was conducted at the New Zealand Defence Force 
Archives, Trentham near Wellington which saw the examination of officer personnel 
paper files. The original sample list that was provided to the Defence Force archivists 
was of 350 individuals. My supervisors advised that a sample of 300 officers was 
needed to provide a sufficient amount of raw data for analysis, but a sample list of 350 
was provided in case some files were incomplete. However, given the time restrictions 
and size of some of the files this proved somewhat ambitious. Fortunately, thanks to 
the help from several of the archivists who allowed extra time which exceeded the hours 
available to researchers, a total of 325 individual files were able to be examined. 
 
    Methodology of sampling 
 
 Details examined for each individual were: 
 
1. Date of Attestation; this is the day that the individual formally enlisted in the army 
which assisted in determining the individual’s length of service. 
 
2. Date of first commission and at what rank; an officer’s commission is bestowed by 
the monarch, with the lowest officer’s rank being Second-Lieutenant. 
 
3. Age when commissioned; to determine the range of ages of those sampled to get an 
accurate indication of the general age of the officer corps as a whole. 
 
4. Date of Birth; to determine the age of the individual when he enlisted. 
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5. Highest level of education; to help identify any trends regarding levels of education 
when selecting officer candidates or cadets.  
 
6. Previous military experience; to help determine if previous service assisted in officer 
selection and the proficiency of the individual. 
 
7. Religion; to help determine whether religious persuasion affected or influenced 
officer selection.  
 
8. Decorations and awards: i.e., gallantry medals or citations such as ‘mentioned in 
dispatches’; to indicate leadership qualities and bravery of officers. 
 
9. Records of being wounded in action, killed in action, died of wounds or made 
prisoner of war; to give a general overview of casualties suffered within the officer 
corps.        
 
These details were determined from the two most important documents of each file; 
these being the Attestation Paper and the History Record sheet. 
  The Attestation Paper proved the most important record in that it provided 
personal details of the officer prior to his enlisting in the army. Details of age, date of 
birth, place of birth, parents’ nationality and place of birth, height, weight, chest 
measurement, complexion, colour of eyes, hair colour, religion, highest educational 
qualification, previous occupation, address of next-of-kin, previous military service, 
marital status and place of enlistment are all recorded on the paper. Collectively the 
Attestation Papers also proved invaluable in assisting to analyse the demographic 
makeup of the officer corps during both conflicts.  This information helped to expose 
certain trends, differences, and regional and social bias that may have affected the 
officer selection process, especially when the expeditionary forces were first being 
formed in 1914 and 1939. One major aim of this thesis is to make the comparisons 
between the officer selection process of the two wars to identify similarities and 
differences that indicate social changes within New Zealand society during these 
periods, and these documents helped to achieve this. 
The History Sheets were also very important in that they provided information 
regarding the individual’s active service during the war. This included where and when 
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the officer served, any promotions and when, any awards or decorations that the 
individual had received, any disciplinary actions taken against the individual, transfers 
to other units or locations, time spent in hospital, any promotion or training course 
attended, any injuries, wounds in action, whether prisoner of war or dying as a result of 
wounds or killed in action. Through this information it was possible to identify trends 
concerning promotion of officers and enlisted soldiers to officer rank, average length 
of time of promotion to the next level, who was most likely to be promoted, differences 
within various corps and theatres of operation that could determine further promotion.  
It was from the information gained from the Attestation Papers and History 
sheets that a substantial database was created. Such a database was essential in 
providing sufficient primary evidence to support the arguments within the thesis. It was 
also required as an instrument for comparison, first to measure any similarities or 
differences with data found in the research for this thesis relating to the officer corps of 
the New Zealand Army in World War One, and second for comparison with the officer 
corps of other nations within the British Empire during the period. 
Obtaining the above data for the officer corps of World War One proved more 
difficult due to limited access of files.  This was mainly due to the majority of paper 
personnel files relating to those who served in the military forces prior to 1920 being 
stored with Archives New Zealand in Wellington which was being temporarily 
reorganised and renovated. This was further complicated by the files of Great War 
officers who continued to serve in some capacity after 1920, either in the Staff Corps, 
Territorial Force or Home Guard during the Second World War, being kept at the 
Defence Force Archives at Trentham. This was not an issue in researching files of high 
profile officers such as Inglis, Hargest and Kippenberger, but proved excessively time-
consuming when attempting to identify junior officers. 
Limited access to data at Archives New Zealand also created some difficulties. 
At the time the initial research was being conducted the Archives building was being 
refurbished to relocate the Alexander Turnbull Library from the National Library to 
Archives New Zealand. As a result public access was restricted from 10 am to 5 pm 
daily. This would pose no problem to a researcher living locally. However, it meant the 
loss of five hours productive research time per week for a researcher based in 
Christchurch. Furthermore, unlike the New Zealand Defence Force Archives, there was 
a restriction on the number of items each researcher could examine. At Archives New 
Zealand each researcher is limited to receiving only five items at one time. With 
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archivists only retrieving batches of requested items on an hourly basis, this ensured 
that only approximately 35 personnel files could be examined each day. This made it 
impossible to examine the 300 officer personnel files needed to provide a credible 
comparison sample within the time available. In addition, many of the historical 
military archives had restricted public access and required authority from the Defence 
Force to view them. Such applications to view these could take a number of months to 
be processed and still result in access being denied. 
A different approach was needed to obtain the required sample. First, sample 
lists needed to be compiled for the early, middle and late years of the Great War. This 
was achieved by obtaining copies of the official New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
gradation lists from the New Zealand Defence Force Library at Defence House, 
Wellington. These lists were generally produced twice yearly for the duration of the 
conflict. However, not all of these had been retained by the Army, although the Defence 
Force Library had the most complete set. Thankfully, this included the 1914 gradation 
list for the Main Body, which recorded all of the officers who sailed with the first 
echelon of the Expeditionary Force in September 1914, as well as those who were part 
of the small force sent to occupy German Samoa in August of the same year.  
This list proved to be the most informative in that it recorded the officers’ full 
names, which previous regular or territorial unit they served in and at what rank, the 
dates they received that rank, what position or unit they were appointed to in the 
Expeditionary Force and at what rank.  The list also indicated those officers who were 
serving with the Samoan Advance Party. What also makes this the most important 
gradation list is that it includes all those officers who were the original leaders of the 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force, and those junior officers who gained promotion to 
become senior officers. By taking a sample of individuals from this list and examining 
their personnel files, it was possible to create a database that provided an insight into 
the characteristics and qualities that were sought when selecting officers. 
The lists for other years proved less informative. The only other available lists 
for the First World War were those for October 1915, November 1916 and October 
1918. The information recorded in them was limited to the officer’s surname, initials, 
unit serving with, rank and appointments date to that rank, as well as noting any military 
decorations that had been awarded. This information proved most important in allowing 
samples to be taken from each unit to ensure that a cross section of the whole 
Expeditionary Force could be analysed. This allowed a comparison to be made not only 
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between various units and corps, but also between the qualities and characteristics of 
officers in individual units throughout the various stages of the war. Such analysis 
proved significant, especially in the late war period when the demands of war had led 
to a shortage of manpower available to replace casualties within the Expeditionary 
Force. 
The limited data available on the gradation lists meant that vital information had 
to be obtained from other sources. Archives New Zealand had previously been funded 
for a project to scan and digitise all the military personnel records that they held. 
Although this funding was later withdrawn, more than 4,000 of the 100,000 files held 
had been processed and were now available to the public via the Archives New Zealand 
website. This ensured that more than 300 officer personnel files could be viewed via 
the internet to extract vital information for comparison with officers from the 2nd New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Second World War. The only way to establish a 
sizable sample was to view laboriously every digitised entry to establish those who had 
held an officer’s commission. Unfortunately, it became clear that many files had 
important documents, such as Attestation and History papers, that were missing or 
incomplete. It was also apparent that information recorded on the Attestation papers for 
the Great War varied from those of the Second World War. An example of this included 
the question regarding the level of education that only required the soldier to record 
whether he had achieved proficiency level at school. This was in comparison to the 
Attestation papers for the later conflict that asked individuals to record their highest 
level of education achieved. 
Another on-line research source was used to gather the required data. The 
Cenotaph database of the Auckland War Memorial Museum, which is available via the 
museum website, has been established to record information for all New Zealand armed 
service personnel who have served overseas and is intended to cover every conflict New 
Zealand forces have been involved in.37 However, to date, only the records for World 
War One servicemen and women are complete. At this time the database includes over 
112,000 individuals who served during the Great War, along with a select number of 
those who served in the Second World War and the Korean conflict, especially those 
                                                 




who were killed or died of wounds. The data base has been put together by sourcing 
information from official records, such as Embarkation Rolls, Gradation Lists and the 
library manuscript collection, as well as from biographical information provided by 
family members. It is intended that the database will become a permanent record that 
provides extensive personal details about the lives and military careers of every New 
Zealander who served in the conflicts of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
Another invaluable primary source was obtained on the advice of Dr. Chris 
Pugsley, who as an adjunct in History at the University of Canterbury, kindly agreed to 
be an associate advisor for this project. Lieutenant-Colonel John Studholme, CBE, DSO 
published Some Records of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force: Unofficial, but 
compiled from official records in 1928, which Pugsley describes as his ‘bible’.38 On his 
recommendation a copy of this scarce and valuable publication was purchased through 
a militaria dealer at some cost. Importantly, the book provides a complete list of all 
New Zealand officers, nurses and warrant officers who served in the Expeditionary 
Force in the Great War. Still more importantly it records their units, highest rank and 
date promoted, date and rank when first commissioned, awards and honours received, 
date when struck off strength, as well as recording whether suffering any wounds or 
death. The book also records dates of attestation of enlisted men who later were 
commissioned as officers. This helped to determine a general trend about the length of 
time it took for enlisted men with leadership qualities to gain commissions. The book 
also proved its worth in providing a cross reference to details obtained from the 
Gradation Lists and Embarkation Rolls for the First World War.  
By combining the information obtained from the Cenotaph database with that 
taken from the Embarkation Rolls held on microfiche at the Macmillan Brown Library, 
a sizable database for New Zealand Army officers for World War One was established. 
Information relating to an individual’s full name, previous occupation, serial number, 
next of kin details, rank at embarkation, regiment  or unit, place of embarkation, vessel 
travelled on, destination, nominal roll numbers, decorations or awards, previous 
military service and marital status was ascertained. Although some records remained 
incomplete due to inconsistencies in recording, it was also possible to establish the age 
of certain servicemen and whether they had become casualties during the conflict. In 
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effect, because of the inconsistencies in the recording of official information during the 
two conflicts two data bases had to be created for the officer corps of World War One 
to provide sufficient data for comparison with the database created for World War Two. 
In an unusual twist of fate some vital primary source data was obtained through 
a chance meeting while returning from the excursion to Waiouru. Emeritus Professor 
Ewen McCann, who had previously been Head of the School of Economics at the 
University of Canterbury, was on the flight and through conversation he offered some 
primary material that he thought might be relevant to this study. Subsequently, he 
posted his original copy of a small booklet, Southland Soldiers and their Next of Kin 
Roll of Honour compiled by Robert Troup in 1920. What made this so significant is 
that it provided a sample of a specific recruiting region that recorded all those men who 
had served in the Great War from Southland and included such details as their full 
names, rank, unit and their next of kin details. Through analysis of this material 
significant evidence was obtained to show the unique characteristics of the close 
relationships between the officers and enlisted men of the Dominion’s ‘citizen’ army. 
This will be elaborated on further in other chapters but suffice to say that this sample 
provided evidence that soldiers recruited into region-based battalions and regiments 
were led by officers they had close relationships with in civilian life. This invites a 
question as to whether this had positive or negative effects on the efficiency of the units 
on campaign, which is also addressed in a later chapter.     
 
 
    Sources 
The primary literature provided the greatest insight into the experiences of 
officers in the New Zealand expeditionary forces. One of the most outstanding 
examples was the memoirs of Major-General Sir Howard Kippenberger, Infantry 
Brigadier.39 This covered his service in the Second World War, from when he was first 
appointed to command a battalion in September 1939 through until he was seriously 
wounded while commanding the 2nd New Zealand Division at Cassino in Italy in March 
1944. Other memoirs from the Second World War that provide similar important 
insights included Major-General W.B. ‘Sandy’ Thomas’s two volumes, Dare to be 
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Free40 and Pathways to Adventure (edited by Denis McLean),41 along with Lieutenant-
Colonel Haddon Donald’s recent autobiography, In Peace & War – A Civilian Soldier’s 
Story,42 written when he was 88, Brigadier-General Jim Burrow’s Pathway Among 
Men, 43  Brigadier George Clifton’s The Happy Haunted,44 and Lieutenant-Colonel 
Arapeta Awatere’s Awatere: A Soldier’s Story .45 It was only after reading the above 
works, along with published First World War memoirs and collections of letters, such 
as Alexander Aitken’s Gallipoli to the Somme: Recollections of a New Zealand 
Infantryman,46 Lieutenant-Colonel Claude Weston’s Three Years with the New 
Zealander’s,47 R.A. Wilson’s A Two Years Interlude, France 1916-1918,48 the 
collection of published letters of Lieutenant Harold Bell, Your Soldier Boy: The Letters 
of Harold Bell, 1915-1918,49 Cecil Malthus’s Armentieres and the Somme,50 The 
Diaries of Ernest George Moncrief MC, 1914-1919,51 and E.P.F Lynch’s Somme 
Mud,52 which provides an Australian perspective of service on the Western Front, that 
a sufficient grasp of the historiography of the thesis topic could be gained to ensure the 
path of the necessary research.   
Other primary sources were used to obtain a wealth of relevant information. The 
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives provided the annual official 
reports of the General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Military Forces. These 
reports included information regarding the nominal strength of the Staff Corps, 
Permanent Staff, Territorial Force and School Cadets for each year, as well as staff 
appointments, promotions and appointments of officers and officer cadets to military 
colleges in Australia, Britain and India. The reports also include information relating to 
issues concerning recruitment and training of officers and other ranks for the period 
covered. Of significance, these reports record military expenditure and budgets that 
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fluctuate depending of the financial situation of the national government at the time. 
This proved to be important in that the reduced budget for the military during the period 
between the two World Wars reflected on the training available to those who were to 
become leaders within the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Second World War.  
The Alexander Turnbull Library, which was situated at the National Library at 
the time initial research for this thesis was being conducted, but temporarily relocated 
at Archives New Zealand, Wellington, held a wealth of primary material relevant to 
this thesis. This mainly comprised of contemporary manuscripts, diaries, journals, 
letters, postcards and photographs written and taken by individuals who were, or who 
had, served in the New Zealand Expeditionary forces during both main conflicts. Also 
included were documents written by government officials relating to the New Zealand 
military forces during the first half of the twentieth century. Such material proved 
significant in that it ranged from official complaints made by serving Brigadier-
Generals to General Freyberg during World War Two, such as that of Brigadier A. E. 
Conway in December 194453, to diaries sent home to relatives by lowly ranked privates, 
such as that written by Alfred Cameron who was a trumpeter in the Canterbury 
Mounted Rifles and who had embarked for overseas service in World War One with 
the Main Body in September 1914.54  
What makes such documents important is that they provide an insight into the 
range of experiences these individuals had and provides the reader with a greater 
understanding of what New Zealand soldiers were exposed to through military service 
overseas. Archives such as the Alexander Turnbull Library are achieving greater 
importance in New Zealand history in the twenty-first century as they are securing 
permanent records of those servicemen and women from the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries who have since died. A significant example of this, which is of major 
importance to this thesis, is the set of diaries belonging to Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Malone that are held in the Library. With the increasing celebration of New Zealand 
nationalism through military experience, Malone has become recognised as a hero of 
the fateful Gallipoli campaign of 1915 and his leadership qualities, determination and 
professionalism became obvious when reading his diary entries.55   
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The Alexander Turnbull Library also has a large photographic collection that 
includes a vast range of images of New Zealand military personnel serving overseas 
during the two world wars. These can be viewed on-line via the library website and 
many well-known images have been published in secondary sources. Such images were 
important to this thesis in that they provided visual evidence of the terrain and climates 
that the New Zealanders campaigned in. Although Kiwi soldiers were forbidden to take 
cameras to war, most of the images in the collection were taken by individuals who had 
secreted cameras in their kit bags when embarking from New Zealand or had purchased 
one, or traded to get one, while on active service. What makes these images so valuable 
is that they portray the real experiences of the officers and troops, good and bad, 
compared to the sometimes sanitised photographs taken by official army photographers 
that were provided to the media during and after the conflicts. 
Any serious student of New Zealand military history could not claim to have 
exhausted their search for primary source material without a visit to the Kippenberger 
Military Archive and Research Library based at the newly named National Army 
Museum, Waiouru. Though woefully understaffed due to the constant financial 
constraints placed on the New Zealand Defence Force budget, this establishment should 
be regarded as a national treasure in that it not only houses an ever-increasing archive 
of diaries, letters, journals, postcards, written and oral interviews of veterans, but also 
arguably contains the largest and most comprehensive military library in the country.  
The relative isolation of Waiouru and the distance from Christchurch ensured 
that several logistical issues had to be overcome before travelling to the museum. 
Firstly, contact was made with the sole archivist, Dolores Ho, who is responsible for 
the collation of material donated to the archive by veterans and their families. 
Unfortunately, Dolores is the only person in the establishment who has the knowledge 
of where items are stored in the archive, including material which is kept off site and 
must be manually collected by her. As retrieving requested items is so time- consuming, 
especially when she is dealing with numerous researchers at one time, it was imperative 
that contact was made directly with her more than a month in advance of any visit to 
conduct research. Having a sole archivist posed other issues when researching; the 
demand for searching for requested material has led to a restriction of only two 
researchers at one time being admitted to the archives. This measure has been necessary 
to ensure the quality of service is maintained. This means that dates for researching at 
the archives must be confirmed well in advance to ensure the availability of the 
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archivist. Further, as there are no others in the establishment who can fill the archivist 
role, researchers are prevented from having access to material when the archivist is on 
leave. Such an occurrence happened when conducting research for this thesis when the 
archivist was on sick leave for a day. This proved an inconvenience in that it restricted 
the amount of material that could be accessed. This was particularly disappointing 
considering the limited time available for this research trip, the isolated location and 
the extra cost in possibly having to return to Waiouru to complete the work. Officially 
the archive is only available to researchers between 10 am and 4 pm, Monday to Friday. 
However, thanks to the kindness of the archivist who had taken into account the 
distance travelled to complete this research, on this occasion she generously extended 
the hours from 9 am to 4.30 pm, thus allowing for more items to be examined. 
The visit to KMARL was somewhat of a ‘fishing expedition’ due to the large 
amount of material available. Early contact with the archivist proved crucial in that it 
ensured that the most relevant material could be determined.  An initial phone call, 
followed by a series of emails confirming the focus of the thesis ensured that a 
comprehensive list of primary sources was available for examination. These were 
predominantly diaries, post cards and letters of officers and enlisted men who had 
served in the New Zealand expeditionary forces during both world wars. These proved 
fruitful in providing an insight into individual experiences and attitudes of serving 
soldiers, especially in regard to relationships between senior and junior officers, as well 
as how the other ranks perceived commissioned officers. When taken as a whole, such 
information can identify and help to explain certain trends that became obvious while 
collating research material.  
The most significant material examined was a collection of officer training 
manuals that had not been found elsewhere. It was obvious that these items had not 
been viewed by other researchers in recent times as they had been stored off-site and it 
had taken the archivist some time to locate them. The finding of these manuals proved 
crucial to this thesis in that they provided detailed information on every duty required 
of company grade officers on active service and in the training and supervision of the 
men under their command. What became obvious after reading these manuals is how 
important they must have been in assisting young junior officers to become proficient 
in their roles, especially the majority who had previously been civilians who had either 
volunteered or been conscripted into the army. Small enough to fit into a tunic pocket, 
these manuals provided an aide-memoir that could be carried around by the officer and 
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easily referred to as required. From the number held in the archive it would appear that 
such booklets were in common use by New Zealand army officers during both world 
wars, with many manuals distributed in the Great War being reprinted and issued in the 
Second World War. An example of such manuals included The Officer and Fighting 
Efficiency which had been published by the War Office in London and reprinted in New 
Zealand under authority of the Chief of General Staff, New Zealand Military Forces in 
1941.56 This particular example was typical of the majority of manuals examined and 
included chapters on dealing with the welfare and training of the men, the importance 
of creating Esprit de Corps within units, promoting a fighting spirit and effective 
leadership, self-test of knowledge, and administrative efficiency, which included how 
to perform an inspection of the troops and points to which a troop or platoon 
commander should pay attention before, during and after a move. The final chapter 
covered the army as a fighting instrument, emphasizing to officers that ‘example is 
everything’ and that an effective officer will become a hero to their men, resulting in 
success through inspired leadership.57 Other such examples included; Hints to officers 
on Command, Discipline and Care of the Men, which had been published in 1916 and 
which was used by Brigadier A.E. Conway during the Second World War;58 Infantry 
Training- Company Organisation;59 Instructions for the Training of Cadets in Officer 
Cadet Battalions;60 The Company, Etc., Officer and his Job;61 The Officer’s Field Note 
and Sketch Book and Reconnaissance Aide-Memoire;62 Notes on Courts Martial – For 
the Use of Officers of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force;63 A Précis of The King’s 
Regulations and The Manual of Military Law for Officers;64 Notes of Trench Warfare 
for Infantry Officers;65 The Officer and his Job: Morale and Fighting Efficiency.66 Such 
publications were obviously abundant during the war years as some manuals were to 
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be distributed to every officer and officer cadet in the New Zealand Military Forces.67 
However, they are now scarce and to have gained access to such a large collection 
proved critical to the explanatory power of this thesis. 
Among the secondary material held in the library, the original Kippenberger 
Collection was of particular interest, which the estate of Major-General Sir Howard 
Kippenberger had donated to the New Zealand Army. This legacy formed the 
foundation of the military archive and library. In his book Kippenberger – An Inspired 
New Zealand Commander, Glyn Harper describes Kippenberger as one of the great 
military commanders of the Second World War who should be added to the short list 
of great but rare military commanders who could combine extreme professionalism 
with warm humanity to gain the lasting affection and loyalty of their men.68 Harper 
claims that Kippenberger’s command and leadership qualities initially stemmed from 
his very wide reading on military matters during the 1920s and 1930s and finally honed 
through active service with the New Zealand Division during World War Two.69 
Importantly, perusal of his original collection established who and what influenced his 
military thought and style of command, leading to his inspired leadership. It was clear 
that Kippenberger was a serious student of military history, including the study of 
leadership, strategy and tactics from the eclectic collection of volumes of histories of 
the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War, as well 
as the Great War. He also kept himself informed of the tactics of modern warfare, 
including those of the enemy, Germany, which was evident by some of the definitive 
titles in the collection. These included Sir John Fortescue’s The History of the British 
Army, Colonel John Dunlop’s The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914, 
Marshal Foch’s The Principles of War, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller’s The Decisive 
Battles of the Western World, Liddell Hart’s The Remaking of Modern Armies, Albert 
Muller’s Germany’s War Machine, A. Hilliard Atteridge’s The German Army at War 
and D.G. Brown’s The Tank in Action.  Although Kippenberger was only a Territorial 
officer in the inter-war years it is clear that he took that position seriously enough to 
educate himself through reading the most up to date literature of command that was 
being taught to regular officers throughout the British Empire. It became clear in 
conducting this research that Kippenberger was passionate about passing his knowledge 
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on to officers under his command to ensure his troops were moulded into effective 
fighting formations in the Second World War. 
The library also holds the personal collections of other outstanding and 
influential senior New Zealand commanders from both conflicts. Of particular note is 
that of Major-General Sir Andrew Russell who commanded the New Zealand Division 
on the Western Front from 1916 through to the end of the war in November 1918. He 
had seen service as a regular officer in the British Army in the late nineteenth century 
before retiring to farm on the family sheep-run in Hawke’s Bay. He too had been a 
Territorial officer before the Great War and was fanatical about training his officers and 
troops for the rigours of trench warfare. His methods did not endear him to his men but 
his drive and intolerance of incompetent officers ensured the division earned the 
reputation of an elite fighting force. An inspection of his collection shows that he had 
studied the most recent major conflicts that had involved the British Army which 
included studies of the Boer and Crimean Wars, as well as Fortescue’s History of the 
British Army.  
Another noted collection is that of Major-General Lindsay Inglis who had been 
a junior officer during the Great War and a brigade commander during the Second 
World War who on several occasions had command of the 2nd New Zealand Division 
in the absence of General Freyberg. His collection included a number of monographs 
concerning the American Civil War, Liddell Hart’s Defence of the West, Fortescue’s 
histories, as well as official histories of the First World War. What is apparent from 
viewing these collections is that although all of these men had been Territorial officers 
before marching to war, they had taken a professional approach to studying the art of 
war, especially in regard to modern warfare. Without doubt, such an approach had a 
major influence on their style of command and the fighting effectiveness of the New 
Zealand officers and other ranks that they led. 
Another way to achieve greater insight into the officer corps of the New Zealand 
military forces of the period was to contact some of the few surviving officers from the 
Second World War as well as members of the other ranks. In the early post-war years 
many returned servicemen declined to speak of their experiences for various reasons; 
some wanted to try and forget the horrors of war while others believed they could only 
share their experiences with those who had endured the same ordeals. Hence the 
popularity of Returned Servicemen’s Association clubs throughout the country where 
veterans could speak of their war-time service without being judged by those who could 
 37 
not understand the realities of war. Very few wives and children of veterans got to know 
of what their husbands and fathers did in the war due to the tendency of servicemen to 
keep things to themselves. However, as the war-time generation have reached their 
twilight years, many veterans are more willing to share their experiences in an effort to 
preserve our military heritage and provide a greater understanding of what war meant 
to them. 
The first interview for this thesis was conducted with Jack Collins, a Second 
World War veteran who had been a member of C Company, 26 Battalion. He had seen 
service in the Tunisian and Italian campaigns, being wounded twice. He was fortunate 
enough to have travelled back to Cassino for the 60th anniversary remembrance of the 
battle that proved so costly for the 2nd New Zealand Division. Collins, now aged 92, is 
an uncle of the author and it has only been in the last decade that he has openly spoken 
of his experiences. He agreed to have an interview recorded, not only for the benefit of 
this project but also to leave a permanent record of his experiences for his family. 
Collins served as a private and refused promotion to non-commissioned officer rank. 
Through this interview he was able to provide an insight into how some other ranks 
perceived officers, especially those junior officers who led their platoons. Having 
served in a rifle company at the forefront of battle on numerous occasions, Collins could 
speak with some authority on what the average soldier required and mostly received in 
leadership from their officers. 
The military historian fraternity within New Zealand is quite small which made 
it easier to identify any surviving officers who would be interested in being interviewed. 
Through connections with the Canterbury branch of the Italian Star Association contact 
was made with two senior officers who had served with the 2nd New Zealand Division 
in the Mediterranean theatre. These included Major-General W.B. ‘Sandy’ Thomas, 
CB, DSO, MC and Bar, and Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon Donald, DSO, MC. The great 
significance of being in contact with these highly decorated soldiers was that they had 
both begun their military service in the Territorials as enlisted men, had been 
commissioned to serve as junior platoon commanders at the beginning of the Second 
World War, and through active service and rapid promotion both had ended the conflict 
commanding battalions of over 600 men. Most importantly they were able to provide a 
vast range of experiences from the initial training received to prepare them to actually 
lead men into battle through to being experienced battalion commanders required to 
direct subordinate officers in action. Although both have written books on their wartime 
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experiences, what proved significant through the recent contact was their ability to 
recount what qualities and characteristics they looked for when recommending officers 
for promotion and commissions for non-commissioned officers from within the ranks. 
Both men are in their mid-nineties and surprisingly active and lucid. As Thomas lives 
in Australia and Donald lives in the North Island, the cost of travel prohibited any face-
to-face traditional interviews. This challenge was overcome through a series of phone 
calls, letters and email correspondence that resulted in a record of personal views and 
experiences that proved invaluable to the integrity of the thesis. A more traditional 
approach was taken when interviewing Private Harold Todd who served in 23 Battalion 
in Egypt and Libya, and is a resident of Christchurch. This interview was conducted 
using a digital voice recorder borrowed from the History Department of the University 
of Canterbury and later permanently saved on disc. Todd was able to provide the 
perspective of an average infantryman, including being captured and sent to a prisoner 
of war camp in Italy. 
With no Great War veterans left alive in New Zealand and with the number of 
World War Two veterans rapidly dwindling this work has had to rely significantly on 
various written primary sources that record the experiences and opinions of servicemen, 
as opposed to face-to-face oral interviews. Contemporary letters, journals, diaries and 
official documents provide researchers with information that was recorded either at the 
time of an event or experience, or shortly afterwards. When conducting interviews with 
veterans sixty to seventy years after their war service the reliability of their recollections 
may be less than contemporary records. After this length of time memories of certain 
events can fade or be influenced by social attitudes that have dramatically changed 
towards war.70 Some veterans chose to focus on the lighter side of their war time 
experiences to balance the horrors that only those who had been through battle could 
understand. For some this is a way of coping with the psychological effects of exposure 
to war and sudden death on a sometimes daily basis. However, this can give a less than 
accurate account of what really happened. In contrast, overseas service during the war 
was the probably the most dramatic time of their lives and many veterans retain vivid 
memories of what they experienced - in some cases, only recalling what they endured 
to family and friends in their later years. What has also been found is that some of 
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personal accounts differ from the official histories written shortly after the wars while 
some support them. It is because of this that this thesis attempts to provide a balance 
between the available official documentation and the personal recollections to gain a 
sound analysis of the combat officers of the New Zealand expeditionary forces during 
the two great conflicts.   
One of the significant original contributions of this thesis is the inclusion of the 
previously unpublished World War Two letters of Colonel Denver Fountaine. I am 
indebted to his daughter, Jane Campbell for transcribing them for me and allowing me 
to include them in this work. Fountaine was typical of many young officers of the 1st 
Echelon in that he had been a junior officer in the Territorial Force prior the outbreak 
of war in 1939 and gained rapid promotion through merit and opportunity. He ended 
the war as a full colonel but had been an acting brigadier-general in command for 6 
Brigade in Italy for a brief time during 1944. His letters provide a unique insight into 
not only the experiences of an inexperienced platoon leader, but also that of a veteran 
battalion commander. Included in his personal photographs is a previously unpublished 
image of the officers of C Company, 20 Battalion in 1941, which includes Charles 
Upham VC and Bar. It is from such primary source material that we can obtain a greater 
understanding of the experiences of the men who provided the leadership necessary for 
the combat units of the New Zealand expeditionary forces to function as effective 
fighting formations in both world wars. 
 
 
   Comparisons 
 
To gain some comparison of the combat officers of the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces with those of the other dominions, a number of primary and 
secondary sources were examined. Although the bulk of such research was reliant on 
secondary sources, the digitised archives of the Australian War Memorial Museum 
provided some significant primary documentation. The C.E.W. Bean Collection 
provided a wealth of letters and official documentation relating the experiences and 
opinions of Australian senior and junior officers from the Australian Imperial Force of 
the Great War. The volumes of Bean’s official history of Australia in the First World 
War also provided an abundance of relevant material for comparison. Information 
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relating to the senior commanders was found in numerous biographies of officers from 
both conflicts; notably, David Horner’s works, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, 71 
together with Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese Threat 72 
and General Vasey’s War 73.  Peter Pedersen’s The Anzacs: Gallipoli to the Western 
Front 74 proved very insightful, while F.M. Cutlack’s War Letters of General Monash 
75 provided a clear picture of the style of command Monash preferred when leading the 
Australians on the Western Front. One of the most relevant comparative monographs 
was that of Garth Pratten, whose Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second 
World War76 is the most comprehensive study of the experience and leadership style of 
Australian battalion commanders to date. Information regarding officers of the 
Canadian expeditionary forces was mainly obtained from secondary sources. However, 
the most insightful of these were two academic articles from military historian, 
Geoffrey Hayes; ‘Science and the Magic Eye: Innovations in the Selection of Canadian 
Army Officers, 1939-1945’ 77 and ‘We Need Leaders-God, How We Need Leaders: 
exploring ‘Bad’ Officership in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945,’ 78 provided an 
understanding of the issues facing the Canadians regarding selection and training of 
officers during the Second World War. With such material it was possible to identify 
the similarities and contrasts to the New Zealand experience.              
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               Chapter 2 
    Officer Selection and Promotion 
 
 
     
This chapter will reveal how officers, as military leaders, were selected from 
the civilian population, and later from within the expeditionary forces, while analysing 
certain trends that developed in this process as the wars progressed. Both senior and 
junior battalion and regimental officers are represented in the study so that the officer 
corps are considered as a whole. The data from personnel records and Embarkation 
Rolls sheds light on the background of the individual officers. Information from these 
primary sources is included in a series of databases provided in the appendices of this 
thesis which relate to officers from both major wars. The analysis of these has helped 
to gain a greater understanding of the selection process.  
This study is the first comprehensive analysis of the selection process for 
combat officers of the New Zealand expeditionary forces. Various other works have 
touched on the subject with some historians basing their conclusions on small samples 
taken from single battalions or anecdotal evidence from a selection of biographies. An 
example is Born to Lead? Portraits of New Zealand Commanders edited by Glyn 
Harper and Joel Hayward.79 This work is significant in providing a collection of 
biographies of twentieth-century senior New Zealand military commanders, as well as 
exposing various styles of command displayed by them. Included in this book is a table 
listing of all battalion commanders of the nine provincial based infantry battalions that 
served in the Second World War.80 This table provides a limited sample of data for each 
individual commander including any previous military service and civilian occupation. 
Such a sample is important in providing an insight into the selection of senior officers. 
However, it is limited in that it only relates to World War Two and does not reflect 
company officers who made up the majority of the officer corps. 
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An examination of personnel files provided the best primary data needed to gain 
an insight into the officer selection process. The process of retrieving information from 
such files is explained in the previous chapter. It must be stressed that the information 
gained from these files is extremely important in providing a more accurate account of 
what attributes and characteristics were considered essential in those who were to lead 
New Zealander troops into battle during the period. What becomes obvious by 
examining the individual level data is that certain trends are evident in the selection 
process for both conflicts and that the process evolved over time. These changes came 
about for a number of reasons ranging from a shortage of available manpower from a 
small dominion, through to the increase in campaign experience of officer candidates 
and the personal attributes of the soldiers themselves. A comparison of the officer 
personnel files for different periods of both conflicts make it clear that some criteria for 
officer selection certainly changed as the wars progressed and this is corroborated by 
statements from a number of battalion commanders.81 Hence, those enlisted soldiers 
not considered officer material when the expeditionary forces were formed could 
eventually find themselves leading companies and even battalions at war’s end.  
  
 
   Significance of Territorial Force Service 
 
When forming the New Zealand expeditionary forces by far the most important 
criterion in the selection of officers was previous military experience. In both 1914 and 
1939 almost every officer commissioned to embark with the first echelon, commonly 
known as the Main Body, had seen some form of military service. This is not surprising 
when considering the beliefs and attitudes of the time. The majority of European-
descent New Zealanders of military service age had either emigrated from Britain or 
were of British stock, having grown up with stories of gaining martial glory fighting 
for the British Empire.82  Some, such as New Zealand-born Edward Chaytor who had 
initially been a volunteer militia officer from Marlborough, had already volunteered 
and fought in the Boer War at the turn of the century, while the Great War provided an 
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opportunity for others to also do their bit for ‘King and Country’.83 The arms race 
amongst the European powers at the time led many to believe that war in Europe was 
inevitable which led to a rise in social militarism in the new dominion. This eventually 
saw the passing of the Defence Act of 1909 which provided for compulsory military 
training for every male aged from 12 to 35.84 Christopher Pugsley argues that peace-
time conscription was spurred on by Great Britain, specifically the War Office, to 
ensure that the military forces of the Empire were prepared for the coming war.85 In 
1909 an Imperial Conference was held in London to determine the naval and military 
defence of the Empire. A number of meetings were held at the Foreign Office and the 
War Office where representatives from Britain and the self-governing dominions of 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, Orange River Colony 
and Newfoundland discussed general questions that were to determine defence policy. 
As a result it was decided that military forces throughout the Empire were: 
 
 to be standardised, the formation of units, the arrangement for transport, the pattern of weapons, 
etc., being as far possible, assimilated to those which has recently been worked  out for the British 
Army. Thus, while the Dominion troops would in each case be raised for the defence of the dominion 
concerned, it would be made readily practicable in case of need for that dominion to mobilise and use 
them in the defence of the Empire as a whole.86  
 
This led to the antiquated New Zealand Volunteer Force system being replaced 
with the formation of a Territorial Force for defence of the country. The significant 
difference in conditions of service saw medically fit males from the age of 18 receiving 
some form of regular compulsory military training in the new Territorial Force until the 
age of 25, as opposed to the old system that relied entirely on volunteer enlistment.87 
This further led to a significant increase in the number of trained officers within the 
New Zealand military establishment leading up to the beginning of the Great War in 
late 1914. Evidence of this can be found in the annual reports provided by the General 
Officer Commanding, New Zealand Military Forces. In February 1909 the New 
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Zealand Militia establishment was recorded as having only 201 officers, which did not 
include those professional officers attached to the New Zealand Staff Corps.88  
With the introduction of the new Territorial Force and compulsory military 
training, the number of commissioned officers rose rapidly. Field Marshal Lord 
Kitchener, commander-in-chief of the British Army, visited the Dominion in February 
and March 1910 to inspect the military forces and promote the Territorial system. At 
that time he made proposals and recommendations to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the new establishment. These included raising the age of liability for 
service from those aged 18 years-old through to 26 years-old.89 He also proposed that 
during peace time the Territorial Force should have a permanent strength of 18,800 
rank and file with 1,087 officers to lead them.90 Further to this, short-lived Officer 
Training Corps were established at Otago University, Canterbury College, Victoria 
College, with a junior division at King’s College, Auckland. The purpose of these corps 
was ‘first to train members of these corps as men in the ranks, and then require them to 
act as instructors and leaders. The corps should therefore furnish a valuable source for 
supply of citizen officers, and if the improvement as present observable continues, the 
formation of the corps should be fully justified by the results.’91 However, excluding 
the Otago University Officer Training Corps which was retained for the purpose of 
training medical and dental officers, the other corps were dissolved in 1911 with the 
creation of the Territorial Force.92 Another of Kitchener’s recommendations was that 
the New Zealand Staff Corps should be increased from 63 to 100 officers to provide 
the necessary administrative, logistical and training requirements of the expanded 
military establishment of the Dominion.93 
The Defence Act of 1909 provided the official structure for officer selection 
within the Territorial Force. This legislation led to the establishment of Boards of 
Selection and Promotion that were set up in each military district throughout the 
country. Staff Corps adjutants from each district were required to report to the officer 
commanding the particular corps they were attached to from time to time in regard to 
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promising members of the rank and file who were likely to make good officers.94  
Kitchener, in a memorandum on the defence of Australia, which he had visited prior to 
coming to New Zealand, argued that officer candidates should be selected from the 
most promising material available, that they should be chosen young and selected solely 
for capacity for leadership, military knowledge and devotion to duty.95 ‘The citizen 
officer should be appointed as early as possible in his military career, so that he 
may…study his duties as an officer and develop his qualifications for imparting 
instructions and leadership of men’ in what Kitchener believed was the most receptive 
time of the officer’s life.96  
Although Kitchener’s criteria for officer selection seem well-founded, they are 
too simplistic. In reality there is compelling evidence to show that officer selection was 
more complex and fluid, with a variety of factors being considered when selecting 
candidates, especially in times of war. Anecdotal evidence from veteran officers 
provides a personal perspective on the selection process. But by far the most substantial 
evidence comes from surveying the personnel files of those men who were 
commissioned when the demand of war required the rapid expansion of New Zealand’s 
military forces. By analysing this data a greater understanding can be gained of what 
qualities were considered essential in the making of an officer. 
When considering Kitchener’s criteria for officer selection for those serving in 
the two expeditionary forces there are three distinct periods to be considered. The 
formation of the original expeditionary forces, commonly known as the Main Bodies, 
consisted almost exclusively of professional army officers from the New Zealand Staff 
Corps, commissioned officers from within the Territorial Army or Territorial non-
commissioned officers who were commissioned at the outbreak of the wars. Clearly, 
these men satisfied the criteria of leadership, military knowledge and devotion to duty. 
The ranks that they held in the peacetime military establishment were gained through 
proven ability and experience of leading men and they were trained soldiers with a 
range of military knowledge. The fact that they had all volunteered to serve overseas at 
the outbreak of war proved their devotion to duty.  
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This sense of duty was further highlighted by those who volunteered from the 
Territorials in 1939; compulsory military service had been previously abolished. 
However, as the conflicts progressed and the need for replacement junior officers 
increased due to casualties and the expansion of the expeditionary forces, the pool of 
experienced regular and Territorial officers dried up and candidates had to be found 
from civilian volunteers and conscripts. While the criteria were fundamentally still the 
same, with most only having limited military knowledge and leadership experience, 
other factors were taken into account in the selection process, such as age, education, 
previous occupation and social status in the community. In the latter years of both wars, 
these factors became less important as commissions were predominantly given to 
experienced NCOs who had proven their leadership abilities on active service.97   
 Although biographies of well-known senior New Zealand commanders, such as 
Sir Andrew Russell, Sir Edward Chaytor, Sir Herbert Hart, Sir Bernard Freyberg and 
Sir Howard Kippenberger, provide in-depth background knowledge of these celebrated 
leaders, it is the attestation papers and embarkation rolls that provide information 
regarding the majority of lesser-known officers who are equally as important in the 
nation’s military heritage. This was recognised shortly after the Great War by the 
laborious study carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel John Studholme, in his government-
funded publication, Some Records of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force: Record of 
Personal Services During the War of Officers, Nurses and First-Class Warrant 
Officers. This book provides the most comprehensive list of every New Zealand 
commissioned officer, senior warrant officer and nurse who served overseas during the 
First World War. The work was published to provide a permanent record of personal 
services, as opposed to official histories that were being published at the time. In 
compiling the lists, Studholme relied heavily on information gained from attestation 
papers and embarkation rolls.98 Likewise, this current study relies on these official 
records to determine the previous military service of officers before they saw active 
campaigning with the expeditionary forces. 
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The gradation list for the New Zealand Expeditionary Force of 1914 shows that 
every officer from second-lieutenant to major-general had previous military experience, 
either in the British Army, New Zealand Staff Corps or Territorials. Some, such as 
Godley, Chaytor, Russell and Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Fulton, had seen active service 
in the Boer War and India.99 Similarly, in 1940 when 2NZEF embarked for overseas 
service only 3 out of 100 junior officers sampled had no previous military experience 
(refer Appendix 5).  Eighty-two percent had served in the Territorial Force before 
enlisting, while 40 percent had served in the school cadets (although cadet service alone 
had limited worthiness). Around 30 percent had served in both. Twenty-three had 
recorded on their attestation papers as having Territorial Force commissions. Most of 
these volunteers had their commissions transferred to the expeditionary force due to the 
large number of trained officers required for the newly formed rifle battalions and 
artillery batteries. Freyberg was reliant on the experience of the Territorial soldiers 
when forming the 2nd New Zealand Division in Egypt. In March 1940 he sent a 
memorandum to the Minister of Defence suggesting that preference for reinforcement 
officers from New Zealand should be given to good Territorial officers and ‘that the 
only reason for commissioning into the NZEF straight from civil life should be the 
possession of special technical qualifications and that except in absolutely outstanding 
cases, men in the ranks should wait for commissions until they have joined the 
Division.’100 This selection policy proved to be fortuitous in ensuring the New Zealand 
divisions eventually became elite fighting formations, generally led by proficient 
officers, after extensive training and lessons learned through campaigning. 
Analysis of previous military service of officers from the expeditionary forces 
of both wars also identified certain differences. The introduction of compulsory military 
training leading up to the Great War ensured that in 1914 almost every commissioned 
officer, as well as the vast majority of enlisted men, had received some form of military 
training prior to volunteering for active service. This trend was maintained throughout 
the conflict even after conscription was introduced in 1916, as all physically fit males 
were required to enrol in the Territorial Army once they turned 18.101 In theory, 
personnel were not permitted to serve overseas until they reached the age of twenty, 
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which should have ensured that recruits had two years Territorial service prior to joining 
the expeditionary force.102 This would have certainly been the case for most junior 
officers commissioned in New Zealand and sent on active service with reinforcement 
drafts. However, many enlisted men still in their teens, and some as young as 15, 
managed to see active service by falsifying their personal details on enlistment.103   
In the Second World War this was not the case. A reduction in military 
expenditure by the New Zealand government immediately after the Great War, 
followed by heavy reductions in the 1930s due to fiscal constraints as a result of the 
Great Depression, dramatically affected the training capabilities of the New Zealand 
Territorial Force. Compulsory military training was abolished and for a number of years 
training was restricted to annual camps for officers and non-commissioned officers 
only.104 The theory was that those who attended annual camps could then pass on their 
training to the rank and file of their particular units at their drill halls and parades held 
monthly.105 While the military budget increased from 1937 as the country moved out 
of recession and the prospect of war in Europe seemed imminent, the effects of these 
cuts ensured that some of those who volunteered to serve in the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force in late 1939 and early 1940, and who were commissioned, had 
very little or no previous military service. This certainly had some effect on the initial 
proficiency of the 2nd New Zealand Division.106 This became less of a problem as the 
war progressed with the ever-increasing policy of promoting experienced NCOs to 
officer vacancies. The policy of promoting combat-proven junior officers and NCOs 
ensured that by the end of the Great War in November 1918 and the Second World War 
in 1945, the combat arm of the officer corps of the New Zealand Expeditionary Forces 
generally consisted of experienced and battle-hardened leaders who had developed into 
professional soldiers.107           
While there were still a significant number of officers from the 1943 sample 
who had served either in the Territorial Force or the school cadets, compared to the 
1940 sample, there was an increasing number who had no previous military training 
before enlisting. In the 1940 sample only 3 percent of those sampled had no previous 
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military service before volunteering, while the figure was 15 percent in the 1943 sample 
(refer to Appendices 5 & 6). By this time the number of officers transferred from the 
Territorials had also reduced. This was indicative of the increasing shortage of 
physically fit and able men in New Zealand for military service, as well as the inter-
war policy that saw the abolition of compulsory military training. By 1945 
approximately 25 percent of newly commissioned officers sampled had no previous 
experience before enlisting and this was to have a detrimental effect on the performance 
of the New Zealand Division in the final stages of the Italian campaign. Almost all had 
been promoted from the ranks and had fighting experience, but were now expected to 
lead from the front and thus expose themselves to being killed or seriously wounded. 
This was at a time when the war was coming to a close and very few were willing to 
take risks that increased their chances of being maimed or killed.         
 
 
Maori Officer Selection  
 
The most obvious example of a unique officer selection process was within the 
Maori Contingent of the First World War and that of the 28th (Maori) Battalion of the 
Second World War where, initially, junior officers were chosen by Maori leaders from 
the traditional chiefly families from dominant tribes. According to Wira Gardiner, 
inherited ancestral mana (honour and prestige) was the basis on which many young 
Maori originally received a commission.108 An examination of Maori officer details in 
the data bases provided in Appendices 1 to 7 clearly indicates that most of these men 
were also relatively highly educated for the time, which puts them in line with the 
officer selection process of the regional battalions. An example includes Major (later 
Sir) Peter Buck (Te Rangi Hiroa), who in 1914, as a registered medical practitioner, 
had the dual roles of medical officer and second in command of the contingent.109  
Initially, both the Maori Contingent of the First World War and 28 (Maori) 
Battalion of the Second World War were raised with the stipulation from the 
Government that the senior ranking officers were to be appointed by the General Officer 
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Commanding the expeditionary forces and not selected by Maori leaders.110 In 1914 
Major-General Godley believed the selection of officers should be left to Maori to 
decide and did not want the army to be involved in any inter-tribal issues.111 This 
ensured that although the junior officers were nominated by their tribal elders, 
command of the formations was given to experienced non-Maori officers until suitable 
Maori officers had sufficient experience and opportunity to take command. This policy 
was unpopular within Maoridom, but similarly to other newly formed units within both 
expeditionary forces, it was found that some of the original officers selected were not 
of the desired calibre. In October 1914, the Minister of Defence, James Allen, inspected 
the ‘Natives’ in camp at Auckland prior to the Maori Contingent’s departure for 
overseas service and recorded his opinion of the officers in a letter to Major-General 
Godley: 
 
I found in camp a very good lot, but some who certainly must be weeded out at an early date. 
So far as I can judge there is very good material for non-commissioned officers and junior officers, but 
I am quite persuaded it would be wrong to send a Maori major and I am very doubtful about Maori 
captains. All the officers have gone in on probation. None have been selected to go.112 
 
Allen stated in the same letter that he was under considerable pressure and 
‘agitation’ from Maori political leaders, such as Sir James Carroll and others, as well 
as from the Maori troops themselves that all the officers be allowed to travel to Egypt 
with the unit to join the expeditionary force.113  Once serving overseas it appears that 
some of Allen’s concerns came to fruition, with a number of junior officers condemned/ 
criticised by the commanding officer of the Maori Contingent, Major A.H. Herbert, for 
not performing to the expected standard. Four officers from the Maori Contingent 
(Captain W.T. Pitt and Lieutenants R. Dansey, T. Hiroti and T. Hetet) were returned to 
New Zealand in 1915, which Pugsley argues was due to tensions between these officers 
and Herbert.114  Whether their perceived unsuitability was due to a clash of cultural 
attitudes, personality conflicts, racism or genuine incompetence as commissioned 
officers, it is clear from official correspondence that Herbert’s opinion of these officers 
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was supported by his superiors, if not by the Maori troops serving under them. Maori 
leaders in the Dominion felt disgraced by this and pressured the Minister of Defence 
for their return to the Contingent. Allen wrote to Godley explaining the situation: 
 
…the Maoris are very sore over the break-up of their unit and the treatment of their officers. I 
do not for one moment say they are right; I think you have done what is best, still they are very sensitive 
and it has been very difficult to deal with them. I am sorry that the two Maori officers, McGregor and 
Broughton, have got into trouble.115 
      
In December 1915 Brigadier-General Andrew Russell made his opinion clear 
to Godley about the proposal to have Pitt and Dansey returned to the expeditionary 
force stating: 
 
Thinking over the Maori question last night, I came to the conclusion that it would be a pity to 
see Dansey and Pitt again. Pitt at any rate will start mischief probably and Dansey is a fool. Neither are 
competent…Is it an act of grace to the Maori race to give them incompetent leaders?116  
 
However, political pressure eventually saw Dansey, Hiroti and Hetet posted to the New 
Zealand Pioneer Battalion on the Western Front, where Pugsley argues they performed 
good deeds.117 Ironically, in response to Maori criticism of Herbert’s leadership of the 
Contingent, Godley concurred that although he was not the most suitable officer to 
command Maori, he was the most suitable that was available at the time: 
 
I do not think for one moment that he is ideal, or that he was in every way qualified to command 
Maoris, but at the time I could not hear of anybody better qualified, nor for the matter that, have I heard 
of anyone since, and this is one of the main difficulties about having them [Maori] in one contingent.118   
 
Eventually, combat leadership experience identified those Maori officers who 
were the most suitable to command their own troops. As both wars progressed 
promotion within the battalions was based on merit, ensuring that Maori officers 
became battalion commanders of their own formation. Limited combat roles for the 
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New Zealand (Maori) Pioneer Battalion on the Western Front during the Great War 
ensured that it was not until the Second World War that a Maori battalion commander 
led in battle. During World War Two the high casualty rate amongst senior officers of 
the 28th (Maori) Battalion provided opportunities for six Maori officers to command the 
unit throughout the war; the first being Lieutenant-Colonel Tiwi Love, a Territorial 
officer for fifteen years who was given temporary command of the battalion in 
November 1941.119 Others achieved high rank, including men from more humble 
ancestry who had gained mana through their battlefield exploits and were offered 
commissions. An example was Peta Awatere who became the commanding officer of 
the battalion in 1945 after having been promoted from the ranks.120 Sir Charles Bennett, 
who began the war as a platoon commander and who progressed to command the 
Battalion at Tebaga Gap, Tunisia in March 1943, summed up after the war the strong 
need for Maori to be led by their own officers: 
 
The Maori attitude to European officers must not be interpreted as racial prejudice. It was simply 
a manifestation of that strong natural urge, inherent in all self-respecting peoples, which is not willing to 




    Age when first commissioned 
 
Analysis of recorded ages of officers when they were first commissioned shows 
that in both conflicts there was some variation in ages between those commissioned 
early in the wars and those at the end of the wars. The age of commissioned officers is 
relevant in providing a greater appreciation of the command structure of the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Forces and assists in explaining any strengths or shortcomings 
in the effectiveness of the combat formations. The variations throughout the conflicts 
were determined by a number of factors that had to be overcome to ensure effective 
command structures were maintained at every level. High officer casualty rates meant 
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there was always a shortage of replacements; indeed the age of company officers varied 
according to the number of casualties sustained. Thus, the greatest variance can be 
found in the analysis of junior officers. 
There was also some variation in the ages of the senior officers of the main 
bodies of the two expeditionary forces. It seems obvious that those who were to 
command brigades and battalions should have had extensive military experience and 
knowledge. To have reached this level of command these officers needed to have served 
in military formations for many years, either as regular officers in the Imperial army, 
the New Zealand Staff Corps, or as officers in the Territorial Force. Promotion in the 
peace-time army was very slow compared to that during war. Hence, it took many years 
to achieve the field rank of major and above, ensuring the early senior commanders 
were mostly in their forties when they were commissioned to lead the first fighting 
formations. 
The senior officers of the Main Body who embarked for overseas service in the 
Great War were generally older than those who held the same positions in 2NZEF. 
Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone was 55 when he was appointed commanding 
officer of the Wellington Infantry Regiment in late 1914, while Lieutenant-Colonel 
Charles Mackesy who commanded the Auckland Mounted Rifles was 53.122 William 
Meldrum, Lieutenant-Colonel commanding the Wellington Mounted Rifles was 49, 
while Brigadier-General Andrew Russell and Colonel Edward Chaytor were both 46.123 
All of the regimental commanders had achieved their rank in Territorial units, while 
Russell and Chaytor had seen substantial service as regular officers. There appears not 
to have been any formal directive restricting overseas service for senior officers on the 
grounds of age. However, the rigours of modern warfare experienced during the First 
World War did have some influence over command appointments during the Second 
World War. 
There was a slight difference in the ages of those senior commanders who led 
2NZEF when it was formed in late 1939 for service in the Second World War. At age 
50, Major-General Bernard Freyberg was the most senior ranking officer to embark 
with the First Echelon in 1940.124 He was followed closely by Brigadiers Edward 
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Puttick and James Hargest who were 49 and 48 respectively.125  Colonel Frederick 
Varnham who had command of the 19th Battalion was 51 when 2NZEF was being 
formed in 1939 and was the eldest battalion commander to embark for overseas service 
in the Second World War.126 At age 39, Colonel John Gray who led the 18th Battalion 
appears to have been the youngest commanding officer of a rifle battalion in the First 
Echelon.127 Colonels Lindsay Inglis and Howard Kippenberger, who each commanded 
fighting battalions, were 45 and 42 respectively and represent the average ages of unit 
commanders who travelled with the Main Body.128 This is ironic considering that Glyn 
Harper states in his biography of Kippenberger, that when war broke out in September 
1939 Kippenberger was concerned that he might be passed over for command of a 
battalion because of his age.129 However, initially, the need for experienced senior 
officers to lead the expanding and inexperienced citizen army outweighed any concerns 
regarding the age of unit commanders.  
  In general, battalion commanders of 2NZEF were younger than their World War 
One counterparts. This resulted from a change in selection policy. When Freyberg first 
became General Officer Commanding of the New Zealand Forces he was concerned 
about the ages of his subordinate commanders. He issued a directive that future 
battalion commanders were to be Regular Force officers under the age of 35.130 
Fortunately for Kippenberger, his commander was so impressed with his knowledge of 
the men within the battalion, including knowing their preference for Speights beer, that 
he retained command of the 20th Battalion prior to embarkation.131  As the war 
progressed the age of replacement battalion commanders certainly became younger. In 
extreme cases some newly appointed commanding officers were only in their mid-
twenties. Haddon Donald was 27 when he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of 22nd 
Battalion in May 1944.132 After receiving his commission as a 22 year-old lieutenant in 
the Territorials one week prior to the outbreak of war, he had rapidly risen in rank due 
to experience, performance and the need to fill a number of vacancies among senior 
positions in his battalion after numerous campaigns.133  Another example was W.B. 
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‘Sandy’ Thomas, who at 24, became the youngest lieutenant-colonel to command a 
New Zealand battalion in either war, and probably the youngest battalion commander 
of any Allied force in Italy during the Second World War.134 Such a feat seems 
incredible when considering that only four years before he had been a newly 
commissioned and inexperienced 20–year-old second-lieutenant who had previously 
been a bank clerk before volunteering for the army at the outbreak of war.135 An analysis 
of his elevation and the rise of other junior officers through the ranks are covered further 
in this chapter. 
In general, Kitchener’s 1910 selection criteria regarding the optimum age for 
junior officers was adhered to. An analysis of officer personnel files shows that with 
the rapid expansion of the expeditionary forces during the wars there was a trend for 
newly commissioned officers to be younger as the war progressed. Samples from 
Gradation lists from the early, mid and last years of World War Two provide evidence 
of this. The age range of second-lieutenants and lieutenants in 1940 was from 21 to 50, 
with most being in their mid-20s and early 30s. Out of a sample of 100, there were eight 
over the age of 35, including three in their 40s. In the 1943 sample of 123 junior officers, 
the ages ranged from 20 to 46. The bulk of the officers were aged between 21 and 26, 
although there were a significant number in their early to mid-30s. By 1945 the age 
range of the 110 officers sampled was from 19 to 39, with all but a small minority under 
30 (refer Appendices 5-7).  
The number of older newly commissioned officers in 2NZEF in 1940 was due 
to many having their Territorial Force commissions transferred into the expeditionary 
force. Most of these men had been in the Territorials for many years and had experience 
in organising and leading men on military exercises. It appears that there was generally 
no political influence in the appointment of combat officer commissions at this time, 
although the appointment of Brigadier James Hargest was one notable exception to this.  
Hargest had been a decorated battalion commander during the Great War and had 
continued to serve in the Territorial Force as a brigadier during the inter-war years. 
When he volunteered to serve in the 2nd NZEF in 1939 army medical officers initially 
considered him to be unfit for overseas service due to his history of suffering from 
shellshock.  However, as a member of parliament, he used his political influence with 
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the future prime minister, Peter Fraser, to be appointed as a brigadier in the 
Expeditionary Force. Despite Freyberg’s reluctance to accept Hargest’s appointment, 
the situation was out of his hands, with the New Zealand Chief of Staff informing him: 
‘This was a Government decision, and they took all responsibility from myself and the 
D.M.S. [Director of Medical services].’136  A number of those who received 
commissions in their late 30s and 40s had seen active service in the First World War 
and their experience was thought to be invaluable in preparing troops for the rigours of 
modern warfare. However, some of these officers, including some holding senior rank, 
such as Brigadier Edward Puttick and Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew, proved unfit 
for combat command once they had seen action in the Mediterranean campaigns and 
were eventually sent back to New Zealand.137 Both were considered suitable for high 
level administrative roles and subsequently were promoted; Puttick was appointed as 
Chief of General Staff, while Andrew was given command of the Wellington Fortress 
area.138    
The 1943 sample was taken from the 3rd New Zealand Division that served in 
the Pacific from 1942 to 1944. By the time this formation was formed conscription had 
been introduced which led to younger and less experienced men gaining commissions. 
The division was created at a time when New Zealand had a military man-power 
shortage and it considered the ‘poor cousin’ compared to the 2nd NZ Division serving 
in the Mediterranean.139 When it was disbanded in 1944, most of the junior officers 
were demoted to non-commissioned rank before being sent to serve with the 2nd NZ 
Division. However, the majority regained their commissions once they had proven 
themselves as leaders in combat conditions in Italy.140 This was a policy fostered by 
Freyberg who was of the opinion that promotion in the New Zealand Division first had 
to be earned.141 The few officers of the 3rd Division who refused to accept a reduction 
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in rank were posted back to New Zealand and either demobilised or utilised in training 
camps where it was made clear that they would not be promoted further.142  
By 1945 the majority of newly commissioned combat officers were under 30. 
However, by this time almost all had seen active service as non-commissioned officers 
and had proven leadership ability before becoming officers. This was a repeat of what 
had occurred in the New Zealand Division during the Great War where physically fit 
young men with combat leadership experience proved to be the most effective platoon 
and company commanders. It was a belief strongly held by both Freyberg and Russell 
that commissioning experienced NCOs was also good for maintaining morale.143  
There are numerous examples of fit young leaders with some previous form of 
military training rapidly gaining promotion, once combat experienced, to senior roles 
within the expeditionary forces. A significant number of lieutenants and second-
lieutenants who were newly commissioned from within Territorial units at the 
beginning of both conflicts went on to become brigade and battalion commanders by 
the end of the end of hostilities, especially during World War Two. Examples of this 
includes Monty Fairbrother who was only a lieutenant in 20 Battalion in 1940 but by 
1945 was the lieutenant-colonel in command of the same battalion; and Ian Bonifant 
who held the same junior officer rank in the Divisional cavalry in 1940, but who by 
1945 had risen to the rank of brigadier and had commanded both 5 and 6 Brigades.144   
As previously mentioned Haddon Donald and ‘Sandy’ Thomas were the 
youngest to achieve such rank but the high casualty rate amongst senior officers of 
frontline units, especially during the Second World War, meant that there was always 
opportunity for promotion for those who showed leadership ability. One such example 
was Denver Fountaine, a 19-year-old company clerk from Westport, who had enlisted 
as a private in the Territorials in 1933 and had risen through the ranks to be 
commissioned in 1937.145 When war broke out in September 1939, and then aged 25, 
he volunteered to serve overseas and went to Burnham Military Camp where he was 
made a lieutenant in the newly formed 20 Battalion.146 By mid-1942 after experiencing 
and surviving campaigns in Greece, Crete, Libya and Egypt, Fountaine had risen to 
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command B Company of the battalion. At this time he was only 28 and was then 
promoted to lieutenant-colonel in command of the 800 men of the 26th Battalion as 
preparations were made for the defence of Egypt.147 He was made a full colonel in April 
1945 when commanding the 2NZEF Advance Base at Bari, Italy, but prior to that he 
had, for a brief period in July 1944, been acting brigadier in command of 6 NZ Infantry 
Brigade.148 Although less common in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force during the 
Great War, possibly due to the large number of officers within the Territorial Army at 
the time and with less turn over in senior commanders than experienced in 2NZEF, 
some junior officers did reach high command. James Hargest was one of the better 
known examples; having being attested into the Otago Mounted Rifles as a second-
lieutenant in August 1914, four years later he was a decorated lieutenant-colonel 
commanding the second battalion of the Otago Infantry Regiment on the Western 
Front.149       
 
     Education 
 
Education appears to have been a significant factor in officer candidate selection 
in the New Zealand military forces during the first half of the twentieth century. The 
available primary source material indicates that even in times of war when the demand 
for replacement junior officers was high, those with a higher level of education were 
more likely to be commissioned. This seems obvious when considering that regular 
officer cadets were required to study for three years at the Royal Military College of 
Australia at Duntroon, New South Wales (now Australian Capital Territory) before 
being commissioned.150  
Likewise, pre-war Territorial officer candidates were required to pass intense 
written examinations before being promoted. Even during the war years, those who had 
been nominated from the ranks had to attend Officer Cadet Training courses for varying 
periods up to three months, which involved studying numerous military topics; the 
purpose of such courses was to ‘turn-out out a young officer fit to be of immediate 
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practical use in quarters and in the field’.151 This required the individuals to have the 
ability to study and retain information, essential if they were to become competent 
leaders of men in modern warfare.  
However, leading up to, and including, the period of the Great War, higher 
education was limited to relatively few young men within the Dominion.  In the early 
half of the twentieth century it was common for New Zealand children to leave school 
once they completed their primary education and had passed the Proficiency 
examination at the end of Standard 6 (later known as Form 2 and now referred to as 
Year 8).  
Economic and social factors helped to determine this trend, as unless students 
received scholarships they were required to pay for their secondary education.  There 
were fewer secondary schools established in New Zealand, especially prior to 1914, 
compared to the late twentieth century and rural students had to travel considerable 
distances or become ‘boarders’ to attend them. It was common practice for wealthy 
landowners and farmers, many living in isolated rural locations, to send their sons to 
prestigious colleges in the cities and main provincial centres, while it was not 
uncommon for some, such as Andrew Russell, to have been sent to England to receive 
their education.152  
Data from the Attestation Papers from both expeditionary forces reveal that 
there was a high proportion of officers who had attended this mixture of single-sex state 
and elite private secondary schools. This should not be surprising. Schools such as 
Christ’s College, Christchurch Boys’ High School, St. Andrews College, Otago Boys’ 
High School, Waitaki Boys’ High School, Wellington College, Nelson College, 
Wanganui Collegiate, Auckland Grammar, St Stephens College and Te Aute College 
all had cadets corps which were compulsory for students. These young men were taught 
rudimentary military skills such as marching drill, weapons drill, musketry, basic 
battlefield tactics and leadership skills.153  
Patriotism amongst the students was further fostered by the teaching of British 
military history and the duty of individuals to defend their country and the Empire in 
times of war.154 This was especially so leading up to and during the Great War, where 
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the social militarization of New Zealand ensured that there were strong expectations 
placed on the young men of the Dominion to volunteer.155 The above named schools 
consistently appear on the Attestation Papers and there is anecdotal evidence from 
diaries and letters from officers who were students of these colleges that there was an 
‘old boy’ network within the officer corps.  
  A prime example was Christ’s College, Christchurch, which had many past 
pupils serving as officers in the Canterbury Mounted Rifles and the Canterbury Infantry 
Regiment. Names of sons of prominent Canterbury landed families, such as the Deans, 
Rhodes and Westenras, who had attended the school, dominated the Gradation lists of 
these regiments in both conflicts.156 The extent of such networks of school mates 
serving together at Gallipoli is portrayed in a letter to Mrs Bevan-Brown, the wife of 
the senior master of Christ’s College from Lieutenant Gordon Harper, serving in the 
machine gun section of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles in Egypt in March, 1916; after 
thanking her for the gifts for the old boys of his school he stated, 
 
…Petre, W. Cookson & A.J.W. Bain were the three surviving members of a band of some 14 
mates, in which were numbered Lionel Parson, Nelson, Syme, Buttle, Erwin and Kitson. Everyone had 
been killed or wounded, and that very night Petre and Bain joined the rest whose lives had been spent in 
the same classrooms and on the same playing fields. In the night attack of August 6th I stumbled upon 
Bruce Brown and a few minutes after I had passed Will Deans who has since lost a foot.157  
 
The bonds and friendships developed during their school days proved important 
in providing unity in times of war: ‘Of the rest of the great band who are fighting and 
have come through alive, I can only say that the great bond of sentiment which united 
us all in times of peace has proved itself by the times we have been through, to be a 
never failing source of help when help was most needed.’158 Such old school networks 
were also prevalent amongst the affluent and educated Maori officers of the Pioneer 
Battalion of the Great War and the 28th (Maori) Battalion, with schools such as Te Aute 
College, St. Stephens, Hikurangi, Otaki and Three Kings Colleges being well 
represented in these corps.159  
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  Most large working class families could not afford the luxury of a high school 
education, especially in times of low wages and economic depression, such as during 
the Great Depression of the 1930s. The majority of working-class boys would have 
been required to seek employment after completing primary school to supplement the 
family income, while children from the middling classes were more likely to progress 
to secondary school. Then as now, those who gained a higher level of education were 
more likely to have greater vocational and financial opportunities than those with less, 
and this was reflected in the data collated from personnel files from both conflicts. The 
most valuable evidence was obtained from the Attestation Papers of those who enlisted 
for the Second World War. These papers differed from the Attestation Papers of the 
Great War in that the soldiers were now required to record their highest level of 
education which provides researchers with a more precise measure of education levels. 
This is in contrast to the Attestation Papers of the First World War that only required 
recruits to confirm whether they had achieved ‘Proficiency’, an examination sat in the 
final year of primary school which entitled students to progress to secondary school 
(see Table 1), which almost all had.160  In most cases, the only way to determine whether 
the volunteers and conscripts from the Great War had attended secondary school was if 
they had recorded that they had attended cadet training on their Attestation papers.    
  Comparison of three samples taken from the Second World War personnel files 
indicates that levels of education for officer candidates remained constant throughout 
the war (see Appendices 5-7). Samples were taken from junior officers serving in 
various periods of the war; those of the First Echelon of 1940, the mid-war period of 
1943, and the final year of the war, 1945. Analysis revealed that 78 percent of junior 
officers from the 1940 sample had attended secondary school, while 51 percent 
recorded their highest education qualification as ‘Matriculation’ or University 
Entrance. The establishment of a large number of district high schools throughout the 
country during the 1920s and 1930s made secondary education more available to the 
population, especially those living in rural areas, leading to more students attaining a 
high level of education.161  From the 1940 sample 20 percent of those surveyed had 
university degrees, were attending university prior to enlistment or had attained papers 
towards degrees. Only 14 percent recorded ‘Proficiency’ as their highest qualification.  
                                                 
160 Colin McGeorge, Interview, 19 November 2010 
161 Erik Olssen, ‘Towards a New Society,’ in The Oxford History of  New Zealand, 2nd ed., ed. Geoffrey 
W. Rice (Auckland, 1992), pp. 276-277  
 62 
There was little variation in the samples for 1943 and 1945, although one officer 
in the 1945 sample had left school after standard five (now Year 7). In both later 
samples 20 percent had attended university and had completed or partially completed 
degrees. There was a significant increase by 1943 in those who had attended secondary 
school, with 99 out of 111 recording this on their attestation papers. A similar number 
was recorded for 1945.  
 
 
Table 1: Recorded Highest Education Levels of Sampled Junior 












Proficiency 14 14% 12 10% 9 8% 
Secondary 
School 
78 78% 99 80.5% 93 84.5% 
Junior Free 
Place 
1 1% 0  0  
Senior Free 
Place 
2 2% 6 5% 7 6% 
English 
Public School 
2 2% 0  0  
School 
Certificate 












4 4% 3 2.5% 4 4% 
Professional 
Papers 
10 10% 10 8% 6 5.5% 
University 20 20% 21 17% 21 19% 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from Personnel Records, New Zealand Defence 
Force Archives, Trentham 
Note: School Certificate and University Entrance qualifications were only 
introduced in 1944 which accounts for the lows numbers recorded for School 




This evidence alone would indicate that the junior officers within the 
expeditionary force in 1945 were better educated than those in 1940. However, these 
figures are possibly misleading when compared to the number who attained 
matriculation or university entrance. In 1940, 51 out of 100 had done so while in 1945 
43 out of 102 had achieved this qualification. Most importantly, what this information 
demonstrates is that the officer corps of 2NZEF as a whole was relatively highly 
educated for that period. As James Belich points out, secondary education remained a 
minority experience until the 1930s, but this minority was increasingly large and 
included not only most middle-class children but also an increasing number from 
working-class families.162  It also illustrates that officers were intelligent enough to 
learn and pass on to the rank and file, modern military strategy, tactics and technical 
expertise that they required to mould into an efficient combat force. The limited 
personal education information provided on the First World War Attestation Papers 
prevents any proper comparison to be made concerning levels of officer education. 
However, analysis of recorded previous occupations of New Zealand officers serving 
in the Great War gives some indication of education levels of these officers. 
 
     
    
 
    Previous occupations 
 
In his book John McLeod touched on the previous occupations of officers in a 
single chapter entitled ‘All blokes together?’ He based his findings on data obtained 
from every fifth page of the first three embarkation rolls of the 2nd NZEF. He has limited 
occupation classification to only four occupation classes; solicitor, teacher, shop 
assistant and labourer. He claims that the majority of officers were professionals such 
as solicitors, accountants, teachers and farmers.163 This was certainly the case in 1940 
when many senior officers with commissions from Territorial regiments transferred 
into the new regular units. Territorial commissions were usually held by the educated 
social elite who could afford to take time from their occupations to commit to the 
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required training. Glyn Harper portrays this in his biography of Major-General Howard 
Kippenberger who took time from his legal practice to train as an officer in the 
Territorials before the war.164  
However, McLeod’s sample is limited in that it is only relevant for 1940 and 
his occupation classifications are too narrow. An example of this is that he does not 
differentiate between farmers, whether they were landed gentry with large estates, small 
holders with a few acres, or a stockman such as Charles Upham. He also appears to 
include tradesmen with labourers, but this does not indicate whether they were self-
employed or a navvy for the local council. His thesis also seems to intimate that 
occupation identifies the level of education and socio-economic status groups within 
the officer corps. This is not necessarily so. 
A small but useful body of data comprising all of the battalion commanders of 
nine battalions of 2nd NZEF has been assembled by Roger McElwain. He listed the 
previous occupations of these officers which show that of the 67 commanders listed, 
only six were professional soldiers.165 On the other hand, all but ten of these men had 
some military service either as a regular officer or as a Territorial.166 Unfortunately, 
some doubt exists over the accuracy of the information; Lieutenant-Colonel Denver 
Fountaine, who at various times commanded both 20 and 26 Battalions, is shown as 
having not served in the Territorial Force, but he is known to have done so as mentioned 
earlier in this chapter. What the battalion commander charts clearly show is that there 
was an overwhelming predominance of unit commanders who had professional 
occupations in their civilian lives. Of the nine original lieutenant-colonels who led these 
battalions when the Main Body was formed, three were barristers or solicitors, three 
were professional soldiers, while the others included a farmer, newspaper manager and 
a tobacconist.167 Significantly, the last three had all seen service during the Great War 
and had continued their military service as senior officers in the Territorials during the 
inter-war years.168     
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Petty Official           10   
7.25 
            3   
2.65 
      0   0 
White Collar           41 29.7
1 
          40 35.4
0 
    52 23.7
4 
Skilled             8   
5.80 
            8   
7.08 
    17   
7.76 
Semi-Skilled             9   
6.52 
            6   
5.31 
    18   
8.22 
Labourer             1   
0.73 
            3   
2.66 
    15   
6.85 
Farmer           36 26.0
9 
          12 10.6
2 




            1   
0.72 
            0   0       2   
0.91 
Total         138          113     219  
 
Sources: Compiled by the author from Embarkation Rolls and digitised Army 
Personnel Files, Archives NZ, and cross-referenced with the Cenotaph Database, 




To provide a deeper overall analysis of the officer corps of the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces a database was created from Embarkation Rolls covering a 
selection of lieutenants and second-lieutenants who served overseas during the First 
and Second World Wars. Using this data I surveyed the previous occupations of the 
soldiers to establish any class bias in officer selection. The conclusion is clear that the 
majority of the junior officers in 1915 and 1940 were from middle-class occupations; 
teachers, accountants, clerks, farmers, stock agents, bank officers, students and 
salesmen were prevalent. However, there were examples of some with skilled trade 
 66 
occupations, such as a painter, a storeman, a bricklayer and a farrier gaining 
commissions prior to leaving New Zealand (see Tables 2 and 3).169 The most obvious 
explanation for this is that these officers had previous service in the Territorials and had 
gained their commissions on merit. 
By referring to the contemporary occupation classifications used by Erik Olssen 
in his work on late nineteenth century Caversham, Dunedin, I have classified the 
previous occupations of officers into the following categories: unskilled & semi-skilled 
labourer, skilled labourer, white collar, petty official, professional and farmer. 
Although such classification is arguably subjective, for the purpose of this study 
unskilled and semi-skilled labourers include occupations such as miner, shepherd, 
shearer, apprentice, station hand and seaman. Skilled labourers include tradesmen such 
as tailors, mechanics, bakers, blacksmiths, carpenters and cabinet makers, while white 
collar and petty officials incorporate policemen, clerks, station masters, mine managers 
and civil servants. Finally, the professional and semi-professional categories cover 
barristers and solicitors, doctors, accountants, teachers, engineers, company directors 
and large business owners. University students are also included in this category as their 
academic qualifications would most likely have taken them into a profession had they 
not served in the army.  A separate category for farmers is included, though, there is no 
way of determining whether these men were owners of large estates, such as Sir Andrew 
Russell, or struggling leaseholders of small farms. What is evident from Table 2 is that 
there was a predominance of men from professional and white-collar occupations 
within the officer corps of NZEF throughout the First War World War. This also implies 
that such men predominantly came from an urban background. 
The trends from within the officer corps of NZEF in the First World War were 
repeated in 2NZEF in the Second World War. The statistics provided in Table 3 show 
the same predominance of professional and white-collar occupations of officers that 
once again also implies most came from urban backgrounds. However, by 1945, a 
greater number of ‘unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled’ labouring occupations were 
represented within the junior ranks of the officer corps, such as labourers, barmen, 
paper hangers, mechanics and warehousemen. By this stage almost all junior officers 
of combat units were enlisted men promoted on merit from the ranks. They had proven 
experience as non-commissioned officers leading troops in battle and had earned their 
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commissions despite their civilian occupations. This will be examined further in the 
thesis. However, an interesting point to make is that data from these later Embarkation 
Rolls show many of these officers, despite having previous ‘labouring’ or tradesmen 
occupations, had attended socially elite secondary schools. This was indicated by 
comparing their occupations recorded in the rolls with the school cadet information 
written on their attestation papers.170 This shows that not all those who attended affluent 
schools went on to professional occupations. 
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Professional     30     24.0 
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     5.6 % 
  
     8 
    
   5.72 % 
 
    14 
 
   9.10 % 
Petty Official     6      4.8 %      3    2.14 %       2    1.30 % 
White Collar   47    37.6 %    51  36.43 %     55  35.70 % 
Skilled    3      2.4 %      7     5.0 %     14    9.10 % 
Semi-Skilled    8      6.4 %    14   10.0 %     16  10.39 % 
Labourer    4      3.2 %    12     8.57 
% 
    11   7.14 % 
Farmer  13    10.4 %      8     5.72 
% 
    10   6.50 % 
Not Recorded    7      5.6 %      0     0       1   0.66 % 
Total 125   140    154  
 
Sources: Compiled from Gradation Lists and Army Personnel Files, NZDF 
Archives, Trentham. 
Note: The 1943 data relates to officers from the 3rd NZ Division  
 
 There is evidence indicating that civilian occupations could also determine a 
man’s chance of being commissioned in the Australian Imperial Force during the Great 
War. A study of 982 original members, all ranks, of the 1st Australian Infantry Battalion 
revealed that 53.12 percent of the officers were drawn from professional or clerical 
occupations.171 This was completely out of proportion to the overall representation of 
the battalion, with 16.27 percent of the total personnel coming from these 
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backgrounds.172 When comparing the lieutenants with the sergeants, 57.14 percent of 
the lieutenants came from either professional or clerical backgrounds, while 48.32 
percent of the sergeants came from labour intensive occupations. 173  It appears that this 
trend continued throughout the war. Major-General John Monash showed his bias 
towards selecting replacement officers for the 3rd Australian Division, which he 
commanded on the Western Front: 
 
 The officers (the great majority of whom I promoted from the ranks) represent the cream of our 
professional and educated classes; young engineers, architects, medicals, accountants, pastoralists, 
public-school boys and so on.174         
 
Such attitudes towards officer selection were not unique. It was a common trend among 
all the forces of the British dominions that saw the officers predominantly selected from 
the educated and professional classes in both major conflicts. However,  the evidence 
does show that towards the end of both wars, those experienced soldiers from the ranks 
who came from labour intensive occupations had a better chance of being selected for 
a commission than when the wars began.     
 
     Religion  
 
It appears that there was no obvious religious bias in the selection of officers in 
either expeditionary force. Considering the predominance of Protestants in New 
Zealand society, particularly Anglicans and Presbyterians, it is not surprising that the 
overwhelmingly percentage of the junior officers within the officer corps during both 
conflicts professed adherence to these two churches (see Table 5).175 In 1940 
approximately 56 percent were Anglican and 22 percent Presbyterian.176 Roman 
Catholics accounted for 9 percent, with a small number of Methodists also being 
present.177 When comparing these percentages with religious statistics of the general 
population taken from the 1936 New Zealand census, Anglicans were over-represented 
in the officer corps by 16 percent, while Catholics were under-represented by 4 
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percent.178 Although these figures could indicate a bias towards Anglicans and against 
Catholics if used as the sole measurement, the argument of this thesis is that the 
soldiers’ previous occupation and education had a greater influence on determining who 
was offered a commission. Other officers identified themselves as Congregationalists 
and Free Thinkers, while only one stated that he had no religion at all, indicating that 
those from less orthodox faiths were considered for commissions.179 These percentages 
remained the same throughout the war, although less well-established faiths in New 
Zealand were represented in the later years, including a Jew, a Christian Scientist, a 
Baptist and members of the Church of Christ and Ringatu faith.  
A report from Major-General Robin to the Minister of Defence in May 1917 
indicates that these percentages were reflective of the religious make-up of the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force during the Great War. Of the 70,445 personnel who had 
served overseas at that time 35,777 (51 percent) had listed their religion as Church of 
England, 18,316 (26 percent) as Presbyterian and 9,721 (14 percent) as Roman 
Catholic. Methodists were the next largest representation with 4,084 (6 percent), while 
there were 26 other religious faiths recorded on the report.180 Arguably this sample is a 
relatively close reflection of the religious makeup of the Dominion’s society at the time 
according to the 1911 Census, although Anglicans were over-represented in the NZEF 
by 10 percent and Methodists under-represented by 4 percent.181 A sample of religions 
adherence taken from Archives New Zealand digitised personnel files of 221 officers 
of all ranks replicates Robin’s all-army information. As Table 4 indicates, there is an 
over-representation of those who were Anglican, while Catholics and Methodists are 
under-represented.  There was a similar trend in the study made of the 1st Australian 
Battalion in the Great War. The data from the Embarkation Rolls of the battalion 
showed that only one out of the 32 original officers was a Catholic.182 This was 
disproportionate to the 17.80 percent of the total personnel of the battalion who were 
Catholics.183 Dale Blair argues that there was a clear bias against Catholics when the 
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unit was formed considering that 11.95 percent of the Catholic volunteers came from 
professional or clerical backgrounds.184   
      
Table 4: Recorded Religion of Officers from NZEF in the First World War 





















41.14 %      131 59.27 %  
Presbyterian 23.32 %        53 23.98 %  
Roman 
Catholic 
13.97 %        19 8.60 %  




6.53 %          3 1.36 %  
Non-Christian 1.49 %          1 0.45 %  
Atheist 0.55 %          1 0.45 %  
 
Although New Zealand was predominantly a Protestant country, there is no 
evidence to suggest that being Catholic had a negative influence on the potential for 
officer selection in the New Zealand military forces. This can be compared to the British 
Army where Catholics had been treated with suspicion since the Jacobite uprisings of 
the eighteenth century. An example to support this argument from the First World War 
is Colonel William Malone who was a practising Roman Catholic when he was 
appointed to command the Wellington Infantry Regiment in 1914. His religious beliefs 
had not hindered his promotion in the Territorials prior to the war where he had 
command of the Taranaki Regiment.185 Likewise in World War Two, Colonel Denver 
Fountaine was a Roman Catholic from the West Coast of the South Island. His religion 
appeared not to have been detrimental to his promotional prospects, which saw him 
being promoted to command two infantry battalions, as well as briefly commanding 6 
NZ Infantry Brigade in Italy during July 1944.186 Haddon Donald stated that a soldier’s 
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religion was never taken into consideration when recommending him as an officer 
candidate.187 Similarly, ‘Sandy’ Thomas was of the same opinion, stating that the most 
important thing to consider was the individual’s proven ability to lead men into 
battle.188 Perhaps this should not be so surprising since Sir Joseph Ward, who led the 
Liberal government from 1906 to 1912, had become the Dominion’s first Roman 
Catholic premier, something that has never occurred in modern Britain (although Tony 
Blair converted to Catholicism after his tenure as prime minister). 
 
Table 5: Recorded Religion of Sampled Junior Officers of the 2nd 











56 56% 53 43% 64 58% 
Presbyterian 22 22% 40 33% 24 22% 
Roman 
Catholic 
9 9% 11 9% 11 10% 
Methodists 4 4% 12 10% 4 3.5% 
Congregational 1 1% 2 1.5% 1 1% 
Free Thinker 1 1% 0  0  
Christian 
Scientist 
0  1 1%   
Protestant 0  2 1.5% 1 1% 
Baptist 0  0  1 1% 
Church of 
Christ 
0  0  1 1% 
Jewish 0  1 1% 0  
Ringatu 0  0  1 1% 
No religion 1 1% 0  0  
Not recorded 6 6% 1 1% 2 2% 
Source: Personnel Records, New Zealand Defence Force Archives, Trentham  
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      Chapter 3 
 
              Opportunity for Promotion on Active Service 
 
 
The greatest opportunity for promotion of junior officers and the commissioning 
of soldiers from the ranks within the New Zealand expeditionary forces came through 
active service overseas. Whereas, those officers who had been appointed in the Main 
Body of NZEF in 1914 and those of the first three echelons of 2NZEF in 1939-1940 
having already served as officers in peace-time in either the staff corps or Territorial 
Force, increasingly, as the wars progressed, officer vacancies were filled by those who 
had proven themselves as competent combat leaders. Primarily, vacancies occurred 
through the expansion of the expeditionary forces once serving overseas, through 
‘wastage’ due to combat casualties and campaign fatigue, and through the need to 
replace those officers who proved incompetent or physically or psychologically unfit 
in battle. This natural attrition saw the loss of many highly-capable and experienced 
combat leaders within battalions and regiments, but it also paved the way for the 
promotion of battle-hardened veterans whose proven leadership ensured the continued 
fighting capabilities of units within the expeditionary forces. Although there were 
occasions when situations dictated the need for immediate field promotions and 
commissions, even on active service, most promotions were determined by a traditional 
formal process.       
There were set regulations regarding the promotions, appointments and 
transfers of commissioned officers. Formulated on systems established in the British 
Army, the purpose of these was to provide a standardized structure for promotion of 
regular officers based on seniority.189 During the First World War the General Officer 
Commanding the New Zealand Expeditionary Force introduced a policy for officer 
promotion based on the peace-time regulations. The policy was amended on occasions 
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and was published as part of the officer gradations list of the New Zealand military 
forces.190 By the regular publication of the gradation lists, along with the updated 
policy, officers were kept aware of their current seniority and could calculate their 
prospects for promotion. 
These regulations provided individuals with a level of certainty. Those seeking 
promotion could feel confident that promotions would be made in accordance with the 
spirit, if not to the letter, of the published regulations. In theory officers could expect 
full consideration, no matter in what capacity or location they might be serving.191 
However, this was not always the case. Studholme records that though these regulations 
were rigidly adhered to as far as possible, the regulations themselves were not rigid and 
were extended and changed as the expeditionary force expanded and as the demands of 
war required.192 
There was a set of principles applied in regard to promotions. All promotions to 
the rank of lieutenant-colonel and over, and all appointments carrying such ranks, were 
made solely by selection.193  The purpose of this regulation was not only to prevent an 
abundance of senior officers, but also to encourage officers to remain serving with their 
units rather than seeking secondments to other appointments.194 In the case of officers 
of the rank of captain and under, promotions up to the rank of major were determined 
by seniority.195 Even so, such promotions would only be made provided the individual 
was recommended by his commanding officer as being ‘fit for promotion to a higher 
rank.’196 
To determine such fitness for promotion, a policy was introduced that directed 
all commanding officers of units to report periodically on their subordinate officers. 
This came in the form of a questionnaire that was required to be submitted every three 
to six months, depending on where the units were serving.197 The purpose of these was 
to facilitate prompt filling of vacancies. Officers were deemed to be fit for promotion 
to a higher rank or not, and those who received an unfavourable report were shown the 
document, with all reports then being forwarded to divisional headquarters.198 When a 











vacancy occurred, the most senior officer having a favourable recommendation was 
immediately promoted. Accordingly, no officer with a current unfavourable report was 
to be promoted, no matter what his seniority might be.199  
This system was maintained in the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force during 
the Second World War. In theory, the regulations should have neutralised bias for or 
against an individual. However, in the case of appointments of senior officers this 
certainly was not the case. An example is that of Major-General Lindsay Inglis of 
2NZEF. Having already temporarily replaced Freyberg as the commander of the 2nd 
New Zealand Division as a result of Freyberg being wounded at Minqar Qaim in June 
1942, Inglis was overlooked twice for the position when Freyberg was later appointed 
to command the 2nd New Zealand Corps at Cassino in March 1944.200 Inglis was so 
disillusioned by the decision that he resigned his position as 4 NZ Armoured Brigade 
commander and returned to New Zealand.201 Freyberg, and likewise Godley, Russell 
and Chaytor in the First World War, had the sole authority to determine such senior 
appointments.202 This provided the flexibility to promote those who had performed well 
in senior positions, such as brigadiers Barrowclough, Kippenberger, Weir and 
Parkinson during the Second World War, along with brigadiers Braithwaite, Fulton, 
Hart and Meldrum in the Great War, while preventing those who had not performed to 
the expected level from progressing any further. In regard to Inglis, there had been some 
questions regarding his style of leadership during the costly attack at Ruweisat Ridge 
during the first battle of El Alamein in July 1942, and although he was regarded as a 
competent brigade commander, Freyberg overlooked him twice for temporary 
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Promotion from the ranks in World War 1 
 
In 1994 Peter Hodge in a  BA Honours research essay, challenged some myths 
surrounding the egalitarian nature of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force during the 
Great War. He argues that although officially, due to public pressure, the government 
made changes to policies regarding replacement commissioned officers in the NZEF 
towards the end of the conflict to ensure it was seen as an army of opportunity, 
unofficially it was not.204  He concluded that the promotion of Territorial officers 
directly from New Zealand into the expeditionary force for the duration of the war acted 
as ‘a physical block to promotion’ of more experienced and proven leaders from the 
ranks. He also stated that education and social class were determining factors in the 
selection of officers, and that the selection process was slanted towards the ‘natural 
officer group’ from the middle classes.205 While this work has merit, it is limited in that 
Hodge’s sample of 100 officers from the NZEF in the First World War is quite small 
in comparison to the number of officers surveyed in this work. While Hodge’s 
conclusions concerning education and social class having some influence in officer 
selection support the findings of this thesis, his other argument that the commissioning 
of officers direct from New Zealand quelled the prospects of others is contestable.  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine how egalitarian New Zealand 
society actually was. The complexity of the issue has seen New Zealanders take up 
widely differing positions. David Pitt, a sociologist, in a scholarly approach to the 
question, has stated that until recently the official and intellectual ideology, and popular 
mythology, was that New Zealand was egalitarian, but that evidence suggests that there 
developed a significant amount of social stratification, especially after the Second 
World War with the migration of Maori and Pacific Islanders to the main urban 
centres.206 The Marxist view linking capitalism with the class society sees an inherent 
antagonism between the capital-owning class and the majority working class which can 
only be resolved by a transfer of power from one to the other.207  Other schools of 
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thought argue that societies are naturally or inevitably under the control of a dominant 
elite.208   
The concept of egalitarianism within the New Zealand expeditionary forces has 
to be taken in the context of the time. James Belich argues that accepted egalitarianism 
in European New Zealand society in the early twentieth century did not mean an 
absence of class but more an absence of extreme class distinction, class oppression and 
direct gentry rule.209  He states that cap-doffing and respectful addressing to social 
superiors became less common during this period, indicating that there was an 
increasing sense of measured equality within society, especially in comparison to 
Britain.210 Erik Olssen argues that the class structure of Britain did not fit the New 
Zealand model, which he states was more complex, and that although there was limited 
class conflict within the growing urban society, there was very little in rural 
communities where the majority of people ‘enjoyed acceptance and difference.’211  The 
early pioneering society most certainly fostered a sense of egalitarianism within the 
European population. Olssen states that in the goldfields of the 1860s and 1870s, though 
most of the miners were from the British middling classes, the ‘overwhelming 
preponderance of men, the roughness of their life, the importance of strength and luck 
created fiercely egalitarian…communities…where the brotherhood of miners was 
essentially a one-class community’ irrespective of their previous social status in 
Britain.212 The introduction of universal suffrage for both men and women by 1893 and 
the progressive social policies of successive Liberal governments during the 1890s 
through to 1912 would have also reinforced a growing sense of equality and opportunity 
for the working classes in New Zealand compared to the society many had left behind 
in Britain.213  At that time most working class people did not expect equality in every 
aspect of life, especially in the military forces which are based on hierarchies of 
leadership.214 Even in Maori society there were hierarchies of leadership based on 
tradition and mana (honour), but unlike European society, monetary or property wealth 
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was not a significant factor in social status.215 It was this sense of egalitarianism, real 
or perceived, that the citizen-soldiers of the Dominion took with them into the 
expeditionary forces.  
Clearly, there were opportunities for those who had the proven leadership, 
ability and communication skills required of an officer during that era, although more 
so in during the Second World War than during the First World War. The fact that many 
experienced soldiers from the ranks, who had been coal miners, saw-millers and farm 
labourers in civilian life, were being commissioned was a progressive step in the 
development of the New Zealand military forces. Few such men would have been given 
or earned the opportunity to be officers in the Territorial Force prior to the war. An 
example of this was Private Denis O’Brien, a Roman Catholic who was a coal miner 
from the coastal village of Millerton in Buller, a geographically isolated region on the 
west coast of New Zealand’s  South Island. He volunteered to serve overseas in 1915 
and initially served with the Canterbury Infantry Regiment.216 On the Western Front he 
transferred to the New Zealand Pioneer Battalion and received a commission, ending 
the war as a second-lieutenant, but later served in the Territorial Force as a captain.217 
At the end of the war, O’Brien was accepted to study at Oxford and it is unlikely that 
this would have happened had he not been a commissioned officer.218 He certainly 
would not have had this opportunity in his previous civilian life.      
 What is evidently clear is that, unlike the British Army, low social status in 
civilian life was not necessarily a barrier to deserving soldiers from the rank and file of 
the New Zealand forces from eventually receiving commissions and promotions during 
both conflicts; competent and effective leaders at all levels were recognised. The 
expansion of the divisions and the high attrition rate due to combat and exhaustion from 
years of campaigning ensured that there was always a demand for replacement officers 
and non-commissioned officers. The increasingly limited number of regular Staff 
officers and trained Territorial officers fit enough for active overseas service and 
available as reinforcements from New Zealand meant that promotion of experienced 
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junior officers and NCOs became the most effective and efficient option in filling 
commissioned vacancies.219    
 When the expeditionary forces were being formed in 1914 and 1939, Godley 
and Freyberg openly recognised the need to promote those enlisted men from within 
the established formations who possessed the qualities and proven leadership skills 
required of a commissioned officer. Both knew that the level of wastage of personnel 
while on active service overseas would require regular replacements of officers and 
NCOs, although neither would have anticipated the extreme casualty rates suffered in 
the early stages of both conflicts.220  By July 1942 the 2nd New Zealand Division had 
sustained 680 officer casualties as a result of the fighting in Greece, Crete, Operation 
Crusader and the break out at Minqar Qaim. Of these 75 had been killed in action, 17 
died of wounds, 16 died as a result of accidents or illness, three died while prisoners of 
war, 304 were prisoners of war, 256 had been wounded and nine were reported 
missing.221 The official reported total of 2NZEF officers killed in action or dying of 
wounds was 442, while 1,206 were wounded.222 The casualty rate among officers in the 
NZEF during the Great War was even higher, with 773 being either killed in action or 
died of wounds or illness, while 1,686 were wounded during the conflict.223 As 
Alexander Aitken stated in his autobiography recounting his experiences in the First 
World War and commenting on the excessive number of platoon commanders his 
battalion lost in the fighting on the Somme: ‘The life of a subaltern at the Somme and 
Passchendaele was…nasty, brutish, and short.’224 It was the same experience for those 
officers who served at Gallipoli. Ewen Pilling who served there in the ranks of the 
Otago Infantry Regiment at Gallipoli, and who later served as an officer on the Western 
Front, provided sobering evidence of this in his diary in July 1915, describing the heavy 
losses of leaders within his battalion:  
 
Out of the original officers and non-coms in our regiment, we have only one officer and three 
corporals remaining. My promotion, first to corporal, and later to sergeant, in each case filled a gap. 
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Those at home may think that those promotions out here are the reward for some special piece of work. 
That is not so. One’s old ambitions and childish visions of winning a V.C. or some other distinction fade 
away under such active service conditions as we have experienced here. We put little value on 
decorations now, and will be satisfied if we do our work and get back home alive.225     
 
The loss of officers on Gallipoli, as elsewhere, was the balance of casualties and those 
returning to their units having recovered from wounds or illness. Again, according to 
Pilling, the Otago Infantry Battalion in January 1916, after it had been evacuated from 
the Peninsula, had only two of the original officers of the battalion on strength.226  
 However, during the Great War, it was not until the New Zealand Division was 
serving on the Western Front that a system was established for enlisted men to be 
commissioned from the ranks. As the conflict continued the demand for replacement 
officers made it clear that the supply of officers depended both on reinforcements from 
home and, increasingly, the promotion of suitable combat-experienced candidates from 
other ranks. Battalion commanders were tasked with nominating experienced enlisted 
soldiers from within their units whom they thought had the experience and potential to 
become platoon commanders.227 Under this system, once nominated, the candidates 
were transferred to officer cadet battalions in England where they underwent rigorous 
training in leadership and field craft from between six to nine months, depending on 
whether a major offensive was to occur or had occurred.228 It was believed that with 
this period away from the front and in the company of other officer cadets these men 
would begin to think and behave as officers prior to returning to their units.229 Some of 
those nominated were returned to New Zealand where they were commissioned and 
eventually returned to the Western Front and Palestine with reinforcement 
detachments.230 Pilling was one such example of this policy. In March 1916, after 
having originally served as a private and rising through the ranks to become a sergeant-
major, he was posted back to New Zealand to attend a two-month commissioning 
course and subsequently returned to the New Zealand Division later that year as a 
lieutenant in the 17th Reinforcements.231  
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 The idea behind this policy was to prefer the allocation of commissions to those 
who had seen active service, thus providing experienced combat officers while avoiding 
any animosity among the rank and file.232 Godley clearly stated the importance of this 
policy in a letter to the Minister of Defence in early 1916:  
 
The authority which you have given me to recommend a certain proportion of suitable N.C.O.s 
and men for commissions in the Army at Home, and also to send a certain proportion back to New 
Zealand, with a view to their being trained as officers of reinforcements, is a great help, and will make 
matters much better as regards the relationship of the reinforcement officers with those who have been 
here all the time, and who may be qualified for commissions, but for whom vacancies may not hitherto 
have been forthcoming.233 
    
An example of the animosity that could occur when inexperienced 
reinforcement officers were given command over veterans is provided by Sergeant 
Gary Clunie of the Wellington Mounted Rifle serving in Egypt in a letter to his family 
in June 1916: 
 
When we went back to the trenches we had officers and men over us that did not know the first 
thing about war in the trenches. I had an argument with our o.c. squadron who was only a second 
lieutenant about standing to arms morning and evening. He tried to tell me that the supports did not stand 
to, when that is the part of the army that stand to is especially for, as men in the trenches are always 
ready. Anyhow, you can imagine how you would like a new chum out from home to come and start 
telling you how to run the farm. Well its almost the same thing, only that you would be able to take a 
stand and tell him what you thought of him and that is just what we can’t do.234   
  
Clunie had volunteered at the outbreak of war and had embarked with the Main 
Body for Egypt. Whether Clunie was angry at being personally passed over for 
promotion after the Gallipoli campaign or whether his grievance was generally 
representative is unclear. However, his letters show that he did hold the original officers 
of his unit in high regard, especially having followed them into the battle for Chunuk 
Bair in August 1915: ‘Our captain had his leg blown off below the knee. He was the 
best officer we had too. All our officers got knocked out and poor old Colonel Bauchop 
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got very badly hit.’235  Prior to returning to New Zealand to be commissioned, Pilling 
was another combat veteran who wrote of his concern at the quality of the 
inexperienced replacement officers coming from home. It was his opinion that the 
commissions should be offered to those who had already proven leadership in combat 
and who had earned such promotion: ‘Personally, I am prouder of having started at the 
bottom, in the ranks, and of having been a private at the landing at Gallipoli, than of 
any other part of my military career.’236      
The number of combat commissions available in the NZEF and the demand for 
replacements fluctuated throughout the First World War, making it extremely difficult 
to achieve a balance of the required number of newly commissioned junior officers. In 
February 1916 when the combat units of the NZEF had returned from Gallipoli and 
were rebuilding their strength, Godley reported to Allen that at that time he believed 
that there was a ‘quite fair and satisfactory balance’ being maintained between those 
officers coming from New Zealand and those currently serving in Egypt looking for 
commissions.237 Godley highlighted the difficulties he faced in attempting to achieve 
such a balance: 
 
I think what you say about calling up [Territorial] non-commissioned officers, who are likely 
to be suitable as officers, to go through a special course of training before their reinforcement units go 
into camp is very good and should have satisfactory results. But, now for some time we shall probably 
have no serious casualties, and I hope you will send as few officers as possible. I know you will say that 
I am inconsistent  and that one moment I am complaining of a shortage of officers, and the next saying 
that we have too many, and this is quite true. It would be very easy and simple if, directly an officer went 
away sick or wounded, someone was promoted to fill his place, but this would let you in for a great deal 
of excess of establishment, and the payment of altogether of too many officers. It is one of the difficulties 
incidental to active service, which we must make the best of and try to hit off a happy medium as regards 
dealing with it.238       
 
   However, combat casualties and the rigours of campaigning on the Western 
Front increased the wastage of officers within the New Zealand Division and ensured a 
fluctuating demand for replacements.  In September 1916, Brigadier-General George 
Richardson, who was in command of NZEF troops stationed in the United Kingdom 
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and who administered the training of reinforcements prior to their joining combat units 
on the Western Front, suggested that the question of the supply of officers should be 
reviewed frequently in order to avoid too large a surplus during periods of comparative 
inactivity in the field. He calculated that the New Zealand Division required 360 to 400 
replacement officers per year, or 30 per month for infantry alone.239 At that time he 
indicated that the supply of replacement junior officers from the reserve group in 
England was not equal to the demand from the Division, but that with the numbers of 
officers recovering from wounds and sickness, the supply might in future be 
satisfactory.240  Such a demand for replacement junior officers could not be sustained 
without the promotion of experienced soldiers from the ranks, and according to 
Studholme’s research of official records, 2,100 enlisted soldiers were commissioned in 
the NZEF prior to it being disbanded in 1919.241 
 
Providing a balance between supplying newly-commissioned combat-
experienced junior officers and suitable inexperienced junior officers from the 
Dominion for the New Zealand Division on the Western Front was no easy task. In 
November 1916 Major-General Alfred Robin, who was commander of the New 
Zealand Military Forces in the Dominion for the duration of the war in Godley’s 
absence, outlined the difficulties he faced in supplying junior officers for service 
overseas: 
 
This is a difficult problem as our New Zealander generally considers himself fit and is ambitious 
for a commission, likewise so many parents clamour for promotion of their sons. The N.C.O.s sent from 
[the] Division to New Zealand to train and returned with commissions if qualified are not an unmixed 
blessing. They come to us and resent being practically put to recruit work. They demand their 
commissions at once on going into camp and state that they were promised all sorts of things. However, 
we will do our best to send them away fit.242       
 
 
There were a number of principles adopted and, supposedly, strictly adhered to 
regarding the commissioning of soldiers from the ranks in the First World War. Firstly, 
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no member of the NZEF was to be considered for nomination to an Officer Cadet Corps 
or commissioning course unless he had been nominated by the commanding officer of 
his unit.243 In the case of those serving in non-combatant units, no nomination could be 
accepted without the recommendation of the commanding officer of his unit, but in 
addition he needed to have been subsequently transferred to a combat unit serving at 
the front.244 After having served at least three months with the unit, the candidate 
required a favourable report from the senior officer regarding the candidate’s behaviour 
under fire.245 According to Studholme, many of those candidates serving this 
probationary period at the front were killed in action.246 Alexander Aitken mentions an 
incident at Armentieres where two officer cadets studying for commissions from 
another unit where killed by a single bullet from an enemy sniper when standing 
together in a trench while seconded to his Otago infantry battalion.247 
 Not all those promoted from the ranks attended commissioning courses. The 
need to urgently replace platoon commanders who had become casualties during major 
offensives meant that some enlisted men were commissioned in the field. This was 
through necessity to ensure an effective leadership structure remained in place while 
the units were in the frontline, where demand for experienced junior officers 
outweighed the ability to supply them through the normal process. To be commissioned 
in the field was considered a great honour during both wars, but was more likely to 
happen in the Great War. An example of this was the commissioning of Alexander 
Aitken in August 1916; after his battalion had lost 180 men in a costly trench raid at 
Armentieres, Aitken and four other experienced NCOs were given immediate 
commissions, without having to attend any courses.248 Of the five commissioned at that 
time, all were to become casualties, with four being killed.249 Aitken also recalls that 
two sergeant-majors had been commissioned in the field a month earlier in an effort to 
provide immediate replacements for the battalion.250 In contradiction to the official 
process, newly commissioned ex-rankers were supposed to be transferred to other 
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battalions or regiments after becoming officers as it was believed familiarity with those 
from their own unit would be detrimental to discipline.251  
As the Great War progressed, experience ensured that the official guidelines and 
directives concerning the selection and commissioning of reinforcement officers from 
New Zealand for active service overseas were tightened. The aim was to ensure that the 
best candidates were selected and that a reasonable balance could be maintained 
between the number of commissions offered and the number of officer vacancies within 
the NZEF. The contentious issue regarding the appointment of inexperienced combat 
platoon and company commander ahead of worthy combat veterans of the NZEF was 
acknowledged in an official memorandum to the commandant of Trentham Camp in 
October 1918 which stated that due to the surplus of inexperienced Territorial officers 
being ‘called up’ or volunteering to serve overseas, that all such officers were now 
required to serve as sergeants or face being court-martialled as deserters. This directive 
proved very unpopular with those it affected and it was hoped that the official 
explanation would help to provide some understanding regarding the policy: 
 
It may assist them (officer candidates) if they admit what is due to the gallant fellows who joined 
the ranks years ago, not as sergeants but as privates, and who fought and suffered all sorts of dangers and 
privations to attain to commissioned rank, and realize what the feelings of these fellows would be to see 
brand-new officers coming in over their heads four years after the war had begun.252          
 
However, there was a reduction in the number of reinforcement officers sent 
from the Dominion as early as 1916. Commencing with the 17th Reinforcements, the 
establishment per draft was reduced from 45 to 39, with officer candidates of such drafts 
having to undergo a preliminary training course of twelve weeks prior to 
embarkation.253  Part of such courses included prospective officers undergoing six 
written examinations of 90-minute duration which covered Field Service Regulations, 
administration, an essay on march discipline, arithmetic, infantry training and military 
sanitation. Examples of such questions included: ‘what are the duties of a platoon 
commander in the firing line in the attack,’ and ‘explain what is meant by active 
defence.’254 Those who failed these examinations reverted to the rank of temporary 
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sergeant and were posted to the next reinforcement draft, while even those who passed 
were not guaranteed a commission during the middle-war years.255   
According to an Army Department memorandum, British Imperial Army 
Regulations stipulated that ‘an officer must not serve in a rank lower than that which 
he has acquired by examination or appointment,’ which, together with complaints from 
members of the public regarding the legality of reducing qualified officers in rank, 
proved problematic.256 This was highlighted when a Territorial captain, L.H. Levien, 
complained of being reduced in rank to a second-lieutenant prior to being posted to the 
New Zealand Division in France. However, Robin, as Commandant of New Zealand 
Military Forces, took a pragmatic approach and simply ignored them. He wrote that the 
public would not accept a position whereby officers could not be sent abroad because 
they were too senior in rank, resulting in them being retained in New Zealand on leave 
without pay, which was not in the interests of the service.257  
 
At this stage of the war it does not seem fair that Territorial officers should proceed to the front 
with senior ranks, thus superseding officers who have had considerable experience of active service. 
Individual cases of apparent hardship in this connection can hardly be considered, as efficiency is the 
first consideration. Expeditionary Force headquarters are continually asking that ranks in reinforcements 
be kept as low as possible as it is difficult to place officers of senior rank who lack previous experience 
in the present war.258    
 
 
It was for this reason that Robin introduced a policy change in June 1917 that 
stipulated that in future no Territorial officer of subaltern rank belonging to combatant 
branches would be accepted for appointment to the Expeditionary Force reinforcements 
in rank higher than second-lieutenant.259   
Robin also argued that if no vacancies could be found for surplus officers then 
the introduced local policy of reducing officers to non-commissioned rank was a 
practical approach and would over-ride other considerations.260 An example of this 
policy was the 29th Reinforcements, where only the top four qualified officer candidates 
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were given commissions (who included Second-Lieutenant Leslie Averill who 
famously won a Military Cross scaling the walls of Le Quesnoy in 1918), compared to 
the 20 and 25 officers commissioned in the 27th and 28th Reinforcements.261 Those 
qualified candidates for whom there were insufficient vacancies in the NZEF and who 
scored highly in their examinations were to be considered for appointments as company 
sergeant-majors in later drafts. This trend appears to have continued with no non-
commissioned officers who qualified for commissions from the 32nd and 33rd 
Reinforcements being commissioned before embarkation to England due to a lack of 
vacancies.262 What makes this so significant is that it provides evidence that as the war 
progressed and officer casualties mounted, vacancies within the NZEF were 
increasingly filled by combat experienced non-commissioned officers already serving 
overseas, thus reducing the need to rely on qualified, but inexperienced, reinforcement 
officers from New Zealand.  
         
 
Promotion from the ranks in World War 2  
 
 During the Second World War Freyberg fostered the commissioning of 
experienced NCOs from within the expeditionary force, believing it made the 2nd New 
Zealand Division a more effective fighting formation. Early in the war he was confident 
that he could supply the required commissioned personnel to fill the vacancies resulting 
from losses sustained during the campaigns in Greece and Crete from within the 
Division. In a secret ciphered message to Prime Minister Peter Fraser on 17 May 1941, 
only several days before the German invasion of Crete, Freyberg stated that he was not 
anxious about the successors to commissioned vacancies as the quality of the officers 
within the division was excellent and that good men could be promoted from the 
ranks.263  Freyberg’s experience during the Great War had shown him that veteran 
NCOs who maintained the trust and confidence of the men serving under them and who 
had proven combat leadership, generally made excellent commissioned platoon 
commanders.264 He was also conscious of the ill-feeling that occurred within units when 
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reinforcement officers recently arrived from New Zealand, and lacking combat 
experience, were used to fill vacancies that the troops believed should have been filled 
by deserving and experienced NCOs. To counter this, during the Italian campaign 
Freyberg insisted that those officers from the disbanded 3rd New Zealand Division who 
were to be transferred to the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean, were 
required to accept demotion by at least one rank.265 In part this was  an effort to maintain 
morale within the veteran units serving in the 2nd Division, as well as ensuring the 
reinforcements, who only had limited combat experience, became acclimatised to the 
more open warfare characterized by the fighting in Italy. Major-General Barrowclough 
who had commanded the 3rd New Zealand Division protested against this measure, 
claiming that his officers were experienced and deserved better treatment.266 In the 
event, most of these officers, many of whom had been reduced to NCO rank, were 
generally promoted to commissioned rank once they had proved themselves during the 
fighting in Italy, with Freyberg later praising the quality of these reinforcements. 
 The responsibility of finding suitable replacement junior officers from within 
the ranks remained with the battalion commanders. From recent interviews and 
correspondence with Sandy Thomas and Haddon Donald, along with anecdotal 
evidence from autobiographies, biographies, diaries and letters of other battalion 
officers, there appears to be a common practice as to how this was achieved. According 
to Sandy Thomas, when he was commanding 23 Battalion he followed a ‘committee 
style’ selection process.267 This involved him seeking recommendations for possible 
candidates from his company and platoon commanders, with Thomas having the final 
say as the battalion commander.268 It was his belief that platoon and company 
commanders who bonded with their troops got to know the strengths and weaknesses 
of their subordinates well.  He stated that all ranks were considered after they had 
proven combat experience and that he and his officers were always looking for 
individuals who showed leadership potential. He claims that this was necessary as there 
was always a shortage of good junior officers after a battle due to the high casualty rates 
of platoon commanders who led from the front.269 Those selected for commissioning 
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courses from his battalion were usually posted to other South Island battalions (i.e. 20 
or 26 Battalions) once commissioned as there remained a strong sense of regional 
identity among the South Islanders.270 
 Haddon Donald practiced a similar style selection process. As a young platoon 
subaltern in 1940 he was asked to nominate enlisted members from his platoon whom 
he thought would make suitable officer candidates. At that time he nominated six, all 
of whom passed their commissioning course. Included amongst these men was 
Corporal Ted Norman who rose through the ranks to eventually become the lieutenant-
colonel in command of 25 Battalion, being awarded the DSO and MC. After the war 
Norman was knighted and became the Anglican bishop of Wellington. Donald was 
certainly in favour of commissioning soldiers from the ranks: 
 
 The calibre of my platoon was very impressive as they were all country types, very self-reliant 
and reliable; whereas the city boys did not seem to adapt as well to army life. There were three others in 
my platoon whom I wanted to nominate who turned the offer down as they wanted to get away [overseas] 
with their friends. Living close to our men as we did made it fairly easy to select the most promising. 
Natural leaders stood out, but I would not choose any one who talked too much – better if they listened 
carefully and then acted.271        
 
 The belief or perception of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force being 
egalitarian in nature during the Second World War has some foundation when 
considering the recruitment of the officer corps. In 1939 there were less than 100 regular 
officers in the New Zealand Staff Corps.272 This number was insufficient to provide 
leadership for the proposed 6,000 strong first echelon of the expeditionary force. Each 
battalion required approximately 25 officers of which the majority were subalterns 
(lieutenants and second-lieutenants), who commanded platoons of around 30 men. To 
initially solve this problem, Territorial Force officers were offered commissions, mostly 
at their substantive rank, in the newly formed regular battalions.273 This proved 
practical in that the battalions were generally raised from volunteers from within the 
Territorial units. The transfer of the officer establishment provided cohesion and the 
experience needed to provide adequate training to the new formations. This policy is 
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evident in the 1940 sample where 78 out of 100 junior officers had their commissions 
transferred from the Territorials. 
 Initially, Freyberg attempted to maintain a reasonable balance in seeking 
replacement junior officers from reinforcements from New Zealand and by promoting 
other ranks from within the Division.  In March 1940 he had proposed that 60 percent 
of the junior officer vacancies due to wastage be filled from officers of the 4th and 5th 
Reinforcements expected from the Dominion, while 40 percent of the vacancies be 
filled from within the Division;274 although this was later changed to 50 percent each 
for the 5th Reinforcements.275 The same figures were suggested for the 6th and 7th 
Reinforcements; however, by this time only one third of the vacancies were filled from 
reinforcements, with two-thirds being filled from promotion within the Division.276 In 
late 1940 the proportion of officers to other ranks within the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force was 1 to 19.3, but there still remained a problem of filling 
vacancies. According to a memorandum from the 2NZEF Headquarters it was 
estimated that a further 169 to 190 replacement junior officers would be required by 
April 1941 and that the Division would need 64 replacements per month from January 
to April 1941.277  It was at this time that a request was made for the Division to establish 
its own Officer Cadet Training Unit (OCTU) in Egypt so that it could provide a short 
two-month course for prospective officers from the ranks that would help to satisfy the 
supply demand for junior officers, especially in combat units.278    
 As the war progressed and the demand for combat-experienced replacement 
officers increased, the practice of filling vacancies direct from New Zealand could not 
be sustained at previous levels. The 1943 and 1945 samples clearly indicate a change 
in recruitment policy. In the 1943 sample 102 out of 123 officers had been promoted 
from the ranks, while almost all of the 110 officers of the 1945 sample had done the 
same. There are a number of reasons for this. The veterans of the early campaigns of 
Greece, Crete and North Africa resented inexperienced officers coming directly from 
New Zealand and leading them into battle.279 Their lack of experience could lead to 
unnecessary casualties in a division that had already suffered heavily early in the war. 
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This was recognised by Freyberg, who had always encouraged the promotion of 
experienced non-commissioned officers. This practice had the dual effect of 
maintaining the fighting efficiency of his formations as well as promoting morale.  
The policy had a dramatic effect on the officers of the 3rd NZ Division who were 
to be transferred to the 2nd NZ Division in the Mediterranean. Most of the junior officers 
were required to relinquish their commissions and became temporary sergeants, while 
those who had been battalion and regiment commanders in the Pacific, such as 
Lieutenant-Colonels F.L.H. Davis, J. Brook-White and B. Wicksteed, were reduced to 
majors.280 Ironically for Davis and Brook-White, who were regular officers in the New 
Zealand Staff Corps, service with the 3rd NZ Division had limited their chances of 
promotion; both had previously served with the 2nd NZ Division in the Mediterranean 
and had been transferred to serve in the Pacific to provide combat leadership in the 
inexperienced 3rd NZ Division.281 Had they remained with the 2nd NZ Division they 
would have had a greater chance of obtaining substantive rank sooner.     
 However, after some experience with the 2nd NZ Division most of the men who 
were forced to resign their commissions and who had proven themselves in combat in 
Italy were promoted to commissioned rank on merit.282 Of all those officers from the 
3rd NZ Division who remained in New Zealand after the division had been withdrawn 
from the Pacific none of those sampled were promoted above their substantive rank. 
There was certainly some prejudice towards the junior officers of the 3rd Division, 
especially from within the 2nd Division. The reason was mainly due to the limited 
fighting experience of the 3rd Division which had been used as a garrison for Fiji and 
in a supporting role in the Solomon Islands. This was in comparison to the 2nd Division 
which had forged a reputation as an elite fighting force after years of continuous 
operations in the Mediterranean. 
 However, the reinforcements from the 3rd New Zealand Division provided a 
good source of officer candidates. Sandy Thomas agreed with Freyberg’s stance on 
initially reducing these men in rank to prevent any ill-feeling among the veterans of the 
2nd Division, but was happy to recommend them for promotion once they had proven 
themselves and survived battle: 
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 We had some good officers come from the 3rd Division in the Pacific. General Freyberg didn’t 
want them to command the experienced troops of the 2nd Division until they had proven themselves in 
battle…I remember one particular corporal who I thought would have made an excellent officer but he 
was killed in battle before I could recommend him.283        
 
 
It is ironic that Barrowclough should complain about Freyberg’s stance regarding 
replacements from the 3rd NZ Division when he took a similar approach himself. In 
October 1943 Barrowclough complained to Puttick that he had a surplus of over 100 
officers within the 3rd NZ Division, mainly due to the disbandment of 15 Brigade, and  
requested that no more reinforcement officers be sent from New Zealand.284 He stated 
that he intended posting some of the older officers back to the Dominion which would 
not only provide opportunities for promotion for younger fit combat officers but would 
also address the surplus issue. He clearly took the same approach as Freyberg in 
wanting to provide opportunities to those experienced and deserving officers and other 
ranks from within his division when he wrote to Puttick: 
 
There will be other officers whose services could be dispensed with but I will not want to replace 
them with officers from New Zealand who have had no experience or training in island operations. It 
may be that some officers whose services were required in New Zealand all through the war would feel 
a sense of injustice at not being allowed to proceed overseas. There may, in fact, be some injustice done 
[to] them but I have to be careful that I do not do a greater injustice to the officers of this force who have 
served abroad so long and who have, at last, had an opportunity of getting battle experience. I am sure 
you will realise that with the best intentions possible it will be extremely difficult for me to absorb 
officers from New Zealand. The Middle East (2nd NZ Division), of course, have felt this difficulty in a 
much greater degree as their officers have had a great deal more active service experience and you have 
had to solve that difficulty by asking officers to resign their commissions in order to get overseas. As 
time goes on the same conditions will apply to my force and it will be unfair to the 3rd Division if 
promotion is forever blocked by the absorption of commissioned officers from New Zealand.285      
  
The surplus of Territorial officers who were commissioned in New Zealand 
came about through the expansion of the Territorial Force for home defence due to the 
threat of a Japanese invasion from 1941. The issue Puttick faced was what to do with 
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those officers who were ‘called up’ for overseas service once the invasion threat had 
passed. Like Robin in the Great War, Puttick had to take a pragmatic approach and 
reported in July 1943 that the surplus officer problem was mostly solved, with 300 
surplus officers having volunteered to trial as pilots in the Air Force, while over 500 
others had voluntarily relinquished their commissions so that they could proceed 
overseas to serve in the expeditionary force.286  He praised the sacrifice of these 
volunteers stating: ‘It is a fine tribute to their strength of character and common-sense 
and makes one think that the selection of these officers was not so bad as one was 
inclined to think.’287   
      
 Australia and Canada followed much the same practice in their selection process 
when choosing officers for combat units. Like New Zealand, these dominions only had 
small staff corps and cadres of regular soldiers to provide the administration and 
training of their civilian militia forces leading up to both major conflicts. However the 
rapid expansion and large size of their expeditionary forces ensured that finding suitable 
officers was a constant issue. As with New Zealand, these countries relied heavily on 
the volunteer officers from their militias to provide the leadership within the newly 
formed battalions and regiments of the expeditionary forces.  
Of the two allied dominions, Canada had the most contrasting experience.  In 
contrast to New Zealand’s single division on the Western Front, during the First World 
War Canada’s expeditionary force consisted of four fighting divisions which were 
eventually formed into a corps.288  In the Second World War, at its peak, the Canadian 
combat formations that served in the Mediterranean and Northern European theatres 
included three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two independent 
armoured brigades, together with numerous attached allied units, which were formed 
into the 1st Canadian Army by 1945.289 As Geoffrey Hayes states, there was a 
fundamental change in the selection policy of Canadian officers in the Second World 
War from the process of the First World War. Similar to New Zealand and Australia, 
the Canadian military forces had suffered from governmental financial constraints 
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during the inter-war period and were unprepared for war in 1939. The country had 7,000 
army officers on strength at this time, but only 455 of them were regular officers.290 He 
argues that the need to find sufficient officers led to a change in the Canadian selection 
policy from 1943, where a series of ‘scientific’ officer selection practices evolved 
which challenged the underlying principles and methods by which officers had 
previously been selected. Until that time units had been authorised to select suitable 
candidates from within established formations or from the reserve, and followed the 
methods used within the British Army.291 The system of the ‘magic eye’ where the 
experience and judgement of commanding officers determined who were considered 
suitable candidates to receive a commission was the traditional method used by most 
military forces of the Empire and Commonwealth. However, unlike New Zealand and 
Australia, the Canadians looked to a more sustainable practice as the war progressed 
and demand for junior officers increased. 
Educational qualifications and psychological testing became the main focus of 
the Canadian selection process. Unlike New Zealand, the Canadian universities had 
established ‘Canadian Officer Training Corps’ from which members received 
commissions directly into the army until mid-1943. This proved unpopular with some 
politicians who considered that enlisted men were being overlooked for commissions 
in favour of privileged college students who became officers due to their social status 
rather than merit.292  This then led to the establishment of Officer Selection and 
Appraisal Centres in Canada and England where candidates took a series of written and 
practical tests to determine suitability for a commission. These included the new Bion 
‘leaderless group test’ where a section of candidates were given physical tasks with no 
prearranged plan or leaders. Observers then accessed individuals on how well they 
could organise and control the actions of the section. Further assessment included 
interviews with Personnel Selection Officers and psychiatrists.293  This practice 
followed those used by the United States and was ideal for recruiting large armies.294 
Although such practises are now used in ‘Possible Officer Selection Boards’ for the 
New Zealand Army Reserve, from the evidence provided by battalion commanders 
                                                 
290 Geoffrey Hayes, ‘Science and the Magic Eye: Innovations in the Selection of Canadian Army 






Sandy Thomas and Haddon Donald, the traditional method of nomination of officer 
candidates using the ‘magic eye’ was considered more suitable for the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force during the Second World War, where proven leadership 
experience remained the focus for selecting officers from the ranks.295 
 
          Conclusion 
         
Clearly, the main finding of this chapter is that previous military service was 
the most important criterion in the initial selection of both senior and junior officers 
during the formation of the main bodies for both expeditionary forces. Education was 
also important in that officers were required to study military theory and practice to 
ensure the effectiveness of their regiments. Those with higher education were more 
likely to enter professions in civilian life that allowed them the freedom to spend time 
training with the Territorial units, thus having more opportunity for achieving 
commissioned rank and promotion. Old School networks were also important in pre-
war society, particularly prior to the First World War, and were influential in the 
provincial Territorial regiments from which the officer corps of the expeditionary forces 
was formed. An obvious example was the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry that included 
officers and enlisted men who had attended Christ’s College and who were prominent 
in the Canterbury Mounted Rifles. However, as the wars progressed promotion was on 
merit and not on social status in civilian life. The shared experiences of war ensured 
that eventually only those who had proved themselves in battle were given command. 
There were plenty of opportunities for promotion on merit within both 
expeditionary forces, with many junior officers reaching high rank.  This was especially 
so for those who left with the Expeditionary Force for Egypt in 1940.  Of the 100 junior 
officers sampled for this year 81 percent achieved the rank of captain or above, with 
two becoming brigadier by 1945. To put this in perspective, these two officers had gone 
from being responsible for 30 men of a platoon to a brigade of around 3,000 men. 
However, such opportunity for promotion was also available for some during the Great 
War, with the likes of James Hargest and Edward Puttick ending the war leading 
infantry battalions after for being commissioned as platoon commanders.  
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The rapid promotion of some came about through a number of circumstances. 
Gallipoli, the Somme and Passchendaele in the First World War, along with the 
disastrous early campaigns in Greece, Crete, Libya and Egypt during the Second World 
War saw the New Zealand forces suffer high casualties, especially amongst combat 
officers. A significant number were killed, seriously wounded or made prisoners of war 
leaving vacancies for others. A number of older senior officers were found to be unfit 
for frontline duties and were sent back to New Zealand or transferred to training camps. 
An example of this was Brigadier James Hargest, a veteran of World War One and a 
member of parliament, who had used his political clout to gain a senior position. He 
was heavily criticised for his lack of action and poor leadership on Crete.296 His 
subsequent capture, and that of other senior officers during Operation Crusader in North 
Africa in 1941 made way for more youthful officers to experience high command. This 
had a flow-on effect with lower positions having to be filled by junior officers. 
 Even those commissioned later in the war had a good chance of attaining high 
rank. Many senior officers from the early war years were exhausted from years of 
campaigning and were given administrative positions. Around 32 percent of the junior 
officers (lieutenants and second-lieutenants) sampled for 1945 were made captains and 
around 9 percent became majors (see Table 6). This mainly came about due to veterans 
being sent home to New Zealand prior to the end of the war on furlough, creating a 
large number of vacancies. What is significant is that most of these newly promoted 
officers had enlisted as privates earlier in the war. 
 















Captain     34   34 %    26 21.14 %     35 31.82 % 
Major    31   31 %      4   3.25 %     10   9.10 % 
Lieutenant-
Colonel 
   13   13 %      0        0  
Colonel      1    1 %      0        0  
Brigadier- 
General 
     2    2 %      0        0  
Note: The 1943 sample was taken from the 3rd NZ Division where there were 
minimal opportunities for promotion.  
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     Chapter 4 
 





 It is generally accepted by New Zealand military historians that the Main Body 
of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force of the First World War was the better trained 
and better prepared military force of the two expeditionary forces that embarked from 
this country for overseas service in the first half of the twentieth century. If this is so, 
then it could only have come about through efficient and effective leadership and 
training provided by the officer corps of the army. To date only Glyn Harper and Joel 
Hayward have attempted to provide some understanding of the training New Zealand 
senior officers received in their book Born to lead? Portraits of New Zealand 
Commanders. However, this is more of a collection of biographical essays than a study 
of the military training curriculum of junior and senior officers. This chapter will 
provide an in-depth understanding of how the officer corps developed in the years 
leading up to the Great War and how the continually evolving curriculum provided 
senior and junior officers, as well as non-commissioned officers, of front-line combat 
units with the knowledge and skills to confidently lead men into battle in modern 
warfare. 
The training of officers within the New Zealand military forces during the first 
half of the twentieth century was fluid in that officers were required to be 
knowledgeable in the latest tactics and military developments to succeed. Training 
provided prior to the Great War and during the inter-war years soon became outdated 
with the development of trench warfare in the First World War and the mechanised 
mobile warfare of the Second World War. Such developments required that officers at 
all levels needed constant training and education to ensure they remained proficient in 
their particular area of expertise as well as military matters in general; as was the case 
for officers from other dominions of the British Empire.  
Almost all the official training received by the New Zealanders during the war 
years was based on British Army manuals and practice. This was the same for the 
Australian and Canadian military forces. To cater for the large numbers of newly 
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commissioned junior officers of the volunteer, and later conscripted, ‘citizen’ armies, 
the War Office in London produced hundreds of constantly updated instruction 
manuals. These were distributed throughout the empire to assist in educating the 
thousands of inexperienced men in the basic principles of military field craft, 
engineering, drills, musketry, military law and leadership. Regular force officers from 
New Zealand, Australia and Canada had usually graduated from military colleges at 
Duntroon, New South Wales (later Australian Capital Territory), Kingston, Ontario and 
Sandhurst in England, and in the case of a few officers, from the prestigious Staff 
College at Camberley. However, during both wars the vast majority of officers serving 
in the expeditionary forces were limited to experience in the Territorials and short-term 
courses at local officer cadet training units. Ultimately, it was the combination of front 
line experience, formal and informal training that provided the best education for 
officers of all levels. 
  
 
    Before the Territorials 
 
 Compulsory military training laid the foundation for a proficient officer corps 
within the World War One New Zealand Expeditionary Force. Prior to the 
establishment of the Territorial Force through the Defence Act of 1909, which directly 
led to compulsory military training being introduced, there appears to have been little 
or no formal structure for the training of officers within the numerous volunteer militias 
scattered throughout the Dominion. These volunteer formations of citizen soldiery 
maintained local autonomy, with the officers being chosen through election by the rank 
and file of the corps.297 This ensured that influential land owners and prominent local 
businessmen were elected to lead the militias, even though they were not necessarily 
the most appropriate choice. In the Edwardian era colonial social connections, wealth 
and education were prime prerequisites to becoming an officer in the militia. An 
example of this was the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry Regiment that was regarded as 
more of a private club for the social elite of the province than a military formation; 
members of prominent landed families such as the Rhodes, Deans, Birdlings and 
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Westenras were listed as officers and non-commissioned officers of the unit through to 
the Second World War.298  
 Even in less fashionable corps, such as the Marlborough Hussars, which later 
became the Marlborough Mounted Rifles, the landed middle-classes tended to occupy 
leadership roles. Edward Chaytor is an example of this. His family farmed sizable 
estates throughout the district and were influential in local politics.299 As an 18 year-
old, Chaytor, who was later to become a career officer in the New Zealand Staff Corps, 
enrolled in the unit as a trumpeter in 1886.300 However, he was soon promoted to 
sergeant and within two years was elected to the vacancy of lieutenant.301 It is doubtful 
whether such rapid promotion from the ranks would have been possible for someone 
less influentially connected. 
Overseas service in the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 also influenced 
the structure and training of militia and Territorial officers in New Zealand leading up 
to the Great War. More than 6,500 New Zealanders volunteered and fought in the South 
African conflict, with many veterans providing much needed military experience and 
knowledge to the militia corps and the newly formed Territorial Force.302 Chaytor had 
served as a captain in the 3rd Contingent, known as the ‘Rough Riders,’ due to the lack 
of military experience of the officers, and it was during the conflict that he befriended 
Harry Chauvel, an Australian officer with whom he served in Egypt and Palestine 
during the First World War.303 After receiving a wound and returning to New Zealand, 
Chaytor later accepted promotion to lieutenant-colonel in command of the 8th 
Contingent, anticipating that it would lead to a permanent position in the army and a 
reasonable salary due to his service in South Africa.304 After resigning from the 
Volunteers he was reinstated to the regular rank of lieutenant-colonel and appointed as 
the Assistant Adjutant-General at the Defence Department headquarters in 
Wellington.305 It was in this position that Chaytor was to play a significant role in the 
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restructuring of the military forces of New Zealand prior to the Great War, particularly 
in regard to the selection and training of officers. 
With the threat of war with Germany looming, Chaytor was aware of the need 
for constant and rigorous up-to-date training of both regular and volunteer officers to 
ensure competency and efficiency. He himself had increased his military education by 
being the first New Zealander to attend a two year course at the British Staff College at 
Camberley from 1907.306 What made this so significant was that at age 39 he was 
considerably older than his contemporaries on the course and he was also lacking in 
social background and education compared to the other students.307 
The timing of Chaytor’s advanced military education was crucial in preparing 
the New Zealand military forces for war in that it was at a time when the British Army 
was implementing significant changes to its establishment and training. In completing 
this intensive course he became the Dominion’s first fully trained professional officer 
and an important resource in the reformation of its military forces. He had studied all 
the necessary facets of warfare and command, including military history, geography, 
strategy and tactics, strategic geography, reconnaissance, staff duties, administration 
and training of troops.308 His course also covered the study of naval supremacy, coastal 
defence, permanent fortifications, artillery, engineering, transport and supply; all of 
which were particularly important in the defence of New Zealand.309 Afterwards he 
attended a four-month course at the Royal Naval War College where he was instructed 
in dealing with the problems of overseas expeditions and naval attacks on coastal 
defences.310 The lessons he learned here proved fundamental in the rapid mobilization 
of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in 1914. 
On his return to New Zealand in 1909, Chaytor played a pivotal role in the 
training of both the few professional officers and the hundreds of volunteer officers 
scattered throughout the country. He arrived back from Great Britain several months 
prior to the passing of the new Defence Act and was appointed to the temporary position 
of Director of Military Training and Education until a sufficient number of Imperial 
training officers could be seconded from the British Army, after which he became the 
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commanding officer of the Wellington Military District.311 After his inspection of 
Territorial camps, Major-General Alexander Godley, General Officer Commanding 
New Zealand Forces, identified him as being a most proficient senior officer; ‘I have 
had little opportunity of judging his capacity for command, but I should think from 
what I know of him that his line were more administrative. He is hard-working and 
conscientious, and sets a good example of duty to all under his command.’312 What set 
Chaytor aside from other colonial officers and made him so valuable was that his recent 
educational opportunities had made him conversant with the changes in the formation, 
training, strategy and tactics used by the British Army which he then helped to introduce 
to the New Zealand forces. 
 
 
   The Territorial Force 
 
The 1909 Defence Act that led to the introduction of the Territorial Force in 
New Zealand was a direct response to the outcomes of the Imperial Conference that 
had been held in London earlier that year. A series of meetings between the British 
prime minister and representatives of the self-governing dominions within the British 
Empire was held at the Foreign Office and the War Office during July and August to 
discuss general questions regarding the military and naval defence of the Empire with 
the increasing likelihood of war.313 It was decided that to ensure the forces of the Empire 
could rapidly combine into one homogenous Imperial Army for defence in times of 
emergency that the military forces of the dominions were to ‘be standardised, the 
formations of the units, the arrangements for transport, the patterns of weapons, etc, 
being as far possible assimilated to those which have recently been worked out for the 
British Army.’314  It was further decided that while the dominion troops were to be 
raised for the defence of their dominion ‘it would be made readily practicable in case 
of need for that dominion to mobilise and use them for the defence of the Empire as a 
whole.’315  Thus, Chaytor’s acquired knowledge and experience within the recently 
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revamped British military system made him pivotal in the implementing of the required 
training and reorganisation of the New Zealand Forces prior to the Great War. 
The restructuring of both the professional and volunteer officer corps within the 
Dominion’s military forces was essential to provide competent leadership within the 
army. This came about with the creation of the small New Zealand Staff Corps (NZSC) 
of less than 100 professional career officers, and the restructuring of the volunteer 
forces. Although the new Defence Act provided the legislation for change, it took some 
time for improvements to happen. In early 1910 there were only 63 permanent officers 
on the establishment to oversee the administration and training of the expanding 
Territorial Force, while there were 1,087 Territorial officers to command the 18,800 
rank and file of the ‘volunteer’ formations.316 It had earlier been thought necessary to 
find young educated men of good character to take commissions as junior officers in 
the expanding military establishment. Hence, officer training corps had initially been 
established at Otago University, Canterbury College, Victoria College and a junior 
division at King’s College, Auckland by 1910, through which a combined total of 486 
students were enlisted.317  These recruits were first trained as soldiers in the ranks before 
being required to act as instructors and leaders in order that ‘The corps should therefore 
furnish a valuable source for supply of citizen officers, and if the improvement as 
present observable continues, the formation of the Corps should be fully justified by 
the results.’318 However, except for the Otago University corps, these units were short-
lived as it was argued that the newly formed Territorial Force would provide the number 
of officers required.   
The policies formulated at the Imperial Conference of 1909 directly promoted 
the professionalism and the competency of the officer corps within the New Zealand 
Defence Force. In contrast to the old militia policy of electing officers, officer 
candidates for both the Staff Corps and the Territorial Force now had to follow the 
British Army model of passing entrance examinations for commissions. The quality 
and ability of candidates appears to have been high when considering the results of the 
examinations; in 1909, of the 170 candidates who presented themselves for 
examination, 152 or 89 per cent passed, while in 1910, of the 263 who attempted the 
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tests, 205 or 78 per cent passed.319 Without knowing the exact content of the 
examinations, what these results indicate is that those young men who succeeded in 
gaining commissions by passing the written tests were able to communicate in written 
form to the standard expected of British officer candidates and were of high intelligence 
in that they had the ability to study and retain the required information. These qualities 
were necessary in an officer who was expected to pass on clear written and verbal 
instructions to his subordinates as well as to analyse situations and to report to superiors. 
A high standard of education and intelligence was certainly required for candidates who 
applied for regular commissions in the Staff Corps who were then required to attend an 
intensive three-year officer cadet course at the Royal Military College of Australia at 
Duntroon, known at the time as West Point College.320 
With only a small professional military force, New Zealand could not justify 
establishing its own military college and this was unnecessary while Australia had an 
academy. Such trans-Tasman cooperation in the training of officers was actively 
encouraged at the highest levels as early as March 1910 when Field Marshal Lord 
Kitchener wrote a letter to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Sir Joseph 
Ward, stating ‘It appears to me that for your land forces New Zealand and Australia 
should adopt homogeneous military systems, in order to be able to efficiently support 
one another in the event of national danger. The desirability of such cooperation is 
evident by reason of the geographical position of the two countries. I think, therefore, 
that uniformity in training and establishment of units, as well as the closest ties of 
comradeship, in the armed land forces of New Zealand and Australia should be fostered 
in every way.’321  
It was imperial initiatives that ensured New Zealand and Australian officers 
received the same training and expected to achieve the same professional standards. 
From 1910 New Zealand Permanent Force officers and Australian officers were 
examined using the same papers supplied from Britain. Again, this decision was made 
as a result of the Imperial Conference where it was decided that officers of the New 
Zealand, Australian and Canadian defence forces were to sit the same examinations as 
those of the British Army.322 The purpose of this was to ensure a marked improvement 
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in military education throughout the Empire and this certainly was the case in New 
Zealand.  
Chaytor was a prime example of what a colonial officer could achieve through 
better military education opportunities. When he was appointed to the New Zealand 
Permanent Staff, he recognised his deficiencies in his professional understanding, most 
likely apparent to him through his recent service in the Boer War and further 
highlighted during his 1905 tour of training establishments in Britain.323 He actively 
sought positions on senior training courses in England, and although he was the first 
New Zealand officer to attend such prestigious military colleges, he became the first of 
many to have the opportunity to improve their professional knowledge at overseas 
military institutions.  
In January 1909 an interchange system was introduced that saw Imperial 
officers seconded to the New Zealand Staff Corps while a number of officers from the 
New Zealand Permanent Forces attended courses and were attached to regiments in 
Britain.324 Some examples include Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Bauchop who followed 
Chaytor in attending a two-year course at the Staff College at Camberley in 1911, while 
around this time Brigadier-General R.H. Davies, Lieutenant-Colonel F.W. Abbott and 
Captain R.J.S. Seddon were attached to regular regiments in England for training.325 A 
further eight lieutenants were also sent to Britain on secondment for the purpose of 
improving training of other junior officers and non-commissioned officers on their 
return to New Zealand.326 This interchange system was implemented at the same time 
as the number of officer cadets being sent to Duntroon was increasing. 
These policies resulted in a marked improvement in the professionalism of the 
Staff Corps, Permanent Staff and the Territorial Force leading up the Great War. Those 
senior officers who returned from the Staff College in England were usually then 
appointed to command military districts to oversee the implementation of the current 
training practices of the British Army throughout the Territorial units.327 Lieutenant-
Colonel Bauchop took command of the Canterbury Military District on his return in 
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1912, while Lieutenant-Colonel Abbott was appointed to command the Auckland 
Military District but died on the return journey before being able to take the position.328  
At this time the majority of the Staff Corps officers were scattered throughout 
the military districts where their main purpose was to implement regular training of 
Territorial formations and provide administration.329 However, the size of the corps 
remained small and even as late as 1912 it had not reached its official strength of 100, 
with only 66 being recorded in Godley’s annual report.330 This meant that there was an 
insufficient number of professional officers to provide all the training for the increasing 
number of Territorial soldiers, even though Godley argued otherwise. He stated in an 
annual report that the proportion of one permanent officer, non-commissioned officer 
or other rank to every 50 Territorials was appropriate given the high standard of the 
permanent soldiers.331 
However, the responsibility of implementing regular training within individual 
battalions, regiments and artillery batteries mainly fell of the shoulders on Territorial 
officers. By 1912 there were 1,174 Territorial officers registered to provide leadership 
for the 30,000 strong defence force of active Territorials and reservists.332 Although 
only part-time civilian-soldiers, these officers were required to achieve a high standard 
of proficiency. Territorial Force officers in New Zealand were required to sit the same 
examinations as Territorial Army officers in Britain before being commissioned.333 It 
is clear that they were required to have a high standard of military knowledge and had 
to be self-motivated in their study. 
 
    Influence of Military Literature  
 
The Defence Department extended military knowledge by issuing a variety of 
training manuals from Britain free to every officer and NCO within the Territorial 
Force.334 In addition, copies of the Handbook on Military Law and the New Zealand 
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Military Journal were issued free to all officers on the active list.335  Such reading was 
essential for experienced senior officers and inexperienced junior officers alike in that 
these part-time leaders of men were required to be cognizant with accepted protocols 
and regulations of the British Army to function effectively, as well as remain up-to-date 
with strategies and tactics of modern warfare. Although these books and journals 
proved indispensable in educating Territorial officers and non-commissioned officers, 
the more discerning officer was required to extend his study to the plethora of available 
manuals and relevant reading material related to his particular corps to become 
proficient. The War Office in London was the main supplier of manuals to the New 
Zealand Defence Department leading up to the First World War, but with the demand 
for such material increasing with the expansion of the Territorial Force, the government 
commissioned local printing companies, such as Whitcombe & Tombs, to provide 
sufficient copies to satisfy the thirst for military knowledge from the Dominion’s citizen 
soldiers.336 An example was the British Field Service Regulations, 1909, which was the 
essential handbook for both professional and Territorial officers before the outbreak of 
war.337 
Officers needed a certain level of education and intelligence to be able to read 
and understand the material that was available to them. This was to be expected of 
officers within the technical corps, such as those in the engineers and artillery, who 
were required to be au fait with the sciences, mathematics and recent advances in their 
particular fields. However, the evolution of modern warfare meant that even the most 
junior infantry platoon commander was required to study aspects of all the various corps 
that made up the army to ensure the coordinated mutual support required for military 
operations. Anthony Clayton argues this was in contrast to the experience of infantry 
officers in the previous two centuries where linear tactics of attack and defence required 
that a junior officer, such as an ensign or lieutenant, only needed to be familiar with the 
rudiments of platoon drill in musketry, marching and advancing in particular 
formations.338 In the British Army of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries officers 
very seldom trained with their men, mainly leaving these duties to the senior non-
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commissioned officers.339 The advances in artillery during the last half of the nineteenth 
century, particularly with the introduction of long-range quick-firing heavy guns and 
machine guns had changed the nature of battlefield tactics. Some relevant lessons had 
been learned during the Boer War and in the numerous small colonial wars of the late 
nineteenth century where officers commanding small formations had more 
responsibility in directing and leading their men in battle. To do this effectively an 
infantry officer was expected to become a ‘jack of all trades’ and the only way to 
achieve this was through studying the increasing number of journals and manuals being 
published.   
No single manual was ever sufficient to cover all aspects of what an officer 
needed to study for service in a ‘modern war.’ This was mainly due to the development 
of trench warfare that required new and dynamic tactics for attack and defence; tactics 
that were not anticipated before the First World War. The desire to defeat an enemy has 
always fostered continual improvements in weapons and how they were to be used to 
gain superiority over the foe. Strategies and tactics implemented at the outbreak of the 
Great War very quickly became outdated. This posed a problem of how best to keep 
the officers and NCOs informed about the new systems that were being introduced 
without the need to keep the men longer in training camps and out of the front line 
where they were needed. Even prior to war being declared in August 1914, the War 
Office had produced and supplied the British Army and the defence forces throughout 
the Empire, including New Zealand, with numerous publications that summarised the 
military arts. There were general treatises, such as Field Service Regulations, Military 
Cooking, Military Law, the Clothing Regulations and Care of Barracks that had 
universal relevance to every officer, but there were also numerous textbooks for most 
corps that were distributed widely through His Majesty’s Stationary Office in 
London.340 For New Zealand Staff Corps officers and those infantry officers in the 
Territorials, the manual Infantry Training 1914 was the most up-to-date title available 
and considered essential reading, with the chapters on musketry being crucial.341 As for 
the cavalry, the standard essential title was Cavalry Training, although not all the tactics 
stipulated in this manual were appropriate for the New Zealand Mounted Rifles.342  The 
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technical corps within the army were saturated with official instructions; engineer 
officers were required to be fully conversant with all aspects of their profession 
covering many different types of general construction, surveying, drainage, electrics, 
railways, signalling, as well as providing defensive and offensive constructions. 
Although there were individual manuals covering each of the above, the Field 
Engineering manual of 1911 proved to be the ‘bible’ for engineer officers throughout 
the Empire.343 Likewise, the Royal Artillery disseminated handbooks for every piece 
of ordnance in use by British forces, plus volumes of text relating to ranges, instruments 
and the use of horse artillery.344 These were issued to artillery officers and NCOs 
throughout the dominions and colonies to help ensure that the artillery corps maintained 
a high level of proficiency.345  
The required reading of both Regular and Territorial officers was not restricted 
to that of their respective corps. Sub-genres of manuals relating to foreign armies, 
countries, pay, military history, command and leadership, medical and veterinary 
matters were distributed so that officers had a general understanding and knowledge of 
military-related topics outside their specific expertise. In 1912, over 7,000 various 
training manuals imported from England had been issued free to every officer and NCO 
of the Territorial Force to increase their knowledge.346 Clearly, the officers, both from 
the Staff Corps and the Territorials, who led the Main Body of the expeditionary force 
in late 1914 had sufficient reading material to ensure they were fully conversant with 
the theories, practices, law and tactics of the British Army when they embarked for 
active service. Major-General Sir Andrew Russell’s personal library, now held at the 
National Army Museum, indicates the importance such senior officers attached to 
studying recent conflicts involving the British Army. Russell’s collection included Sir 
John Fortescues’s History of the British Army, as well as official histories of the Second 
Anglo-Boer War and the Crimean War. Russell was one of a few who had seen service 
as a regular officer, having graduated from Sandhurst, but typically, what the majority 
of officers in the Dominion’s military forces lacked was essential experience.347  
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To compensate for initial lack of military experience the Field Service Pocket 
Book, 1914 was issued to every New Zealand officer and NCO training in Egypt in 
early 1915.348 This was an official War Office handbook that was issued to all officers 
and senior NCOs within the British Army during the Great War and provided details of 
many aspects of the British military, beginning with the war establishment of the British 
Army and covering cavalry and infantry divisions, as well as ancillary units.349 The 
handbook detailed everyday military conduct in the field and provided the regulations 
and guidelines for marches, water supply, quarters, camp cooking, and sanitation.350 
There were chapters that covered orders and the means of communication, map reading, 
field sketching, overseas operations and intelligence functions. Basic field engineering 
was also included, covering aspects of tools, explosives, together with defensive 
systems, obstacles and working parties.351 Minutiae of engineering field craft covered 
such specifics as knots, blocks and tackles, bridging and demolitions. Chapter V 
provided the necessary details for transportation, including convoys and movements by 
sea and rail, while chapter VI dealt with the important details of small arms and heavier 
guns, the supply of ammunition, rations, fuel, together with their storage.352 Other 
aspects covered included pay, clothing, field equipment, office work, billeting orders, 
discipline and courts martial. There was also a chapter covering the Indian Army and 
the military forces of other British dominions, as well as details of foreign armies. This 
handbook, and the revised 1916 edition, proved invaluable to the citizen-soldier officers 
and NCOs of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force as it provided them with a concise 




   Forming the Expeditionary Force  
 
Officers of the Main Body of the expeditionary force had very little time for 
training in New Zealand prior to embarking for overseas service. In July 1914 the War 
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Office warned the New Zealand government that war was imminent and to begin 
preparations.353 When war was declared on 5 August the preparations for mobilisation 
had already begun, with Territorial officers preparing themselves and their families for 
their departure. Within days of the declaration of war both officers and the rank and file 
of the Territorial Force who had volunteered to serve overseas, plus civilian volunteers, 
were gathering and forming new battalions and regiments in locations throughout the 
country. Training began immediately with parades, drills, musketry, forced marches 
and mock battles held on a daily basis to attain unit cohesion and improve military 
effectiveness.354 The officers within these units had very little time to improve their 
own military knowledge before the force embarked from Wellington on 16 October. 
However, the six-week sea voyage from New Zealand to Egypt provided an opportunity 
to rectify this. Conscientious junior officers keen to develop a sound knowledge of their 
profession and anxious to be proficient platoon and company commanders, spent much 
of their spare time studying the wealth of military related manuals and journals made 
available to them.355  
In an effort to promote proficiency and standards, as well as to combat boredom, 
formal lessons were also provided. Senior officers such as Major Herbert Hart of the 
Wellington Infantry Battalion held daily courses of instruction for junior officers, 
covering a variety of subjects, including lectures on infantry tactics taken from the 
Training and Manoeuvre Regulations, 1914 and Infantry Training, 1914.356 According 
to Hart, lectures for the officers were usually held every evening between 8 and 9 pm, 
while officer physical training was held every morning between 7 and 7.30 am.357 In 
between times the officers were required to attend parades and lead sessions of 
instruction to the rank and file.358 Hart also recorded that there were evening lectures 
provided for non-commissioned officers and those who were considered potential 
NCOs.359 Many of these men were later commissioned, and such lectures and 
instructions marked the beginning of their officer training.  
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The experience for officers selected and sent in the numerous reinforcement 
detachments for the expeditionary force differed from those of the Main Body. The 
officers who embarked with the 1st Reinforcements that accompanied the Main Body 
all had extensive Territorial training and experience, similar or equivalent to those in 
the Main Body. However, with most of the experienced officers from the Staff corps 
and Territorials serving overseas in the Main Body, there was only a limited number of 
experienced officers available in New Zealand to fill the commissioned vacancies in 
the reinforcement drafts. The commanders of each military district were asked to 
recommend officers for active foreign service with preference given to those in the 
following order: Territorial officers on the active list, Territorial officers on the 
unattached list, officers on the Reserve list, officers on the Retired list and officers who 
have had previous military service in the forces of New Zealand or Britain.360 
 These selection criteria proved practical in that these officers already had 
sufficient experience as Territorial platoon, troop or company commanders and were 
familiar with the necessary military protocols, reducing the amount of time required to 
prepare them for military service overseas. For this very reason Godley initially decided 
not to accept civilian officer candidates and required those civilians who aspired to gain 
commissions in the expeditionary force to serve in the ranks first.361 Subsequent 
selection criteria included a provision that nominated lieutenants were only accepted 
up to the age of 38, while captains and majors had to be no older than 48.362 These rules 
were introduced as a result of actual experience in the officer training courses held at 
Trentham Camp, where it was found that some older officers were not fit enough to 
handle the physical demands.363 Another condition was that nominated officers must 
have held a commission for at least six months before being recommended. This rule 
was adopted when it was found that some officers had less service than non-
commissioned officers who had been training in Trentham Camp with a view to 
obtaining a commission from the ranks.364 
In contrast to officers of the Main Body, those in the reinforcement drafts were 
required to undergo a five-week training course at Trentham before the rank and file of 
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the draft were due.365 According to Brigadier-General A.W. Robin, a Boer War veteran 
and General Officer Commanding the New Zealand Forces in 1915, the preliminary 
training course had produced excellent results, with the officers found to be fully 
competent to undertake preliminary training of their men on arrival in camp.366 Robin 
also noted that these preliminary officer courses promoted efficiency in providing an 
opportunity to ‘weed out those officers who are not likely to prove efficient.’367 Not all 
candidates were found to be suitable and those who had not reached the appropriate 
standard were told that their services were not required in the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force or were offered a lower rank or resignation.368 How the army 
achieved this was by making all the appointments in Trentham Camp probationary only 
during the training courses, with the officers not being gazetted into the NZEF until 
they were finally approved the week of their embarkation.369 Once on the sea voyage 
to Egypt, and later England, these officers received a similar on-board regime of 
lectures and drills experienced by those of the Main Body. 
Prior to embarking for overseas service, reinforcement officers received an 
opportunity to hone their leadership skills when they undertook further training with 
the other ranks when they entered camp. Although the training the reinforcements 
received in New Zealand developed as the war progressed, the training syllabus of the 
8th Reinforcements in August 1915 was generally typical of what the officers and other 
ranks experienced early in the Great War. For the infantry and mounted rifles this 
included squad drill, physical drill, route marches, lectures on discipline, health and 
soldierly spirit, musketry and care of weapons, bayonet fighting, entrenching, platoon, 
troop, company and squadron attack exercises, while learning the fundamentals of 
manning outposts and advance guards.370 Artillery personnel underwent the same 
training as above but their instruction also included lectures and practice on gun drill, 
battery foot drill, signalling, semaphore and working field telephones.371            
An important factor to note regarding training of expeditionary force personnel 
in New Zealand prior to service overseas is that all nominated non-commissioned 
officers were required to complete a course at Trentham identical to the officers. 
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Preference was given to NCOs from within the Territorial Force or with previous 
military service; otherwise civilians were selected who had a good education and some 
military knowledge.372 Like the officers, these men were put through a five-week course 
where those found unsuitable were identified and removed.373 This is significant in that 
most NCOs who survived the early campaigns of the war went on to receive 
commissions to replace heavy combat officer casualties, especially within the infantry 
battalions. The initial training they received at Trentham would have certainly provided 
them with the basic foundation of the knowledge and leadership skills they would 
require to lead men into battle. 
 
    
   Training in Egypt 
 
It was in Egypt where the officer corps of the expeditionary force had sufficient 
time to develop their military skills and put their knowledge into practice. The Main 
Body arrived at Alexandria on 2 December 1914 and from then until mid-April 1915 
when elements of the force embarked for the Gallipoli campaign, the majority of time 
was spent in various forms of training. The New Zealanders were encamped at Zeitoun 
on the outskirts of Cairo and it was here that the officers and men spent endless days 
enduring parades, marching drills, musketry training, bayonet drills and forced marches 
while combating the heat, thirst and flies.374 This was the first opportunity that the 
senior officers got to train and command brigade-size formations in exercises involving 
positions of attack and defence in mock battles. Godley was determined to forge the 
New Zealanders into the best force of citizen soldiery gathering in Egypt but his 
repeated comments that they were nearly as good as British regulars did not endear him 
to his subordinates.375 However, the constant training did help to promote cohesion and 
camaraderie within units, while reducing the potential for a break down in discipline 
which had been an issue for the Australian commanders.376 During this period the senior 
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officers had a chance to get to know the qualities of the junior officers under their 
command, while platoon and company commanders attempted to gain the trust and 
respect of their men through their shared experiences during the desert training.    
The time spent training in Egypt provided the volunteer ‘civilian’ officers with 
the opportunity to gain some confidence as leaders prior to seeing action in the 
Dardanelles. The members of the NZEF had a lot to learn, especially the junior officers. 
In early December 1914 Colonel Russell wrote in his diary that there was plenty of 
room for improvement in the development of young and inexperienced officers within 
the Mounted Rifle Brigade: ‘Troop training – many young officers as yet by no means 
understand how to lead – and many are ignorant of details they should have at their 
fingertips.’377 However, combined exercises with British and Australian formations 
fostered healthy competition, where the New Zealand officers, led by Godley, strived 
to be as professional as the regular British Army officers. Godley was wary that family 
and social ties within the provincial battalions and regiments were not necessarily 
conducive to maintaining military discipline. To counteract this he demanded that strict 
military protocol be adhered to in relation to officers and the rank and file.378 This 
ensured that the volunteer Territorial officers, and particularly the junior officers, began 
to develop a greater sense of professionalism. Any familiarity between officers and 
their men was actively discouraged by senior commanders, who expected their 
subordinates to follow the examples of their British Army counterparts in maintaining 
strictly professional relationships with their men.379 While comparing themselves to 
fellow British and Australian officers, the New Zealanders began to gain confidence in 
their own martial abilities. Training in the desert presented unique challenges, 
especially in regard to map reading and navigation, where the expansive desert and 
shifting dunes made maps unreliable. According to Lieutenant-Colonel William 
Malone of the Wellington Infantry Regiment, what helped was that many New Zealand 
officers came from rural backgrounds, especially those in the Mounted Rifles, and were 
used to using geographical features to determine their locations; officers of British 
Territorial units usually had little or no experience in such matters.380 
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Provincial rivalry and the competitive nature of battalion and regimental 
commanders also fostered strict training regimes for junior officers. Malone and 
Lieutenant-Colonel D. McBean Stewart of the Canterbury Infantry Regiment were two 
such officers who struck up a rivalry and were determined that their respective 
battalions were going to be the best units in the expeditionary force.381 To achieve this 
they both recognised that their company officers required constant training for the rank 
and file to be efficient. Even before the troops embarked for Egypt Malone demanded 
that his officers improve their military knowledge and performance. Entries in his 
diaries indicate his determination and drive in providing the required training for both 
officers and rank and file: ‘They are of all classes. Sons of wealthy run holders, farmers, 
schoolmasters, scholars, MAs, BAs, musicians, tradesmen, mechanics, lawyers and all 
sorts. They will make good soldiers and the regiment I trust will lead the other 
regiments in the Brigade. I will do my best to make it.’382 He had particular concern for 
the lack of experience of his company grade officers prior to embarkation and was 
determined to improve their performance through constant training. Repeated diary 
entries made while leading battalion training in the hills surrounding Miramar near 
Wellington portray this: 
 
Regiment training in Wellington - work by company commanders not  good…paraded all 
officers and went for them for not arranging facilities for men to wash their cloths and criticized work of 
yesterday.…regiment to Karori Hills, company in attack practice – not well done. Officers don’t rise to 
the occasion. Must keep away at them until they do.…Went with regiment to Miramar – attack practice- 
not good enough. I sailed into [verbally attacked] two of my company commanders. Determined to go 
back to most elementary work and take each company myself or get Hart and McDonnell to do so. I have 
given the commanders a good show and they cannot train their companies because they don’t know their 
work. I have been too considerate.383 
 
While in transit Malone remained active in improving the military knowledge 
and training for his officers. On board ship at night he would attend the lectures 
provided for young officers and read extracts from Ruskin’s lecture on war, ‘Crown of 
Wild Olive’ while also instructing on tactics and engagements of the Boer War.384 He 
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obviously thought the officers of the battalion were not proficient at this time and 
voiced some frustration in his entry for 9 November 1914, ‘I am reviewing the training 
and am going to begin again! More work for the NCOs and officers and less for the 
men until the officers and NCOs are better able to teach ‘Festina Lente’ – make haste 
slowly.’385  
Once settled into camp life at Zeitoun Malone continued to train his battalion 
hard, particularly in an effort to make his officers and NCOs professional. Emphasis 
was placed on musketry and bayonet drills in keeping with the British Army practice 
and it was the job of the officers to instruct the rank and file; ‘I got [Major] Temperley 
up to give my officers some points on bayonet fighting to pass on to the men and 
NCOs.’386 There is no doubt from reading his diaries that Malone was a perfectionist 
and demanded nothing short of excellence from his officers. He was determined to 
prepare his troops as best he could for the physical and tactical demands of modern 
warfare and remained critical of his subordinate officers, at least leading up to the 
Gallipoli campaign. This is evident in his entry for 18 January 1915:  
 
Battalion training. March, protection  on the move, ‘attack.’ I had the advance guard struck up 
and then put 3 companies into attack. The work fairly done, but company commanders do not co-operate 
together, and the flank company, as usual sprayed out too wide. In the afternoon, I had a marked position 
laid out and put the whole battalion into action pinning the company commands down to an exact 
frontage, so that they may get the full picture of a properly built up firing and assaulting line. Their 
spraying out does away with weight in the assault….Our brigadier, who unknown to us had been 
watching the show, came and complimented me saying the work was ‘exceedingly well done.’ He was 
easier pleased than I. There is lots of room for improvement.’387  
 
 Malone was obviously a hard task master and rightly strove for professional 
standards from his ‘citizen-soldier’ officers. However, it is debatable whether his 
expectations were realistic when most of his junior commanders had never experienced 
battle.  
The initial experience of the officers of the mounted rifle regiments was slightly 
different from that of the infantry. An examination of the training syllabus for the first 
five weeks that the 2nd Reinforcements of the Otago Mounted Rifles were in Egypt 
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shows similarities in training to that of the infantry, but also the limitations they 
laboured under initially. It took three to five weeks before the horses of the mounted 
rifle units were considered fit enough for any heavy work, which ensured the first few 
weeks of training were restricted.388  Training was initially confined to five hours a day, 
mainly due to the need for the men and horses to acclimatise to the Egyptian heat. The 
syllabus for the first week included the care and light exercise of the horses, squadron 
drill, musketry (concentrating on fire direction and control), dismounted outpost 
exercises, and a series of lectures which the regimental officers gave to the other ranks. 
This training regime was repeated for the next four weeks but also included the 
introduction of advanced musketry and exercises in providing advance, rear and flank 
guards in week two, entrenching and exercises in attack and defence in week three, and 
exercises in conducting patrols, reconnaissance and providing protection on the march 
and at rest.389  
The infantry and artillery officers were equally kept busy on arrival in Egypt, 
learning from more intensive training than they had previously received in New 
Zealand. In the first five weeks in Egypt infantry officers were required to develop their 
skills in leading platoon and company drill, along with exercises in musketry and 
bayonet fighting, extended order drill, skirmishing, attack practice and night 
operations.390 By the fourth and fifth weeks battalion officers were required to lead their 
troops in outpost duties, route marches across the desert and exercises in attack and 
defence. As a technical branch of the expeditionary force, the officers of the New 
Zealand Field Artillery were expected to be experts in all the tasks and technical 
knowledge required of combat artillerists. While not only having to instruct their 
gunners in standing guns drills, the laying of their guns, fuse setting, and providing 
lectures on gunnery and ammunition, the battery officers also had to refine their skills  
as artillery directors and observers, while practising the fundamentals of fire discipline 
and leading batteries in action. Once in Egypt artillery officers also had the opportunity 
to experience regular brigade-scale exercises where they could practice march 
discipline, reconnaissance and communication skills, along with the occupation and 
                                                 




retirement from positions, and methods of target engagement and observation under 
pseudo-combat conditions.391               
Although the months of constant training in Egypt leading up to the Gallipoli 
campaign proved monotonous for the officers and other ranks of the expeditionary 
force, this period was crucial in moulding the New Zealanders into an effective military 
formation. Many soldiers, like Private Peter Thompson of the Otago Infantry Battalion, 
complained in diaries and letters home of the filth, heat and taxing route marches in the 
desert, but they remained eager to have an active role in the war: ‘Life here is very 
monotonous as a permanent job…We are all sick of this show and want to be doing 
something somewhere.’392 There was criticism from some quarters concerning the 
quality of the training provided to the colonial troops, with Australian war 
correspondent (and later official historian) Charles Bean claiming what they received 
was ‘simply the old British Army training. Little advice came from the Western Front. 
The Australian and New Zealand officers had to rely almost entirely upon themselves. 
They had not seen a bomb [hand grenade]; they had scarcely heard of a periscope [a 
device using mirrors for safe observation from trenches].’393 However, although the 
training the New Zealand and Australian troops received at this time was certainly not 
as advanced as that which they received in the later years of the war, it was in Egypt in 
late 1914 – early 1915 that the citizen volunteer officers and other ranks had time to 
learn the fundamentals of military life, develop regimental élan and fitness, while 
acquiring essential combat skills that would be required in the campaigns ahead. 
  
 
   Learning from Experience 
 
It was also in Egypt that officers of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade got to put 
their recent training into practice. In late January 1915 the Turks made a reconnaissance 
in force towards the Suez Canal and the New Zealanders were sent from Zeitoun Camp 
to help defend it. This was the first action that the expeditionary force was involved in 
during the Great War and provided the officers with an opportunity to apply their skills 
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in maintaining a defensive position under fire. On 31 January Major Hart was in 
command of the Wellington Battalion located on the west bank of the canal when it 
became the first New Zealand unit to be fired upon during the war: ‘The right of my 
line was fired on at 4 am…We all got into the trenches but the enemy withdrew before 
morning.’394  This initial experience also provided the officers and men a taste of what 
to expect in trench warfare; on 4 February Hart wrote in his diary:  
 
Rained hard for two hours last night and everyone got soaked through. Frightfully unpleasant 
standing still in the trenches watching and watching and waiting in case of alarm, with the rain running 
down one’s back. In addition to sentries being on guard all night, all ranks stand to arms at 4 am. The 
sun came out warm and bright and we got dry again during the morning.395  
 
 However, this experience in action proved invaluable in boosting the 
confidence of officers where their professional abilities were recognised by their 
superiors and exposed any shortcomings in their training that needed be dealt with.  
This short ‘stunt’ (a term used by the soldiers for combat operations) at the front was 
followed by a return to Zeitoun where daily training recommenced until early April.               
Training in the NZEF leading up to the landing at Anzac Cove on 25 April 1915 
had not prepared the officers and men for the required tactics and also rigours of the 
failed campaign. Even as late as March 1915, the infantry battalions were continuing to 
prepare for fighting on the Western Front, as evident from another of Hart’s diary 
entries: ‘At 5 pm the Division paraded and marched for two hours into the desert to 
Beet el Shahat and there our Brigade and the Australian Infantry Brigade occupied 
imaginary trenches on the assumption we were part of the British line in France. The 
enemy was 400 yards in front entrenched and protected by flares and entanglements. 
Our Battalion was in the front line and sent out patrols seeking information, and to 
destroy the entanglements and flares and disturb and annoy the enemy.’396 However, 
such tactics proved near impossible during the Gallipoli campaign as the Turks held the 
high ground that restricted the British forces from movement in the open. No units 
within the expeditionary force had received any training for operating in hill-covered 
terrain as none of the senior officers, such as Godley, Russell and Johnston, had ever 
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expected to be campaigning anywhere other than the plains of northern France or the 
deserts of the Middle East.  
Both the officers and the NCOs had to adapt quickly in finding ways to operate 
in what effectively became siege warfare, for which they had not been trained. The 
experience of Lieutenant Arthur Batchelor who led No. 2 Troop of the 9th Squadron of 
the Wellington Mounted Rifles was typical of officers when they first landed at 
Gallipoli: 
  
Ordered ashore at 6 o’clock. Taken ashore in destroyers. Bullets splashing all around us. Rotten 
feeling at first, soon got used to them…Landed at Suicide Point and proceeded 600 yards to left of beach 
to Shrapnel Gully. Heavy fire above us. Camped for night in Deadman’s Gully. Dead tired and slept in 
spite of bullets…Ordered to relieve Naval Brigade now in Reserve Trenches. Had to climb to top of cliffs 
up a very steep grade road made by our troops. Made ourselves comfortable in dug-outs in side of 4 ft 
trench.397  
 
The difficulties in fighting at Gallipoli and the need for the officers to quickly 
adapt tactics were apparent from the day of the landing. Lieutenant Herbert Westmacott 
led a platoon of the Auckland Battalion ashore and immediately advanced up the rugged 
terrain in support of the Australians:  
 
 The regiment was very confused and bunched up, owing to Dawson’s company  having run 
into an unclimbable cliff and being turned about towards the rest of us. No parade ground formation 
seemed possible here…I called to my platoon to follow as they were and led the way up, by what seemed 
the shortest route along the hill side…I came quickly to where a party of Australian engineers were 
making a zig-zag track to the top, and almost immediately cut off an angle of it by making a run up. I 
was followed by some of the more active men and from where I was above them helped others by taking 
their rifles by the muzzle and pulling them up till six men were with me, when I saw it was too steep for 
most of them and told the  others to follow the track already well defined and half formed.398 
 
 It was the difficult terrain that determined the new tactics that now needed to 
be developed and used; officers at all levels now were receiving their practical training 
through experience.  
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The continual selection and training of junior officers while the expeditionary 
force was on campaign was essential to ensure the fighting effectiveness of the units by 
providing replacements for the heavy losses of company commanders. Officer 
candidates, increasingly chosen from experienced NCOs, were sent to officer training 
courses in Egypt and Britain where they received instructions about the various duties 
and knowledge deemed to be required. One such Gallipoli veteran to be selected to 
attend a commissioning course at Sling Camp in England was Cecil Howden, who had 
been a trooper in the Mounted Rifles but later transferred to the Wellington Infantry 
Regiment in March 1916.  After a year of service on the Western Front Howden found 
himself attending a six-week commissioning course at Sling in late April 1917: 
‘commenced our classes today with short lectures and drill, etc, having in all about 15 
different subjects during the day.’399 He recorded in his diary that during the course the 
candidates were examined for their knowledge on bombing, field engineering, 
administration, musketry, pistol use, as well as drills in advancing in company, platoon 
and extended order, along with bayonet fighting and physical drill.400 Howden passed 
the course and was then commissioned as a 2nd lieutenant in the NZ Machine Gun 
Corps, remaining at that rank until the end of the war.401 His experience was typical of 
those who were fortunate enough to attend commissioning courses in England and 
Egypt for officer candidates. 
Some officer candidates from the New Zealand Division were sent to England 
to serve in Officer Cadet Battalions. These units were introduced in 1916 and were 
predominantly created to train potential officers from the ranks.402 Many of these units 
were based at universities, which reinforced the link between education and the officer 
class of the British Army.403   This system ensured that those candidates who proved 
unsuitable could be identified and returned to their original regiments. The officer 
cadets within these training battalions only received their commissions once they had 
successfully completed the four-month course. The content of these courses remained 
fairly constant throughout the war and included various subjects, such as drill, 
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musketry, tactics, military law and recent military history. Other subjects covered 
included anti-gas measures, open warfare, field engineering (which included the siting 
and lay of trenches and the construction of dugout and tunnels), administration, map-
reading, reconnaissance and bombing.404 Gary Sheffield states that one of the primary 
roles of the battalions was to teach the officer cadets to think like officers and raise their 
level of thinking so that they could think for themselves and issue orders with 
confidence.405  The socialisation of the cadets was also a priority, where they were 
instructed on the appropriate expected behaviour of an officer in the British Army. 
Sheffield argues that this system was a pragmatic response to the shortage of officers 
from the ‘traditional providing classes’ and an attempt to manufacture passable 
imitations of gentlemanly officers through an intense course that taught the ‘public 
school values’ and social training that upper-class men received in their youth.406 The 
whole process stemmed from the belief that officers had to possess certain qualities to 
be effective.407       
Not all officers promoted from the ranks were fortunate enough to attend 
commissioning courses. At times the severe losses of company officers on the Western 
Front during an offensive meant that vacancies had to be filled without delay to provide 
platoons with effective leaders. These positions were usually filled by experienced 
NCOs who had proven ability in leadership and were knowledgeable on the tactics 
required for trench warfare. One such example was that of Alexander Aitken of the 
Otago Infantry Regiment, who as a student at Otago University in 1915, had enlisted 
and served as a private during the Gallipoli campaign. While serving on the Western 
Front in mid-1916 he was promoted to sergeant and only several months later was 
awarded a commission as a 2nd lieutenant in the same regiment.408 In his autobiography, 
Aitken states that his battalion had sustained heavy casualties among its platoon 
commanders during operations leading up to the battle of the Somme and that a number 
of NCOs were promoted without attending a commissioning course: 
 
Without our knowledge several others and myself, on leaving Armentieres, had been 
recommended for commissions in the field; this had gone through, and we were now received by the 
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Brigadier-General. Promotion, antedated by three days, was really from 26th August; the other new 
subalterns were Sergeant Bain of the 4th company, Gabites and Rallinshaw of the 8th, and R.Q.M. Pascoe. 
For me the Brigadier-General’s handshake meant wounds a month later on 27th September (though as an 
N.C.O. I might well have been killed), for three of the others death – Bain and Rallinshaw on this same 
27th, Gabites at Polderhoek Chateau on 3rd December 1917.409 
 
 Aitken makes it quite clear in his memoir that neither he nor his compatriots 
received any form of officer training before becoming platoon commanders prior to the 
involvement of the NZ Division in the battle of the Somme in September 1916. It 
appears that operational requirements made it impossible for these men to attend a 
commissioning course that would have been the usual protocol; they only had sufficient 
time to secure the appropriate kit. Aitken states that on 29 August the five new 
subalterns were congratulated by their colonel and given leave to proceed to Abbeville 
to invest their kit allowance of £25 in procuring officers’ clothing and equipment.410 
Once this was achieved, and after a few days leave, he was then transferred to take 
command of the 1st Platoon of the 4th Company of the Otago Infantry Regiment prior 
to embarking for the Somme sector.411 After being severely wounded leading his 
platoon into combat, Aitken was subsequently invalided out of the army. He eventually 
became a professor of mathematics and occupied the Chair in that field at Edinburgh 
University.412  
Junior officers who accompanied the numerous reinforcement detachments that 
were sent from the Dominion to serve with the New Zealand Division on the Western 
Front underwent a rigorous training regime at Sling Camp prior to transferring to 
France. Reinforcement infantry officers and other ranks were initially posted to the New 
Zealand Reserve Group where personnel were exposed to a comprehensive training 
syllabus that catered for the introduction of new weapons, such as the Lewis Gun, and 
tactics developed through the experiences of trench warfare. Such training was more 
advanced than that which the Main Body of the expeditionary force initially received 
in Egypt before the Gallipoli campaign.  A memorandum providing a synopsis of the 
training the infantry reinforcement officers and other ranks underwent in August 1917 
indicates that although musketry and drill remained an important focus of training, other 
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essential topics had been introduced. At this time reinforcements were initially required 




Lectures    36 hours 
Musketry   36 hours 
Drill     18 hours 
Bayonet Fighting & PT  13 hours 
Bombing (hand grenades)  12 hours 
Anti –gas training  6 hours 
Fire Control   6 hours 
Lewis Gun   6 hours 
Compass   6 hours 
Problem Solving   6 hours 
Revolver   4 hours 
Wiring    4 hours  
 
Combat officers of the NZEF received further training opportunities at Sling 
from 1916 onwards at the 2nd Army Central School of Instruction. Reports on lectures 
provided to officers at the school show that there was heavy importance placed on the 
continuing education of combat officers throughout the war. The roles of frontline 
officers were varied and the responsibilities of leadership in the trenches were seen as 
fundamental to efficiency and maintenance of morale. One of the lectures given at the 
school focussed on the importance of frontline officers and their troops in gathering 
military intelligence. Emphasis was placed on regimental officers in gathering 
information from sentries, scouts, patrols into ‘no man’s land,’ enemy prisoners and 
civilians, where information regarding movement in the enemy trenches, positions of 
machine guns, artillery positions, identification of enemy units and any change in 
enemy activity could be recorded and sent back to designated battalion intelligence 
officers.414  
Heavy emphasis was also placed on providing combat officers with knowledge 
and skills in the command and leadership of their men. One such lecture given to New 
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Zealand junior officers at Sling in early 1918 provided a list of principal attributes seen 
as necessary in establishing successful combat leadership. This lecture, entitled 
‘Command and Leading of Men,’ stated that it was most important for officers to gain 
the confidence of their subordinates which could be achieved by showing professional 
knowledge; by displaying physical courage which was considered ‘absolutely essential 
in every platoon commander and every man who has to deal with men’; and by 
constantly displaying moral courage and positivity, stating ‘A man who can display 
cheeriness under all circumstances and conditions is invaluable.’415 The conditions and 
experiences of trench warfare made it almost impossible for young officers to live up 
to these ideals, where the compounding affects of exposure to artillery bombardment, 
sudden death and life in the trenches proved physically and emotionally taxing on those 
who had to live through it.  
Such lectures also focussed on instilling a sense of duty of officers to their men 
and fellow officers. One such practical tip provided in one of the lectures would have 
struck a chord with the national sporting character and role of team captain many New 
Zealanders identified with:  
 
Another thing which will make your men follow you through thick and thin, and that is, devotion 
to duty, and to play the game. Remember that you are soldiers and that you are leading the finest men in 
the world. You cannot give too much of your time, thought, and work to the manner in which you are to 
lead them. Remember the lives of your men are in your hands, and if you do not know your work you 
are risking those men’s lives.416                                  
 
The young officers were also encouraged to show duty to fellow officers from 
neighbouring platoons and companies when fighting in the trenches. One example 
given was to not always have machine guns facing forward, but to consider providing 
covering support fire to units on each flank. Another point emphasized was to never 
revert responsibility onto subordinates but to shoulder responsibility yourself.417 This 
responsibility included stepping up to take control if a superior officer became a 
casualty: 
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If you are a platoon commander you should be able to take the place of a company commander, 
and if you are a company commander, you should be able to take the place of a battalion commander.418 
 
   This encouragement of junior officers to up-skill to the next level of command 
proved practical in that it promoted self-confidence of individual officers and helped to 
ensure that unit cohesion was maintained in combat if commanding officers became 
casualties. The training was relevant in both the First and Second World Wars where 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces suffered heavy casualty rates among combat 
officers. 
Officers were also responsible for the maintenance of moral strength in combat 
units and the importance of this was stressed in lectures given while training at Sling. 
Emphasis was placed on strength of character and the use of common sense which it 
was argued provided the power of clear thinking.419   An example of the rhetoric used 
in lectures of the late war period in early 1918 indicates that officers of fighting units 
were also now encouraged to use a certain amount of initiative, based on the skills and 
knowledge they had acquired through study and experience: 
 
Success in war depends more on moral than physical qualities. Skill cannot compensate for want 
of courage, energy and determination, but even high moral qualities may not avail without careful 
preparation and skilful direction. The development of the necessary moral qualities is therefore the first 
of the objects to be attained. The next, organization and discipline, which enable those qualities to be 
controlled and used when required. A further essential is skill in applying the powers which the 
attainment of these objects confers on the troops. The fundamental principles of war are neither very 
numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made 
subject to rules.  The correct application of principles to circumstances is the outcome of sound military 
knowledge, built up by study and practice until it has become instinct.420 
 
Such advice was also mixed with an instilled sense of national superiority 
focusing on the virtues and characteristics of the British officer and his men. In the 
same lecture as above the young officers were told that they were superior to the enemy  
because of their physique, they received better training, better food, and that coming 
from New Zealand they have greater initiative and resourcefulness, while having a 





better cause to fight for.421  The officers were also told that they must always retain a 
determination to win and that they must encourage this spirit in their men as the 
offensive doctrine of war has been the doctrine of the British Army for over a century; 
they must foster and cherish it as it is the only doctrine of war that can assist a nation 
to win.422 It is questionable whether many officers experienced in trench warfare would 
be totally convinced by such jingoism, but they were provided with some practical 
leadership advice that could assist in gaining and maintaining the respect of their 
subordinates: 
 
Show your men that you know more than they do, look to their wants, their clothes, their food, 
their sorrows, their joys, treat them firmly and fairly and let them keep their place as you have to keep 
yours. Show them you are their leader in every way.423               
 
Most importantly, these young officers were told not to ask their men to do 
impossible tasks.424 While this was sound advice, the irony was that junior officers were 
unlikely to play any part in the planning of large-scale attacks but were expected to lead 
advances across difficult terrain in ‘no man’s land,’ where they were exposed to heavy 
artillery and machine gun fire, and were likely to be killed or seriously wounded. Some 
attacks did prove impossible where heavy casualties were sustained; most notably at 
Passchendaele on 12 October 1917 where a combination of poor planning, preparation 
and co-ordination at divisional level, combined with a determined German defence and 
terrain that proved almost un-crossable, led to the heaviest losses of officers and other 
ranks of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force sustained in any single battle of the 
war.425  Many of those officers who attempted to cross ‘no man’s land’ in this doomed 
attack and who survived, felt let down by the senior commanders. Captain Leslie Taylor 
who led B Company of the 3rd Battalion of the NZ Rifle Brigade wrote after the battle 
that: 
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As far as the 3rd Battalion was concerned, the whole affair from the beginning appeared to be 
rushed. This was seen in the time allowed officers to impart to the other ranks the meagre information 
received about the essential features of the attack, and in the belated issue of the bombs, flares, etc.426            
       
The disaster at Passchendaele proved that the senior commanders within the 
New Zealand Division could not expect success in battle by relying solely on the 
training, experience, leadership, courage, initiative and patriotism of the regimental and 
battalion officers and their men. While these traits were necessary, timely preparation 
was also essential if the officers of fighting units were expected to achieve success, and 
without it, their task was almost impossible.       
 
Russell’s determination to make the New Zealand Division the best fighting 
formation on the Western Front ensured that not only the most inexperienced junior 
platoon commanders but also experienced brigadiers were constantly subjected to 
various forms of training when away from the front.  A perfectionist like Malone, 
Russell was forced to rebuild the NZ Division repeatedly after it suffered heavy 
casualties in France, especially during the battle of the Somme in September 1916 and 
at Passchendaele in October 1917.427 Casualties were particularly high amongst 
infantry company and platoon commanders which had the potential to reduce the 
efficiency of the battalions. To counter this, Russell ensured that training remained a 
priority whenever units were pulled out of the front line. Experienced officers were 
expected to instruct not only recently arrived officer replacements from reinforcement 
contingents arriving from New Zealand, but also those NCOs who proved themselves 
candidates for promotion.  
The officers and troops were exposed to a regime of constant training from when 
the division first arrived on the Western Front in April 1916 up to when it garrisoned 
Cologne in December 1918. Interest was maintained, and standards improved by 
adding an element of competition to facets of training. Competitions in rifle exercises 
and physical drill were held between platoons, companies and battalions in an effort to 
get the best out of the men, with the responsibility of a good performance being placed 
on the officers.428 Russell established Divisional Training Schools for officers, NCOs 
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and other ranks where they received a range of military instruction while being held in 
reserve in the rear of the front line or when the whole division had been withdrawn 
from the front to rest.429  
 During these times experienced officers got to hone their military skills while 
the inexperienced replacement platoon commanders practised tactics and developed 
leadership skills with their men prior to going into action. Such training included 
musketry, route marches, bayonet fighting, trench-bombing and close order drill. 
Battalion and brigade size exercises were held when the opportunities arose, including 
practicing advancing over open ground under a supporting creeping barrage using live 
fire.430  Battalions from the NZ Division received such training at the infamous ‘Bull 
Ring’ training camp near Etaples on the Channel coast where the severity of the training 
was notorious. It was here, and at other similar training camps at Rouen, Harfleur and 
Havre that Kiwi officers and other ranks attended refresher courses and assault training 
before being included in an offensive.431  
 The nature of warfare on the Western Front was ever changing, especially in the 
last months of the war where the stalemate of trench warfare gave way to a more mobile 
conflict where successful offensives by both sides led to rapid advances across open 
terrain. It was at this time that the New Zealand officers realised the benefit from the 
training they had received in leading raids and patrols into ‘no man’s land.’ Raiding, 
patrolling and scouting had always been essential offensive and active defensive tactics 
in trench warfare where the aim was to gain information regarding the enemy and the 
area of operations, to inflict losses on the enemy and to destroy his morale while 
increasing that of your own troops.432 Although such tactics had been taught to infantry 
and cavalry officers prior to the Great War, they had become increasing relevant to 
trench warfare on the Western Front where the Germans generally held the high ground, 
which restricted the observation of the British forces in low lying positions. By May 
1917 New Zealand junior infantry officers at Sling were being lectured on scouting and 
leading small patrols forward of the front line, where emphasis was placed on the 
officers reporting on enemy positions, determining the best route to bring up support 
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troops, locating the best point to observe the enemy while identifying good positions to 
place machine guns.433 They were also instructed on how to distinguish between the 
enemy forward posts and the main defence line, while noting positions of wire 
entanglements, sunken roads and fordable points of a river.434  
 By early 1918 the junior officers and non-commissioned officers of 
reinforcement drafts that were arriving from New Zealand were receiving very similar, 
if not the same, comprehensive preparations at Sling prior to being posted to front-line 
units on the Western Front. Training papers held at Archives New Zealand in 
Wellington indicate that from at least February 1918 NCOs were systematically trained 
to step up to command platoons when required. This training policy proved a practical 
measure to help retain the effectiveness and cohesion of small combat formations 
during operations where casualties among junior officers were very high. In a 
memorandum titled ‘Special Training for Reinforcement Officers and NCOs,’ it states 
that on arrival at Sling, officers and all NCOs above the rank of lance-corporal were 
detached from their units from 8.30 am to 6.30 pm daily for the purpose of going 
through a special course of instruction.435 This course lasted for five weeks, during 
which time they were given instruction in all subjects with a view for preparing them 
for leadership roles in the trenches. During this time they were available only for 
administrative duties and recreational training with their units at weekends and in the 
evenings.436 
The differences in the later-war training within the NZEF compared to that of 
1914-1915 were quite marked. Most significant was that reinforcement junior officers 
and NCOs were training together. Classes were organised into training platoons and 
sections, with individual officers and NCOs each having a turn acting as platoon and 
section commanders respectively. The intention of this was to ensure that all were made 
thoroughly competent with the latest platoon organisation and tactics, which were 
generally new to them.437 
Such courses provided intensive training and the performance of individuals 
was highly scrutinised. During the first week the classes were put through a thorough 
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preliminary grounding in all subjects by experienced instructors, with special attention 
placed on drill, bayonet work and physical training, bombing [grenade throwing], 
musketry, Lewis Gun, gas and wiring.438 In the second week members of the class were 
expected to do the instructing on these subjects while working under supervision and 
criticism of the experienced instructors. By the third week the principles of the platoon 
and company in attack and defence were explained and carried out as a drill, with each 
officer given an opportunity to act as a platoon commander. In the fourth and fifth 
weeks live ammunition and grenades was used on ranges, while the participants were 
examined on all subjects.439 Field work was also carried out using live ammunition, 
grenades and gas, with special attention being paid to ‘Trench to Trench Attack,’ 
‘Attack on a Strong Point’ and ‘Attack in Open Warfare.’ All course participants were 
required to take notes on lectures and their notebooks were examined at the end of the 
course. Lecture subjects included: topography and use of a compass; command and 
leading men; trench raids; organisation of a battalion and a division; scouting and 
patrolling; trench discipline; trench to trench attack; theory on use of artillery, rifles and 
grenades; the system of supply in the field; military law; and the tactical employment 
of machine guns and Lewis Guns.440  On the last day of the course the officers and 
NCOs were given practical and written examinations that could determine their future 
roles. While the officers were only subjected to a confidential written assessment, the 
NCOs could find themselves demoted if they failed to achieve the required standard; a 
pass of 70 percent was required for sergeants and 60 percent for the rank of corporal.441  
Once the officers and NCOs had completed this course they returned to their units to 
undertake field training, focusing on the platoon and company in attack. Further 
advanced training was also provided to the reinforcements if they remained at Sling 
after they had completed an initial nine weeks of training.442   
Such training and experience gained from using these new weapons and 
evolving tactics during the years of static trench warfare proved invaluable in the rapid 
advances of the Hundred Days campaign in late 1918. When the opportunities came, 
the training, fighting qualities and confident professionalism of the NZ Division was 
recognised and ensured its success in the battle of Bapaume and the drive to the 







Hindenburg Line in the last month of the conflict. It was this training that provided 
officers with the essential confidence needed to successfully lead men into battle. 
 
     
    The Mounted Rifles 
 
The training experience of the officer corps of the New Zealand Mounted Rifle 
Brigade in Egypt and Palestine was somewhat different to their counterparts in France. 
Prior to landing at Gallipoli in May 1915, the brigade had received months of intensive 
training in the deserts of Egypt, where route marches, long-range patrols and mock 
engagements were the norm. Russell initially commanded the brigade and he was fully 
aware that his men had a lot to learn, especially his junior officers: ‘…many young 
officers as yet by no means understand how to lead – and many are ignorant of details 
they should have at their fingertips.’443 This situation did not last long as the months of 
constant military exercises and lectures on command and tactics transformed the 
volunteers into trained officers.  
A certain amount of colonial initiative was required by the senior command to 
ensure this happened, while the Mounted Rifle regiment and squadron commanders 
were determined to ensure their units were prepared to engage with the Turks at any 
time. Good horsemanship was imperative for the survival in the desert and it was just 
as important for the officers of the Mounted Rifles to learn to care for their mounts in 
campaign conditions in the desert as it was for them to learn the art of war. Exercises 
included fording rivers, navigation, using the geographical features of the desert, such 
as dunes and wadis as defensive and offensive positions, as well as conducting rapid 
mounted advances to then dismount and lead bayonet charges.444 What made such work 
harder was having to conduct such training in excessive heat that drained the energy of 
both the horses and the soldiers.445   
 Ironically, it was as infantry in the trenches on the hills of the Gallipoli 
Peninsula that the Mounted Rifle Brigade first saw major action. The formation was 
used to reinforce the Anzac Corps that had suffered extreme casualties. Although the 
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mounted regiments had not been training to operate in such terrain, they acquitted 
themselves well and earned a reputation as tenacious fighters. Brigadier Russell proved 
to be one of the few surviving senior officers to come out of the campaign with 
credibility, which directly led to him later being appointed to command the NZ 
Division. However, the brigade sustained heavy casualties, especially in commissioned 
officers.446 The recorded officer casualties of the Canterbury Mounted Rifle Regiment 
in September 1915 are an example of this; of the 26 officers who had originally landed 
at Gallipoli with the regiment on 12 May 1915, along with six replacement officers, up 
until that time five had been killed in action, two had died of sickness, one was missing, 
and 23 had either been wounded or hospitalised through illness.447 The mounted 
regiments were further decimated in regard to well-trained and experienced combat 
officers with the formation of the NZ Division in early 1916;  41 officers, and 2,000 
NCOs and troopers were drafted into the infantry and artillery for service in France.448 
This ensured that the depleted brigade was left with only 62 officers, with each of the 
three remaining mounted rifle regiments only having a cadre of experienced officers 
who were familiar with desert warfare.449  
To counter this, the new commander of the brigade, Brigadier-General Edward 
Chaytor, was given the task of rebuilding the regiments where he used his outstanding 
administrative ability to eventually train and create an elite mobile fighting force. At 
Moascar in April 1916 he established a base training camp with a training regiment to 
provide replacements for each active regiment, as well as schools on instruction which 
also catered for young commissioned officers; the training depot was later transferred 
to Tel el Kebir.450 The instructors were all veterans who were rotated every three 
months from regiments in the field. This system ensured that those receiving the 
training were gaining the experience from seasoned campaigners and being instructed 
on the most up-to-date tactics and practices being used at the front. Such training 
included horsemanship, marksmanship, scouting, reconnaissance, patrolling and the 
‘cultivation of initiative and self-reliance.’451 This innovative system of training proved 
successful in ensuring a constant supply of competent replacement troop commanders 
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and NCOs to the brigade for the duration of hostilities in Egypt and Palestine. Such a 
system was necessary, especially in 1916 when the brigade received a number of 
inexperienced reinforcement junior officers from New Zealand, which caused 
considerable ill-feeling among veteran NCOs who had initially been overlooked for 
commissions.452  
Chaytor refused to take any credit for his work. Instead he claimed after the war 
that he was fortunate in the calibre of his men and the reinforcements he received: ‘One 
could not go wrong; even if I made bad mistakes they would pull me through.’453 
Chaytor was also fortunate in that the brigade sustained relatively minimal officer 
casualties compared to the NZ Division in France; throughout the whole conflict only 
77 officers within the NZ Mounted Rifle Brigade (including the detached Otago 
Mounted Rifle Regiment) were either killed in action or died of wounds or illness 
compared to 514 officers from infantry regiments.454 This ensured that once the 
regiments within the Mounted Rifle Brigade had been rebuilt, the units maintained 
effectiveness in retaining experienced leadership while ensuring junior officers had 
time to learn their roles.455 
 
In general, the officers of the New Zealand military forces leading up to the 
Great War, and during it, did receive sufficient training and instruction to make them 
proficient leaders in the field. The imminent prospect of war had ensured that the New 
Zealand government provided senior commanders with sufficient funds and materiel  
to prepare both their professional and Territorial officers to a standard of leadership and 
command that allowed them to operate within the protocols and tactics of the British 
Army. However, the changing nature and tactics used in the war, combined with the 
contrasting geographical features within the various theatres the forces of the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force had to operate in ensured that continuous training and 
combat experience were crucial in developing the professional élan that the New 
Zealand officers strived so hard to achieve.    
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               Chapter 5 
 




Although the topic of this thesis concerns the combat officers of the two New 
Zealand expeditionary forces that served in the overseas campaigns of the First and 
Second World Wars, a full understanding of the initial problems facing the leadership 
of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force cannot be appreciated without 
acknowledging the experience of the Dominion’s military forces during the inter-war 
years of the 1920s and 1930s. The purpose of this chapter is to outline the difficulties 
the officers of the New Zealand Staff Corps and the Territorial Force faced in 
maintaining training and experience to achieve a sufficient standard of competency 
required of combat leaders. These difficulties were not unique to the New Zealand 
military forces, with Australia and Canada suffering from the same issues. What is 
evident is that the combat officers of the NZEF had a different experience in the lead- 
up to the First World War from those who served in the Second World War. 
Compared to the officers of the Main Body of the New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force of the Great War, in general, the officers of the 1st Echelon who embarked for 
overseas service in the Second World War were less prepared and had received only 
minimal training. Prior to the First World War, the New Zealand military forces were 
comparatively highly organised and fully funded in preparation for the coming armed 
conflict that was supported by a patriotic population; whereas leading up to the Second 
World War, local anti-war feeling and economic depression had restricted military 
training in the Dominion. The fiscal policies of successive governments of the 
Dominion during the inter-war years had a negative effect on the recruitment and 
training of both the Permanent and Territorial forces, ensuring a reduction in the 
effectiveness of both.  The shortage of experienced and highly trained officers within 
the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in 1939 initially limited its involvement in 
combat operations until the formation had sufficient time to receive sufficient training. 
This chapter examines why this occurred.     
 135 
To date little has been written about the training of officers of the New Zealand 
military forces leading up to and during the First and Second World Wars, and yet the 
importance of such training was fundamental in determining how the expeditionary 
forces were led and performed during the conflicts. In 1986 John McLeod published a 
comprehensive and ground-breaking study, Myth and Reality: The New Zealand 
Soldier in World War II, based on his Masters thesis. This work challenged some 
contemporary and lasting views regarding the experiences and attitudes of New Zealand 
soldiers in general during the conflict. Although McLeod did not concentrate 
specifically on the training of officers, he did identify that the limited training available 
to officers during the inter-war years and immediately leading up to the start of the 
conflict had a detrimental effect on the units of the expeditionary force when they first 
experienced combat.456 McLeod identified that the years of neglect of the New Zealand 
military forces had eroded the training base and effectiveness of the army to the point 
where equipment was obsolete and training was on an ad-hoc basis, where officers were 
still learning their duties while attempting to turn civilian volunteers into soldiers.457  
He directly blamed the initial defeats of 2NZEF in Greece and Crete on ‘The pre-war 
military system, through a lack of finance, numbers and initiative, [that] had failed both 
to train officers and senior NCOs for their likely war role and to imbue them with the 
necessary positive and aggressive principles required for success in war.’458 Glyn 
Harper also alludes to this view when writing of Howard Kippenberger, a self-taught 
military theorist, in his biography, Kippenberger: An Inspired New Zealand 
Commander, stating that ‘The 1930s were without doubt the nadir of the fortunes of the 
New Zealand Army.’459 This chapter expands on the issues regarding officer training 
during the period and provides a more in-depth study of what training and education 
was provided to the men who were expected to lead the nation’s citizen-soldiers into 
combat in World War Two.   
The war-weary attitude of the New Zealand public as a result of the 
unprecedented casualties suffered in the Great War had a dramatic, immediate and 
lasting effect on the training provided to the military forces of the country in the inter-
war years. This began with the demobilization of the expeditionary force in 1919 when 
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those surviving officers who had either volunteered for overseas service from the 
Territorials or who had been conscripted were gradually released from the army to 
return to civilian life, either in New Zealand or in Britain. By June 1920 the permanent 
military establishment of the Dominion had been reduced to near the pre-war numbers, 
with 191 Regular officers (including 114 from the Staff Corps) and 919 other ranks.460 
This was reduced even further by June the following year, with only 156 officers and 
676 other ranks registered in the Permanent Force.461  Likewise, the Territorial Force 
was also reduced from a strength of 1,183 officers and 30,292 other ranks in June 1920 
to 1,031 officers and 22,157 rank and file by June 1921.462 By this time Major-General 
Sir Edward Chaytor had been appointed as the general officer commanding of the New 
Zealand Forces, the first New Zealand-born officer to hold this position, and it was his 
responsibility to ensure the military establishment remained a proficient force of 
sufficient size for Dominion and imperial defence in a time of economic hardship.463 
Chaytor formulated a plan to reorganise the post-war defence forces to promote 
economy and efficiency. A single General Staff was created and the positions of 
Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General were abolished. In addition, staff work 
was divided into three branches; ‘G’ branch was to oversee training and operations, ‘A’ 
branch was responsible for the former duties of the Adjutant-General, and ‘Q’ branch 
was responsible for the former duties of the Quartermaster-General.464 To ensure 
efficiency, Chaytor argued that all staff officers were to be trained so that they could be 
interchangeable between branches.465 He also ensured that promising New Zealand 
officers with war experience were given positions on the Staff Corps, which gave the 
army a greater New Zealand character than the pre-war establishment. 
Chaytor further argued for more formal training for officers. He called for a 
reduction in drill training but an increase in training in the field; this was to include an 
11-day annual camp for other ranks and 13 days for all officers.466 Increased 
compulsory formal training for officers and NCOs was to replace the voluntary course 
that they could previously choose to attend and only selected NCOs who had attended 
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a four-week compulsory course in camp would be eligible to receive a commission.467 
Similarly, all officers would have to attend a two-week compulsory camp before they 
were considered for promotion.468 He stipulated that only officers and NCOs should 
attend a seven-day refresher course annually and that time spent training in camp with 
the whole unit should be reduced.469 This scheme was designed to provide better 
provision for the instruction of officers and NCOs while attempting to provide greater 
efficiency. The scheme called for the retention of the same number of officers and 
NCOs in the Territorial Force but a reduction in the number of privates in half from 
30,000 to 15,000, with the emphasis on ensuring efficient and rapid mobilization if and 
when required.470 Chaytor’s scheme was endorsed by a Joint Committee in October 
1920, but it was identified in the subsequent report as not providing ‘a highly trained 
force, but it will provide an efficient one which can be quickly brought to a high state 
of training on mobilisation.’471 The reorganisation began in early 1921.      
Similar to the reduced allocation of funding faced by the recently retired Chief 
of the New Zealand Defence Force, Lieutenant-General Rhys Jones, the reduction in 
military funding from the national budget at that time forced Chaytor to reformulate the 
policy that further reduced the amount of training provided to officers and other ranks 
for the whole military establishment. He outlined this policy in his annual report in 
1922 where universal military training was to continue as prescribed in the Defence Act 
of 1909 but the amount of training was to be less than that provided leading up to the 
Great War.472 Economy in expenditure was to be achieved by reducing the size of the 
Territorial Force and reducing the period of service in the force from seven years to 
four years.473 He planned to balance the reductions by ensuring that the available 
training was to be carried out by a highly trained permanent staff that could provide 
quality training under a progressive system, if not quantity.474 A general training section 
was to provide cadets with physical and musketry training, along with military drill to 
platoon level, while Territorial soldiers at the age of 19 were to receive the same but up 
to company standard. Territorial Force officers and NCOs were also to attend special 
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courses of instruction, while whole units were only to attend a limited number of drills 
each year, which included attending an annual camp.475  
Financial restrictions meant that the policy was not carried out as planned, and 
that only officers and NCOs attended annual camps. Also, as with the current situation, 
the reduction in the military vote led to the forced retirement of experienced officers 
and non-commissioned officers which further affected the number of personnel 
available to provide the necessary training, although Chaytor attempted to put a positive 
spin on it: 
 
  In the carrying-out of this reorganisation it has unfortunately been necessary to  dispense with 
the services of a number of permanent officers and non-commissioned officers surplus to establishment, 
and to reduce the number of units in the Territorial Force. The present organisation, however, is better 
adapted to the needs of modern war; it will be more economical to administer, and, in the event of a 
national emergency, can be mobilized more  quickly and effectively than the pre-war organisation.476 
  
Ironically, at this time the New Zealand Staff Corps had increased in strength 
from the pre-war establishment.  In 1913 there were only 74 officers in the 
‘understrength and over-worked’ Staff Corps at a time when the country was preparing 
for war and when there were increasing demands placed on professional officers to 
provide instruction to the Territorial units.477 By 1917 the number had risen to the ideal 
peace-time establishment of 101, of whom 74 were on active service overseas, while 
29 officer cadets were studying at the Royal Military College at Duntroon.478 This 
continuation of recruiting and educating officer cadets throughout the war and 
immediately afterwards ensured that by 1920 the Staff Corps had increased to 138 
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   Retrenchment 
 
Continued fiscal constraint throughout the 1920s and 1930s had an immediate 
and lasting adverse effect on the military establishment leading up to the Second World 
War. Officer recruitment and training, both in the Staff Corps and the Territorial Force, 
were heavily restricted which affected the whole military structure of the country. In 
November 1921 Chaytor received a directive from the government that military 
expenditure was to be reduced by £107,000. This necessitated drastic cuts where 
possible, including the discharge of most of the temporary personnel, the closing of the 
School of Instruction and the cancellations of annual camps.480 In his 1922 annual 
report Chaytor was clearly upset at having to make cuts that he viewed as detrimental 
to the service: 
 
The decision to reduce the Defence vote to £350,000 necessitated the reduction of the permanent 
personnel by over one-third; among those retired being many highly qualified officers, warrant officers 
and non-commissioned officers with excellent records of service both in New Zealand and in the field; 
also thirteen Staff cadets at the Royal Military College of Australia. Of the officers retained, four 
lieutenant-colonels were reverted to the rank of major, and one major to the rank of captain.481 
 
 Such action reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the defence force, with 
the recruiting and training of officer cadets ceasing altogether. Chaytor’s 
disappointment in having to implement such measures was obvious:  
 
The personnel of the Staff Corps, the Permanent Staff, and the Royal NZ Artillery is no less 
than half of that maintained prior to the war, and obviously cannot carry out the same amount of work as 
the pre-war staff; but by economising work by closing all obsolete defences, by abandoning the attempt 
to keep touch with those trainees posted to the non-effective list, by reducing the number of compulsory 
parades, and by consolidating the training as much as possible, it is hoped that training can be continued 
at all except in very small centres.482 
 
It was at this time that the Staff officer cadets withdrawn from Duntroon were 
offered positions in the British and Indian armies, as there was no opportunity to be 
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commissioned in New Zealand.483 However, there were only a limited number of 
graduates, the same number ‘allotted to graduates from the Royal Military College, 
Kingston’ in Canada, who were also offered commissions in the British Army.484 Only 
six graduates each year from Duntroon received such opportunities, limiting the career 
prospects of those graduates not selected.485 It was also from this time that many 
promising officers became demoralised and left the service. 
The prospects for adequate officer training and a future career in the New 
Zealand Permanent Force were much reduced by 1923. At this time no New Zealand 
officer cadets were enrolled at Duntroon and the professional development of serving 
officers was severely limited by the reduction in training. Chaytor argued that the 
Turkish Crisis of September 1922 had highlighted the need to maintain the military 
forces in an efficient state and with sufficient available reserves of clothing and 
equipment to allow a small expeditionary force to be mobilised and dispatched without 
undue delay.486 He further stated that of the 790 officers and 11,197 other ranks that 
had volunteered and registered to serve during the crisis, sixty percent were too young 
to have served in the Great War, which emphasised the necessity for training young 
officers and rankers who were coming of age for service.487 In his 1923 annual report 
Chaytor clearly warned his political superiors that the reduced number of regular 
officers and the lack of sufficient training for them needed to be addressed to ensure 
the situation did not get any worse: 
 
The uncertainty regarding the future prospects in the Permanent Forces is causing much 
dissatisfaction, and some of the best of the younger officers are preparing themselves for outside 
employment in preference to studying for their promotion examinations. Unless  their prospects are 
improved many of the more able and enterprising officers may be expected to resign as soon as they can 
obtain suitable employment elsewhere…In view of the shortages of officers it is hoped that three cadets 
may be sent next year for training at Sandhurst, Woolwich or Cranwell, and that three more will follow 
each year after that. The question of exchanging NZ Service Cadet officers with officers of British units 
has not yet been settled, but such exchanges offer the only opportunity for NZ officers to obtain necessary 
experience in regimental duties or in handling men in the field.488 
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Prior to his retirement in 1924, Chaytor continued to voice his concerns to the 
government, promoting ideas that he believed would assist in the recruitment and 
retention of experienced, competent and youthful officers. In a confidential 
memorandum to the Minister of Defence in January 1924, Chaytor suggested that one 
solution would be to encourage the retirement of older officers. This would see them 
being replaced by more youthful officers, with promotion providing them with an 
incentive to stay in the service.489 He further argued that the selection of such officers 
should be based on merit, not solely on seniority.490 It was also his opinion that sending 
cadets on a four-year course to RMC Duntroon was proving too expensive and that a 
cheaper alternative was to send three cadets each year for 18-month courses at either 
Sandhurst, Woolwich or Cranwell in England. On graduation, he recommended that 
these cadets be commissioned as second-lieutenants and then posted to British Army 
units for 10-month secondments to gain experience prior to returning to New 
Zealand.491 
  Chaytor also pointed out that the continually reducing defence budget was 
directly affecting his ability to retain experienced Staff Corps officers. In a 
memorandum to the Minister of Defence in January 1923 he made it clear the 
uncertainty of the Defence policy had reduced the prospects of a career as an officer in 
the New Zealand Staff Corps and: 
 
has greatly discouraged the present officers and tends to make them feel that they are wasting 
their time and energy by remaining in the service…Recent experience has shown that New Zealand may 
be called on at any time to provide an expeditionary force at short notice and proves the necessity for 
maintaining the N.Z. military in an efficient state; but the efficiency of the N.Z. Military Forces must 
depend primarily on that of the officers, who are responsible for the organization and training in peace, 
and for the staff work and leadership in war. It is therefore essential that every possible means should be 
employed to obtain and retain the right type of officer and that any officer who falls below the required 
standard should be retired.492 
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Poor salaries were identified as an issue in the retention of Staff Corps officers. 
In July 1923 Chaytor actively campaigned for an increase in pay of regular officers in 
New Zealand. He claimed that their current salaries ‘compare most unfavourable’ to 
officers in the British Army and the New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy who were 
paid nearly double the rates of New Zealand Staff Corps officers.493  In October the 
same year he pushed for colonel-commandants to receive a pay increase to £900 per 
annum to cover the expenses incurred in entertaining visiting officers: 
 
Officers commanding commands are rightly expected to extend hospitality to visiting officers, 
and this cannot be done without an expense which their present rate of pay will not stand, and it is not 
just that an O.C. Command should have to call upon his private means to fulfil an official obligation. 494    
 
Chaytor’s successor, Major-General C.G. Powles, suffered the same frustration 
in trying to maintain a minimum state of efficiency under a reducing Defence budget. 
In March 1924 he wrote to the Minister of Defence strongly recommending that the 
training of New Zealand officer cadets at military colleges in the United Kingdom be 
commenced forthwith. He argued that the earliest such cadets would be available for 
duty in New Zealand, if accepted, would be in 1927, by which time the officer corps of 
the Permanent Forces would be under strength.495 He made it clear that the current 
situation was having a detrimental affect on the service, advising: ‘There is already a 
danger of having to adopt the bad policy of appointing partially qualified men because 
there are no cadets coming forward, a danger which will increase as the delay in 
enrolling cadets continues.’496  
Although some measures were taken regarding the recruitment of officer cadets, 
the general decline in the efficiency of the New Zealand military forces due to reduced 
personnel continued throughout the 1920s. This was identified in a military training 
review conducted by Major Edward Puttick in 1929. In his report Puttick pointed out 
that for the Dominion’s military forces to achieve the dual roles of local defence and 
defence of the Empire it was essential to maintain a highly-trained corps of regular 
officers and non-commissioned officers sufficient in strength to provide around 50 per 
cent of the numbers in those ranks required for the forces mobilized on the declaration 
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of war, and to provide sufficient instructors for training camps and Staff in New 
Zealand.497  He also argued that it was essential to ensure that Territorial officers and 
non-commissioned officers were as highly trained as circumstances permit, to provide 
a proportion of leadership requirements for the first units mobilized, as well as for the 
establishment of subsequent units and reinforcements.498 He further pointed out that the 
military training of soldiers needed to be comprehensive to give officers and NCOs 
sufficient practice in command and tactical exercises, while providing knowledge of 
administrative services.499 
Puttick therefore highlighted the importance that for the military organization 
to function well in times of war, it must maintain a sufficient corps of highly trained 
regular officers, and reasonably well trained Territorial officers, in peace-time.500 As 
he pointed out in his report, particular importance had to be given to the training of 
Territorial soldiers in that it was the Territorial Force that ‘produced practically all the 
officers and NCOs required on mobilization’ of the expeditionary force in the Great 
War.501  The findings of his report made it very clear that government policy had 
seriously limited the country’s ability to provide an effective expeditionary force if the 
need arose: 
 
The reduction of the training age [for Territorials] from 25 years to 21, the abolition of the one 
camp per trainee’s period of service, the reduction in courses of instruction, and many other similar 
measures of economy have very seriously affected the efficiency of the forces…The present system does 
not – on account of reduced training age – provide a trained force immediately available, the existing 
Territorials being below ‘active service’ age. In the event of war practically all the men required must be 
found from the Reserve, i.e. from men who have passed through the Territorial Force. 502  
           
However, one of the few positive findings within Puttick’s report was, that in 
his opinion, the knowledge and ability of personnel within the small New Zealand 
Permanent Force was of a high standard, and that a large proportion of Territorial 
officer and NCOs were capable, under supervision, of providing the required training 
of units in the event of mobilization.503 In order to achieve this New Zealand was reliant 
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on the British Army to provide the necessary training. In the mid-1920s the British 
government established the Imperial Defence College where its function was the 
training of a body of staff officers from the Navy, Army and Air Force ‘in the broadest 
aspects of Imperial strategy, and the occasional examination of current problems of 
Imperial defence referred to it by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in which the 
supervision of the College for professional purposes is vested.’504 From February 1927 
New Zealand was allocated two vacancies, but only one was filled due to financial 
considerations.505 
At this time a limited amount of professional development was still being 
provided and the recruitment of officer cadets had resumed, albeit, on a very small 
scale. An interchange system had been introduced with the British Army that saw three 
New Zealand officers seconded to British infantry regiments serving in India in 1927.506 
Such opportunities were invaluable in ensuring these officers experienced service and 
duties in active battalions; an experience they could not attain in New Zealand where 
there were no regular infantry regiments. Further to this, two officer cadets had been 
selected to attend an 18-month commissioning course at the prestigious Royal Military 
College at Sandhurst in England, where after graduating they were attached to regular 
British infantry regiments in England for twelve months before returning to New 
Zealand.507  
The secondment to regular infantry regiments was probably the most beneficial 
aspect of this system for the New Zealanders as it would provide the only opportunity 
for newly commissioned junior officers to experience command of troops  prior to 
returning to the Dominion; an experience that was not provided at the Royal Military 
Colleges.  According to a War Office memorandum from 1926, the purpose of the new 
syllabus of the commissioning course at Sandhurst was not meant to directly produce 
effective junior combat leaders, but was intended to provide foundations from which 
the cadet’s future military studies could be built, as well as extending the general 
education of the cadets where subjects such as the modern history of England, European 
geography, languages and similar subjects where taught:508   
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In the first place it must be emphasized that under the new syllabus no attempt is made to turn 
out a trained troop leader or platoon commander. The young officer’s training in these capacities will 
begin when he joins his regiment…Thus, for example, in tactics and strategy cadets receive instruction 
on very broad lines during their first two terms, and are only introduced to the elements of platoon and 
section work only in their last term, as it is considered that the more general forms of tactical and 
strategical instructions can be better dealt with in classes at Sandhurst, whilst a young officers’ training 
as a platoon commander can most certainly be better carried out in his regiment.509  
   
 
Another memorandum sent from the War Office in 1927 shows that the new 
syllabus was focussed on expanding the knowledge and military skills of the cadets, 
rather than directly developing their leadership skills. Apart from tactics and strategy, 
other subjects in the syllabus included field engineering, map reading and field 
sketching, organisation and administration, military law, military hygiene, along with 
drill, weapons training and physical training. Some subjects, such as German, French 
and Political and Economic History were voluntary and there was an effort to encourage 
cadets to study teaching methods.510 However, very few New Zealand officer cadets 
got the benefit of this scheme.  
 Although a small number of Staff officers continued to attend courses in Britain 
during this period, the recruitment of officer cadets eventually ceased. In his 1930 GOC 
annual report, Major-General Robert Young stated that since September 1928 no officer 
cadets of the New Zealand Permanent Forces had been selected for training at the 
military colleges in England and that the approved policy of appointment of officers 
had been in abeyance for two years.511 His frustration at the current situation was 
evident as he argued the importance of receiving training provided by the British Army: 
 
The system has been found to be the most suitable from all points of view, and whatever 
establishment of officers is maintained in the future, it is essential that vacancies shall be  filled from 
specially selected cadets who graduate at one of the colleges in England, and who are given further 
opportunity of undergoing a course of training with a unit of the regular Army before returning to the 
Dominion. Owing to the constant development of military science it is important that, in the interests of 
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the Forces generally, our young officers should be adequately trained for their duties, and it is therefore 
hoped that it will soon be possible to resume sending cadets to England.512 
  
Such hopes proved fruitless and the economies placed on the Defence budget 
further reduced opportunities for regular and Territorial officers. In the case of officer 
cadets only those who could afford to support themselves were accepted. In 1930 
several New Zealand cadets were accepted for commissions in the regular Army on the 
nomination by the Governor-General for cadetships at the Royal Military College, 
Sandhurst and the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, but all their expenses were to 
be paid by their parents.513  Previously only those young men with a high level of 
education, the minimum being matriculation and its later equivalent of University 
Entrance, were accepted as regular officer cadets; whereas the financial constraints of 
that time meant that the families of prospective cadets also had to be extremely wealthy 
to afford the passage to and from England as well as paying for all course and 
accommodation-related expenses for the 18-month course.514 An example is that of 
John Russell, whose wealthy and influential father, Major-General Sir Andrew Russell, 
financially sponsored his 19-year-old son as an officer cadet at Sandhurst in 1923.515 
Such practice did not reflect the egalitarian character of the officer corps of the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force that had developed during the later half of the Great War, 
where officer selection was increasingly based on merit and experience rather than 
social class and wealth. 
By the early 1930s the situation had become worse. Economic depression had 
seen further severe cuts to the Defence budget and a reduction in the number of 
professional officers to administer training for the Territorial Force. Major-General 
Young, a Great War veteran, was the general officer commanding the New Zealand 
Defence Force at this time and he had to suffer the same frustration as his predecessors 
in attempting to maintain a cadre of well-trained professional officers for the Staff 
Corps. The Territorial Force was also to suffer from the lack of government funding in 
1930 and the years following. While expressing appreciation to a number of brigade 
and regimental commanders who had relinquished their positions after the regulation 
period of four years in their roles, and commending their valuable service that was 
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‘reflected by the high standard of efficiency attained by the Territorial Force during the 
previous years,’ Major-General Young also noted in his annual report that there was 
some criticism from the public regarding the Territorial Force.516  Such disparagement 
concerned both the organisation and the system of training in the Territorial Force that 
some considered obsolete, inefficient and that no attention had been paid to keeping up 
to date with modern military developments that were being fostered by the regular army 
in Britain.517 Such criticism may have had some foundation considering that in March 
1930, on the grounds of economy, the government had cancelled all Territorial training 
camps for that year which affected six Mounted Rifle regiments, the 3rd Field Battery 
of artillery and the NZ Medical Corps.518  Such action would most certainly have 
reduced the potential efficiency of these units by preventing the officers and other ranks 
from training in large war-time formations. 
 
 
 The Wasted Years: Further Effects of Fiscal Constraints  
 
 It appears that 1931 was the year of despair for career officers and those officers 
within the Territorial Force who were serious about extending their military education 
and efficiency. In March of that year further retrenchment led to the enforced retirement 
of 19 officers and 117 other ranks from the Permanent Force, leaving a total number of 
only 86 officers and 263 other ranks within the regular force available to provide 
administration and training to the Territorial troops.519 Such numbers were totally 
inadequate and may have assisted the government in deciding to make the Territorial 
Force a voluntary organisation. In 1930 the Territorial Force had a total complement of 
16,990 all ranks, but by the end of 1931 it had been drastically reduced to a cadre of 
only 3,658.520 Such steps were necessary when examining the recorded Defence 
expenditure for that time; the expenditure for 1931 was £229,050 which was almost 
half that of the previous year of £401,645.521 Those few fortunate career officers who 
were already attending courses in Britain were able to complete them but no new officer 
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cadets were sent to commissioning courses at Sandhurst or Woolwich that year. Some 
officers were fortunate enough to be seconded to units within the British Army to 
further their experience, such as Captain K.L. Stewart, MBE, of the NZ Staff Corps 
who was attached to the Ceylon Defence Force after graduating from the Staff College 
at Camberley.522 Another was Captain L.G. Goss who was attached to a regular British 
Army regiment in England after graduating from the same course.523  
These secondments also had an economic value in that such appointments also 
saved on the cost of passage back to New Zealand at a time when military expenditure 
was at its lowest. Other officers were less fortunate; Lieutenant-Colonel N.W.B. Thom 
completed a course at the Imperial Staff College in London but was retired under the 
provisions of the  Finance Act (No.2) of 1930 immediately afterwards.524 Major-
General Young also retired that year as ‘General Officer Commanding’ and was 
replaced by Major-General W.L.H. Sinclair-Burgess. In his annual report Sinclair-
Burgess explained how a large number of officer retirements were enforced from 31 
March 1931 under the provisions of Section 39 of the Finance Act, 1930. The act 
referred to authorised retirement on superannuation of any member of the Permanent 
Force or the Permanent Staff under the Defence Act, 1909, who, due to age or length 
of service, would have been entitled to voluntarily retire within five years from 1930.525 
Officer training for the Territorial Force also reached an all-time low during this 
period. The drastic reduction in Defence Department spending reduced most units in 
the Territorials to only cadres of officers and NCOs where training at annual camps was 
reduced to theory exercises  of ‘Training Exercises Without Troops’ (TEWT). In 
accordance with the government policy, the Territorial Force was reorganised on a 
voluntary basis from 1 June 1931 which led to the total force being reduced to 10,000 
personnel.526 Again the General Officer Commanding attempted to accentuate a 
positive stance of the situation:  
 
 The reduction in personnel has been brought about by adopting smaller peace establishments 
for certain units (eg. Infantry and Mounted Rifles) but care has been taken to ensure a proper allotment 
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of officers, NCOs and men within units to enable progressive training to be satisfactorily carried out and 
to provide for a rapid expansion to a war footing if necessary.527  
 
As at 31 March 1931 there were only 971 officers registered as serving in the 
Territorials, with only 86 regular officers on strength to provide training for them, and 
even then, some of these were Staff officers who were employed solely on 
administrative duties that did not involve training duties.528 This state of affairs proved 
unacceptable to Colonel Harold Barrowclough, who had previously served in combat 
leading a battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade on the Western Front in 1918, and 
who at this time was the Territorial commander of the 3rd New Zealand Infantry 
Brigade. In July 1931 a memorandum from the officer in command of the Southern 
Command advised that Barrowclough was transferring from Christchurch to Auckland 
to take up a partnership in a law firm and thus was compelled to relinquish command 
of the brigade. However, Barrowclough’s disillusionment at the changes to the new 
Territorial system led to his resignation from the Territorials which was recorded in the 
memorandum: 
 
He states that in view of the difficulty he has felt in accepting the present Defence proposals 
with any degree of enthusiasm, he considers that it would be advisable for him to relinquish the command 
immediately, and so enable his successor to take up the duties as near as possible at the commencement 
of the new scheme.529  
 
    
Barrowclough was subsequently transferred to the Reserve of Officers list, 
having no further active role until he volunteered to serve in the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force when it was established in 1939.530 
    The limited training opportunities for both regular and voluntary officers 
were to remain until the late 1930s. Sinclair-Burgess outlined the difficulties the army 
faced in providing the necessary training in his 1935 annual report, stating that through 
the shortage of available staff and the stoppage of promotions, the majority of the Staff 
officers were overworked by holding more than one appointment and that many junior 
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officers were carrying out responsible duties that would normally be given to senior 
officers. An example of this was the appointment of Captain L.W. Andrew VC, as 
adjutant of the 2nd Field Company, Corps of New Zealand Engineers, when at the same 
time holding the position of adjutant for the 2nd Field Ambulance.531 Sinclair-Burgess 
argued that this was not in the best interests of the service but that there was no 
alternative due to the financial constraints placed on the military forces that prevented 
recruitment and promotion of officers.532 The ‘abnormal conditions’ continued to affect 
the amount of training provided to existing officers with only a select few being able to 
receive training overseas; an example being three captains who successfully passed 
entrance examinations to attend the Staff College at Camberley in 1933, and Captain 
C.S.J. Duff of the Royal New Zealand Artillery who travelled to England in July of the 
same year to attend a gunnery course and an artillery survey course.533 Such 
opportunities were few and no New Zealand officers had been sent to the Imperial Staff 
College since 1930.534 
The lack of funding to provide young regular officers and cadets with training 
with the British Army forced the General Officer Commanding once again to look to 
Australia for suitable alternatives. Major-General Sinclair-Burgess’s frustration is 
evident in his annual report and his argument for the need to provide sufficient training 
was valid: 
 
It has not yet been found practicable for New Zealand to again resume representation at the 
Imperial Defence College, but the advantages of this college have not been lost sight of, and it is hoped 
that the time is not far distant when a nomination may be made…In order to keep up the steady inflow 
of young officers, to meet requirements occasioned by retirements, resignations and deaths, four cadets 
were sent to the Royal Military College of Australia on the 16th of February 1934. As pointed out 
previously, the Service is seriously understaffed in officers, and it is hoped it will be possible to send a 
further six cadets to the Royal Military College of Australia during the ensuing year.535 
 
  Such appointments were a great improvement from having only a few wealthy 
parents fund the military education of their officer-cadet sons; for cadets were once 
again selected on merit and not wealth alone. However, it took four years for the cadets 
                                                 
531 New Zealand Gazette, No. 55, 1 August 1935, p. 2107, AD1, 1521 253/3/38, ANZ 






to graduate for service as officers from the time they entered the college and as a 
consequence did not resolve the lack of continual training for serving officers at that 
time. Once again Australia provided a solution; at the invitation of the Australian 
Commonwealth Government an exchange of officers was effected during the camp 
training period during the same year, with a view to obtaining closer liaison between 
the military forces of the two countries. This initiative was seen as a positive move, 
with Sinclair-Burgess reporting: 
 
Apart from the interchange of ideas on methods of training, etc, which such an arrangement 
affords, I regard the personal contact so established between the two forces as of primary importance. 
The Chief of the General Staff, Australian Military Forces, has expressed the desire that the scheme now 
initiated should continue, a proposal in which I fully concur.536 
 
The training of the Territorial Force was equally important as its personnel 
would provide the bulk of the officers and non-commissioned officers of any future 
expanded expeditionary force. Sinclair-Burgess considered it vitally important and saw 
the object of the peace-time training role of the Territorials as providing a frame-work 
and machinery for expansion and training in the event of war. He argued: 
 
This required not only a sound system of training the instructors themselves, but also an equally 
efficient organisation for training private soldiers, as it is from the latter that the additional non-
commissioned officers required on mobilisation will be drawn. Most Territorial Force officers are more 
capable of training their subordinates to be leaders than training them to be instructors. It must be 
accepted therefore that the detail work of training instructors must be done by the Permanent Forces.537 
 
 Although his argument may have been valid, it is questionable whether there were 
sufficient regular personnel available at the time to provide such instruction and 
training, with the Permanent Force only consisting of 83 officers and 339 other ranks.538  
A number of measures were taken to remedy the issue of insufficiently trained 
officers from the mid-1930s. In December 1934 seven regular warrant officers were 
appointed to lieutenant commissions within the New Zealand Staff Corps, but Sinclair-
Burgess reported that even with the granting of these commissions, the shortage of 
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officers was still acute and further measures were necessary to remedy the situation 
once financial conditions permitted.539  A further seven cadets entered the Royal 
Military College of Australia that year and the system of interchange with Australian 
officers that had been introduced the previous year was continued.540 The liaison was 
further extended by the appointment of an officer of the NZSC as an instructor at the 
Australian Royal Military College.541 This bi-lateral extension of officer training was 
certainly beneficial to the New Zealand military forces as both officer cadets and 
serving officers received training and were kept up-to-date with the current tactics, 
practices and military theory taught by the British Army. However, training for regular 
officers stationed in New Zealand was limited to attending 14-day refresher courses 
which were held periodically. These courses comprised an administrative and tactical 
exercise for officers, while warrant officers and other NCOs attended a course in 
signalling, weapon training and the instruction of subordinate leaders.542 The training 
was carried out on the model used by the British Army in Great Britain, with the 
syllabus including infantry training, physical training, weapon training (rifle, Lewis 
Gun, Vickers Gun and use of the 3-inch mortar), gun drill, first-aid, signalling, anti-gas 
training, topography and administration.543  Such training filtered down to the 782 
officers and 1,604 NCOS of the Territorial units where they received instruction on the 
same specific topics.544 At this time the Territorial Force was under-strength due to a 
high turn-over of personnel and short-term service of volunteers, which limited the 
reserve of trained officers and soldiers. Conversely, this did allow a high degree of 
concentration in specialist training such as machine gunners, signallers and mortar 
personnel, leaving Sinclair-Burgess to comment that ‘The standard of training of 






                                                 








    Improvements 
 
The threat of war in Europe and the improved financial position of the New 
Zealand government saw a greater emphasis on officer training in the late 1930s. 
Ironically, the increased funding for the military forces was provided by the new Labour 
government from 1935, the cabinet of which included ministers who had been 
imprisoned as conscientious objectors during the Great War. In 1935 the Defence 
‘Vote’ was £378,181; in 1937 it was £427,635, and by 1938 it had been increased to 
£529,632.546 Not surprisingly, the greatest increase in the Defence vote came about in 
1939 when it appeared to many that war with Nazi Germany was inevitable. That year 
the government set aside £703,904 to spend on its military forces which was almost 
double the amount spent in 1935.547  The improved economic climate can account for 
the ability of the government to increase Defence expenditure during this period but the 
overriding reason must certainly be a change in priorities with the threat of war. 
The increase in military expenditure provided greater opportunities for officers 
and NCOs of both the regular and Territorial forces to receive much needed training. 
In 1937 it was proposed that all personnel were to attend 20 days annual training, an 
increase from 12 days, and that they would be paid to attend such training.548 In October 
the same year, James Hargest, who had previously served as a battalion commander in 
the Great War, then served as a senior officer in the Territorials until 1930, and who 
was a member of parliament at the time, made a public plea for higher rates of pay for 
Territorial soldiers as an incentive to encourage more volunteers.549 Also that year an 
Army School of Instruction was established at Trentham for the training of all regular 
personnel, while Schools of Instruction were established in each of the national 
command districts for the training of Territorial soldiers of all ranks, including 
officers.550 Except for the Mounted Rifles, motorised transport was introduced for all 
other units at their annual camps, where officers and NCOs received training in the 
command and deployment of mobile troops.551 Another progressive step towards 
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modernising the army at this time was the establishment of a motorised cavalry 
regiment, where British-made Vickers Light Tanks were to provide a modern 
reconnaissance element.552 Subsequently officers and NCOs within this new corps 
received essential training in the operation and tactics for the use of these vehicles 
which was far different and more technical than those skills and knowledge required 
for the Mounted Rifles. 
This period also saw an increase in the opportunities for officers to receive 
formal training and education overseas. While in 1937 there were still no members of 
the New Zealand Staff Corps attending courses at either Camberley or the British Army 
staff college at Quetta in India, another five officer cadets were sent to Duntroon, 
bringing the total number of officer cadets studying at the Royal Military College of 
Australia at that time to 20.553 Also that year Colonel Edward Puttick DSO became the 
first New Zealand officer to attend the one-year course at the Imperial Defence College 
in London since 1930.554 With war looming, there were further improvements in 1938 
with one officer sent to study at the Staff College at Camberley and another to Quetta. 
Special emphasis was now placed on technical advances which included sending five 
regular officers to Duntroon for specific courses relating to artillery, while the officer 
interchange system with Australia was successfully continued.555 The newly-
established Army School of Instruction at Trentham had seen 91 regular officers and 
NCOs attend extensive training courses that year; a vast improvement on the available 
training provided earlier in the decade. Such military education had a flow-on effect for 
the officers and NCOs serving in the Territorial units where most received up-to-date 
training in the mechanisation of the field artillery and infantry brigades at the district 
schools that had been set up for the Territorials at Burnham, Trentham and Narrow 
Neck, near Auckland.556  
However, there were still some serious concerns from senior officers within the 
Territorial Force regarding the ability of the military forces available to defend the 
country. In 1938 four Territorial brigade commanders (Colonels C.R Spragg, N.L 
Macky, A.S. Wilder and R.F. Gambrill) issued a written public statement that 
challenged government assurances that the Territorial Force was sufficient in size and 
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well enough trained to protect the Dominion. They claimed that morale was low, that 
the force was inefficient and that successive governments had not encouraged voluntary 
enlistment.557 This proved a great public embarrassment to the government and Army 
Headquarters, subsequently leading to the officers being placed on the Retirement List 
in June of that year for breaching Kings’ Regulations by making their protest public. 
The government’s embarrassment was the greater because it was reported in the 
Auckland Star that the Minister of Defence admitted that there were training issues 
within the Territorial Force: 
 
The Minister at Dargaville admitted that although 9,000 are wanted only 7,400 are enrolled, and 
of these only 41 per cent have attended camp this year. Thus only 3,000 men, or one –third of the required 
number, are being trained towards that ‘high state of efficiency’ which is the Minister’s objective.558  
   
The extension of training and instruction was the main focus of military 
planning leading up to the outbreak of war in September 1939. This was stressed by 
Major-General J.E. Duigan, the General Officer commanding, in his annual report 
submitted in June of that year: 
 
With the rapid development of new weapons and changes in tactics resulting from their 
adoption, it has become increasingly important that officers and non-commissioned officers of the 
Regular Forces should gain experience with the British Army and at training establishments abroad. 
During the year five officers received instruction in England or India and four officers and thirteen non-
commissioned officers attended short courses of a technical nature in Australia.559 
 
What was also evident from his report was the important part the relationship with 
Australia played in the effective training of New Zealand officers: 
 
The training of Regular personnel in Australia has been of great benefit to those  concerned. 
The Chief of General Staff in Australia has been most helpful in arranging for the attendance of personnel 
from New Zealand at various courses of instruction throughout the year. Quite apart from the great value 
of the training received, the liaison established by our Regular personnel with the personnel of Australian 
Military Forces is most desirable.560 
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The deteriorating international situation in 1939 led to an increase in public 
support for the military forces in New Zealand and the subsequent expansion of the 
Territorial Force. This further led to a greater demand for trained officers to lead it.  
However, there was frustration among officers within the Territorial Force concerning 
the government’s hesitation in mobilising the Dominion’s military forces with the 
increasing likelihood of war. Major-General Piers Mackesy, a British Army officer who 
had conducted a tour of inspection of New Zealand early that year, reported that 
Territorial officers were frustrated at the limited response to the situation, but that the 
officers were ‘imbued with a desire to serve the state’ and were proud to do so.561 
However, while acknowledging the valuable training provided to the Territorial officers 
and other ranks by the Army and District Schools of Instruction, he argued that such 
training were only ‘paper schemes’ compared to training within regular units, and that 
a lack of a regular force had proved detrimental in preparing both regular and Territorial 
officers for combat roles: 
 
No regular officer in New Zealand ever, throughout his service, in peace, gets any opportunity 
at all to exercise tactical command, except when attached to a unit abroad. Neither as a young subaltern 
nor as a senior officer, does he ever command any of his troops in the field.562 
 
 At this time the government had authorised for the establishment of the 
Territorials to be expanded to 16,000 troops, all ranks.563 However, in June 1939 there 
were only 10,364 soldiers registered in the force, although there had been an influx of 
3,252 new recruits from the same time the previous year.564 With only 100 Regular 
Officers on strength, it was clear that the majority of the officer corps for any 
expeditionary force would be provided from the 778 officers of the Territorial Force.565 
A number of experienced senior officers then serving within the Territorials were 
considered either too old or unfit for overseas service and in the months and weeks 
leading up to the declaration of war with Germany there was a flurry of commissioning 
courses for prospective junior officers from within the NCOs of Territorial units. Many 
of these newly commissioned citizen-officers were to prove to be superb leaders of men 
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in battle and were to achieve high rank during the war. One such example was Haddon 
Donald, and who at age 22, was offered a chance to sit an examination for an infantry 
commission which he passed on 25 August 1939.566 He was then commissioned as a 
second-lieutenant in the 22nd Battalion when it formed at Trentham in December that 
year.567 Donald initially served as a junior platoon commander, but by May 1944 he 
had risen to the rank of lieutenant-colonel and was in command of the same unit. At 
age 27, along with Sandy Thomas, he was one of the youngest battalion commanders 
in the New Zealand Division and the whole British Army.568 
The fiscal constraints of successive New Zealand governments during the 1920s 
and 1930s, due to economic decline and anti-war sentiment, left the Dominion’s 
military forces under-prepared for war. Mackesy summed this up in his report: 
 
I fear that unless steps are taken at an early date to increase the prestige and to improve the 
conditions of the military forces of New Zealand, something approximating to this disastrous state of 
affairs may arise. The Army in New Zealand has, it appears to me, for causes which no doubt appeared 
at the time to be adequate, been allowed to drift into the position of the Cinderella of the fighting 
services.569  
 
The shortage of trained officers at all levels when war was declared in 1939 led 
to the appointment of some senior officers who proved unfit to cope with the new 
mobile tactics of the enemy, and the commissioning of young but inexperienced junior 
officers. Frustrated at the constant reduction in the Defence budget throughout the inter-
war years, successive General Officers Commanding the New Zealand Forces warned 
repeatedly that limited recruitment of officer cadets and the restricted training available 
for Staff Corps and Territorial officers was detrimental to the Dominion’s ability to 
provide a trained fighting force.  Such policies ensured it took eighteen months of 
sustained training before the officers and troops of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force were ready for combat.       
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  Officer Training: World War Two  
 
An Under-Prepared Force 
 
Compared to the Main Body of the NZEF in the First World War, initially the 
first three echelons of 2NZEF were under-prepared for their combat role in the Second 
World War. Freyberg was well aware of this and was able to hold back his troops from 
active campaigning, at least for 18 months, in an effort to provide the necessary training 
until the German invasion of Greece. It was during this campaign that the NZ Division, 
together with the Australian and British units within W Force were hopelessly 
outclassed by the enemy in terms of armaments, organisation and combat experience. 
Barrowclough, who had served in Greece and Crete, was determined that his 3rd NZ 
Division would not suffer the same fate and ensured his officers and men were battle-
ready before committing them to combat operations in the Pacific. The losses the 2nd 
NZ Division sustained in 1941 and thereafter made it essential to develop training 
facilities in New Zealand and overseas to maintain the required supply of junior officers 
throughout 2NZEF. The training the officers received helped to transform the combat 
units into efficient and effective fighting formations.        
The newly-commissioned junior officers received only minimal training as 
platoon commanders before embarking for overseas service with the 1st and 2nd 
Echelons of the expeditionary force in early 1940.  Haddon Donald had only received 
his commission a week before war was declared and his experience was similar to many 
others.570 W.B. ‘Sandy’ Thomas was an under-aged lance-corporal in the Territorials 
in 1939 when he was selected to be an officer: ‘Out of the blue the army called me to a 
rather urgently organised course to commission young officers against the likelihood 
that New Zealand would again have to raise forces for overseas service. Normal officer 
cadet courses of this type would call for months or even years of training and evolution.  
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In my case, I was commissioned after one week in camp.’571  Such rushed measures 
were extreme when considering regular officer cadets attending Sandhurst, Duntroon 
and the United States Military Academy at West Point only received their commissions 
after four years of intense training and study.572 However, such measures were 
necessary if the New Zealand government was to provide the required 400 junior 
officers fit enough to serve and lead troops on active service with the expeditionary 
force at that time.573  
The length of training for officers embarking with the 1st Echelon differed from 
the following echelons and reinforcements. This was confirmed in Major-General 
Duigan’s annual report in 1940: 
 
Owing to the necessity of the rapid concentration of the First Echelon, its officers and NCOs 
received only one month’s prior training. It was, however, possible with the Second and Third Echelons 
to grant officers and NCOs at least two months prior training. In future NCOs will receive three months, 
and officers and those selected to be granted commissions five months preliminary training. This latter 
course is dictated by the fact that most officers of the TF who are eligible as regards to age and medical 
fitness have already joined the NZEF, with the result that officers for future drafts will be composed very 
largely of newly-commissioned officers. These officers will, however, be reinforcements for formed 
units overseas, and their comparative inexperience will not be a disability.574 
 
Duigan’s opinion that the inexperience of reinforcement officers from New Zealand 
would not be a disability to units already serving overseas was not held by Freyberg or 
his enlisted veterans, which is covered in a later chapter.   
The initial training experience of Denver Fountaine, a young lieutenant from 
Westport in C company of the 20th Battalion was typical of those officers who embarked 
with the 1st Echelon. On 26 September 1939 he arrived at Burnham Camp near 
Christchurch where a selected group of officers and NCOs who had volunteered from 
Territorial units were gathered to prepare for the arrival of the rank and file of the newly 
formed battalion. In a letter home to his future wife, written only four days after his 
arrival, Fountaine articulated the urgency in getting officers ready to receive their men: 
‘We have had to go like hell ever since we arrived here and although I’ve had time to 
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think about you and the folks at home, business and everything connected with it might 
never have existed…According to the programme laid down it will be hard work all 
day, lectures in the evening and after that we will have to prepare the following day’s 
work.’575 According to his battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Howard 
Kippenberger, some of the officers and NCOs who had arrived at this time needed the 
most rudimentary training when they arrived in camp: ‘officers and NCOs started with 
drill, the first thing obviously being to get saluting right….There was no doubt that our 
saluting was a horrible sight until we had all been induced to conform to the book.’576  
Training for officers, NCOs and the other ranks began in earnest from the time 
they entered camp until embarking for overseas service. Fountaine recorded that the 
officers of the 20th Battalion continually attended conferences and received instruction 
from staff officers every night, while receiving special instruction on the weekends.577 
Initially, this proved very tiring compared to their previous civilian life but became 
routine after several weeks.578 Heavy emphasis was placed on getting all ranks 
physically fit for the rigours of active service, with physical training being conducted 
by platoon commanders every morning from 6.15 am.579 Battalion route marches were 
constantly conducted which could also include mock battles to simulate campaign 
conditions. Fountaine described such training at a camp at Cave in South Canterbury 
prior to embarkation:  
 
The first three days after we arrived here it rained but it has been fine since and hot as Hell. We 
have been marching up to 12 miles a day and we come back like wet towels. Fortunately there is a good 
stream alongside the camp and we can have a swim every day….Yesterday we had manoeuvres as far as 
Pleasant Point about 13 miles away, slept out under the stars, got up at 4 this morning, had another attack 
and arrived back in camp at 1 o’clock absolutely jiggered.580  
 
Haddon Donald’s 22nd Battalion embarked as part of the 2nd Echelon and his 
experience provides evidence of the typical inexperience and insufficient training 
provided to the officers and other ranks prior to embarkation:  
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My call-up came when the 22nd Infantry Battalion officers gathered at Trentham Camp for a 
preliminary course in December 1939 to prepare for the arrival of the troops early in January 1940. Our 
commanding officer, the adjutant and the senior non-commissioned officer were regular soldiers, while 
the remaining officers and some NCOs were drawn from Territorial and school cadet units. Several early 
volunteers from the First Echelon, who had been recommended for commissions passed out in time to 
join our course as junior officers. The entire battalion of some 800 men, with the exception of the three 
regular soldiers, had volunteered direct from civilian jobs, showing how pitifully short New Zealand was 
of regular, trained soldiers.581  
 
Donald was critical of the training he and his men received in New Zealand, 
stating that the expenditure on the armed forces had been ‘criminally neglected’ by 
successive governments for the two decades prior to the outbreak of war; the officers 
and men were issued with equipment of dubious quality left over from World War One 
and there was not a high standard of marksmanship (except for country boys) due to 
shooting practice being severely restricted because of limited ammunition.582 His 
disappointment at the lack of preparation for active service is clear and perhaps sums 
up what many officers felt about the early training they received: ‘We could not rely on 
the army to teach us much. However, plenty of discipline, route marching and physical 
training gradually moulded us into a workable infantry battalion.’583  
Officers did receive some instruction on leadership, command and tactics prior 
to leaving New Zealand, but it is questionable whether such training was sufficient for 
sending young and inexperienced civilian-officers to war. Cross-referencing data from 
Embarkation Rolls and personnel records show that in 1939 almost all junior officers 
of the infantry battalions had served in the Territorial Force prior to the expeditionary 
force being formed; from the 1940 sample 40 percent had served in the cadets, 82 
percent in the Territorials, 29 percent having served in both, while 23 percent had 
served as officers in the Territorial Force, with 3 percent having served in the First 
World War. Significantly, of the 100 officers sampled only two were professional 
soldiers; one from the NZ Staff Corps and one senior NCO who had been commissioned 
from the NZ Permanent Staff. Only 3 percent had no previous military experience, but 
as the war progressed there was a significant increase in those who had no previous 
military service before the conflict (see Table 7).  Sandy Thomas was more generous 
                                                 




in his description of the preliminary training the officers of 23 Battalion received prior 
to the arrival of the other ranks of the unit:  
 
We were fortunate in having two months, before the main body of volunteers arrived, to train 
and be trained together. Miracles of improvisation were achieved as we studied tactics, infantry drills 
and manoeuvres, under the guidance of a handful of regular officers.584 
 
 
Table 7: Recorded Previous Military Service of Sampled Junior 










Cadets 40 40% 44 36% 41 37% 
Territorial 
Force 




29 29% 23 18.5% 21 19% 
WW1 3 3% 1 1% 0  
NZSC 1 1% 2 1.5% 2 2% 
NZPS 1 1% 3 2.5% 3 3% 
TF 
Officer 
23 23% 13 10.5% 2 2% 
Home 
Guard 
1 1% 0  2 2% 
None 3 3% 19 15.5% 27 24.5% 
 
Key: WW1 – World War 1 
         NZSC – New Zealand Staff Corps 
         NZPS – New Zealand Permanent Staff 
         TF – Territorial Force 
 







                                                 




Like the officers and NCOs of the NZEF in the Great War, those of the 1st 
Echelon of the 2nd NZEF in the Second World War began their training in earnest in 
Egypt. It was here that the officers had time to put their previous civilian occupations 
behind them and settle into military life in an effort to become professional soldiers 
before being sent into combat. Unlike the experience in the First World War, where the 
troops of the expeditionary force only had four months of training in Egypt before the 
Gallipoli Campaign, in the Second World War those of the 1st Echelon were stationed 
in Egypt for 14 months in preparation for a fighting role in Greece. General Freyberg 
emphasized the need for extensive training of the New Zealand troops to the British 
High Command prior to the force arriving in the Middle East: ‘I have inspected the 
First Echelon. Its training has suffered from lack of equipment, ammunition, vehicles, 
and weapons. The force will require a further period of individual training and cannot 
be ready for war for three months.’ 585 Maadi Camp, on the edge of the desert nine miles 
from Cairo and within view of the Pyramids, became the home for the 2nd NZ Division 
for the duration of the war. A school of instruction was established where officers and 
other ranks alike attended courses covering all facets of military study, while officers 
also attended training at the British Army school at Abbassia.586  Officer training was 
varied and included receiving instruction from British Army warrant officers, attending 
specific courses such as infantry tactics, navigation, intelligence, military law, 
command and leadership, as well as instruction on basic engineering and field craft.587 
Those officers of supporting units such as artillery, signals and engineers also received 
ongoing training specifically related to their trades.588  
Freyberg was determined that his officers and men would be trained to a high 
standard before they were exposed to combat and there were challenges in ensuring this 
occurred. By May 1940 he felt that his troops were well trained and fit for the limited 
operations that it was contemplated they would be used for, but that no further headway 
in training of the 1st Echelon could be made due to the shortage of equipment.589 This 
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led him to seek authority to travel from Egypt to Britain with his training staff to oversee 
the training of the 2nd Echelon stationed there at that time. Such a move was a priority 
for him in his drive to ensure his men were led by competent officers trained in up-to-
date tactics: 
 
From all accounts the Second Echelon have benefited from the new training syllabus and I feel 
that with two months collective training they would be fit for war. What I wish my minister to realise is 
that none of the senior officers of the Second Echelon are fit to start unit or collective training without 
first being trained themselves. Every day I am kept from taking their preparation in hand will delay the 
ultimate preparedness of the troops.590 
 
 Freyberg eventually travelled to Britain to oversee the necessary training where 
he observed the officers of the 2nd Echelon in three full-scale training exercises, 
involving the defence of a seaside town, a brigade-size attack and an endurance march 
of 100 miles in six days. The object of these exercises was to practice Divisional staff 
in carrying out a bus move of the Division, to give brigadiers and battalion 
commander’s experience in handling their commands in the field, and to try 
administrative services in the field.591 He later reported: 
 
During the exercises the Commanders learned how to handle their fast-moving bus columns and 
their transport, and the junior officers and men found their feet and got the idea of working together as a 
force…and I feel confident that if we are asked to take part in the defence of Great Britain the Second 
Echelon of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force is a force to be reckoned with, and will give an 
excellent account of itself wherever it may be used.592  
 
Such confidence at that time may have been premature and history would prove that 
such training could not replace the value of combat experience. 
A major challenge Freyberg faced in preparing and training his officers and 
troops of the expeditionary force to fight as a combat-ready division was the dispersal 
of his command and the need to provide essential training to reinforcements quickly. 
The arrival of the 3rd Echelon in Egypt in September 1940 meant that the officers and 
men within the newly arrived units needed months of intensive training to bring them 
up to the standard of those members of the 1st Echelon, which he felt had received 
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sufficient training to the point where they were ready for combat operations.593 He was 
anxious to have the 2nd Echelon transferred to Egypt once the threat of German invasion 
of Britain had passed, so that all the senior officers of 2NZEF could train and have the 
experience in operating together within divisional size exercises and operations.594 
Freyberg vented his frustration in the delay in achieving this to the Minister of Defence 
in October 1940, stating that it prevented full efficiency and smooth administration of 
the Division, and that assistance from the New Zealand government to ensure the rapid 
despatch of the 2nd Echelon to the Middle East was required.595 
 The 2nd Echelon did not arrive in Egypt until February 1941, giving no time 
for Freyberg to provide his officers with the opportunity to experience a divisional-size 
exercise before embarking for the campaign in Greece. Haddon Donald was a platoon 
commander at this time, and although he had been training with his men since January 
1940, he felt that the Division as a whole was not sufficiently prepared. He claims that 
the feeling of most officers was that the expedition to Greece was ‘ill-conceived’ and 
that the decision makers were ‘well aware we were not strong enough to beat the 
Germans…We did not have the tanks, the aircraft or the expertise to be anywhere near 
a match for the victorious German army and, in my opinion, the Allies should never 
have gone to Greece.’596 He further stated that halfway through the battle the Allied 
forces were shown to be totally inadequate and that there was a need to find suitable 
replacement junior officers due to the high casualty rate of platoon commanders.597  
 
 
Formal Officer Training 
 
The establishment of Officer Cadet Training Units (OCTU) ensured that the 2nd 
New Zealand Division maintained a constant supply of trained replacement officers to 
fill vacancies sustained during campaigns. Commissioning courses for officer 
candidates serving overseas with the Division were usually eight to twelve weeks long 
and Freyberg, who took a particular interest in the development of his junior officers, 
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had initially intended that all officer training would be conducted in Britain.598 
However, this was overruled by the British Army decision to establish an OCTU at 
Abbassia, near Cairo, to save on the return travel costs of sending candidates from the 
Middle East to Britain.599 In October 1940 Freyberg authorised the establishment of a 
New Zealand OCTU at Maadi Camp where a syllabus, based on British Army officer 
training, but tailored to the particular requirements of 2NZEF, was taught.600 This short-
lived establishment was officially known as the New Zealand Wing, Middle East 
Officer Cadet Training Unit (NZ Wing ME, OCTU), which Brigadier W.G Steven 
stated could provide training towards the things the New Zealanders considered most 
important in war and where the excessive amount of ‘spit and polish’ could be 
dispensed with.601 This move proved unpopular with the hierarchy of the British Army 
in the Middle East who argued against any duplication of facilities. Under advice from 
his staff, Freyberg eventually relented and those New Zealand soldiers selected as 
officer cadets continued to be trained by the British at Abbassia.602 However, by late 
1943 New Zealand officer candidates were being sent to Britain for such training, where 
they attended courses at the Royal Military College at Sandhurst and at OCTUs 
established in England specifically to cater for the New Zealand Division.603 Incredibly, 
it was argued that this proved more cost effective than attending such training at the 
British Army establishment in the Middle East.604  
Economic factors may also have been an influence in the 2nd NZ Division 
establishing its own OCTU at the 2NZEF Advance Base at Taranto, Italy in late 
December 1944.605 Maadi Camp in Egypt was originally the preferred site for the 2nd 
NZ Division’s own OCTU, where it was argued that suitable accommodation was 
available, while the favourable weather conditions would ensure less interruption to the 
syllabus.606  However, the hard-fought Italian campaign led to the constant need for 
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replacement platoon commanders to fill vacancies caused through casualties. By this 
stage of the war most officer candidates were experienced NCOs serving in the Division 
in Italy and it proved more practical to train the cadets near to where the Division was 
serving. This ensured that there was only minimal time in travelling to and from the 
course, compared to having to travel to courses in Britain and the Middle East, and thus 
vacancies were filled quickly. 
The syllabus of the first OCTU course held at Taranto was typical of the courses 
previously held in Britain and Egypt throughout the war. However, this course and the 
two others that would follow before the last intake graduated in May 1945, were of six 
weeks duration, shorter than those previously held in Egypt and Britain.607 It is possible 
that one reason for the reduced length of such courses late in the war was that 
consideration was given to the combat and leadership experience of candidates, most 
of whom were battle-hardened veterans by the latter stages of the conflict. Typical days 
would begin with drill and parades taking up the first morning session. This was 
followed by lectures covering subjects such as map reading, divisional organisation, 
counter intelligence, military law, company and platoon administration, responsibilities 
of officers, first aid, mine school, the characteristics and employment of the New 
Zealand field Artillery, communication drill, staff duties, evacuation of casualties and 
history of 2NZEF. Weekly war reviews were also held.608 Church parades were 
compulsory on Sundays, with the Roman Catholic officer candidates and other ranks 
stationed in the area encouraged to attend mass at the local parish church in an effort to 
foster relations with the Italian community.609  
At this time, Colonel Denver Fountaine, who had started the war as an 
inexperienced platoon commander in 20 Battalion and who became a battle-hardened 
commander of 26 Battalion in North Africa and Italy, was now commander of the 
2NZEF Forward Base at Bari. The NZ OCTU came under his jurisdiction and it was he 
who took the salutes and made the presentations at the completion of each course.610 
Reports from the courses indicate that they proved successful in producing junior 
officers of the required standard; 65 cadets passed out at the completion of the second 
course in April 1945, with four receiving ‘A’ passes, 22 receiving ‘B’ passes and 39 
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‘C’ passes, while of the 41 cadets in the third course, only one was returned to his unit 
due to ‘behaviour unbecoming of an officer’ after an incident in the NZ Forces Club in 
Bari.611 The New Zealand OCTU at Taranto was short-lived, being established on 17 
December 1944 and officially disbanded on 23 August 1945, even though the last 
officer candidates had ‘passed out’ in May of that year.612   
The Officer Cadet Training Unit based at the Army School of Instruction at 
Trentham Camp near Wellington catered for the training of officer candidates for 
reinforcement drafts to the 2nd NZ Division serving in the Middle East as well as 
personnel for the 3rd NZ Division serving in the Pacific theatre. An Army School of 
Instruction had been established at Trentham in 1937 at a time when the government 
was increasing defence spending, although there were still District Schools of 
Instruction in each of the three military districts at that time that catered for officer 
training. However, in 1939 there was an amalgamation of the Army School and District 
Schools of Instruction which saw the majority of training conducted at Trentham, while 
Territorial training for the southern and northern districts continued at Burnham, near 
Christchurch, and Papakura.613 By May 1940 all officers who were to be posted from 
New Zealand to serve overseas with 2NZEF were required to undergo training at 
Trentham prior to embarkation, including officer cadets: 
 
In accordance with the decision arrived at during the conference at Army Headquarters on 10 
May [1940], all officers accepted for service in the N.Z.E.F., irrespective of rank, will carry out their 
preliminary training at the A.T.C. [Advanced Training Company], Army School, Trentham.614   
      
An examination of reports relating to the 4th OCTU course held at Trentham in 
mid-1940 provides an in-depth description of the training the candidates received prior 
to being commissioned and serving overseas. It is clear that by this time these officer 
candidates, who were to embark in the 3rd Echelon, were receiving more comprehensive 
instruction than that received by newly commissioned junior officers of the 1st Echelon 
in late 1939, with the 10-week course commencing on 31 May and concluding on 12 
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August.615 According to one report facilities for specialist corps training, such as 
artillery, divisional cavalry and engineers, were not available at Trentham and officers 
of those corps were transferred for unit training once they had completed the 
commissioning course.616 The allocation for positions within each course was 
determined by the demand for replacements from the various corps, with the infantry 
and artillery being allocated the most vacancies. Of the 37 vacancies in the 4th OCTU 
course, 16 were filled by infantry cadets and 14 by artillery candidates.617 On arrival at 
the course, cadets were graded and placed into squads according to the amount of 
previous military experience and training in an effort to maximise the best use of time 
and resources.618  
The general syllabus for the commissioning course mainly focused on infantry 
training. Topics of instruction included: light machine guns, signals, field craft, section 
leading, digging/ wiring, platoon fire power, platoon tactics, section training, section in 
attack, section in defence, street and village fighting, road blocks, fighting patrol, night 
patrol, pistol drill and administration.619 The pre-course report recorded that all cadets, 
regardless of what corps they were in or previous military experience, would receive 
training in drill, physical training, infantry training covering topics previously 
mentioned in the general syllabus, anti-gas training, as well as training with weapons 
common to all arms: rifles, bayonets, hand grenades, Lewis Guns, 3 inch mortars and 
pistols.620 The course also included instruction relating to mess etiquette, the 
organisation of rifle battalions and artillery, map reading, orders and communication, 
evacuation of casualties, supply in the field, cooperation with artillery, sanitation and 
hygiene.621 Officer cadets of technical corps, such as artillery and engineers, also had 
to attend lectures covering topics within their specialised fields. For artillery cadets 
these included subjects such as ballistics, organisation of field batteries, map reading 
and field sketching, duties of officers in a field regiment, deployment of batteries, 
engagement of targets, cooperation with infantry, observation of fire range tables, fire 
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control and numerous other related subjects that were practiced once the newly 
commissioned officers were posted to their units.622              
The OCTUs generally proved successful in identifying and producing 
competent junior officers from within the citizen-soldiery of the 2nd New Zealand 
expeditionary Force. The reported results of the 4th OCTU Course provides evidence of 
this, with only eight of the 37 cadets failing to graduate.623 Of those eight, three were 
recommended for retraining in the following course and were later commissioned. This 
included Second-Lieutenants A.C. Williams and J.W. Godfrey who had initially 
attended the course as machine gunners but could not qualify as such and were later 
commissioned into the infantry.624  However, five of the eight who failed the course 
were Maori. These soldiers were posted back to 28 (Maori) Battalion and were not 
considered suitable for retraining.625 Although no reasons were given for their 
unsuitability, it is possible that these cadets struggled with written examinations and 
report writing given the limited education opportunities many rural Maori had received 
at that time.  In contrast, some of the men who attended this course went on to achieve 
field rank after proving to be competent combat leaders. One example was C.A. ‘Sandy’ 
Slee who had risen to the rank of major in 23 Battalion by the time he died of wounds 
he received at Cassino in March 1944.626 However, the most notable was James C. ‘Jim’ 
Henare who was decorated for his ‘inspirational’ leadership as a company commander 
at Cassino and who was later promoted as lieutenant-colonel in command of 28 (Maori) 
Battalion in 1945.627            
Not all junior officers who graduated from Officer Cadet Training Units proved 
to be of the right calibre. One example is that of Second-Lieutenant C.H. Telfer of 24 
Battalion who faced serious disciplinary charges in August 1945 after only receiving 
his commission four months previously. While a student at a platoon commanders’ 
course at the School of Infantry at Warminster in England he lost his temper and failed 
to obey an order. The adverse report from the officer in charge of the course was 
disparaging:  
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This officer has been most difficult since his arrival at the school. He has made no attempt to 
do his best. He has been most obstructive and truculent in manner, and has been a distinct handicap to 
the smooth running of his section and platoon. He has not responded at all to the spirit of his platoon and 
has made himself unpopular with his instructors and fellow students.628  
 
Although brought up on disciplinary charges for his behaviour, these were subsequently 
withdrawn and Telfer only suffered dismissal from the course and was returned to his 
battalion in an effort to save his career.629   
Prior to becoming officer cadets at OCTUs while on active service overseas, 
candidates were generally required to attend ‘Pre-OCTU Courses.’ These usually 
comprised four weeks of intense instruction where the purpose was to weed out those 
who were not up to the required standard.630 British, Australian, Canadian and New 
Zealand ‘Other Ranks’ who were considered officer material were sent to these courses, 
based in the United Kingdom and in the Middle East, that were administered by the 
British Army.631 However, for a period 2NZEF held its own pre-entry courses at the 
New Zealand School of Instruction in Egypt.632 A specific number of positions were 
allocated to the forces of each dominion based on the size of their establishment, with 
the 2nd New Zealand Division having a maximum of 34 candidate positions each month; 
including 15 from the infantry, 6 from the artillery, 3 from the armoured brigade and 2 
from the engineers.633       
The demand for replacement of trained officers in the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Force in New Zealand directly led to the short-
term establishment of a staff college in the Dominion. After an appeal from the New 
Zealand government stating a need to establish such a training facility, in August 1941 
General Sir Archibald Wavell (General Officer in Command, India) sent his most senior 
staff officer from ‘Training Northern Command, India’ to act as director of the 
establishment.634 On his arrival he found that there had been no preliminary 
arrangements made for the college, although the first suggested location for it at 
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Waiouru was considered unsuitable by the Imperial officer.635 Brigadier Weir then 
suggested Massey College, near Palmerston North, as a suitable venue and it was here 
that the facility was established.636 All of the five original senior directory staff had 
seen active service in the Greek and Crete campaigns, with Lieutenant-Colonel Brooke 
and Majors Brooke-White and Davis being regular officers. Between them they 
formulated a syllabus for a four-month course that was ‘nearly to the standard of Quetta 
and Camberley,’ where they were expected to train civilians of Territorial units to a 
second grade officer standard.637 The college also ran senior staff courses of seven 
weeks duration for commanding officers and those selected for promotion to those 
positions.  
The first course that commenced in January 1942 caused some tension between 
the director and Army Headquarters in Wellington regarding the ages of some of the 
attendants; the average age of the 50 students was over 40 years old, with the oldest 
aged 54.638 Few had any military training at all and over fifty percent were not 
recommended for staff appointments within the Territorial Force due to their age. The 
college argued that younger officers were more receptive to, and able to absorb, modern 
ideas of warfare. Subsequently, the composition of future courses consisted of students 
of an average age of 30.639 Lieutenant-General Puttick wrote in his annual report in 
August 1943 that 300 students from six courses had passed out of the college that year 
and that there had been special emphasis in the training relating to the requirements of 
the Pacific theatre; the majority of the graduates from the college eventually saw service 
in the Pacific.640 At this time New Zealand regular force officer cadets were still being 
enrolled and attending courses at the Royal Australian Military College, with nine 
graduating that year and another 18 still in attendance.641   
However, by early 1944 the reduced demand for combat officer training in the 
3rd NZ Division and within the military forces in New Zealand led to the closure of the 
Staff College. Brigadier William Gentry, a veteran of the 2nd NZ Division who had 
returned to New Zealand to serve as Deputy Chief of General Staff, wrote a report in 
February of that year stating that the college was conducting the first of two tactical 
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courses at company commander level; the first course had a strength of 22 officers, but 
the second would only have half that number.642 His report makes it clear why the short-
lived college was closed. 
 
There is no longer any demand from 3 Div for the training of staff officers and the local demand 
has ceased. In these circumstances, there is no scope that one can foresee for the Staff College in its 
normal role. A limited amount of tactical instruction will still be necessary from time to time and it 
therefore proposed that when the staff college is closed down, the Tactical Wing of the Army School at 




   Self –Motivated Officers  
 
Some officers were self-motivated and took the initiative to study military 
theory and practices beyond the set army curriculum, not only during the inter-war 
years and leading up to embarkation, but also on active service. The most obvious 
example was Howard Kippenberger. A lawyer by profession, Kippenberger took his 
role as an officer in the Territorials seriously and was passionate to the point of 
obsession in improving his knowledge of military history, theory and command and 
leadership. According to one of his biographers, Glyn Harper, he devoted most of his 
spare time and money to the study of military history which gave him the understanding 
of the importance of good, competent leadership while appreciating the crucial 
significance of morale in obtaining victory.644 Kippenberger was convinced New 
Zealand would find itself at war again in the years following the Great War and was 
dedicated to preparing himself for such an event as he progressed through the officer 
ranks during the 1920s and 1930s.645 An examination of some of his personal collection 
in the library at KMARL shows his determination in educating himself to be an 
effective commander in modern warfare (refer to page 35). Of significance is the 
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collection that related to contemporary military theory and tactics which ensured 
Kippenberger was well educated in the tactics of modern warfare. Volumes such as 
Captain Basil Liddell Hart’s The Remaking of Modern Armies, Albert Muller’s 
Germany’s War Machine, A. Hilliard Atteridge’s The German Army at War, and D.G. 
Brown’s The Tank in Action ensured that he was not only familiar with the workings of 
the British Army but also that of his expected enemy, Germany.  
Harper argues that from such study Kippenberger learned much about military 
command and operations that made him an outstanding commander who focused on 
competent leadership and morale.646 Harper also states Kippenberger was heavily 
influenced by Liddell Hart’s military theories of modern warfare, which were 
considered controversial by some traditional military theorists at the time. 
Kippenberger seemed to agree with Liddell Hart’s theories from the pencilled notes he 
wrote in the margin of his book, The Real War 1914-1918, revealing that he felt it was 
the best work written so far on the Great War.647 Liddell Hart’s main theory was that 
the indirect route was the best approach when attacking; a tactic that the New Zealand 
Division successfully and repeatedly used in the defeat of Rommel’s forces in North 
Africa. 
Major-General Lindsay Inglis was another such senior combat commander who 
was well-read on contemporary military history, strategy and tactics. Interestingly, for 
years Inglis had been Kippenberger’s regimental commanding officer, and later 
Brigadier, in the Territorials; Kippenberger claimed, ‘I had learned more of soldiering 
from him than from anyone else with whom I had served.’648 Inglis took his role in the 
Territorials seriously and was passionate in his own study of modern warfare, as well 
as in ensuring his subordinate officers maintained a certain level of military education 
through providing lectures on current tactics and military history. Not only did he read 
extensively himself, but he also encouraged his junior officers to do so as well. An 
example of this was the lecture he gave in 1924, while a major in the Canterbury 
Infantry Regiment, titled, ‘Reading as Part of an Officer’s Military Education.’649      
Although it could be expected that senior officers within the regular and 
Territorial Forces were well-read in military matters, many company officers also took 
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some personal responsibility in improving their knowledge of army regulations and 
protocols, weaponry, tactics, command and leadership relevant to their level of 
command, albeit, at varying degrees of enthusiasm. This was especially so for the 
majority of officers with the 2NZEF who had only seen Territorial service prior to 
embarking for active service overseas. Battalion-size training exercises had been non-
existent leading up to the formation of the expeditionary force, ensuring that the 
company officers of the new battalions within the 1st Echelon had only limited 
experience to compare with the theoretical and practical instruction they received. 
According to Kippenberger, those of the 20th Battalion were restricted to a week-long 
training camp at Cave, as previously mentioned, and a week of exercises at Tai Tapu, 
near Christchurch, where the battalion was divided into companies that either attacked 
or held the township.650 Officers from within the technical and support units, such as 
the artillery and engineers, were more fortunate in that most were very familiar with 
their specific trades through pre-war training and were only lacking in experience of 
co-ordinating with large infantry formations.  
As with their fellow officers from the Great War, company officers of 2NZEF 
were also exposed to drills, physical training and lectures on military history, strategy, 
tactics and administration based on the British Army curriculum during their voyages 
overseas.651  When Sandy Thomas embarked with the 23rd Battalion of the 2nd Echelon 
in May 1940 he described himself as ‘a very raw second-lieutenant of twenty years’ 
who had been put in charge of 15 Platoon of C Company of the battalion.652 He only 
had four months training with the unit in New Zealand prior to embarkation, and due 
to his inexperience he attempted to study for his new role as much as he could while in 
transit and while the battalion was stationed in Britain.653 Haddon Donald was aged 24 
and held the same rank as Thomas when he travelled with the 22nd Battalion, also in the 
2nd Echelon, to Britain and then later on to Egypt after the threat of invasion of the 
British Isles had passed. In his autobiography he noted that while in England the 
battalion trained in performing night attacks, which was new to the training syllabus 
but was later to become a tactic that the 2nd New Zealand Division mastered and became 
renowned for.654 Donald was a practised marksman and for his efforts he was selected 
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to attend a ‘Snipers and Intelligence’ course at Bisley during the period his unit was 
still stationed in England. He graduated second from the course while another New 
Zealander took the top honour.655 Donald argues that the determination and self-
motivated work ethic of most Kiwi officers and other ranks in training were obvious 
when attending courses ‘where they were competing with Brits, Aussies, Canadians, 
South Africans & others, and we nearly always topped the list.’656  
Another example of the initiative some of the young officers took in improving 
their military knowledge in the period before the 2nd NZ Division saw combat was 
provided by Donald in his book when writing of the journey from England to join the 
1st Echelon in Egypt: 
 
Life on board ship was fairly monotonous but Colin Armstrong [another junior officer in his 
battalion] and I were given the task of studying the one and only Tommy Gun which had been issued to 
the 22nd just prior to embarkation. There was no information with it so our first job was to produce a 
handbook. I had some knowledge of technical engineering terms and could draw up and describe the 
parts and Colin was good at putting it all together. We had some ammunition and learned the intricacies 
of how to handle it effectively. Then we gave courses to all the NCOs so they could instruct their sections 
after the guns were finally issued to us in Egypt.657 
 
   
The 3rd New Zealand Division in the Pacific  
   
Officer training for those commissioned in the 3rd New Zealand Division 
serving in the Pacific theatre varied from those serving in the Middle East. Whereas 
officers of the 2nd NZ Division were trained for open mobile warfare in the desert, those 
of the 3rd NZ Division needed to be proficient in amphibious landings and jungle 
combat. The 3rd NZ Division originated from a brigade group known as B Force that 
was formed from units sent to defend Fiji and Tonga in mid-1940. The officer in 
command of the brigade, Brigadier William Cunningham, had recommended that the 
officers and men posted to the formation should receive at least three months training 
in New Zealand before being sent to the islands.658 When reporting on the second relief 
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force that arrived in Fiji in August 1941, Cunningham voiced serious concerns 
regarding the quality and inexperience of the officers that had recently arrived, stating 
that apart from some senior officers, the Brigade was again made up of new personnel 
with limited training, with new officers, mostly second-lieutenants, having only 
recently graduated from OCTUs in New Zealand.659 Another concern was that the 
posting of ten captains back to New Zealand had resulted in subalterns now acting as 
company commanders.660  
As a result of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the 
United States took on the major role in the defence of the islands in the South Pacific. 
By August 1942 the two brigades of New Zealand troops in Fiji and Tonga had been 
posted back to the Dominion to form the nucleus of the newly formed 3rd NZ Division. 
The American High Command who had control of all Allied operations in the South 
Pacific had indicated that this formation was to be used as garrison troops for territory 
recaptured from the Japanese and could be used in minor ‘mopping up’ operations. 661 
Major-General Harold Barrowclough, a combat-experienced brigade commander from 
2nd NZ Division, was appointed to lead this force on 12 August 1942 and it was his 
determination and administrative skills that ensured the officers and other ranks within 
this force received appropriate training. 
Barrowclough was disconcerted by the unsuitability of many officers initially 
attached to the Division when he first took command. In a report to Army Head Quarters 
in Wellington in late August 1942 he recorded that only a few of the senior officers on 
his Divisional staff had combat experience in the desert, such as Colonel J. Brooke-
White and Brigadier C. Duff, while many of the other officers were Great War veterans, 
some physically unfit and most lacking in recent combat experience.662 It was also 
evident to him that those who had served in Fiji had received little or no training in 
exercises larger than battalion level.663 To address this Barrowclough immediately 
purged the division of unfit, inadequate or elderly officers, while promoting more 
energetic younger men, which Reginald Newell argues in his recent PhD thesis, proved 
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greatly beneficial to morale.664 Barrowclough was determined that his officers and men 
would be combat-ready in the eventuality that the division would be used in that role.  
The nature of the island warfare fought in the unfamiliar terrain of tropical 
jungles led to a new approach to training, with special emphasis placed on combat 
experiences of Australian and American troops currently campaigning against the 
Japanese. Barrowclough took personal responsibility for determining the training of his 
officers and men by devising and leading exercises in both New Zealand and later in 
New Caledonia. Prior to leaving the Dominion he oversaw an exercise in the Kaimai 
Ranges near Auckland where he attempted to replicate the experience, terrain and 
tactics used by Australian forces in defending the Kokoda Track in Papua New 
Guinea.665 The exercise involved one brigade of infantry and supporting units attacking 
while another had a defensive role.666 This and further exercises conducted when the 
Division transferred to the tropics ensured that both seasoned and inexperienced 
officers and NCOs had the opportunity to learn lessons in air-ground co-operation, 
logistics and engineering that would prove beneficial on active service. Training for all 
ranks and units of the division was continuous in New Caledonia and New Hebrides in 
early and mid-1943 where they were trained in jungle warfare, which had previously 
never been part of the New Zealand forces training curriculum prior to this conflict, 
together with exercises in amphibious landings, river crossings, mountain warfare and 
route marches over difficult terrain.667 Exercises were also multi-dimensional for 
officers of all levels, with senior officers partaking in ‘Training Exercises Without 
Troops’ (TEWT) at brigade and divisional level, while battalion and company officers 
trained with their troops as battalion combat teams that involved individual infantry 
battalions operating as a self-contained force with the close support of artillery units 
and sections of engineers, field ambulance and Army Service Corps.668 Such training 
for these combat teams also included exercises on Guadalcanal with 3 NZ Division 
Tank Squadron in attack and defensive operations.669 In his official history of the 
Division in the Pacific, Oliver Gillespie argues that ‘New Zealanders of 3 Division, for 
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the first time in history preparing for jungle and island warfare, were practically writing 
their own text books as their training progressed.’670 It is clear that Barrowclough took 
the formal training of his officers and other ranks very seriously and could not rely on 
the traditional British Army curriculum to prepare them for the challenges of 
amphibious and jungle warfare. It was through his diligence and leadership that the 
officers and men of 3 NZ Division were as prepared as possible, considering their lack 
of fighting experience in such terrain, for the rigours of warfare in the Pacific. Contrary 
to some beliefs at the time, such training and experience also placed those officers of 
the Division in good stead who were later transferred to 2 NZ Division as part of the 
10th Reinforcements in June 1944.671  
 
Training Manuals  
There was an implied expectation that officers would take personal 
responsibility for ensuring they remained proficient in their role and knowledgeable 
and up-to-date in current military practices and tactics of their corps.  To assist them in 
this the War Office in London provided the New Zealand and other Commonwealth 
governments with a plethora of text books, manuals, pamphlets and other military-
related publications for distribution among their officer corps. As to be expected, some 
publications dated back to the Great War and were outdated for the mobile warfare of 
the Second World War. Others were of significant value, focusing on the skills and 
practices required for good military leadership at all levels, which never date. One such 
example was The Officer and Fighting Efficiency (Extracted from Army Training 
Memoranda), 1940, that was reprinted under licence for the Chief of General Staff , NZ 
Military Forces in 1941. This pocket-size booklet was distributed to every officer and 
officer cadet of the New Zealand military forces during the Second World War and 
became the ‘bible’ for officers to refer to and reflect on while training and on active 
service. It was a concise but informative reference for newly commissioned officers, 
which proved an essential item for the majority of the young New Zealand citizen-
soldier officers who had little or no experience of military life. The booklet was 
specifically designed to give the new officer ‘direct and practical assistance in his day 
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to day work of training and administration.’672 Chapters covered care of the men, Esprit 
de Corps, the fighting spirit and leadership, self-testing of relevant knowledge and 
administrative duties. Included in those chapters procedures and suggestions for 
discipline and punishments, maintaining morale, dress standards, drill and physical 
fitness, effects of new weapons, duties and practices specific to various corps, how to 
conduct inspections and points to which a platoon or troop commander should pay 
attention to before, during and after a move.673  Newly commissioned officers were 
expected to study this and similar publications when not on active duty and could use 
them as aide-memoirs when in the field.  
Another such official publication produced by the War Office and issued to 
officers of the New Zealand Forces was The Officer and his Job: Morale and Fighting 
Efficiency, which was another pocket-size booklet that could be easily carried on 
campaign but provided more in-depth instructions that catered for all levels of 
command for commissioned officers. This too was an extract from the British Army 
Training Memoranda and covered more specific duties required of officers in the field 
such as duties of a piquet commander, duties of a commander of an outpost company, 
reconnaissance during a battle, and principles of mounting an attack and defence.674 
There were some similarities and contrasts in the ability of the New Zealand 
military hierarchy to provide a sufficient number of highly trained officers at all levels 
of command for the expeditionary forces formed in both the First and Second World 
Wars. The main contrast concerning the Second World War was that the military 
establishment had to contend with limited government funding due to continual 
economic recession and anti-war sentiment as a result of the unprecedented casualties 
sustained in the Great War. This had a dramatic effect on the training available for 
officers and NCOs of both the regular and Territorial forces between the wars. The 
main similarity was that when both expeditionary forces were formed, there was a core 
of enthusiastic, determined and experienced citizen-soldier officers from within the 
Territorial Force on whom the government could rely to train and lead the Dominion’s 
newly formed military formations. Diaries, letters and memoirs of junior and senior 
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combat officers serving and training with both expeditionary forces in Egypt in 1914-
1916 and between 1940 and 1941, such as William Malone, Herbert Hart, Denver 
Fountaine, Haddon Donald, Sandy Thomas and Howard Kippenberger, show that many 
officers were conscientious and keen to learn their new profession; studying 
publications in their free time that supplemented their formal training to engrain the 
military practices and theories that they would need for the basis of becoming proficient 
and effective leaders of men into battle. However, the prevailing evidence from the 
recorded recollections of their experiences show that they believed that as citizen-
soldiers, despite months and years of peace-time training to make them proficient 
officers, they really only learned their new profession and honed their leadership skills 
from the harsh experiences of combat. It was the lessons learned from defeat in Greece 
and Crete, as well as the hard-fought victories in the early North African campaigns 
that ensured the officers of combat units within the 2nd NZ Division became effective 


























Command and Leadership: Battalion and  
     Regimental Commanders 
 
 
 Infantry battalions provided the foundation of New Zealand expeditionary 
forces in the First and Second World Wars. The Mounted Rifle regiments of the First 
World War were equally important; used as infantry during the Gallipoli campaign and 
later providing the role of mobile mounted infantry in Egypt and Palestine. It was these 
formations, along with the field artillery regiments, that provided the principal combat 
arms of the Dominion’s military forces overseas. How these battalions and regiments 
performed in battle was crucial in establishing the reputation of both expeditionary 
forces as determined and effective fighting formations. The fighting efficiency of each 
unit throughout these wars fluctuated and was primarily determined by the leadership 
provided by their officers. Arguably, the most important officers to provide such 
technical leadership were the battalion and regimental commanders. Although effective 
leadership at company, battery, squadron, troop and platoon level was also critical to 
success in battle, it was the battalion and regiment commanders’ responsibility to 
prepare the company and platoon commanders, non-commissioned officers and other 
ranks within their units for combat, and it was to them that junior officers looked for 
leadership and confidence in the heat of battle.  
 To date, the historiography surrounding the colonels, lieutenant-colonels and 
majors who led the combat arms of the New Zealand expeditionary forces has been 
limited to a small selection of autobiographies, biographies, articles and books relating 
to specific officers, such as William Malone and Herbert Hart in the First World War, 
and W.B. ‘Sandy’ Thomas, Howard Kippenberger, Jim Burrows and George Clifton in 
the Second World War. Further, historians Roger McElwain and Monty Soutar have 
provided two informative essays on the battalion commanders of 2NZEF and the 
commanders of the 28th (Maori) Battalion, respectively. While all these works provide 
an insight into New Zealand infantry battalion commanders in the Second World War, 
there remains no similar work for the NZEF in the First World War. This chapter 
attempts to remedy this by comparing the experiences of the battalion and regiment 
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commanders in both wars, focusing on their social background, education, selection 
process, training and combat leadership roles in an attempt to obtain a greater 




 The Attributes of Commanders 
 
 To assess the effectiveness of battalion and regimental commanders within the 
two New Zealand expeditionary forces we must first identify the basic attributes of a 
successful commander. The research from this study makes it clear that paramount 
amongst these attributes is having and maintaining the respect of subordinate officers 
and other ranks for him as a person, as a capable and knowledgeable professional, and 
as a commander who could be relied on in battle. In the New Zealand context, such 
attributes had pre-war settings, such as social and professional position in civilian life, 
along with experience and proven authority and leadership while serving in the 
Territorial Force. This was followed by pre-campaign settings where battalion and 
regimental field officers established and supervised effective training and morale 
building regimes for their inexperienced and newly formed units. The final settings 
arose out of a commander’s behaviour and aptitude in combat that had a direct effect 
on the fighting spirit of the troops they led.          
 The role of the battalion commander, or regiment commander in the case of 
mounted infantry and field artillery, remained crucial in determining the combat 
effectiveness of these formations. Garth Pratten states in his book Australian Battalion 
Commanders of the Second World War, that battalion commanders were responsible 
for the conduct of their units both in and out of battle and that it was also their 
responsibility to establish and maintain standards, through training and discipline that 
were essential for ensuring success on the battlefield.675 He argues that through timely 
employment of the battalion’s sub-units and support elements during combat these 
commanding officers were often seen by subordinates as fatherly figures overseeing the 
welfare of the battalion and regiment, with many being commonly referred to as the 
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‘old man.’676 This was also the case in New Zealand units throughout both wars. 
Colonel Denver Fountaine who commanded 26 Battalion, 2NZEF at the battle of El 
Alamein and throughout the Tunisian and Italian campaigns stated in an interview just 
prior to his death in 1993 that he was humbled at being promoted to command the 
battalion and thought it funny that his troops referred to him as the ‘Old Man’ even 
though he was only 28.677  Such benevolent authority conformed to the practicalities of 
leading men in war and the use of nicknames helped to establish the comradeship of 
officers and men. The familiarity also conformed to the egalitarian ethos of New 
Zealand society and perhaps this fostered among the other ranks an imagined sense of 
equality that did not really exist.  
 Battalion command was more personal in nature than higher command. It was 
the highest level of command where the commander could maintain personal 
knowledge of his men. This was in contrast to brigade commanders whose higher level 
of command was focussed on providing the necessary administrative and combat 
leadership of a number of battalions, thus generally removing them from regular 
personal contact with their fighting troops. Conversely, battalion commanders 
remained in daily contact with their subordinates, both officers and other ranks alike, 
as all facets of the battalion remained their responsibility. This aspect reflected not just 
the experience in the New Zealand expeditionary forces. Australian Fred Chilton, who 
commanded 2/2 Battalion of the Australian Imperial Force during the Second World 
War and later held command of the 18th Brigade, stated in his experience the battalion 
commander was ‘everything’ to the battalion, but once he was elevated to command a 
brigade he lost touch with his men.678 Gary Sheffield argues in his book on officer – 
rank and file relations, that the ideal battalion commander was a benevolent paternal 
figure.679 He states how one British soldier recorded that he would do anything for his 
colonel, describing him as a real gentleman and a leader of men who was liked by all 
ranks.680  
During both wars many soldiers wrote of the loss they felt when a popular 
battalion commander was either killed or gravely wounded.  An example of this was 
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provided in the writings of Major Fred Waite who served at Gallipoli and later compiled 
a book from his diary that he kept during the campaign. When writing of the deaths of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Bauchop, who commanded the Otago Mounted Rifles, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone of the Wellington Infantry Regiment, he claimed 
that their loss had a detrimental effect on the morale of their troops.681 Supporting 
evidence of Bauchop’s loss and the effect he had on his troops comes from the diary of 
Trooper Arthur Cargill, written shortly after he heard of his colonel’s death: 
 
We get more men and good men, but can we get as good a colonel again? He set a fine example 
in action and out of it. Over in the trenches he was cheerful and amiable and interested in all that was 
going on. He had a reckless disregard for bullets. Davidson told me that one day he was standing up in 
the trench talking to them and not troubling to keep his head down, while the bullets were flying close. 
One man said, ‘Look out, sir! They are sniping there.’ ‘Oh, are they,’ said the colonel with the bullets 
pipping after him. He did get a slight wound one day but refused to go to hospital with it. Some might 
consider this recklessness a fault, but it gave the men confidence in him as a leader and encouraged the 
same spirit in them, which is of great importance over there [Gallipoli].682 
     
Likewise, in the Second World War, Roger McElwain mentions that the men of 
18 Battalion felt an enormous sense of loss when their old battalion commander, 
Brigadier Gray, was killed in July 1942, with many claiming something irreplaceable 
had gone from their unit.683   
However, Garth Pratten argues that at the battalion level ‘leadership’ alone does 
not identify good commanders. In his opinion the ability to ‘command’ is of greater 
importance, with decision-making and the ability to direct the formation in difficult 
operations and activities being essential qualities.684 He further argues that leadership 
is only one facet of command, but that ideally such officers should provide good 
leadership in carrying out all their functions of command.685 He states that effective 
officers at all levels need the personal skills to get the best out of their men, which is 
leadership, but that they also need to have the decision-making ability to effectively 
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direct complex activities or operations at the level of their command.686 The soldiers of 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces of both world wars were fortunate enough, for 
the most part, to have officers commanding them who largely fulfilled these roles of 
leadership and command. 
 
 
    Choosing Commanders 
 
 
The role of the combat battalion and regiment commanders was universal in 
both conflicts. It was imperative that such officers held the respect and trust of their 
subordinates to ensure the formation could be forged into an effective fighting unit. 
Those commanders who gained the confidence of their troops did so through having 
previous military experience, by showing tactical knowledge, by building or 
strengthening an esprit de corps within the battalion or regiment, and by caring for the 
welfare of those under their command. When Godley formed the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force August 1914, he ensured that all the infantry and mounted rifles 
regiments, along with the field artillery, were commanded by experienced regular and 
Territorial officers capable of leading such formations. With only a limited number of 
New Zealand Staff Corps officers available to command at this level, Godley was 
initially reliant on those Territorial officers who had experience in commanding 
Territorial regiments, to lead the newly formed NZEF regiments. Although such men 
were not professional officers, this did not prevent them from moulding their units of 
mostly inexperienced citizen-soldiers into trained and confident fighters.  
In fact, Godley took care to make the best use of the experience and talent 
available to him. When overseeing the new military scheme based on the measures 
introduced in the 1909 Defence Act, he was determined that there would be emphasis 
on the professional development of both his regular and Territorial officers. It was his 
philosophy that Territorial units would be commanded and trained by officers within 
the same unit, supported by Staff Corps and Permanent Staff personnel.687 It is obvious 
from reading his 1911 Annual Report that he understood the importance of establishing 
a strong bond between unit commanders and the soldiers within the formation to 
enhance performance. When writing in regard to Territorial regiments he stated that 
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every commanding officer would have plenty of professional soldiers ‘to help him and 
to relieve him of administrative duties, but no one to interfere between him and his 
regiment.’688 He followed this idea through to the formation of the expeditionary force 
in 1914, when he predominantly appointed these same experienced Territorial 
commanders to lead the newly formed infantry and mounted rifle regiments.  
The selection of officers has been covered in a previous chapter, but there is 
clear evidence that there were trends in the selection of battalion commanders in the 
expeditionary forces of New Zealand, Australia and Canada in both major conflicts. All 
three dominions had small regular staff corps at the outbreak of both wars and were 
heavily reliant on experienced volunteer officers to provide leadership in the newly 
formed combat formations, especially the infantry battalions.689 Both Godley in the 
First World War, and Freyberg in the Second World War, had the responsibility to 
appoint the right men to lead their enthusiastic, but inexperienced battalions and 
regiments. Both were also aware that there were only a limited number of senior 
Territorial officers with the necessary personal qualities capable of filling these 
vacancies, and it is to their credit that in most cases those chosen when the expeditionary 
forces were formed generally proved to be effective combat leaders. 
Godley’s selection policy was firmly based on suitability rather than seniority. 
When war broke out in early August 1914, his preference was to appoint Territorial 
officers who had been trained under the new establishment as unit commanders over 
regular officers, Boer War veterans or officers from the old Volunteer system who had 
not progressed through the Territorials.690 However, Godley did not hesitate to appoint 
such experienced officers as regiment commanders when he believed there were no 
suitable candidates from within the Territorials. An example of this includes the 
appointment of Major Thomas McDonald of the New Zealand Staff Corps to command 
the Otago Infantry Regiment of the NZEF, mentioned in detail later in the chapter.  
Freyberg had the same philosophy when making his appointments for 2NZEF. 
In contrast to Godley in 1914, in 1939 and 1940 Freyberg was able to select battalion 
and regimental commanders who had experience in fighting a modern war against 
European armies. Of the eleven original infantry battalion commanders of 2NZEF 
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(including 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion and 28 (Maori) Battalion), eight were veterans 
of the Great War, including two who were regular officers in 1939.691 Some had been 
appointed prior to Freyberg taking command. Seven of the eleven officers were selected 
from the Territorial Force, and the remaining four were regular force officers.692 In 
comparison, of the four infantry and four mounted rifles regiment commanders of the 
Main Body of NZEF in 1914, six were Territorial officers and only two of the eight had 
any combat experience; both Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Bauchop of the Otago 
Mounted Rifles and Lieutenant-Colonel John Findlay, commander of the Canterbury 
Mounted Rifles, had served in South Africa during the Second Anglo-Boer War.693 
When compared to the original selection of unit commanders for NZEF in the 
First World War, Freyberg had followed Godley’s selection policy to a lesser extent, 
preferring a greater balance of experience and professionalism when making his 
appointments. The selection of battalion commanders for the 1st Echelon had been made 
prior to Freyberg being given command, but he later stated that he had full confidence 
in those officers appointed to the positions. However, he requested in November 1939 
that he be consulted over the appointment of commanders of battalions in the 2nd and 
3rd Echelons.694 Of the eight unit commanders of these later formations, four appointees 
were professional soldiers, of whom two, Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew of 22 
Battalion and Lieutenant-Colonel George Dittmer of 28 (Maori) Battalion had served 
as officers in the First World War.695 Clearly, Freyberg was determined to select and 
appoint the most suitable officers available, irrespective of whether they were regular 
or Territorial soldiers.             
   As the 1914 NZEF units were established based on provincial Territorial 
districts, newly appointed commanders such as Malone of the Wellington Infantry 
Regiment, MacBean Stewart of the Canterbury Infantry Regiment, Charles ‘German 
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Joe’ (later ‘Old Joe’) Mackesy of the Auckland Mounted Rifles and William ‘Bill’ 
Meldrum of the Wellington Mounted Rifles were known to many of the junior officers 
and troops under their command. Likewise, when the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force was formed in September 1939, most of the original infantry battalion 
commanders were also experienced officers selected from Territorial regiments. 
Examples include Lieutenant-Colonel Howard Kippenberger who was in command of 
the Canterbury Regiment of the Territorial Force when he was chosen to lead what was 
to become 20 Battalion at the outbreak of war, while Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay Inglis 
had been a Territorial regimental and brigade commander during the 1920s and 1930s 
before he was given command of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion. Inglis had been 
Kippenberger’s Territorial brigade commander in the 1930s and they knew each other 
well.696   
As the majority of officers and other ranks with the Main Body of NZEF in the 
First World War, as well as those of the 1st Echelon of the 2nd NZEF in the Second 
World War, were volunteers from Territorial units, the battalion and regiment 
commanders had already established relationships with a number of the junior officers 
within the newly formed units. Not only did they know these men through service in 
the Territorial regiments, but many were also known through social and vocational 
spheres. The previous knowledge the commanding officers had of their junior officers 
and experienced non-commissioned officers meant that they could allocate positions 
and responsibilities within the unit based on the experience and perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of individuals. A number of the original battalion officers believed that it 
was the relationships formed within the Territorial Force before the formation of the 
two expeditionary forces that contributed to the cohesion of the newly formed units, 
especially when they were training in Egypt before their first campaigns. An example 
of this can be found in a diary of William Malone who wrote that he was ‘very pleased 
to find Major [Herbert] Hart my 2nd in command’ when his battalion was being formed 
at Awapuni, near Palmerston North in August 1914.697 Even though Hart was not from 
Malone’s own Territorial regiment, the 11th (Taranaki Rifles) Infantry Regiment, he 
knew him well from their years of attending annual camps together and was a barrister 
like Malone. According to Malone’s entries, both he and Hart were dissatisfied with 
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the adjutant, Lieutenant Robinson, who had been appointed without their consultation 
and according to Malone lacked experience and knowledge.698 Malone subsequently 
had him replaced with his adjutant from his old Territorial regiment, which he wrote 
was ‘to my pleasure.’699  
Such relationships within the expeditionary forces were not unique to New 
Zealand. The Australian Imperial Forces of both world wars were formed on a similar 
basis, being heavily reliant on volunteers from militia units. Charles Bean recorded in 
his official history of Australia in the First World War that the majority of those few 
permanent Australian and Imperial officers then serving in Australia fit for service 
overseas when the 1st Australian Division was being formed in late 1914 were appointed 
as staff officers.700 He argues that there were hardly any regular officers left available 
to act as brigadiers or battalion commanders and that such positions were filled by 
senior militia officers and a selection of past and present British Army officers living 
or serving in Australia at the time. Of the three original infantry brigade commanders 
of the Australian Imperial Force, two were militia officers, while the third was a British 
Army officer on exchange.701 The brigadiers were given the freedom to choose their 
battalion commanders, while the battalion commanders then had the discretion to select 
their own company officers.702 According to Peter Pedersen, two-thirds of the 631 
officers of the 1st Division had served in the old militia system.703 With the Australian 
infantry battalions and light horse regiments being recruited and formed on a district 
basis similar to the NZEF, and, as in New Zealand, with only a small pool of suitable 
officers, it is clear that the relationships formed in the Citizen Military Force also 
affected the formation of the Australian Imperial Forces. 
The Australians had a similar policy at the beginning of World War Two. Like 
New Zealand, the Australian military forces had only a limited number of regular 
officers when war erupted in late 1939. However, there were underlying issues between 
senior officers of the Australian Staff Corps and those of the Citizen Military Force 
(similar to the New Zealand Territorial Force) when the Australian Imperial Force was 
being formed. The professional officers, such as George Vasey, had had little 
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opportunity for advancement during the inter-war years. Historian David Horner argues 
that these officers were highly trained, knew each other’s strengths and weaknesses, 
and were determined to seize their chances in the developing war.704 The senior militia 
officers were also seeking such roles. They considered themselves more suitable to 
command the newly formed infantry battalions due to their experience in commanding 
these formations in the militia, compared to the Staff Corps officers who had been 
limited to administrative and training roles during the inter-war years.705 Squabbling 
occurred among these two groups of officers for senior positions, especially for 
vacancies as battalion commanders, which Vasey described as ‘a mass of petty 
arrogances and jealousies.’706 While regular officers such as Vasey and Sydney Rowell 
were appointed brigadiers, the officer commanding the AIF, Major-General Thomas 
Blamey, a militia officer himself, mostly selected experienced militia officers to 
command the newly formed infantry battalions.707 Like the original battalion 
commanders of 2NZEF, those who were chosen to lead the Australian battalions were 
First World War veterans. 
 
 
      Social Settings 
  
There is clear evidence that the battalion and regiment commanders of the 
original main bodies of both New Zealand expeditionary forces were from the affluent 
and educated sectors of society. This characteristic was not unique and was typical of 
the officer corps of most modern military forces in the early twentieth century. 
Understandably in that period, relative wealth was required to receive a high level of 
education. Leading up to the First World War, primary education in New Zealand was 
compulsory and free, while secondary education was free only to those who had 
attained government funded scholarships, known as ‘Free Places’ by passing national 
examinations.708 Secondary and tertiary education was available to those who could 
afford to pay for it. This generally limited higher education to those children from 
middle-class families, and education and wealth had a direct correlation to employment 
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opportunities. This further influenced social status within society, which was reflected 
in the Territorial regiments through the Dominion. 
The original battalion and regiments commanders of both expeditionary forces 
were highly educated for that time and from the social elite. Unlike Britain, there was 
no established aristocracy in the colonial societies of the Empire. However, there were, 
to a lesser extent, significant social inequalities based on land, wealth, occupation and 
education. In late nineteenth century New Zealand, pastoral land was often the preserve 
of a few wealthy run-holding families. Many of these large estates, however, were 
eventually reduced in size due to the policies of Liberal governments at the turn of the 
twentieth century. This ensured more land was available for smaller holdings, equating 
to a more equal distribution of land among the population of the colony and provided 
greater opportunity for acquiring wealth through agriculture, even though the 
Dominion’s population was increasingly becoming urbanised. The rise of the service 
professionals from the 1890s created a new, mainly urban, middle-class elite that gained 
social status and influence equal to the old pastoral elite. In New Zealand prior to the 
First World War, occupation opportunities had a direct correlation with wealth and 
education. In Erik Olssen’s words: 
 
Education became the key to social mobility…Those with some secondary education had the 
best chance of obtaining white-collar and semi-professional jobs, while the prerequisite for admission to 
the professions was a university education. Prior to 1890, few occupations required school skills beyond 
literacy and basic arithmetic. Secondary education, although supported by public endowments, was 
largely the preserve of the wealthy.709 
 
In 1901 less than 3 per cent of youth aged between 12 and 18 attended public 
secondary schools. By 1921 almost 13 per cent of the same group attended secondary 
school, and by 1939 this had increased to 25 per cent.710 This demand for higher 
education was driven by public perception that education was the key to social mobility 
in New Zealand. The increasing number of state-funded secondary schools that were 
established, especially in provincial areas post-First World War, provided educational 
opportunities to children of less affluent families who previously could not afford 
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secondary education. This trend provided greater opportunities for commissions and 
promotion for those serving in the Second World War compared to those in the NZEF.         
It was generally those Territorial officers from relatively wealthy families who 
had received secondary education or higher, and who had professional backgrounds, 
who were considered suitable to command battalions and regiments when both 
expeditionary forces were formed. It seems that those who held positions of social 
authority, such as lawyers, teachers, business owners and company managers, had 
proven administrative and managerial competence, that was expected in these 
professions, but most importantly they had experience in use of authority; qualities that 
were considered essential in commanding battalions and regiments.711  However, these 
civilian social and professional ‘qualifications’ dwindled in importance as the conflicts 
progressed, especially during the Second World War where commanders were 
increasingly drawn from those who had proved themselves as capable leaders in the 
lower ranks.  
A prime example of this early selection criteria was that of William Malone. He 
was a barrister and solicitor by profession, as well as being a substantial land owner in 
Taranaki. This provided him with a social position in the province and increased his 
opportunity to achieve high rank in his Territorial regiment in the pre-war years. There 
is no doubt that Malone was a keen student of military history and had a profound sense 
of duty in the defence of ‘King and Country,’ but it is unlikely that he would have risen 
to such a position in peacetime without such social standing. Other such examples from 
the Main Body of the NZEF in the First World War include; D. MacBean Stewart, the 
son of a doctor, who was an accountant in civilian life prior to commanding the 
Canterbury Infantry Regiment;712 William Meldrum, who like Malone was a farmer 
and barrister in civilian life before commanding the Wellington Mounted Rifles;713 and 
Arthur Plugge who was the Headmaster of Dilworth School when he was appointed to 
command the Auckland Infantry Battalion in 1914.714 Such men would have required a 
high standard of education and relative wealth to gain such occupations and the 
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authority that went with them; something that was not available to the majority of 
working-class New Zealanders at that time.  
This was also the case for those New Zealand Staff Corps officers who were 
appointed to command battalions and regiments throughout the Great War. Imperial 
officers who served in the NZEF at this level, such as Harry Fulton and Napier Johnston 
came from middle-class English society and had sufficient higher education and wealth 
to gain entry to the Royal Military Colleges at Sandhurst and Woolwich, or in 
Johnston’s case, Kingston, Canada. Cadets at these establishments were generally 
selected from candidates who had emerged from the British Public School system based 
on privately-funded schools, which was the preserve of the upper-classes and emerging 
middle classes of society. Prior to 1915 it was usual for potential officers joining the 
British Army to be required to possess Officer Training Corps certificates from either 
public school or university OCTs.715 This ensured very few, if any, working-class 
applicants possessed the necessary such qualifications. This was different from the New 
Zealand experience, where New Zealand Staff Corps officers who were appointed to 
command infantry battalions and artillery units during the Great War had received 
formal military training through the British Army curriculum, either through attending 
courses in New Zealand, courses at the military colleges in Britain and India, 
secondment to British regiments overseas, or through graduating from the Royal 
Military College of Australia at Duntroon.  
An unusual example of a New Zealand Staff Corps officer who rose from a 
humble background to later command an infantry battalion before going on to 
command a brigade on the Western Front is provided by Charles Brown. Prior to 1911 
Brown had served in the Volunteers, where he was elected as a captain, and later in the 
Territorials while employed as a coalminer in Denniston and Greymouth where he rose 
to became a mine manager.716 However, in that year he was one of a number of 
candidates from the Territorial Force offered a commission in the Staff Corps that was 
being expanded under Godley’s direction.717 Once a regular officer, Brown’s military 
training would have exceeded more than he could have expected as a Territorial officer, 
which most certainly would have increased his professional knowledge and been 
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influential in his rapid promotion during the First World War. Brown was appointed as 
a captain when the Main Body of NZEF was formed in 1914 and initially served as a 
staff officer at Divisional Headquarters in Egypt and during the Gallipoli landings, after 
being promoted to major.718 By May 1915 he had been promoted to lieutenant-colonel 
and placed in command of the Canterbury Infantry Battalion, which he led in the 
doomed attack on Krithia by the New Zealand Infantry Brigade at Cape Helles.719 He 
later went on to command the 2nd battalion of the Auckland Infantry Regiment on the 
Western Front where he confirmed a reputation as an effective battalion commander. 
He eventually rose to the temporary rank of brigadier-general and was killed while 
leading the 1st Brigade of the New Zealand Division at Messines in June 1917.720 It was 
his professionalism and proven leadership as a battalion commander that marked 
Brown out for higher command. Originally coming from a working-class occupation in 
civilian life, it is unthinkable that he would have had the same opportunities of 
command had he sought a commission in the British Army. 
Enhanced secondary education opportunities in New Zealand during the inter-
war years led to the appointment of battalion and regiment commanders from a broader 
spectrum of society in the Second World War than in the First World War. The increase 
in the number of government-funded secondary schools throughout the Dominion, 
especially in relatively isolated provincial areas such as Westland and Buller in the 
South Island, and Northland and the East Coast in the North Island, provided a greater 
opportunity for working class children to receive secondary education; something that 
had previously been limited to those provincial families who could afford to send their 
children to boarding schools predominantly in the main urban centres. Denver 
Fountaine was one such example of a 2NZEF battalion commander who came from a 
working-class family but was fortunate enough to attend Westport Technical College 
after it had been established in 1923.721 This resulted in him obtaining a clerical position 
upon leaving school and eventually led to him being commissioned in his local 
Territorial regiment before the outbreak of war in 1939.722  
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Another Second World War battalion commander from a humble background, 
who eventually became a brigadier, was Jim Burrows. Coming from the small North 
Canterbury farming village of Waiau, he considered himself very fortunate that his 
family made a significant financial sacrifice to send him to attend Christchurch Boys 
High School in 1918. As he states in his autobiography Pathway Among Men: ‘It was 
not by any means the customary thing in my day to go to secondary school and boys 
normally left primary school to go straight to local employment.’723 Burrows only 
expected to remain at the school for six months due to the financial burden this would 
place on his parents. During the school holidays he earned a ‘man’s’ wage working on 
a local farm to help pay for his school fees, but after four years at secondary school his 
parents could no longer afford the boarding fees.724 Fortunately for Burrows, the school 
principal paid his fees for his final year, stating that completing his secondary education 
would make a difference for his future prospects.725 Burrows went on to became a 
teacher at the school and was commander of the school cadets in 1939; thanks to this 
position, and his experience in officer training, he received a captain’s commission and 
was made a company commander in 20 Battalion when it was being formed in 




    Cultivating Professionalism 
 
As with the expeditionary forces raised by Australia and Canada at the 
beginning of both world wars, the original commanders of the battalions and regiments 
of the New Zealand expeditionary forces were chosen from those who had proved 
themselves as accomplished officers in pre-war military forces. Their challenge, in the 
first instance, was to bring their battalions and regiments to combat readiness. The most 
obvious question that needs to be asked when making an evaluation of such officers is 
how successful were they in providing the necessary training and building the morale 
of their units. The British Army, on which these dominion forces based their training 
syllabus, was not well prepared on the whole for the demands of trench warfare in the 
                                                 
723 J.T. Burrows, Pathway Among Men (Christchurch, 1974), p. 13 
724 Ibid., pp. 13, 23-25 
725 Ibid., pp.23-25 
726 Ibid., pp. 74-75  
 197 
First World War, or the blitzkrieg and desert warfare in the Second World War. The 
initial campaigns that both New Zealand expeditionary forces were involved in 
identified the serious limitations of the training that had been provided. Yet the 
battalions and regiments did not break under severe pressure, which says much for the 
basic cohesion and preparedness that proved invaluable at the time when the troops 
lacked combat experience. Battalion-building was an on-going process, where 
incoming officers and men had to be absorbed and integrated into the units, 
recuperation from battle had to be organised and replacement officers appointed. Along 
with this, battalion and regimental commanders also had the responsibility of ‘out of 
battle’ morale building to maintain confidence and an esprit de corps within their units, 
as well as the New Zealand brigades and divisions as a whole. However, until now, 
little was known about how this was achieved. What is clear is that it could not have 
been achieved without the cultivation of a certain level of professionalism in leadership 
primarily led by unit commanders.       
When the First World War broke out in August 1914 Godley had been making 
preparations for the creation of a New Zealand expeditionary force for the previous two 
years and had been assessing suitable unit commanders in that time. As early as August 
1912, he had sought approval from the government to work out details for such a force, 
which was originally to be part of an Australasian division of 17,000 men all ranks.727 
However, after discussions with General Sir John French and others at the War Office 
in London, it was decided that a separate New Zealand expeditionary force was more 
practicable.728  At the time the combat field forces of the Territorial Force consisted of 
four mounted rifle brigades, four field artillery brigades, four infantry brigades and 
supporting units of field engineers and field ambulances to defend the Dominion.729 It 
was from this force that Godley had to select his senior commanders for the 
expeditionary force, while also ensuring there were sufficient experienced senior 
officers remaining in New Zealand to command the home forces.             
Not all Territorial unit commanders were suitable to serve overseas and those 
that were had been identified as early as 1912 and 1913. An examination of the register 
of confidential annual reports of Territorial units from those years indicates the varying 
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quality of the unit commanders available for selection. Many of the lieutenant-colonels 
had reached their rank through the old volunteer militia where officers had been elected 
by the men. Some had retained their rank in the newly established Territorial Force but 
were considered too old to serve on campaign. An example was that of Lieutenant-
Colonel E. Richardson of the 13th (North Canterbury & Westland) Regiment, who in 
1913 was aged 54 and not considered by Godley.730 Even some officers who were 
second-in-command of Territorial units were not considered suitable for promotion to 
lead units of the expeditionary force. An example is that of Major Searle of the 10th 
(North Otago Rifles) Regiment who was described in a report of the unit in April 1913 
as being, ‘very poor at his work…hopeless in dress and discipline and of no help to his 
O/C [Officer–in-Command].’731 Another senior officer to suffer such criticism was 44-
year-old Major A. Leech of the 11th (Taranaki Rifles) Regiment who was reported in 
May 1913 as being indifferent and lacking in military intelligence.732      
In contrast, the inspection reports identified numerous senior and junior officers 
who were to prove capable and effective officers and battalion commanders during the 
Great War. Leech’s commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone was 
described as being ‘fit for the position’ in the report of his unit in May 1913 and his 
leadership of the Wellington Infantry Regiment while training in Egypt and on 
campaign at Gallipoli confirmed this.733 Another such senior Territorial officer was 
Major Arthur Plugge of the 3rd (Auckland) Regiment, who was reported as being an 
excellent officer who was keen and energetic.734 Plugge was subsequently chosen by 
Godley to command the Auckland Infantry Regiment of the Main Body of the NZEF 
in 1914. An examination of the reports concerning the Mounted Rifle regiments show 
similarity to the infantry units. One such officer who was considered ‘excellent’ in 1913 
was Major William Meldrum of the 6th (Manawatu) Mounted Rifles, and such a report 
may have been instrumental in Meldrum being given command of the Wellington 
Mounted Rifles of the NZEF the following year.735  
There were also a number of junior officers from this time who were identified 
as being promising and who subsequently went on to command battalions or regiments 
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within the NZEF by the end of the conflict. In June 1912, 35-year-old Captain D. 
MacBean Stewart of the 1st (Canterbury) Regiment was reported as being ‘very 
excellent’ and that he got ‘good work out of his men.’736 Stewart was given command 
of the Canterbury Infantry Regiment when the Main Body for the NZEF was 
established, and like Malone, gained a reputation as an effective battalion commander 
while training his battalion hard in Egypt.737 In March 1912, Edward Puttick was a 
second-lieutenant in the 15th (North Auckland) Regiment where it was noted that he 
was a ‘Good officer- very keen in his work’ and that he had arranged the transport of 
the men of his unit to their annual camp with ‘great completeness to detail.’738 The 
following year Puttick had transferred to the 5th (Wellington Rifles) Regiment where 
he had been promoted to lieutenant and was reported as being, ‘A most efficient and 
promising officer - worthy of promotion.’739 He volunteered to serve in the NZEF from 
August 1914 and by October 1917 had been promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 
command of a battalion of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade serving on the Western 
Front.740  Another junior officer to receive earlier recognition in these reports was 29-
year-old Captain N.S. Falla of B (Howitzer) Battery of the New Zealand Field Artillery, 
who was described in April 1913 as being, ‘A good officer - well up to his work.’741 
Falla volunteered to serve in the field artillery of the NZEF in November 1914 where 
he retained his Territorial rank. However, due to his distinguished service in 
commanding a battery during the Gallipoli campaign, by May 1916 he had risen to the 
rank of lieutenant-colonel, which he held until the end of the war.742 On the Western 
Front, Falla went on to command the 2nd, 3rd and 4th New Zealand Field Artillery 
Brigades and forged a reputation as an effective and reliable combat artillery 
commander, being mentioned in dispatches four times.743 
There were no formal criteria for the selection of battalion and regiment 
commanders when the New Zealand Expeditionary Force was formed in the First 
World War. As already stated, Godley, with only a few officers of his small staff corps 
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experienced enough for these appointments, and with the units being formed on a 
provincial basis, was obliged to select senior officers from within the Territorial Force. 
Professional soldiers, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Bauchop, who was appointed 
to command the Otago Mounted Rifle Regiment, Major Thomas McDonald, who was 
promoted to lieutenant-colonel as the original commander of the Otago Infantry 
Battalion, and Major Harry Fulton, an Imperial officer on secondment, who was 
promoted to command a battalion in the Samoan Advance Party, were some of the few 
staff officers available to Godley. He was fortunate in having at his disposal Major G. 
Napier Johnston of the Royal Artillery, also on secondment and promoted to lieutenant-
colonel, who proved exceptional in commanding the New Zealand Field Artillery 
throughout the war.  
Godley was concerned at the inexperience of many of the Territorial regimental 
commanders, but had no alternative and was forced to rely on these volunteer citizen-
soldiers. However, he displayed no obligation to existing regimental commanders in 
making his selections if he thought they were not of the required standard or experience. 
An example was his refusal to appoint either Lieutenant-Colonel John McClymont or 
Lieutenant-Colonel John Moir, both Territorial regiment commanders from the Otago 
military district, to command the Otago infantry Regiment. Instead, Godley appointed 
a New Zealand Staff Corps officer, Major Thomas W. McDonald, as lieutenant-colonel 
of the newly formed Otago Infantry Regiment, while both McClymont and Moir 
accepted reductions in rank to major in the battalion; McClymont as second-in-
command of the unit and Moir as a company commander.744 By the end of the war 
McClymont had reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel and was in command of the 3rd 
Otago Infantry Battalion, while Moir returned to New Zealand in mid-1916 as a major 
after he had served a period as second-in-command of the battalion.745  
Evidence that Godley had little or no confidence in these two senior Territorial 
officers to command a battalion, at least in the early stage of the war, was that he 
subsequently replaced McDonald with Captain A. Moore, DSO, an Imperial officer on 
secondment to the New Zealand Staff Corps. Prior to Moore being promoted to 
lieutenant-colonel he had initially been appointed as assistant-adjutant of the battalion 
                                                 
744 A.E. Byrne, Official History of the Otago Regiment, NZEF, in the Great War, 1914-1918, second 
edition (Dunedin, 1921), p. 7 
745 Studholme , pp. 192 & 218 
 201 
and junior in rank to both McClymont and Moir.746 This indicates that Godley was more 
concerned with appointing those he deemed fit to command battalions and regiments, 
rather than appoint commanders to lead such formations merely because they already 
commanded Territorial units.  He explained this in his correspondence with James 
Allen, Minister of Defence (who was later knighted in 1917 for his work in that role): 
 
I have seen McClymont and explained that though he was appointed second-in-command of the 
Battalion, I do not think he has sufficient experience, or is sufficiently qualified to command it on active 
service, and he is very nice about it, and quite content, and says that he will be very glad to take second 
in command under Smyth or Moore, whichever it may be.747 
 
Godley’s increasing lack of faith in McClymont as a suitable battalion 
commander in the early stage of the war was further evident when he wrote to Allen 
from Egypt stating that although unsuitable for that level of command, circumstance 
dictated he would have to retain him: 
 
I am sure that, as I cabled you, the trouble about McClymont and Henderson is only slackness 
and carelessness, and I have cabled you in the hope that it may be possible only to send one of them 
home. Henderson can best be spared, especially as he has already left us, but, under the circumstances of 
McDonald having gone sick, it is very hard to let McClymont go, and it also is, I think, very hard on 
him.748  
           
Fortunately for McClymont, he was retained, and after experiencing and learning from 
four years of combat leadership, he ended the war with a reputation as a competent 
battalion commander.    
The training the first and later battalion and regimental commanders received 
prior to the formation of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force was limited 
compared to those of the Great War. The military forces of the Dominion had paid 
heavily due to the cuts in government spending resulting from the Depression, 
particularly in regard to the suspension of compulsory military training. Burrows’ 
experience as a school cadets officer paints a clear picture as to the state of affairs at 
the outbreak of the Second World War: 
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School teachers who held officer commissions had little or no contact with Territorial battalions. 
Separate courses were held each year and these were reasonably supported by South Island teachers until 
they were affected by the general deterioration which had set in everywhere. The courses may have 
varied a little according to the enthusiasm of the Regular Force but on the whole they were good. They 
had no troops to work with and battle exercises lacked any kind of realism but no one could say the 
courses were a waste of time. At the same time, there was no incentive for anyone to work harder unless 
he proposed to sit promotion examinations at the end of the year. Sometimes a teacher would find he had 
to take over the cadet unit of his school and was expected to step up his rank. In these circumstances he 
would take the annual training course more seriously, knowing he had to sit the same examination as 
Territorial officers and that passes were not granted lightly. Had it been possible to foresee the future at 
that stage, courses in staff training would have paid a good dividend.749 
 
Burrows further argued that in 1939 others like him were ‘a long way from being highly 
trained soldiers,’ and that ‘any likeness between them and the officers of Hitler’s army 
could only be coincidental.’750  
 
 
 The Importance of Experience 
             
 Experience provided the best form of training for unit commanders. In the case 
of the battalion and regiment leaders of both New Zealand expeditionary forces, this 
included experience prior to and during overseas service. Experience as leaders and 
managers in civilian society provided some with valuable skills and knowledge in 
administration, employment and man-management that served them well as military 
commanders. Compulsory military service in the years leading up to and during the 
Great War certainly had a positive influence in the training and efficiency of New 
Zealand units serving in the Middle East and on the Western Front. The previous service 
of both the battalion and regimental officers, along with the other ranks, reduced the 
time it took for these citizen-soldiers to adjust to army life and the rigours of 
campaigning. It also assisted the commanding officers in their duty in forming their 
units into disciplined combat commands. In contrast, the suspension of compulsory 
military training in the 1930s and the continual reduction in military expenditure during 
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the inter-war years certainly had a detrimental effect on the training and resources 
available to the New Zealand military forces leading up to the Second World War. 
However, the limited training that was received, especially by those officers who were 
to lead units throughout the conflict, did prove beneficial in forging the 2nd New 
Zealand Division into an effective fighting formation. 
Battalion and regiment commanders from both expeditionary forces were 
responsible for preparing themselves and their men for combat and recognised that 
previous military service was a key factor in achieving this. Lieutenant-Colonel Claude 
Weston who held command of the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Wellington Infantry 
Regiment on the Western Front from 1917 acknowledged this in his autobiography, 
Three Years with the New Zealanders. His first military experience was that of a cadet 
at Christ’s College in Christchurch, followed by service in the Volunteers where he had 
been appointed as a captain prior to retiring to the Officer Reserve list shortly before 
the introduction of compulsory military service.751 With a shortage of experienced 
officers to serve overseas at the outbreak of war in 1914, Weston volunteered and 
trained with the 6th Reinforcements at Trentham prior to joining his regiment at 
Gallipoli. It was his view that previous military training was essential in preparing the 
New Zealanders for combat: 
 
It must be admitted now, as experience has proved beyond doubt, that a man who has some 
previous military training more easily absorbs the military atmosphere than his fellow citizen with none. 
People were prone to discount the value of the earlier training [Volunteer Corps], but it stood many of 
us in good stead. It was difficult enough to adapt oneself to the new life, but it would have been infinitely 
harder, and taken longer, had one had no volunteer experience. The values of Compulsory Training in 
this war has justified its existence.752  
 
Like many other infantry company commanders who served at Gallipoli and 
who would later serve as battalion commanders on the Western Front, Weston learned 
to appreciate the difficulties in maintaining the fighting effectiveness and esprit de 
corps of frontline units. In France, battalion commanders had to ensure their officers 
and men continually received comprehensive training in trench warfare when out of the 
frontline, balanced with the need for periods of rest prior to returning to the trenches. 
Weston was of the view that fighting at Gallipoli had not prepared the New Zealanders 
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for the rigours of trench warfare in Flanders, where the mud, filthy water and rats were 
inescapable.753  As a company commander, and later battalion commander, he realised 
that it was the unit leader’s responsibility to ensure the command was prepared for 
battle, both physically and emotionally, to ensure success. This proved difficult to 
achieve when sustaining high casualties in battle: 
 
A company on active service is like the shifting sands on the seashore; the officers and non-
commissioned officers, in common with the remainder, come and go, here today, there tomorrow. 
Fortunate is the company that retains an officer for any length of time; because with the officers and men 
strange to each other, its efficiency is impaired and often the men’s happiness endangered. Justice is 
easier when the superior knows the idiosyncrasies and characteristics of his subordinates, and, moreover, 
there is lacking that relationship sometimes stronger than blood-tie, which is born between officers and 
men who have been through a great deal together.754   
 
The efficiency and morale of infantry battalions was fluid within the 
expeditionary forces of both conflicts and was a constant concern for battalion 
commanders. The original battalion commanders of the Main Body of the NZEF in 
Egypt in early 1915 and those of the first three echelons of 2NZEF who trained in Egypt 
and England leading up to the Greek Campaign in 1941, were fortunate enough to have 
months of training with their units where they had the opportunity to get to know their 
subordinate officers and other ranks. These battalions were formed with volunteers who 
generally had years of some form of military experience, either through serving in 
previous conflicts such as the Boer War and the First World War, or through service in 
the Volunteers or Territorials. The periods of training prior to their first campaigns 
provided the opportunity for the formations to achieve a certain level of military 
efficiency, leading to a collective sense of pride among the soldiers in their unit and a 
certain élan within battalions. This was the same for the artillery units and Mounted 
Rifle regiments. Commanders such as Malone, Stewart, Meldrum  and Napier Johnston, 
who commanded the NZ Field Artillery in the First World, and Kippenberger and 
George Dittmer, who was the original commander of 28 (Maori) Battalion, understood 
well how increased efficiency would lead to increased confidence and morale. Malone 
recorded his philosophy on how he needed to achieve this with his newly-formed 
battalion when training in Egypt in early 1914: 
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We start battalion training today. The Brigadier [F.E. Johnston] is in a hurry to rush us along at 
schemes and the top of the work. I am determined to begin at the bottom. He has been used to troops, 
who before they go to their regiments after enlisting have had 6 solid months recruit training, a very 
different thing to ours, where the men have only been 4 months together and 2 of them at sea on a 
transport with no room to work.755 
 
Malone made it clear to Johnston that, as the battalion commander, it was his 
duty and responsibility to ensure the efficiency of his men and that he knew better than 
the brigadier what weaknesses needed to be eliminated within the unit when preparing 
them for combat. Johnston had questioned the amount of time Malone had spent on 
musketry training compared to other battalions, but Malone remained steadfast in his 
approach, telling Johnston that, ‘That it was all very well training nice tactical schemes 
and manoeuvres but that if the fire control was bad, not to mention the actual shooting, 
it was no good…I wanted my Regiment to do something more than manoeuvre.’756  
 
As the wars progressed high casualty rates ensured that reinforcements among 
the junior officers and other ranks needed to be trained to a level of combat efficiency. 
There were periods of inactivity for the New Zealand troops where unit commanders 
could implement such training, especially when the forces were numerically weakened 
from sustaining casualties such as on the Western Front after the battle of the Somme 
in 1916 and Passchendaele in 1917, and during the Second World War when 2 NZ 
Division was withdrawn from the frontline after the battle of Crete and Operation 
Crusader in North Africa in 1941. Such periods of rest and recovery were essential to 
ensure the formations regained their nominal strength and fighting efficiency, with most 
unit commanders proving conscientious in taking an active role in rebuilding their 
battered battalions.  
During the Gallipoli campaign there was little opportunity for the leaders of 
New Zealand combat units to train and rest their troops out of the frontline. Even when 
in reserve out of the forward trenches, the troops were exposed to artillery and sniper 
fire, and together with the difficult steep terrain of Anzac Cove, made battalion and 
regiment training almost impossible. It was only on the few occasions when the 
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formations where withdrawn to the neighbouring island of Lemnos that any form of 
formal unit training could be conducted, but even then this proved difficult due to the 
exhausted state of the troops. It is clear from reading the diaries of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Malone that officers adapted to the difficult conditions by adopting a practical approach 
to at least maintain the morale of their units after suffering heavy casualties, even if 
they could not provide formal training for their reinforcements. He managed to do this 
by keeping his men busy, focusing on manual work in improving the defences at 
Courtney’s and Quinn’s Posts: ‘Went over and took over Courtney’s Post, a very haggle 
piggledy show. People all over the place…There is a lot of work to do remodelling, but 
we will get it done soon. His men are keen.’757                                                  
Regiment and battalion commanders had greater opportunities to maintain the 
effectiveness and fighting strength of their troops on the Western Front later in the Great 
War and almost continuously when not in the frontline during the Second World War. 
As a result of fighting in the battle of Passchendaele in October 1917, Lieutenant-
Colonel Edward Puttick’s battalion of the NZ Rifle Brigade had suffered heavy 
casualties and was left in a ‘dispirited condition with little fighting value.’758 To remedy 
this once the unit had been withdrawn from the frontline and had received 
reinforcements, Puttick implemented a course of training to restore the combat 
efficiency and morale of the formation. He reported that he was able to achieve this 
through a combination of sufficient rest together with a regime of daily physical 
training, military drill and musketry.759 He claimed that he used physical training to 
‘secure good team work, discipline and for transforming a civilian into a soldier,’ while 
drills in bayonet training were ‘particularly necessary to work up a blood lust in our 
troops and to give them confidence in the attack.’760  He also concentrated on providing 
training for signallers, observers, scouts and snipers who played an essential part in 
trench warfare, stating: ‘When well trained, these men were of the greatest value in 
both trench and open warfare.’761 Puttick recorded that by providing three hours of 
training and two hours of sport on a daily basis, that within a week his troops were 
regaining their former morale and alertness.762   
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Unfortunately, due to the ebb and flow of casualties and reinforcements, 
especially within the infantry who generally sustained the greatest losses of the combat 
arms, unit commanders were repeatedly required to rebuild their battalions. Brigadier 
Jim Burrows provides an example of this in his autobiography, Pathway Among Men, 
where he describes how 20 Battalion had to be rebuilt after the battle of Crete, where 
he temporarily held command of it, and again after Operation Crusader, where the unit 
had been overrun at Sidi Rezegh. It was after this battle that Burrows was permanently 
appointed to command the unit and was then responsible for getting the battalion back 
to fighting fitness.763 Like all formation commanders, Burrows could not do this 
effectively without the support of his subordinate headquarters staff and company 
commanders. He claims he was fortunate in having experienced officers to assist him 
who had ‘proved themselves a dozen times over in Crete,’ which included Captain 
Charles Upham, VC, and that he could place absolute reliance on them.764 Burrows 
highlights the pressure and urgency facing battalion commanders of the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces during both conflicts to maintain the fighting efficiency of their 
battalions and the need for a team approach to achieve this when describing his 
experience after the battle of Crete: 
 
I arrived at Baggush to find the strength of the battalion was only ten officers and 127 other 
ranks. This was disaster of the worst kind. The losses in Greece and Crete had been bad enough, when 
400 reinforcements had been needed to bring the battalion up to strength. Even so, five months had been 
available to get them ready for battle. Now the whole process had to be repeated but this time with only 
a handful of experienced NCOs to carry the main burden of training and much uncertainty as to how long 
we would have before the division would be called on again. This, then, was not the time or place for the 
steady training routine which the old soldier would normally expect. The need now was for a special 
programme with emphasis on battle training, and with such a sense of urgency injected into it that 
everyone in the battalion would realise how desperate the situation was and would respond 
accordingly.765 
    
While battalion and regiment commanders initially became prepared to 
command at such level through experience and training as platoon and company 
commanders, as well as through periods of acting as unit commanders in the absence 
of their superiors, training was also provided through numerous formal courses. These 
                                                 




were specific in the training in the command and leadership at battalion and regimental 
level, based on the model formulated within the British Army. An example in the NZEF 
in the First World War is that of Claude Weston, who had attended an officers’ refresher 
course based on a condensed syllabus of Kitchener’s training regime for his new armies, 
prior to serving overseas.766 While serving as captain in the Wellington Infantry 
Regiment at Gallipoli he was made a temporary major due to the shortage of senior 
officers and was later appointed temporary commander of the 2nd Battalion, Wellington 
Regiment, at the same rank.767 When the senior officers of the regiment returned to 
serve again with the unit in France after being invalided to the United Kingdom, Weston 
reverted back to his rank of captain, although he gained his permanent rank of major 
prior to the battle of the Somme in September 1916.768  
The senior infantry officers’ course that Weston attended at Aldershot in 
England in January 1917 was typical of the formal training received by prospective 
battalion commanders of the British Army, including officers from British dominions. 
According to Weston there were positives and negatives in attending the course, with 
the object primarily to train battalion commanders.769 Weston was a major when he 
attended the 10-week course and the 200 officers who attended were allowed to invite 
the wives to attend as well, with Weston stating, ‘I fancy the objects of the Army 
Council comprised not only instruction, but rest for officers.’770 He also claimed that it 
was only at such schools on instruction that the New Zealand officers had a chance to 
meet officers from other countries; in Weston’s syndicate there were eight Englishmen, 
one Scot, two Canadians, three Australians and himself, as well as Irish, Welsh, South 
Africans and New Foundlanders in other syndicates.771 Although the course included a 
variety of exercises and lectures in military command at battalion level, Weston was 
critical that at the course there was no serious attempt to keep up-to-date with military 
research and changes in tactics as the war progressed. In his opinion there were more 
efforts made in field training with battalions in France to address the lessons learned at 
the front, than what was taught at officer courses in England.772 
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Such periods of temporary command of battalions by majors, and at times 
captains when the senior battalion officers became casualties during battle, were also 
common in 2NZEF. As a 27-year-old recently promoted major in 20 Battalion in Egypt 
in early 1942, Denver Fountaine was temporarily promoted to lieutenant-colonel in 
command of the unit during the battle of El Alamein.773 In a letter to his fiancée he 
recognised that his position was only temporary but that he had confidence in himself 
to do the job, stating, ‘my education with Kip [Brigadier Howard Kippenberger] and 
Jim Burrows will stand me in good stead.’774 He reverted back to his old rank as second-
in-command of the battalion later that month as he predicted. However, by October of 
that year Fountaine had been given a permanent promotion to lieutenant-colonel and 
appointed to command 26 Battalion during the later stages of the battle for Egypt.775 
Haddon Donald had a similar experience before he was promoted to command 22 
Battalion during the Italian campaign in May 1944. He had been an officer in the unit 
since it was formed in 1940 and was second-in-command of the battalion when the 
appointment was made. In his autobiography, In Peace & War: A Civilian Soldier’s 
Story, Donald was of the opinion that his experience got him the promotion: 
 
As it was only seven weeks since my 26th birthday, no doubt I was rather young but, after a long 
apprenticeship, I felt confident enough. It was customary for appointments to be made temporary 
initially, but it later became substantive.776 
  
 As with other officers like Fountaine and Donald, the periods of temporary command 
of combat units not only provided experience for officers at that level of command, but 
it also gave their superiors an opportunity to assess their abilities in those roles. 
 
 
Leadership in Battle 
 
The attributes required of effective combat battalion commanders were 
universal within both New Zealand expeditionary forces and the other British Imperial 
and Commonwealth fighting formations. While styles of command varied due to the 
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individual personality of each battalion commander, there were certain characteristics 
that inspired others to follow these officers into the cauldron of battle. Confidence, 
aggression, moral and physical courage, tactical knowledge and loyalty to their men 
were traits that typified those officers who gained reputations as being effective leaders 
of battalions in both the First and Second World War. Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur 
Bauchop was certainly one regiment commander who had such characteristics which 
were appreciated by his subordinates. An unnamed soldier who served under Bauchop, 
who was mortally wounded leading the Otago Mounted Rifles in the battle for Chunuk 
Bair in August 1915, wrote in a letter to his family that was published in The Press in 
September of the same year: 
 
 About half-way up the spur we were joined by a small party of the Otago Mounted Rifles, under 
Colonel Bauchop himself, and we continued to clear out the enemy’s trenches until we reached the 
top…Colonel Bauchop was the life and soul of us that night. He was here, there, and everywhere where 
danger threatened most. He took great risks, and exposed himself continuously, walking about the 
plateau. He asked for a volunteer to hold a place a little down a spur, and I said I would go. He asked my 
name and remembered me…He shifted me about a good bit that night.777      
 
From this letter it is clear that Bauchop, a regular staff officer and experienced veteran 
of the Second Anglo-Boer War in South Africa, motivated his men during this action 
through his personal leadership, providing confidence to his troops through his actions 
and inspiring them to move forward in an attack over difficult terrain under enemy fire. 
 Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone displayed the same attributes and has 
become the most well-known New Zealand battalion commander to emerge from the 
Gallipoli campaign. However, his reputation as an effective commanding officer of the 
Wellington Infantry Battalion has only relatively recently been recognised by historians 
Robert Rhodes James778 and Christopher Pugsley. Pugsley argues that Malone: 
 
 confirmed a reputation that had grown around him during the hard days of training in Egypt. He 
had the drive, determination and sense of organisation to excel in defence. Under him, the left flank of 
Walker’s Ridge and Russell’s Top was secured during the savage senseless fighting of the first week. It 
would never again be seriously threatened by the Turk. He would perform the same service in early June 
at the critical centre of the Anzac line…Under his leadership and practical common-sense, stinking pits 
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held by frightened men dominated by superior Turkish fire and bombing would be transformed into 
impregnable positions. Malone established standards of organisation of defences, covered shelters, 
sanitation and hygiene which became models for other battalions and Anzac to aspire to.779           
 
Malone became known among the survivors of his battalion for his combat 
leadership and command during the capture and defence of the vital heights of Chunuk 
Bair on 7-8 August 1915.  However, he was posthumously criticised by his superiors, 
Major-General Alexander Godley and Brigadier-General Francis Earl Johnston, both 
professional staff officers, for his positioning of his men on the reverse slopes of the 
hill during its defence. They argued that he should have dug in on the crest of the hill 
to provide better observation of the enemy rather than digging in on the reverse and 
forward slopes which they considered weakening the defence of the position by limiting 
the defenders opportunity to fire on the advancing Turks.780 Prior to this action Malone 
had questioned a number of orders directed from Brigade headquarters which made him 
unpopular with Johnston and the brigade-major, Major Arthur Temperley, who 
considered Malone merely an amateur soldier and held little trust in him.781 Temperley 
drafted the official report of the battle which was heavily critical of Malone’s defensive 
positioning after Temperley had previously told Malone not to employ the tactic of 
defending the reverse slope: 
 
this particular battle was being fought above all to get commanding ground and observation and 
that it would be madness having gained the crest of Sari Bair, to dig in below it and allow the Turks to 
concentrate for counter-attack and push us off again….Knowing as I did the obstinacy of the man, I was 
profoundly uneasy because I felt sure that whatever he said to me, he would be found digging in on the 
reverse slope when the time comes.782       
 
Temperley further argued that Malone had wasted two crucial hours digging reverse 
slope defences and that he had thrown away the advantages of holding the height 
stating, ‘The cost in blood was not light: the ultimate cost to the Empire and the cause 
for which the Allies fought no-one can measure.’783  
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However, both James and Pugsley provide convincing arguments in defence of 
Malone. James used previously unpublished written accounts from survivors of the 
Wellington Battalion on Chunuk Bair to claim that Malone was unable to sufficiently 
entrench the summit of the position as ‘Time had been too short, and the ground too 
hard for the new trenches on the crest and forward slopes to be completed, and before 
long the Wellingtons were driven off the summit,’ but left holding on to the reverse 
slope.784 Pugsley argues that it was directly from Temperley’s report that the Anzac 
myth surrounding Malone’s defence of Chunuk Bair emerged, perpetuated through the 
writing of Australian historian, Charles Bean.785 Temperley was an experienced 
Imperial officer and his report of the action was accepted without question by Johnston, 
Godley and General Sir Ian Hamilton, the British commander of the Gallipoli 
campaign. Contrary to Temperley’s perception of him as merely a Territorial officer 
lacking in campaign experience, Malone was extremely well-read on military strategy, 
tactics, military history and British Army Regulations, and had proven himself to be as 
competent battalion commander during the fighting at Gallipoli.786 Due to being killed 
leading the defence of Chunuk Bair, Malone was never able to report his version of 
events or defend himself against any criticism. It was not until Pugsley and James later 
exposed this myth that the virtues of Malone’s ability as an effective battalion 
commander were fully appreciated.        
Since, the story of the capture of Chunuk Bair has become the most celebrated 
event of the Gallipoli campaign for New Zealanders and is now central in the nation’s 
military history, Malone has become the most well-known battalion or regiment 
commander to emerge from the First World War. His style of leadership, seen as 
practical and leading by example, was exactly what was required to lead and inspire 
inexperienced citizen-soldiers in a campaign fought over difficult terrain and directed 
by generals inexperienced in fighting against modern armies. Frontal assaults made on 
entrenched enemy positions that were supported by machine guns and field artillery 
caused unprecedented casualties, resulted in a level of mistrust of the high command 
developing within the rank and file. Generally, there was little such feeling held towards 
battalion or regiment commanders. The lieutenant-colonels and majors who held 
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command of such formations actively served with their troops, both in and out of the 
front line during both conflicts, shared the rigours of battle and campaigning, and were 
exposed to the risk of becoming a casualty just like their men when they advanced 
across ‘no-man’s land’ or were subjected to enemy artillery bombardment.             
Not all those who held temporary command of battalions proved to be suitable 
for permanent command at this level. Some officers had proven ability as company 
commanders but, in the opinion of their superiors, lacked certain skills required to 
command at a higher level. One example of this was temporary Lieutenant-Colonel 
Kingi Areta (Reta) Keiha MC who took over command of 28 (Maori) Battalion in April 
1943 after the battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel (later Sir Charles) Bennett, 
had been seriously wounded at Takrouna during the Tunisian campaign. Keiha had 
served as a platoon commander in Greece and on Crete and had risen to the rank of 
major and second-in-command of the battalion by early 1943. Keiha led the battalion 
from April through to September 1943 when he was evacuated to hospital.787 However, 
Freyberg made it clear in a confidential cable in February 1944 that he did not want 
Keiha to resume command of the unit once he was fit again as he did not consider him 
up to the task: 
 
Keiha proved himself [an] excellent and brave company commander. When Bennett was 
wounded he commanded [the] battalion as temporary Lieutenant-Colonel. It was then found over [a] 
period that he was weak in administration and in maintaining discipline and he cannot therefore be 
recommended for permanent command of the Maori Battalion. As [a] company commander we would 
be glad to accept him back.788  
              
In contrast, there were officers who had been identified as having the required 
qualities to command battalions but never had the opportunity to do so. An example 
was Major W.F. Titchener who had volunteered as an enlisted soldier in 1939 and 
embarked with the 1st Echelon. He served as an NCO until he was commissioned in 
1941 and saw extensive combat service through until the end of the Second World War, 
being awarded the MC and Bar.789 Brigadier Bill Gentry thought very highly of him 
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and indicated in a post-war personal reference that he was of the right material to 
command a battalion: 
 
He is recognised as one of the very best of our field officers, and but for the end of the war 
would shortly have received command of a battalion. He has a sturdiness of character which makes him 
an excellent leader of men. As has been indicated above, his educational qualifications are above the 
average.790 
   
Throughout the Second World War senior battalion officers within 2NZEF had 
the same opportunities to attend similar courses at British Army officer training schools 
in England, Egypt and Palestine as their predecessors in the First World War. However, 
it appears that compared to such courses held during the Great War, those of the Second 
World War were better in addressing the advances in military tactics, in the latter case 
those fostered by the developments in armoured and aerial warfare. In the First World 
War the Allied commanders were unprepared for trench warfare and slow to learn, 
especially on the Western Front where they had to work out how to overcome the enemy 
who possessed advantages in defence. Both sides had similar firepower, but the 
Germans directed theirs from lines of fortified bunkers and entrenchments on high 
ground which exposed the Allied forces to costly attacks. The Germans also gave the 
Allied commanders a lesson in how to adjust tactics to succeed in attacking, as proven 
in the early stages of the ‘Michael’ offensive in March 1918. During the Second World 
War greater emphasis was placed on adjusting tactics early on to deal with the Germans. 
This was particularly important to combat commanders of the 2nd NZ Division whose 
units were exposed to the blitzkrieg tactics of coordinated attacks by mobile armoured 
columns with aerial support by German forces in Greece and North Africa. Major-
General Keith Stewart stated in a letter after the war that Freyberg and his senior 
officers, mostly veterans of the First World War, were inexperienced in the armoured 
tactics used by the enemy and that they were surprised by the speed at which the 
Germans could advance, especially over difficult terrain.791 Lessons learned during this 
campaign, as well as operations in North Africa, influenced the formal training syllabus 
provided by the British Army to senior New Zealand combat officers, as well as those 
of other Commonwealth forces. 
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However, it was experience in battle where battalion and regimental 
commanders learned the most and it was where they proved themselves worthy to hold 
such positions, or not. Command and leadership styles varied due to the personalities 
of individual unit commanders, and this was particularly so among the unit commanders 
of the New Zealand expeditionary forces which primarily consisted of officer corps of 
civilian soldiers. The level of professionalism was never that of the regular British 
Army; however, it was perhaps because of this that the New Zealand combat units 
worked together as a team and generally performed so well during both wars. 
Leadership at battalion and regimental level was crucial to success in battle, with the 
unit commander’s role being the most pivotal, seeing themselves as team captains who 
shared the dangers of battle with their men, but did not necessarily need to lead directly 
from the front. The stance taken by many New Zealand infantry battalion commanders 
in the Second World War can be summed up in the comments of Lieutenant-Colonel 
Fred Baker, who had been an accountant in civilian life, and who led 28 (Maori) 
Battalion during the battle of El Alamein in 1942: 
 
Both as a company commander and as a battalion commander I realised that that my correct 
position was somewhat in the rear. However, in practice I found that I tended to gravitate towards the 
leading platoon or company respectively. In justification of this I put forward the argument that with the 
emergencies which arise in modern warfare, where infantry are likely to run into AFVs [armoured 
fighting vehicles] or other anticipated hazards, it is necessary for a commander to keep sufficiently well 
forward until he is satisfied that these dangers have been avoided or eliminated before taking up his 
position at the HQ [headquarters] in the rear. At all stages satisfactory facilities for communicating with 
his sub units is necessary.’792   
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie Andrew, VC, who led 22 Battalion in the fateful 
defence of Maleme Airfield during the battle of Crete, was of the same opinion. He 
wrote in a survey conducted of senior 2NZEF officers after the Second World War, that 
there were dangers in battalion commanders being too far forward with the troops, 
stating that when they were forward they must not try or take over command of the 
junior formation in the local battle and risk obtaining the too small and too narrow view 
of the fight.793  
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In combat battalion commanders required up-to-date information and 
intelligence regarding their sector of operations so that they could make informed 
decisions concerning the offensive or defensive placement of their troops. In the heat 
of battle communications with forward elements of battalions and regiments could 
diminish, leading to many New Zealand commanders moving closer to the action to get 
a greater and accurate appreciation of the situation; especially during the mobile 
operations of World War Two. Charles Upham wrote after the war that intelligent 
appreciation of the situation and getting information back to battalion or brigade 
headquarters was one of the most important duties of combat officers and that there 
always seemed to be a lost link somewhere during a battle.794 It was for this reason that 
there was a tendency for unit commanders to place themselves close to the action to 
gain better knowledge of how the battle was progressing in their area of control and to 
provide confidence to their troops through their presence. It was much easier for 
battalion commanders to achieve this during the First World War where trench warfare 
restricted the frontage an infantry battalion was allocated to defend, and where battalion 
headquarters were generally situated within 50-100 yards in the rear of the forward 
trenches.795 By being so close to the fighting the battalion commanders could provide 
inspiration and confidence to the men under their command, but it also increased risks 
to their personal safety. 
Evidence that battalion and regimental commanders from both New Zealand 
expeditionary forces shared the dangers of battle with their troops and led from the front 
is provided in the casualty lists from both conflicts. In the First World War Lieutenant-
Colonels Douglas MacBean Stewart and William Malone (of the Canterbury and 
Wellington regiments respectively) were killed leading their battalions at Gallipoli, 
while Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Bauchop died of wounds he sustained leading the 
Otago Mounted Rifles on the peninsula (see Table 8).796 Two other original battalion 
commanders of the New Zealand Infantry Brigade, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Plugge 
of the Auckland Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel A. Moore of the Otago Regiment, 
also became casualties during the campaign.797 On the Western Front in France and 
Belgium, there were three battalion commanders of the New Zealand Division killed in 
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action; Lieutenant-Colonel George King, killed while commanding the 1st Battalion of 
the Canterbury Regiment at Passchendaele, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Winter-Evans 
of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel William Pennycook of the 
Otago Infantry Regiment.798  Although not casualties of combat, it is worth noting that 
three other commanders of New Zealand combat units died of disease during the Great 
War, proving that those of high rank were also exposed to the same diseases associated 
with war as their troops.799 A survey of information obtained from the Cenotaph 
database of the Auckland War Memorial Museum relating to a number of battalion 
commanders of the Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago Infantry Regiments, 
along with those of the New Zealand Rifle Brigade and the New Zealand Pioneer 
Battalion shows that the majority were wounded at some point, with some being 
wounded multiple times. Of the seven lieutenant-colonels surveyed from the Auckland 
Infantry Regiment, six were wounded, while a seventh, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles 
Brown was killed on the Western Front when serving as a temporary brigadier-general. 
Of the five officers surveyed from the Wellington Infantry Regiment, two sustained 
wounds, one was killed in action (Malone) and one died of disease.800  
There was a similar trend with casualties of combat unit commanders within the 
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Second World War. Of the nearly eighty 
battalion commanders that served overseas during the conflict, five were killed in action 
(J.M. Allen, S.F. Allen, A.W. Greville, Tiwi Love and John Russell, son of Major-
General Sir Andrew Russell), while another three (R.J. Lynch, Jan Peart and Reg 
Romans) died of wounds received in battle.801 Roger McElwain argues that more than 
one third of the infantry battalion commanders within the 2nd New Zealand Division 
became casualties, with a number being wounded multiple times.802 Haddon Donald, 
who led 22 Battalion in the latter stages of the Italian campaign, is one such example, 
being wounded four times during the war, although he did not sustain all the injuries 
while he was commanding his unit.803  
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            Replacements 
 
The length of time individual unit commanders held their position was 
determined by a number of factors. Combat and sickness attributed to the replacement 
of battalion and regimental commanders in the expeditionary forces throughout both 
world wars, although there was a greater turnover in these positions in the Second 
World War. The rigours of the eight-month Gallipoli campaign saw the original four 
infantry regiment commanders becoming casualties and replaced by competent and 
younger officers, such as Robert Young who was given command of the Auckland 
Regiment and Jack Hughes who took over the Canterbury Regiment. These young 
officers impressed Godley with their leadership, but they also became casualties as the 
war progressed and were replaced in turn. Fighting on the Western Front accounted for 
high casualties among the senior officers, with three battalion commanders becoming 
casualties during the battle of Messines in 1917.804 The stress of command at this level 
attributed to battle fatigue also played a part in the constant need to identify suitable 
replacements, although Freyberg was more attuned to this than Godley and Russell. 
The high turnover of battalion commanders in the 2nd New Zealand Division 
during the Second World War contributed to its combat efficiency and durability. The 
fighting in Greece and on Crete exposed a number of the original battalion commanders 
as being unfit for the rigours of modern warfare, such as Lieutenant-Colonel Leslie 
Andrew of 22 Battalion. He was an example of a Great War veteran who struggled with 
the blitzkrieg tactics employed by the Germans in the early campaigns in the Second 
World War, and who Sandy Thomas describes as being too slow in reacting to the 
changing situations regarding the defence of Maleme airfield on Crete.805 However, as 
the war progressed Freyberg appointed younger men to such positions, who had not 
only gained valuable experience in fighting the rapid-moving German armoured 
columns in Greece and North Africa, but who also had youthful mental and physical 
strength to sustain them in combat. Men such as Sandy Thomas, Haddon Donald and 
Denver Fountaine were in their mid or late twenties when they were appointed as 
permanent battalion commanders; ages that would have been considered far too young 
to lead a battalion at the beginning of both wars. However, such men and others like 
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them were seasoned combat officers by the time they were appointed, having served as 
platoon commanders from the formation of their battalions. Fountaine led 26 Battalion 
for over eighteen months from the battle of El Alamein in late 1942 until the battle for 
Florence in 1944, although this length of command was unusual.806 McElwain states 
that the period of commands in the 2nd New Zealand Division ranged from several 
weeks through to two years, calculating the average period being 9 months.807  
The performance of unit commanders within both expeditionary forces was 
generally of a high standard, with some proving exceptional. There were a small 
number who suffered some criticism, such as Arthur Plugge at Gallipoli, who Malone 
believed was slack in the leading the Auckland Battalion.808 During the Second World 
War the most controversial New Zealand battalion commander was Leslie Andrew for 
his withdrawal from Maleme airfield in the defence of Crete. However, most other 
battalion commanders remained relatively unknown other than within the divisions. 
Major-General Kippenberger attempted to address this in several newspaper articles 
published in Britain in 1945, where he wanted to acknowledge the input these officers 
had in the success of the New Zealand military forces serving overseas: 
 
I should like to see the names of the battalion commanders in the New Zealand Division better 
known to our people at home. They are men who have served New Zealand very well. They have, in 
many cases, risen during the war from the rank of subaltern, and they have had the responsibility, during 
training and in battle, of commanding thousands of men. They have stuck to their work solidly, through 
the heat and burden of the day, and they have maintained their zest and zeal without a sign of flagging. 
In fact, to a senior officer, one of the most astonishing things has been the way in which these officers 
upon whom one has to rely so much, have retained their thrust, their enthusiasm and their devotion. They 







                                                 
806 Amber Jo Illsley, ‘Col. Fountaine remembers El Alamein,’ The Westport News, 22 October 1992, p. 
5 
807 McElwain, pp. 177-191 
808 Malone, Diary, 16 May 1915, MS Papers 4130, ATL  
809 Major-General Howard Kippenberger, ‘The Names of These Soldiers Should Be Better Known: 
Battalion Commanders of New Zealand Division Have Outstanding Records,’ WAII 1/ 291, ANZ    
 220 
 
Table 8: Campaign Fatal Casualties of Lieutenant-Colonels – New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force in the First World War 
 








KIA Gallipoli 25/4/1915 
Malone, W.G Wellington 
Infantry 
Regiment 
KIA Gallipoli 8/8/1915 
Bauchop, A Otago 
Mounted 
Rifles 





DOD Gallipoli 31/8/1915 
Thomas, C.E NZ Medical 
Corps 
KIA Gallipoli 28/8/1915 
Stewart, G.H. Canterbury 
Mounted 
Rifles 





KIA France 12/10/1917 





KIA France 12/10/1917 
Cook, C. F. Wellington 
Infantry 
Regiment 





KIA France 24/8/1918 
Saxby, C.G. NZ Pioneer 
Battalion 
DOD France 27/11/1918 
 
Key: KIA – Killed in Action 
        DOW – Died of Wounds 
        DOD – Died of Disease 
 
Sources: Nominal Rolls, NZEF; New Zealand Expeditionary Force Roll of 






    
Although Kippenberger wrote this to describe the battalion commanders of the 2nd New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force, his description could well sum up those who commanded 
New Zealand battalions and regiments in the First World War. 
 
In citizen armies social leadership required to be moulded into military 
leadership, though as the conflicts went on those with military capability revealed 
themselves and rose to higher rank. The great weakness of the ‘amateur tradition’ of 
soldiering was that professional standards were at first well below par and were 
acquired only slowly through training and experience. The great strength of the New 
Zealand ‘amateur tradition’ was that it was derived from a society where social class 
and other divisions were not as pronounced as elsewhere; that fairness, equality, 
practicality, coupled with traditional bonds of mateship and team efforts were 
prominent in the social ethos, and that the units had strong communal roots. Successful 
officers, in the first instance, had a good understanding of the sort of society to which 
they and their men belonged. They also had the required professional motivation and 
personal qualities needed to lead men into battle.   
Undoubtedly, the fighting effectiveness of the New Zealand expeditionary 
forces in both major conflicts relied heavily on the abilities of those who commanded 
the combat units. The Dominion was well served by the calibre of its battalion and 
regiment commanders, which was reflected in the fighting spirit of the New Zealand 
divisions both in defeat and victory. Those who had the key ingredients of military 
experience, respect from their subordinates based on practical military knowledge and 
shared experience, confidence, aggression, together with physical and moral courage, 
were able to successfully lead and inspire the troops in defensive and offensive actions 
through years of war. What makes this more remarkable is that the majority of such 
leaders were citizen-soldiers who, through experience and devotion to duty, had 
become highly efficient and effective combat commanders who were able to maintain 
a sense of esprit de corps within their commands. It was such officers who ultimately 
were responsible in forging the New Zealand expeditionary forces into highly trained 







     Chapter 8 
 
  Command and Leadership: Company Officers  
 
 
     
There has been no comprehensive study of the junior officers of the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces who physically led their men into battle during the First 
and Second World Wars. Historians writing on the New Zealand military experience 
during these two conflicts have traditionally focused on either the senior commanders 
who were responsible for the planning and directing of major operations, or analysis of 
the numerous campaigns and battles that the New Zealanders were involved in. Until 
now almost no research has been conducted on the role and experience of company, 
platoon, troop, squadron and battery officers, whom we know very little about, and yet 
who, more than any others, shared the frontline fighting with the rank and file. Their 
role was crucial for success as it was left to young and less experienced junior officers 
within the battalions and supporting units to lead their men from the front into the 
extremes of combat. It was these men who continually inspired others to follow them 
into situations that were likely to end in individuals receiving serious wounds, 
disfigurement and possible death in an effort to achieve tactical victory over the enemy. 
It was through the leadership efforts of these men that the New Zealand divisions of the 
expeditionary forces of both major conflicts eventually forged reputations as elite 
fighting formations; with Winston Churchill describing the 2nd New Zealand Division 
as one of the finest divisions of all time, comparing its deeds to those of the famous 
British Light Division of the Napoleonic Wars.810 The status junior officers received 
once commissioned provided them with certain privileges above the Other Ranks; not 
only in keeping with British Army tradition, but also with every modern army of the 
era. However, with such status also came responsibility for the welfare of their 
subordinates while balancing the need to follow orders from superiors, some of which 
would lead to certain death. The purpose of this chapter is to shed some light on the 
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experiences of junior officers within the expeditionary forces and to examine how they 
dealt with responsibility of leadership and their performance within a citizen army.     
The service and sacrifice of such men is even more inspiring when considering 
that the majority of these officers were civilian volunteers and conscripts who had only 
limited military service before being thrust into the cauldron of modern warfare. The 
burden of responsibility for their men was high and the expectations of service and duty 
placed on them by themselves and their superiors is hard to comprehend for those living 
in twenty-first century New Zealand. This makes a study of such men important, not 
only to provide a greater understanding of the nation’s military history and 
achievements in an international context, but also to provide a greater appreciation of 
the egalitarian values of New Zealand society that were evident in the country’s military 
forces in the first half of the twentieth century.  
The historiography regarding the battalion and company grade officers for both 
major conflicts is limited. John McLeod was the first to consider competency of the 
officers of 2NZEF in the Second World War and their relationships with their men.811 
As previously mentioned, Harper and Hayward’s book Born to Lead?812 focuses on 
senior New Zealand commanders, although there are chapters in the work that cover 
battalion commanders of the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Second World War, 
including a whole chapter on the 28th (Maori) Battalion. This work has made a major 
contribution to the historiography of New Zealand military commanders by identifying 
and reflecting on the individuals who led New Zealand troops during campaigns of both 
world wars. In regard to the battalion commanders, it has also provided a 
comprehensive list of officers who led the rifle battalions, noting officers’ previous 
occupations and dates when commanding the units, from which further study can be 
made.  
However, to gain a broad understanding and analysis of the experiences of the 
battalion, squadron and battery officers who actually led their companies, platoons, 
troops and guns sections in combat, students of military history are reliant on anecdotal 
evidence provided in autobiographies, biographies, official reports, personal letters, 
diaries and recorded interviews with officers, as well as those who served under them. 
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Autobiographies such as those by W.B (Sandy) Thomas813 and Haddon Donald814 are 
important works in that they provide an insight by junior officers who were 
commissioned at the outbreak of the Second World War and who served throughout 
the conflict. Both became battalion commanders. Likewise, the diaries of Herbert Hart, 
edited by John Crawford,815 and those of William Malone816 are equally important in 
not only providing a record of the experiences of officers who served during the Great 
War, but also evidence of the attitudes and beliefs of New Zealand society at the time, 
helping to understand what inspired these men to volunteer for military service 
overseas.  
Many officers and men from the ranks wrote of their personal experiences in 
war after the conflicts in an effort to provide a record of their service and to help their 
families understand how experiencing war could change individuals. Others also wrote 
as a healing process, with the war-time memoirs providing an outlet for emotions that 
had to be suppressed while on active service. Many such memoirs were self-published, 
with only limited copies being produced; however, the historical value of such 
publications is now being appreciated due to the increased public interest in the nation’s 
military past. With New Zealanders now appreciating that the nation’s military history 
is important in helping to understand the development of the country in an international 
context, the demand for publications recording our military exploits and experiences is 
increasing. Many families of veterans are discovering and publishing diaries and letters. 
It is by studying these records of officers and men who experienced the rigours of 
modern war that military historians can gain a clear picture of how New Zealanders 
were led in the front line in the two major wars that proved defining periods in the 
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Status as Officers 
 
Status was a crucial element of being an officer. Officers within the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces, as well as those from Britain and other Commonwealth 
forces, received their status directly from the king when they received their 
commission. A commission gave them formal authority over their subordinates, yet 
also made them responsible for their welfare which included providing adept leadership 
in battle. The British Army, which both New Zealand expeditionary forces were part 
of, was protective of officer status; identified through higher pay, providing separate 
officers’ messes, special accommodation out of the frontline, and numerous other 
privileges that were deemed appropriate for the social classes that officers were 
traditionally commissioned from. This status even extended to special treatment from 
the enemy when officers were captured, as distinctions between commissioned officers 
and the rank and file were observed in every modern army fighting in both world 
conflicts. 
An unwritten ‘Code of Conduct’ operated for officers, emphasising their special 
status. Incompetent officers were moved on to non-combat roles and relatively few, 
compared to the Other Ranks, were brought before Courts Martial. Instead informal 
means were used to deal with those who failed in their duty. However, within the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces there was also a ‘counter-culture’ of mateship and 
comradeship that was implicit at platoon and company level, especially in the Second 
World War. Although Charles Upham’s well-known dislike of the accessories and 
trappings of rank and his close identification with his men was an extreme example of 
this, there is evidence to show that many officers held similar feelings. This was more 
so towards the end of both wars when the practice of commissioning men from the 
ranks was prevalent and which reduced the divide, even if the newly commissioned 
officers were posted away from their original units. 
The junior officers played a significant part in ensuring the orders and tasks 
determined by their unit commanders were carried out. Their role initially was to 
prepare and train the troops under their command for the rigours of campaigning, while 
ensuring that they themselves were fully prepared for such tasks. British military 
historian, Christopher Moore-Bick, has recently pointed out that the part played by the 
captains and lieutenants of the British Army during the First World War has been 
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relatively ignored by historians.817 John Lewis-Stempel is another who has attempted 
to tackle the marginalization of junior officers in the British Army. Moore-Bick, in 
particular, argues that there has been a tendency for historians to see the experience of 
the man in the ranks as the ‘true’ experience of the two great conflicts, contrasting with 
the perceived privileges of the junior officers whose lifestyle in the trenches was 
portrayed as being different from the common soldiers’.818 To some extent, this has 
been the case with New Zealand military historiography, with only the most celebrated 
officers, such as Freyberg, Kippenberger, Upham and Malone receiving recognition 
from historians.   
Obviously, the British social class system has played a significant role in the 
contrasting historical perceptions of the experiences of the officers and other ranks in 
the British Army during this period, but such perceptions are also relevant to the New 
Zealand experience. This was especially during the First World War where elements of 
British class structure were evident in the young dominion. By 1914 middle-class 
society was well established in New Zealand, where the sons of wealthy large estate 
owners, professionals and merchants had the privilege of higher education which led 
on to greater vocational and social opportunities. Evidence of this can be seen in the 
number of young junior officers who were selected for commissions and whose 
attestation papers recorded that they had attended prestigious private schools. Social 
and professional networks also proved influential in officer selection within the 
provincial Territorial regiments, as well as those selected as officer cadets for the Staff 
Corps. Such networks still existed in 1939 when the second expeditionary force was 
being formed, but the greater opportunities for higher education for working-class New 
Zealanders at that time meant that the officer corps within the New Zealand Army was 
more socially homogenised compared to that of the British Army, promoting a more 
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   The Inequality of Discipline 
 
Officers were treated differently from enlisted men in regard to discipline during 
both major conflicts. The most serious offences committed by officers and other ranks 
were usually dealt with through Courts Martial. However, very few officers of the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces were ever prosecuted in such a way, especially in the 
Second World War.  During the Great War, of the 26 New Zealand enlisted soldiers 
who were sentenced to death by Court Martial for desertion in the face of the enemy, 
only five of the sentences were actually carried out. It would be naïve to think that of 
the hundreds of officers who served overseas in the expeditionary forces, that none of 
them succumbed to the temptation to desert their posts in the face of an enemy 
onslaught in an effort at self-preservation. Any reported incidents of such were either 
dealt with within the confines of the battalion mess where the offending officer was 
offered a transfer to a non-combat unit, given the opportunity to resign or was cashiered 
from the army.819 Serious offences committed by enlisted men could be dealt with by 
up to 28 days detention or field punishment determined by the battalion commander, 
while certain offences required a district Court Martial established under the Army Act 
that was heard before a panel of officers acting as judges. These proceedings were 
limited in their power of punishment, with only General Courts Martial being able to 
award punishments of penal servitude and death. Unlike the other ranks, officers could 
only be tried in General Court Martial, although while on active service overseas all 
offences could be heard by a Field Court Martial presided over by a panel of senior 
field officers. Any officer charged with an offence would be defended by another 
officer who had some legal experience prior to military service.820 
Very few officers ever faced a Court Martial. Pugsley indicates that while the 
NZEF was stationed in Egypt some officers proved deficient, but that none were ever 
court-martialled.821 Instead, a number of young platoon commanders were allowed or 
‘invited’ to resign their commissions and so forestall formal disciplinary action.822 Such 
a stance by the military hierarchy was beneficial to all concerned as it limited the 
embarrassment not only to the individual officers, but also to the reputation of the 
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officer corps, as well as the expeditionary forces in general. At least one battalion 
commander and several company commanders were sent back to New Zealand on 
‘medical grounds’ during the Great War; a term that was sometimes used as a 
euphemism for the removal of incompetent officers. Pugsley further argues that an 
unsatisfactory officer was more likely to be removed from command rather than face a 
Court Martial, even if there was sufficient evidence of an offence.823 Those few officers 
who did face a General Court Martial appeared before a panel of five officers, including 
a colonel or brigadier who acted as the president of the proceedings. There was also a 
judge advocate present, usually a qualified barrister or solicitor, to offer legal guidance 
to the court and ensure that such proceedings were strictly conducted in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure stipulated in the Manual of Military Law.824   
Officers of the New Zealand expeditionary forces were more likely to be court-
martialled in the Great War than in the Second World War. In all, 53 Courts Martial 
were conducted for offences committed by officers on the Western Front, with only 
seven officers found not guilty.825  Officers were treated more fairly than enlisted men 
in such proceedings, with officers receiving legal advice while enlisted men received 
very little, if any, through the Field General Courts Martial procedure.826  The most 
common offence for which officers were charged was that of drunkenness, with 
seventeen officers of the New Zealand Division in France facing such prosecution, 
resulting in seven being dismissed from the service in ignominy.827 The remainder lost 
seniority in rank and were reprimanded. There was a various range of other offences, 
from ‘scandalous conduct’ to acts that were ‘to the prejudice of good order and military 
discipline.’828 Two cases included the officers being in possession of cameras and 
taking photographs, for which both lost seniority and were reprimanded. Curiously, 
Denver Fountaine purchased a camera in Cairo in 1940 that he openly carried 
throughout the early North African campaigns, including taking it on a sightseeing 
excursion to Palestine with Colonel Kippenberger and Major Jim Burrows, until he lost 
his kit.829 Although the use of personal cameras was still officially prohibited, such 
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offending seemed to be ignored within the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force during 
the Second World War, at least for officers.  
 In general, it was unlikely that New Zealand officers in both expeditionary 
forces would face court martial proceedings. Whereas five enlisted men from the 
Division in the Great War were executed, four for desertion and one for mutiny, no 
officer suffered the same penalty. But there was at least one example of an officer who 
displayed similar behaviour. In 1918 an officer of the 2nd Auckland Infantry Battalion 
was reported on by his commanding officer for cowardice after he had left his company 
during the attack on Grevillers in August of that year.830 He had done this on a number 
of occasions. His battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel S.S. Allen, pushed for the 
officer to be dealt with by way of court martial as an example to his troops, stating that 
the officer was physically and temperamentally unsuited for any command in the 
field.831 Russell was initially against any prosecution and fortunately for the officer, 
who had been invalided to England, the matter was dropped with the signing of the 
armistice and he was invited to resign his commission.832 Both Sandy Thomas and 
Haddon Donald served as junior platoon commanders in 2NZEF and both progressed 
to command their battalion, Thomas with 23 Battalion and Donald with 22 Battalion. 
These men served in the 2nd NZ Division from 1940 through to the end of the conflict 
and both agreed that the court martial of New Zealand officers was almost unheard of 
in the Second World War. Thomas recalled that from his experience, the discipline of 
officers within the battalion was dealt with in the officers’ mess, with only very serious 
offences ever being officially brought to the attention of the battalion commander.833 
Donald agreed, stating that any issues were generally dealt with by private conversation 
in the mess, with some help from brigade headquarters if an officer could not cope and 
it was decided that he needed to be sent back to base.834 He further stated that there was 
an unwritten code of good conduct understood and expected of officers, both in and out 
of the front line, and that the code was usually enforced privately by the second-in-
command of the unit in the mess.835 Both Thomas and Donald argue that this system 
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proved very effective and that a quiet word to the offending officer was usually 
sufficient to remedy any issues, ensuring that any formal prosecutions were rare. 836 
  
 
    Privileges of Officers  
 
 British Empire army officers, including those of the New Zealand expeditionary 
forces, had traditional privileges that went with their rank. These generally concerned 
quality of accommodation, quality of food, higher pay and leave entitlements, and 
opportunities that were not extended to enlisted men. Although some of the rank and 
file within the New Zealand forces complained of inequality in their letters and diaries, 
the majority accepted that such privileges went with the responsibilities of the rank the 
officers held. Clearly, a captain in command of a company of over one hundred men 
could not be expected to be paid the same as a sergeant in charge of twenty men; 
likewise, the responsibilities of a captain were greater than that of a sergeant, although 
a sergeant’s responsibilities were no less important in ensuring the efficiency of the 
company. With the organisation of the New Zealand military forces modelled on that 
of the British Army, the privileges that officers received followed the practices of all 
modern armies at the time and generally had little effect on the relationships between 
the officers and their men. 
 The better quality food and accommodation that officers received out of the 
front line caused the greatest amount of grumbling from the New Zealand enlisted 
volunteers and conscripts in both expeditionary forces.837 Officers ate at their own mess 
when in camp and while in transit from New Zealand to their theatres of operation.  
Senior officers usually travelled in First Class accommodation, having cabins of their 
own on ships, while company grade officers usually had to share quarters with one or 
more officers of the same rank.838 However, depending on the quality of ship the troops 
were being transported in, some enlisted NCOs were also accommodated in shared 
cabins, while the majority of the rank and file slept in the cramped holds of the ships 
that had poor ventilation and where sanitation was limited.839 This led to many rank and 
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file sleeping on the decks of the ships when the weather allowed. Some battalions of 
the Main Body of the NZEF and of the first three echelons of 2NZEF travelled on ocean 
liners where both the officers and other ranks received the same quality menu in their 
messes that had been provided to civilian passengers in the pre-war years.840 This meant 
that some of the enlisted men received the same food as the officers, with many 
receiving a better diet than they had in civilian life.841 However, this was not the case 
for everybody, where on some ships even the officers complained of the poor quality 
food they received.842 
 Commissioned officers continued to lead a privileged life, compared to enlisted 
soldiers, when not serving at the front, although there was more equality between the 
officers and the other ranks once on active service. Officers still ate from their own 
messes, but these were supplied from the same sources as the messes of the rank and 
file, ensuring there was little difference in food quality. However, when off duty and 
on leave, officers generally had greater financial freedom to eat at finer dining 
establishments in Cairo, London, Paris, Venice and Rome, while enlisted men could 
generally only afford to eat at more humble establishments. Haddon Donald states that 
he had a privileged life as a young officer in 22 Battalion when it was part of the Second 
Echelon stationed in Britain in 1940. He received more leave than enlisted men of the 
battalion, with entertainment for officers in London being provided by such 
organisations as the Victoria League: a group of friendly ladies within English society 
who put themselves out to provide entertainment for overseas officers far from home.843 
After receiving a week’s pass, the League even arranged for Donald to travel to 
Dunninald Castle, near Montrose in Scotland, where shooting parties were arranged for 
officers to hunt deer and grouse.844 Officers were similarly catered for by high society 
in Egypt during both wars. As a major in the Wellington Infantry Battalion in the NZEF, 
Herbert Hart described in his diary taking part in shooting parties along the Nile, 
playing golf and attending formal dinners and balls at the Grand Continental Hotel prior 
to embarking for the Gallipoli campaign.845 Even as a junior lieutenant in 20 Battalion 
during the Second World War, Denver Fountaine found himself invited for meals at the 
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homes of prominent British officials, and enjoying golf, swimming and tennis during 
his leisure time at the Gezira Sports Club in Cairo.846 Such pursuits were not generally 
available to the other ranks.  
There was also a perception that officers received better treatment from the 
enemy when captured. When Sapper Roy Natusch MM of the 6th Field Company, and 
later an All Black trialist, was captured in Greece in 1941 he gave his rank as captain.847 
He explained his reasons in a post-war interview: ‘Rank held great clout in Europe, and 
we reckoned that we’d have a better chance with one of us as an officer.’ He further 
stated that his new rank did allow him privileges but that he was still always scared of 
being found out.848  Captured officers were certainly held in higher regard to enlisted 
men, with both the Germans and Italians providing separate prisoner of war camps for 
them. However, when initially captured the officers suffered the same deprivations as 
their men, with lack of food, poor sanitation and limited medical supplies. Denver 
Fountaine claimed that he received no medical attention from the enemy, along with 
the others from his battalion, after he was shot in the leg at Bel Hamed and taken 
prisoner while at an aid station at Waidi Schimar during Operation Crusader in 
November 1941.849  
Officers imprisoned in Italy recorded receiving mixed treatment, depending on 
the character of the camp commander. Poppi (Campo 38), a former convent in the 
Apennine Mountains, was established especially to accommodate 100 New Zealand 
officers, while New Zealanders were also imprisoned at Padua (Campo 35), an ancient 
monastery, and at Modena (Campo 47), which was a military barracks. More senior 
Allied officers, such as Brigadiers Hargest and Miles, were housed in a modern country 
villa near Florence, known as ‘Campo 12.’850  Officers who proved to be difficult for 
their captors were sent to the punishment fortress of Gavi (Campo 5). On the face of it, 
New Zealand officers appear to have been treated better than the enlisted prisoners. 
Those officers who were sent to Modena claimed they were well fed, had comfortable 
accommodation, space to exercise, resources to provide their own entertainment and 
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were well supplied with wine. They even received regular lectures on various topics, 
including learning to speak Italian. 
It was a different experience for those sent to German POW camps. The 
Germans were extremely respectful of rank and generally ensured that the Allied 
officers were given all the privileges accorded to them under the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention. Commissioned officers were separated from the other ranks and 
held in camps or facilities known as ‘Oflags.’ On the other hand, however, like the 
enlisted prisoners, the officers also suffered from over-crowded accommodation, poor 
sanitation, limited medical treatment and poor food. Bruce Robertson, who had sailed 
with the 1st Echelon as a private in 1940 and was subsequently commissioned as a 2nd 
lieutenant in February 1942, was captured during the first battle of El Alamein in July 
1942 and eventually sent to the Oflag POW camp in Weinsberg, Germany. He recalled 
that he and fellow officers were transported from Italy to Germany in an overcrowded 
railway cattle truck with almost no food, little water or sanitation, and on arrival at the 
camp were initially issued with only one blanket each to keep them warm in winter.851 
In contrast, officers held in the infamous Colditz Castle had access to a library, theatre 
and an orchestra.852 If the prisoners committed any breaches, like the other ranks, they 
also suffered punishment, such as solitary confinement and stoppage of Red Cross 
parcels.853 Officers who proved resourceful and repeatedly attempted to escape, such 
as Upham, were sent to high security prisons, such as Colditz Castle, where they 
remained under heavy surveillance from hostile guards. This indicates that, in general, 
officers who were prisoners of the Germans fared little better than the enlisted men.  
Officers appear to have suffered greater psychological effects at being captured. 
This was especially the case for battalion and brigade commanders who felt they had 
let their men down in organising the defence of their positions. An example was a 
comment from Brigadier James Hargest, when he described how he felt after he had 
been captured when his brigade headquarters was overrun at Sidi Aziz during the relief 
of Tobruk in late 1941. He stated that at the time he realized what the catastrophe meant 
to him, with a sense of defeat, loss, grief and the depressing prospect of months, or 
perhaps years in prison.854 He claimed that so great was his misery at the time that he 
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envied his friend and subordinate, Major Arthur Grigg, who was lying mortally 
wounded and unconscious near him.855 Hargest’s feelings seem typical of how other 
officers described being captured: 
 
The fact of being captured is so overwhelming a disaster that for a little while one’s mind fails 
to grasp the significance. It seems quite impossible that one’s command, one’s freedom, one’s right to 
think for oneself, have been taken away, and that hence forth one must obey the dictates of those 
representing all one hates most in the world. Like every soldier who enters battle I had foreseen the 
possibilities of death, and incapacity from wounds; but I had never for one moment thought of capture.856        
 
It was this unforgettable sense of defeat, utter hopelessness and perceived failure in 
letting their men down that inspired many commissioned officers, such as Hargest, 
Upham and Sandy Thomas, to attempt to escape to fight again.857            
     
  
   Expectations of Duty 
    
As chapters three to five showed, it remained the responsibility and duty of 
every officer to keep himself fully conversant with the up-to-date procedures, directives 
and professional knowledge and standards required for the positions they held in their 
particular corps.858 This requirement was necessary for every officer, from an 
inexperienced platoon commander through to a lieutenant-colonel in command of a 
battalion. Not all officers were able to achieve this, although the majority took the 
burden of leadership and responsibility for their men seriously, ensuring that the rank 
and file of the New Zealand expeditionary forces during both conflicts were generally 
led by competent and effective officers. 
The fundamental duties of junior officers primarily remained the same for both 
wars and the only variance occurred due to specific tasks determined by the corps the 
officers belonged to. Such duties related to the care of the men serving under them and 
the carrying out of orders determined by their superiors.859 This chain of command was 
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essential for the formations to perform effectively and efficiently under the stress of 
combat, where the leadership determined success or failure and life or death. As the 
majority of New Zealand officers in both expeditionary forces were civilian volunteers 
or conscripts whose military experience before serving overseas was limited to service 
in the Territorial Force or basic training and an officer cadet training course prior to 
embarkation, competency only came with extensive training and experience.860 In 
general, the junior officers of the main bodies of the expeditionary forces in 1914 and 
1939 only knew the rudimentary duties and responsibilities of command.861 Although 
both sets had months of training with their troops in Egypt prior to going into combat, 
it was only through the experience of campaigning that they were able to hone their 
leadership skills. Sandy Thomas recalls that even though he had been a platoon 
commander in 23 Battalion since its formation in early 1940, and that the officers and 
men of the battalion had trained extensively as a military formation until embarking 
from Egypt for Greece in March 1941, he believed his men never really saw him as an 
officer until he had led them in combat.862 This was also the experience for replacement 
officers and soldiers commissioned from the ranks during both conflicts who became 
proficient only through enduring the rigours of war.  
Perhaps the reason for this can be explained by the views of the men who served 
under them. Jack Collins was a private who served in C Company of 26 Battalion in 
North Africa and Italy during the conflict. As a 92 year old veteran, he recalled that the 
soldiers looked to their platoon commanders, whether commissioned officers or, on 
occasions, non-commissioned officers not only to provide leadership in combat, but 
also to look to the general welfare of their men. He claims that once the officer had 
proven himself in these areas, he would gain the trust and loyalty of the whole 
platoon.863 He further stated that without the support of the men, the officer could not 
function effectively in his role and was a liability to the unit.864 As the New Zealand 
divisions in both conflicts primarily consisted of infantry battalions, along with 
mounted rifles in the Great War, the majority of New Zealand officers served in the 
infantry where they were required physically to lead their men into battle from the front. 
Knowledge of the duties required of them provides the basis for an analysis of how they 
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performed in their roles and provides a comparison with officers serving in the same 
roles from allied nations.  
The duties of a platoon commander during both conflicts were vast and varied, 
but fundamentally remain the same in the twenty-first century. Training and preparing 
the platoon for combat, as well as effectively leading the men into battle were the core 
responsibilities of subalterns of infantry battalions in both expeditionary forces. The 
training provided to junior officers has been explored in a previous chapters but the 
general comments provided in the Instructions for the Training of Platoons for 
Offensive Action issued by the British General Staff to all officers within the British 
Empire forces in 1917 provides a précis of actions to be taken by platoon commanders 
to provide the leadership necessary for success. The document was produced to assist 
junior officers who lacked experience in the training and fighting of their units and was 
based on experience gained in the early years of the Great War.865 As pointed out in the 
pamphlet, it was not possible to provide a correct line of action for all circumstances 
that might occur in combat, but it was designed to assist officers to act correctly in any 
situation: 
 
 A Platoon Commander will have gone a long way towards having a well-trained 
 platoon if he has gained the confidence of his N.C.O.s and the men and has established a high 
 soldierly spirit in all ranks. 
The confidence of his men can be gained by:- 
(a) Being the best man at arms in the platoon, or trying to be so 
(b) Being quick to act, taking real command on all occasions, issuing clear orders, and not 
forgetting to see them carried out 
(c) Example, being himself well turned out, punctual, and cheery, even under adverse 
circumstances 
(d) Enforcing strict discipline at all times. This must be a willing discipline, not a sulky one. 
Be just, but do not be soft – men despise softness 
(e) Recognising a good effort, even if it is not really successful. A word of praise when 
deserved produces better results than incessant fault-finding 
(f) Looking after his men’s comfort before his own and never sparing himself 
(g) Demanding a high standard on all occasions, and never resting content with what he takes 
over, be it on the battlefield or in billets. Everything is capable of improvement from 
information on the battlefield down to latrines and washing places in billets. 
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(h) Being blood-thirsty, and for ever thinking how to kill the enemy, and helping his men to do 
so  
 
The Platoon Commander should be the proudest man in the Army. He is the Commander of the 
unit in the attack. He is the only commander who can know intimately the character and 
capabilities of each man under him. He can, if he is so disposed, establish an esprit de platoon 
which will be hard to equal in any other formation.866 
           
Although it is unrealistic to think that every platoon commander within the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces of both wars was able to fulfil all the points provided in 
these guidelines, taking into consideration varying personal attributes, strengths and 
character, those who did follow them proved effective and efficient leaders who could 
inspire their subordinates to follow them into battle.  
 
 
The Value of Combat Experience 
 
While some 2NZEF officers, such as Denver Fountaine, wrote of their 
frustration at the continual training and lack of opportunity for action throughout 1940, 
a limited number of New Zealand officers gained early combat experience through 
secondment to the newly formed ‘No. 1 Long Range Patrol Unit’ that eventually 
became known as Long Range Desert Group. Conceived by Major Ralph Bagnold, a 
signals officer of the British Army and pre-war geographer and desert explorer, this 
unit was established to operate in the desert behind enemy lines for weeks at a time, 
reconnoitring and gaining intelligence about enemy garrisons and movements. It was 
formed in Egypt in June 1940 but at the time Bagnold found it hard to find personnel 
who were required to be self-reliant, hardy and accustomed to desert conditions, as well 
as specialists in weapons, signalling, navigation, driving and mechanical repairs.867 The 
2nd NZEF was eventually approached to supply volunteers as the force had been 
training in desert conditions for the previous six months and the officers and men were 
considered to have the practical temperament which was considered suitable for such 
work.  
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Initially volunteers from the NZ Divisional Cavalry, 27th (Machine Gun) 
Battalion and gunners from the 34th Anti-Tank Battery were attached to the unit. This 
included three officers; Lieutenant L.B. Ballantyne of the NZ Divisional Cavalry who 
was appointed adjutant and quarter-master, Second-Lieutenant D.G. Steele of the 27th 
(Machine Gun) Battalion who became a patrol commander and Lieutenant F.B. 
Edmundson of the NZ Medical Corps who became the medical officer of the unit.868 
Eventually, General Headquarters, Middle East, requested that 2NZEF provide a total 
of five officers and 85 other ranks as a regular secondment strength to the group.869 At 
first the New Zealander officers were not expected to lead fighting patrols until they 
had become more familiar with the desert, but Brendan O’Carroll, an authority on the 
LRDG, argues that it was not long before Ballantyne and Steele proved themselves to 
be capable fighting commanders.870  
Although he could see tactical value in such patrols, Freyberg was concerned 
that the continual secondment of personnel from 2NZEF was affecting the efficiency 
of the Division. 871 This issue was eventually resolved in February 1941 when the New 
Zealand government formalised conditions with regard to the loan of personnel to the 
LRDG, with the secondment strength being restricted to four officers and 54 other ranks 
until Tripoli was captured.872 The period of volunteer service was also restricted to six 
months, but this was not strictly adhered to as some returned to their units only after a 
few months, while some officers and men remained with the elite unit until 1945.873 
Even Freyberg’s son, Paul, was attached to the unit as a young second-lieutenant in 
December 1941 in an effort to gain more field experience until he was wounded in an 
attack and had to be evacuated.874 Ultimately, the training value to officers serving in 
the unit was beneficial in that it not only provided them with the opportunity to gain 
experience in active fighting when the majority of the Division was still in reserve in 
Egypt, but it also exposed them to the harsh realities of desert warfare where the 
essential knowledge and skills gained, especially in navigation, would put them in good 
stead for the hard-fought campaigns to come.               
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   The Importance of Proficiency  
 
The proficiency of an officer promoted trust and confidence which was more 
effective in providing sound leadership than displays of personal bravery. An example 
of this was provided by Sandy Thomas who states that the men of his platoon never 
really considered him an officer until they were in combat for the first time during the 
Greek campaign in March 1941.875 When war was declared in September 1939, Thomas 
was a 20-year old junior bank clerk and a corporal serving in the Territorials. He had 
only limited officer training before he took command of 15 Platoon, C Company, 23 
Battalion at Burnham Camp in early 1940.  Like the civilian volunteers under his 
command, he was determined to do his utmost to make his platoon into a professional 
and efficient fighting unit: ‘To a man they were eager to get to grips with their new life. 
We all knuckled down, officers and men, to an almost frantic routine. Soon enough we 
gained a fitness, discipline, pride and confidence in ourselves. We were transformed 
from civilians into fighting soldiers.’876 However, in an interview with Thomas in 2010 
he stated that it was not until the rigours of campaigning that his leadership capabilities 
were tested.877 Although lacking combat experience he proved himself as an effective 
platoon commander when commanding the rear guard of the battalion during its 
withdrawal from its defensive position near Mount Olympus.878 He led by example 
during the fighting on Crete, firstly in leading his platoon in helping to deal with 
isolated groups of German paratroops who had landed in his battalion’s sector during 
the first day of the invasion, followed by leading his men forward during the failed 
counter-attack on Maleme airfield.879 Several days later, together with Lieutenant Rex 
King, Thomas led the now famous successful counter-attack on Galatas on 25 May, 
resulting in him being wounded and later captured.880  
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A comprehensive study of diaries, letters, unit histories and interviews with 
surviving veterans has provided substantial anecdotal evidence that the soldiers of both 
New Zealand expeditionary forces were exceptionally well led by their battalion and 
regimental officers. There are a number of factors that ensured this occurred, some of 
which related to the unique nature of New Zealand society at the time. The introduction 
of compulsory military training in the Dominion prior to the Great War certainly helped 
prepare many Territorial officers and NCOs for the rigours of overseas service. 
Although Malone complained in his diaries that a number of young junior officers 
initially lacked aptitude in their military studies while being shipped to the Middle East, 
the thought of active service and combat soon inspired them to perform to the expected 
levels of professionalism required of their rank.881  
In the case of the Main Body of NZEF and the first three echelons of 2NZEF, 
the officers were all volunteers, some from within the small NZ Staff Corps, but mostly 
from the Territorials. Their enthusiasm to do their duty, combined with a determination 
to rise to the professional standards of regular officers to ensure their men were well 
led were critical factors in the overall performance of the expeditionary forces. This 
was further enhanced by the expectations of excellence from the divisional and brigade 
commanders.  Both Godley and Russell expected high standards from their subordinate 
officers, especially Russell who continually blamed any failures within the Division on 
poor leadership. He was particularly ruthless in removing officers whom he considered 
inept or lacking the required ability to be an effective commander. One high profile 
example was that of Lieutenant-Colonel John Duigan of the New Zealand Staff Corps; 
he was one of two staff officers that Russell had sent back to New Zealand from France 
in 1917.882 Ironically, Duigan later became Major-General Sir John Duigan and the 
General Officer Commanding of the New Zealand Military Forces in the late 1930s.883 
Such transfers were not uncommon within the Division on the Western Front as Russell 
strived to forge the New Zealand formation into an elite fighting unit. 
Freyberg proved less ruthless in his approach during the Second World War. 
Some critics have argued that his affable personality made it difficult for him to remove 
and replace officers whom he considered were not up to the required standard. This was 
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certainly the case after the disaster on Crete where questionable decision making by 
some disloyal senior officers, such as Hargest and Puttick, whom many considered too 
old for active overseas service, certainly warranted some remedial action to be taken. 
Hargest remained a brigade commander until he was captured during Operation 
Crusader, while Puttick eventually returned to New Zealand in late 1941 where he was 
promoted on Freyberg’s recommendation.884 Sandy Thomas stated that company 
officers of combat units who failed to meet the required standards and lacked effective 
leadership skills, whom he described as ‘bad officers’, instead of being demoted, were 
often transferred to duties as liaison officers on troopships and bases away from the 
front line.885  
Issues relating to poor performance of battalion and regimental officers were 
usually dealt with from within the units during both wars. Regiment and battalion 
commanders had the discretion to appoint officers to certain positions relevant to their 
rank and experience within their own units. Those who were identified as not being up 
to the job assigned to them were usually transferred to positions more suited to their 
abilities. An early example of this was the removal of the adjutant of the Wellington 
Infantry Regiment in mid-August 1914, prior to the embarkation of the Main Body, 
after Lieutenant-Colonel Malone complained that the officer’s lack of experience and 
knowledge made him of no real use and he was ‘quite satisfied that he must go.’886 
Battalion commanders and their subordinate officers jealously guarded the fighting 
reputation of their unit, especially when it came to the quality of junior officers leading 
men into battle. Some platoon commanders who proved efficient in training their men 
and preparing them out of the front line buckled under the pressure of combat.887 
Conversely, some who struggled with the minutiae of military life out of the trenches 
excelled in leadership when engaging the enemy. Upham was one such example of this; 
not one to lead by example in following military protocol in dress standards and 
saluting, he inspired his men to follow him through his fighting abilities. 
Platoon commanders who showed limited leadership abilities or potential were 
quickly weeded out. Private Jack Collins of C Company, 26 Battalion, 2NZEF claims 
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that most platoon commanders whom he served under were competent and ensured the 
general wellbeing of their men.888 However, he recalls one young replacement officer 
who lacked experience and refused to heed the advice of his sergeant, and who 
unnecessarily exposed his men to withering enemy fire, resulting in a number of 
casualties, including several soldiers killed. Collins claims that had this been an isolated 
incident then the officer would have been forgiven by his men, but by repeatedly taking 
this stance this officer became a liability to his platoon and was eventually transferred 
from the battalion to a non-combat role.889 Those inexperienced replacement junior 
officers who failed to listen to advice from seasoned soldiers, perhaps through 
arrogance, often paid the ultimate price. Sergeant Alfred Morris served with the 
Canterbury Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli and wrote of one such occasion: 
 
At this time we had with us a young officer who had arrived with a batch of reinforcements and 
who often rather over-exposed his body over the trench. During the day I heard one of my mates telling 
him that he would get a bullet if he wasn’t more careful. In reply to which he said: ‘When I want your 
advice I will ask for it.’ Late that same night the young officer standing high up in the trench not far from 
where I was, received several bullets from a Turkish machine gun, in the head. He certainly required no 
more advice. No, it was a burial party the following day.890 
  
 In contrast to these examples, Haddon Donald recalls how, as an immature and 
inexperienced platoon commander in 22 Battalion, he got his platoon lost while leading 
it during the retreat from Mount Olympus. At the time one of his more knowledgeable 
NCOs took over, with Donald claiming that he learned a valuable lesson from the 
experience to always listen to what the troops had to say.891 According to Sandy 
Thomas, while he was a company and battalion commander in 23 Battalion his way of 
dealing with incompetent officers was to have them transferred to Division 
headquarters where they could not do any damage.892 Such methods quickly came to 
the attention of his superiors, with him claiming that at one stage the Military Secretary 
got quite cross with him over it. However, General Freyberg took him aside and 
laughed, saying that he used to do exactly the same thing in the Great War.893  
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If senior officers could not spot a poor junior officer, then the soldier serving 
under them certainly could. Reginald De Grave served in the 5th Field Park Company 
of the New Zealand Engineers during the campaigns in North Africa during World War 
Two and was disparaging toward the lieutenant whom he served under, stating that ‘The 
pansy lieutenant who leaves his troops …on their own on the battlefield is despised.’894 
He described this particular officer as a bungling comic figure who was ‘as silly as a 
snake and quite harmless,’ and who tried to assert his authority without much 
success.895 According to De Grave the soldiers within the unit could never understand 
how he could have attained his rank but unfortunately for them they were ‘stuck with 
the skunk.’896 This officer was so disliked by his subordinates that they referred to him 
as ‘Napoleon’ due to his ‘know it all’ attitude.897  
C.J. Burt was another soldier who complained about the quality of officers he 
served under. He was an enlisted soldier serving in the War Graves Enquiry and 
Registration Unit in North Africa in 1942 and made numerous entries in his diary 
regarding the officers’ incompetence, lack of interest in their subordinates’ welfare and 
being more interested in acquiring souvenirs than attending to their given tasks, stating: 
‘it is sickening the way this unit does so little, might just as well be home. Too many 
officers with good jobs, having the time of their lives.’898 When one of the second-
lieutenants in command of his section was transferred he recorded his relief: ‘About 
time the useless sod was got rid of. Still, he’ll still be a lieutenant. Gawd, what a 
system.’899  Unfortunately for the likes of De Grave and Burt, the few officers who 
proved unfit to lead in combat were usually either transferred to serve in non-combat 
supporting units or were returned to New Zealand in administrative and training roles. 
Such policies ensured the efficiency of the frontline units by maintaining the morale of 
the troops and reducing the risk of unnecessary casualties.          
Social factors also determined the performance of the battalion grade officers. 
With the relatively small population of New Zealand of just over one million people in 
the first half of the twentieth century, the provincial social networks meant that the 
degrees of social separation were less than those of large countries such as Britain, 
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Canada and Australia. Both rural and urban communities had strong social ties, either 
through family, vocational, class or sporting connections that permeated New Zealand 
society. The Territorial Force was a reflection of these ties, with the officer corps of the 
pre-Great War Territorial regiments being the domain of the middle classes. The prime 
example was the officer corps of the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry which exclusively 
consisted of highly educated professionals, such as lawyers, accountants, school 
masters, and owners and sons of holders of large landed estates. A study of the list of 
original officers to embark with the Canterbury Mounted Rifles in 1914 confirms this, 
with prominent South Island landed gentry families such as the Deans, Birdlings and 
Chaytors amongst them.900 Such families were held in high esteem. The actions and 
behaviour of their men during overseas service reflected not only on the reputation of 
the officers themselves on their return to New Zealand, but also on the longstanding 
reputation of their families. During the Great War such men were expected to act 
according to accepted Edwardian standards of officers and gentlemen, which included 
displays of courage and leadership in the face of the enemy. Any incidents of failure to 
adhere to these standards would quickly become common knowledge in provincial New 
Zealand and could affect any future vocational, social, marital or business prospects of 
the individual on his return home.901 This was also the case for enlisted men, with an 
example being those who were sent back to New Zealand prior to the Gallipoli 
campaign and discharged from the army as medically unfit due to contracting a venereal 
disease in the brothels of Cairo.902 Pugsley states that prior to the Gallipoli campaign 
the worst punishment that officers and enlisted men feared was to be sent home to 
small-town New Zealand in disgrace; even if the reasons were not published, the 
community would find out through letters from other locals serving overseas.903 
However, the stigma had less effect once the troops had experienced combat, where 
being sent home was seen as a blessing for some.  
The dismissal of four officers of the Maori Contingent in 1916 was the most 
famous and controversial example of alleged failure in war affecting personal 
reputations at home. As at the beginning of the Second World War, the Maori 
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Contingent that left New Zealand in 1915 was commanded by an experienced non-
Maori officer. The relationship between this officer, Major A.H. Herbert and the senior 
Maori officers quickly became strained, possibly due to Herbert’s lack of cultural 
understanding of the troops under his control, as well as a perceived casual approach to 
accepted military protocol by the subordinate Maori officers. Wira Gardiner argues that 
the problem stemmed from Herbert’s inability to communicate with his Maori-speaking 
troops, while some of his officers sometimes deliberately misinterpreted his orders.904 
This eventually resulted in the officers, Captain W.T. Pitt, and Lieutenants R. Dansy, 
T. Hiroti and T. Hetet being sent back to New Zealand in disgrace. Pitt and Dansey had 
previously served as officers in the Territorials, while Hiroti and Hetet had been 
commissioned from the ranks.905 Godley sided with Herbert, stating that two of the 
company commanders were useless and did not lead their men well in combat; they 
were ignorant of military matters, lacking in experience and having no sense of 
responsibility, while he described one as being unsuitable to command in the field since 
he was disloyal and obstructed Herbert.906 This caused a great loss of mana (personal 
honour) not only to the individual officers and their unit, but also the families and the 
Maori leaders who had so strongly pushed for the Contingent to be allowed to serve 
overseas.907 Ironically, according to Chris Pugsley, Dansy had shown outstanding 
bravery during the August offensive at Gallipoli and did so again when he, along with 
Hiroti and Hetet, were reappointed to the Pioneer Battalion in France in 1916 as a result 
of political pressure from Maori leaders in New Zealand.908  
 
 
  Leadership in Battle: Leading by Example 
 
The success of all the military operations of the expeditionary forces of both 
wars relied on the leadership of platoon and troop commanders. With the support of 
their non-commissioned officers, it was they who personally led their men in combat. 
The duties of such officers were varied, but ultimately it was their display of personal 
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courage and aptitude under fire that inspired their men to follow them. Platoon officers 
could study all the tactical manuals available to them, but they could only be effective 
by controlling their fear for their personal safety and leading by example. In interviews 
conducted for this study with Second World War veterans, both commissioned officers 
and enlisted men, every soldier admitted experiencing fear at some stage while serving 
overseas. The same emerges from autobiographies, biographies, diaries, letters and 
recordings of other veterans. In a post-World War Two survey of officers conducted by 
Major-General Kippenberger in 1948, Captain R. Boord, who had served as a platoon 
and company commander in C Company of 24 Battalion claimed that courage was not 
instinctive: ‘Courage is the control and subordination of fear by the logical part of the 
brain with the help of certain emotions.’909 There were many examples of New Zealand 
platoon and company commanders, during both conflicts, who had the ability to 
overcome, control or hide their fear in an effort to provide the necessary leadership to 
their men in combat situations. Most went unrecognised by the high command for 
simply being the expected behaviour of an officer, with only the exceptional cases 
receiving official recognition.  
Platoon commanders had a duty to lead and direct their troops from the front in 
both conflicts. This almost certainly accounts for the high casualty rate of company 
officers during both wars compared to those of other ranks from combat formations. 
The ability of junior officers to provide effective leadership in battle was fundamental 
to the efficiency and success of any army. As Christopher Moore-Bick argues, the upper 
classes of the British Army from which the majority of officers came, were taught that 
they had an inherent responsibility to provide leadership and to believe in the virtue of 
sacrificing themselves for the right cause.910  
This was also the case for the officers of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force 
during the Great War, who initially came from the Dominion’s middle classes and had 
been indoctrinated with stories of British imperial martial glory resulting in the creation 
of the British Empire.911 As with other British dominions, British history was an 
important facet of the education curriculum in Edwardian New Zealand, especially at 
secondary level where only the middle classes and some prosperous working-class 
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people could afford to send their children.912 The stories of duty and sacrifice for 
‘Queen and Country’ in times of war, such as Gordon’s defence of Khartoum in the 
Sudan, the gallant defences during the sieges of Mafeking and Ladysmith during the 
Second Anglo-Boer war and the defence of Rorke’s Drift during the Zulu War in 
January 1879, were all celebrated through history lessons and books, fostering British 
imperialism and nationalism throughout the white populations of the empire. The 
names of those officers involved in such incidents became well-known and their actions 
inspired many youth of the Dominion to aspire to such noble duty.913 The introduction 
of compulsory military service in 1909 also ensured that youths of military service age 
prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 were exposed to the duties required of junior 
officers, where leading by example was considered the ultimate attribute. An example 
of one such officer who took such duties seriously is that of Captain Bruce Hay of the 
New Zealand Staff Corps, a Boer War veteran who was killed at Gallipoli while serving 
as a major in the Otago Mounted Rifles: 
 
Captain Hay [only recently promoted to major] also being killed is a great loss to the boys at 
the front. A man they would follow anywhere. He was full of original ideas for improving the trenches, 
etc, and was always knocking about helping the men. He had just led his men to a certain position and 
had written out a dispatch to report they were there when he fell shot through the heart. One day at 
Zeitoun when speaking about the war, he told me that he would never go back to New Zealand again 
because he said, an officer of his rank, who was worth his salt, was bound to get hit sooner or later. 
Strangely enough he fell having just carried out an order that should have been carried out half an hour 
sooner by a senior officer who considered the fire too hot to advance his men, so retired them again.914   
   
Acts of gallantry have traditionally been used to mark soldiers above their peers 
and evidence suggests that most combat officers of the expeditionary forces showed a 
degree of gallantry when facing the enemy. However, as this was the expected 
behaviour of officers, most received little official recognition. This was especially the 
case in the Great War where platoon and company commanders were usually the first 
over the parapets of the trenches during attacks on the enemy. Official casualty returns 
from the Gallipoli campaign clearly indicate that of all regimental officers serving in 
combat, it was the lieutenants and 2nd lieutenants who were more likely to be killed or 
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wounded. Obviously there were more junior officers within battalions than senior 
officers, but it was the young junior officers who were expected to, and did, lead their 
troops from the front in attacks where they were generally more exposed to enemy 
machine gun and rifle fire than their superiors. An example of evidence of this comes 
from the war diary of the Canterbury Infantry Regiment that recorded that the battalion 
sustained six officer casualties in the failed sortie from Quinn’s Post on the German 
Officers Trench on the morning of 5 June 1915; four of the officers being lieutenants.915 
Officers and NCOs were the prime targets of enemy snipers, in both wars, as an attack 
or defence was likely to falter without effective leadership to rally and encourage the 
troops. It is hard to imagine the amount of personal strength and courage required of 
such men to display a sense of calmness leading their troops ‘over the top’ in attacks 
that had to overcome unfavourable muddy and bogging ground, sometimes 
impenetrable barbed wire and enemy machine gun and artillery fire before they could 
succeed. Such attacks almost always resulted in high casualties, especially among the 
officers, and had limited chances of success. 
Such gallantry and leadership were certainly recognised and appreciated by 
those being led. Frank Twistleton was an officer in the Otago Mounted Rifles serving 
at Gallipoli and at one stage was directed to defend a small feature that had previously 
proved difficult to secure. At the time he was placed in command of the Maori 
Contingent who had previously only been used in manual work in the trenches. 
Defending the area proved difficult, resulting in high casualties, but he had high praise 
for the two Maori officers, Lieutenants Ferris and Walker, who helped repulse repeated 
enemy attacks, stating that they were first rate officers who led their men with a joke 
and a smile, proving to be ‘ideal warriors.’916 Their deeds were typical of the majority 
of World War 1 New Zealand frontline officers whose actions were only recognised by 
those who served with them.  Another example that gives a clear picture of how many 
officers stoically met their deaths and maintained the admiration of the troops leading 
their men on the Western Front is from a letter by Leonard Hart describing the death of 
Second-Lieutenant George Knight of the Otago Infantry Regiment who was killed in 
action at Passchendaele on 12 October 1917: 
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We had gone over the top and had advanced a distance of about 250 yards towards the German 
positions on the ridge – Mr Knight, our company commander, being at this point slightly ahead of me. 
A road, known as the Ypres-Roulers Road, ran right through the German barbed wire entanglements and 
pill-boxes and this road was swept by German machine-gun and rifle fire from both sides. It was up this 
road and on both sides of it that Mr Knight’s company advanced. By the time we had gone the 250 yards 
before mentioned we had had at least three parts of our men killed and wounded. 
He still continued to lead the remains of his company fearlessly and determinedly and had just 
reached the German wire entanglement (they were 50 yards in depth and so thick that it was practically 
impossible for anyone to penetrate far into them) on the road when he was shot through the chest. He fell 
immediately without a word or a sound and did not speak again. Two of us were endeavouring to bind 
up his wound when another bullet pierced his throat and he immediately breathed his last…so died as 
popular and brave as ever honoured the uniform he wore. I am quite sure the company never had a more 
popular or worthy commander…Previous to going over the top he seemed cool and collected as he was 
up to the time of his death. It was a German sniper that got him on both occasions. They held a line of 
concrete machine-gun and rifle emplacements behind their formidable barbed-wire entanglements and 
they simply mowed us down as we came at them up the slope of the ridge. Practically all those who 
actually penetrated the wire became entangled in it and shot before their surviving comrades’ eyes. From 
the time we got within twenty yards of the German wire we all knew that we were practically going to 
our deaths, and no one must have known it better than Mr Knight, but he never hesitated and like the 
hero that he was, met his end.917               
 
The criteria for such high gallantry awards had changed from 1920, making it 
harder for recommendations to be accepted. Harper and Richardson argue that the 
raised criteria for VCs (Victoria Crosses), along with the introduction of other 
categories for gallantry led to a reduction in the number awarded in the Second World 
War.918 In that conflict only 182 VCs were awarded, less than a third of the 663 awarded 
in the Great War, even though the Second World War lasted two years longer.919 This 
ensured that the acts of gallantry that were witnessed and recorded in the Second World 
War that would have resulted in the awarding of a VC in the Great War, more 
commonly resulted in the awarding of a lesser honour in the Second World War. There 
was a higher number of posthumous VCs awarded in the Second World War than in 
the first and it has been argued that only heroic actions that carried with them a high 
chance of death would qualify for the medal.920  
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The most obvious example of an officer to satisfy the criteria for a VC is Charles 
Upham, VC and Bar, who remains the most celebrated battalion officer to have served 
in the New Zealand military forces during either war. However, Upham was not typical 
of most New Zealand company combat officers; he was the only combatant soldier 
within the British Army and Commonwealth Forces to be awarded the Victoria Cross 
twice in the Second World War and his reputation for bravery is legendary.921 He has 
become the model to which many young New Zealand soldiers aspire through his 
bravery, determination and perceived lack of concern for his own safety in an effort to 
protect his men. At the time of the German airborne invasion of Crete in late May 1940, 
Upham was a second-lieutenant in command of 15 Platoon, C Company, 20 Battalion 
when he earned his first such award.922  During the ill-fated night counter-attack on 
Maleme airfield in the early of the morning of 22 May, Upham demonstrated his 
abilities as a combat leader and his personal courage when he single-handedly 
destroyed an enemy machine gun position in his first real combat action. He had been 
leading his platoon in an advance across an open field when his men suddenly came 
under machine gun fire from the Germans.923 A number of his men became casualties 
and he immediately ordered the rest of his unit to remain prone and under cover while 
he directed them to crawl slowly forward towards the German position giving him 
covering fire while he also crawled forward and outflanked the enemy. Once close 
enough, Upham lobbed three grenades at the enemy and ran towards them firing his 
pistol killing all eight Germans holding the position.924 A few minutes later he repeated 
a similar style personal attack when he ordered his men to give him covering fire as he 
outflanked an enemy-held farm house, again using grenades to take the position.925 
When the company advanced into the village of Pirgos, Upham continued to 
demonstrate his courage by personally leading the house clearing, then knocking out an 
enemy-held position where the Germans had been operating a captured Bofor gun.926 
Most of these actions were within the view of his company commander, Captain Denver 
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Fountaine, and his battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Burrows, and it was 
their recommendations that led to Upham receiving his first Victoria Cross. 
Upham’s award was significant in that he was the first New Zealand officer to 
receive the Victoria Cross since the New Zealand Wars of the 1860s. Unlike Major- 
General Sir Andrew Russell in the Great War, Freyberg was happy enough to 
recommend deserving officers for gallantry awards and without doubt Upham’s actions 
were worthy. When reading Captain Fountaine’s statement used to support Upham’s 
commendation, it is clear the honour was not awarded for a single action, but for a 
number of actions throughout the brief Cretan campaign:  
 
During the whole of the operations on Crete Mr Upham showed a total disregard for his own 
safety, very seldom used cover as he was always moving around his platoon cheering them on and his 
coolness, leadership and unremitting attention to his men were an inspiration not only to his men but to 
the whole company and with everyone with whom he came in contact.  For a man in good physical 
condition the 10 days operations in Crete were strenuous. Mr Upham had diarrhoea from the time we left 
Servia Pass in Greece on April 18 until we arrived back in Egypt but he remained on duty throughout.927   
 
Upham’s reluctant reaction to receiving the award was also indicative of his 
‘no-nonsense’ approach to leadership which found favour with his troops. When 
General Claude Auckinleck presented Upham with his VC ribbon in November 1941 
he congratulated him and stated that New Zealand would be very proud that he had won 
the decoration; Upham responded, ‘I didn’t win it, sir.’928 Humbled by the attention and 
embarrassed on receiving the award, Upham maintained that his actions were only ever 
those expected of a platoon commander in defeating the enemy and leading his men 
from the front in combat. Upham never enjoyed or got used to the attention he received 
from being awarded this high honour, only wearing the medal ribbon on his battledress 
after being ordered to do so by Brigadier Kippenberger.929 He stated to his biographer, 
Kenneth Sandford, that he considered that he had done nothing to deserve the award, 
that he only did his duty as an officer in leading and urging his men onward, that it was 
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his men who deserved such recognition for the fighting and that he felt humiliated in 
receiving the medal which had been rightfully won by his men.930  
Receiving a second Victoria Cross only caused more embarrassment for 
Upham. Again he was recommended for a bar to his VC not for a single incident but 
for numerous actions of bravery during the breakout at Minqar Qaim on the night of 27 
June 1942, where the New Zealand Division successfully fought a desperate battle to 
escape encirclement by the Africa Korps, and at Ruweisat Ridge on the El Alamein line 
in mid-July the same year where he personally conducted a dangerous reconnaissance 
behind enemy lines and, as the captain in command of C Company, 20 Battalion, he led 
a successful bayonet charge across open ground and captured a strategic German 
strongpoint, even though he had suffered a serious wound to his arm from machine gun 
fire. It was while defending the position that he suffered a serious wound to his leg and 
was later captured while being tended to at a regimental aid post.931 Upham remained a 
prisoner of war until the end of the conflict in 1945, but remained defiant of the enemy 
by attempting to escape from internment camps on numerous occasions which resulted 
in him finally being sent to Colditz Castle, notorious for housing Allied officers who 
repeatedly attempted to escape.932 Although the bar to his medal was not awarded until 
after Upham had returned to New Zealand once the war had ended, this second honour, 
together with his publicised exploits as a prisoner of war, had turned this reluctant and 
humble officer into a living legend with the New Zealand public; recognition which he 
never sought or wanted.933 
Such bravery in an officer did not necessarily justify higher promotion. Sandy 
Thomas argues that personal courage was only one of the important characteristics 
required of an effective officer. He claims to have been a life-long friend of Upham 
after the war, who he states was one of the best soldiers he knew934 (However, Glyn 
Harper questions this as he believes Upham had no close friends and would have seen 
very little of Thomas after the war). Thomas states that in his opinion Upham would 
not have been a suitable battalion commander because he found it hard to delegate: 
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Charlie was a man who would not ask his men to take risks he would not take himself. That was 
why he constantly exposed himself to enemy fire. He would rather risk his own life than those of his 
men. That’s fine for a platoon commander, but it is irresponsible for a battalion CO to do that. While a 
platoon commander leads from the front, a battalion commander is required to direct his company 
commanders from a vantage point behind the forward companies. I don’t think Charlie could have done 
that. 935  
   
The only other officer of the 2nd New Zealand Division to receive a Victoria 
Cross was also a platoon commander. Second-Lieutenant Moana-nui-a-Kiwa Ngarimu 
upheld his warrior tribal heritage when he was posthumously awarded the honour as a 
result of his actions leading his platoon at Tebaga Gap in Libya on 26 March 1943. 
Aged only 24 when he was killed, Ngarimu had enlisted as a private in 1940 but 
received a commission in April 1942 after he had displayed leadership qualities while 
serving in the ranks.936 While initially serving as the intelligence officer in 28 (Maori) 
Battalion he came to the attention of the battalion commander, Lieutenant-Colonel 
(later Sir Charles) Bennett whose description of Ngarimu summed up the typical 
qualities required of an infantry platoon subaltern: 
 
He had qualities which indicated to me that here you have a chap who was solid, who can be 
relied upon and a man of good intelligence who was disciplined, a bit of an introvert, rather than an 
extrovert. He was in control of his situation all the time. And he was the kind of  fellow I felt where, if 
you give him a job to do, you can be sure he will do it.937                            
               
The circumstances surrounding Ngarimu’s actions at Tebaga Gap went beyond 
the level of duty expected of a junior officer in combat. This is clear from reading the 
official citation for his Victoria Cross as well as eye-witness accounts of his bravery 
that ultimately led to his death. At the time he was the officer in command of 14 Platoon, 
C Company, who were directed to make a flanking attack on a prominent enemy-held 
high point known as Point 209 that dominated one side of the gap.938 The attack 
commenced in daylight with Ngarimu leading his platoon from the front up a steep 
rocky slope onto an under-feature that extended in front of the higher position of Point 
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209. It was only after Ngarimu had personally destroyed two machine gun posts during 
the attack, that he became the first to reach the crest of the hill where a brief but violent 
skirmish led to him capturing the position.939 He did not realise that it was only the 
small high point that he had captured until after he had consolidated the position and 
had been reinforced by 13 Platoon.940 Eventually the Germans launched a series of 
aggressive counterattacks throughout the night that resulted in heavy casualties to the 
Maori defenders, including Ngarimu. 
It was Ngarimu’s grim determination and leadership that ensured the Maori held 
the exposed position at the end of the battle. The defenders had suffered heavily from 
exposure to enemy mortar fire, which was followed by a German bayonet charge and 
it was at this point that Ngarimu yelled at his men to stand up and fight the enemy in 
hand-to-hand combat.941 This had been the traditional style of combat of the defenders’ 
ancestors and this action provided one of the few chances in the desert campaign for 
the men to engage their enemy at close quarters. Ngarimu was shot in the shoulder 
during this incident but continued to fight and inspire the outnumbered defenders, 
causing the Germans to withdraw.942 In a following attack the Germans managed to 
penetrate the Maori position but Ngarimu stemmed their advance by rushing to the spot 
and shot two of the attackers, firing his sub-machine gun from the hip.943 When another 
German counterattack forced the defenders off the crest of the feature, Ngarimu, 
described as being in a ‘majestic fighting mood’ rallied his men and led a successful 
attack that led to the recapture of the position.944 It was at this time that he received a 
second wound to his leg. He refused an order to report to an aid post, stating that he 
wished to remain with his men throughout the night.945 When dawn broke Ngarimu and 
twelve remaining defenders still held the outcrop, only two of whom had not been 
wounded.946 At this time the Germans launched their final attack that threatened to 
overrun the position. Remaining defiant, Ngarimu led a counter-charge firing his 
machine gun as he led his men forward before finally being killed.947 Reinforcements 
from the battalion reached the position at the same time and prevented its capture. 











Without doubt, Ngarimu’s bravery was exceptional during the operation, but it was also 
his leadership that inspired his men to vigorously defend the exposed position for so 
long. Had a less determined officer been in command, the heavy losses sustained by the 
platoons involved may have been in vain. 
Although Upham and Ngarimu were the only two officers from the New 
Zealand expeditionary forces of both world wars to receive Victoria Crosses, acts of 
gallantry in combat by officers and non-commissioned officers were a common 
occurrence, with most receiving no official recognition. As Glyn Harper and Colin 
Richardson argue, many deserving officers and men missed being recommended  for 
the award because of lack of witnesses, inadequate written testimony, or in the case of 
New Zealand officers during the Great War, ‘the sheer bloody-mindedness of some 
senior military officers,’ who blocked such recommendations.948 However, other 
military awards, such as the Military Cross (MC) and Distinguished Service Order 
(DSO), Military Medal (MM) and the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM) had been 
created to acknowledge the gallantry and exemplary leadership and service of officers 
and other ranks while on campaign. The Military Cross and the Distinguished Service 
Order were reserved for officers, while the Military Medal and the Distinguished 
Conduct Medal were created for enlisted men. The DSO was awarded for meritorious 
or distinguished service by officers during wartime, and usually for actions in combat, 
to ranks of major and above. But it was also awarded to some junior officers who had 
displayed exceptional valour but had been declined recommendations to receive a 
VC.949 The Military Cross was awarded in recognition of ‘an act or acts of exemplary 
gallantry during active operations against the enemy on land,’ and was awarded to 
officers from the rank of captain and below, as well as to warrant officers.950 From 1931 
it was also determined that the award could be presented to majors.  During both wars 
some officers also received foreign military awards, such as the French Legion 
d’Honour, which reflected the theatres of combat in which they served. A total of 252 
such awards were presented to New Zealand officers, with 93 receiving the French 
Legion d’Honour and 95 receiving the Belgian equivalent.951 Another British military 
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award that officially recognised gallantry was ‘Mentioned in Despatches.’ This award 
was given to both officers and other ranks whose names appeared in official reports 
written by superior officers and sent to the high command, in which was described the 
soldier’s gallant or meritorious action or actions in the face of the enemy.952 The award 
provided some official recognition of gallantry that was not considered deserving of a 
higher award, but nevertheless worthy of some form of commendation. Recipients 
received no medal for such an award but their names were published in the London 
Gazette and a decoration of a metal oak leaf spray was presented for them to wear on 
the ribbons of their campaign service medals.953 Many officers and soldiers received 
such recognition multiple times and it was one of the few honours that could be awarded 
posthumously.        
The number of such awards granted to New Zealand officers from the 
expeditionary forces as a result of combat actions during both world wars is an 
indication of the level of personal bravery displayed by those who led the nation’s 
troops. During the First World War there were eleven Victoria Crosses awarded to New 
Zealand soldiers, all of whom were from the ranks when they won the award.954 The 
policy at that time was to commission the recipients, with six becoming lieutenants, 
while the other five had been killed in action before a commission could be bestowed.955 
One of the promoted men, Second-Lieutenant R.S. Judson of the Auckland Infantry 
Regiment, had already been awarded the DCM and MM prior to winning a VC.956  
Throughout the Great War 141 New Zealand officers received a Distinguished Service 
Order, with eight receiving bars to this medal.957 A further 530 New Zealanders 
received the Military Cross, along with 25 of these men receiving bars to their award.958 
This is a significant number of awards for gallantry and distinguished service for a force 
that was only of divisional strength.  
It is clear from studying numerous letters and diaries of officers and other ranks 
that there was some cynicism towards the end of the war over the large number of 
medals presented not only within the New Zealand Division, but throughout the whole 
British Army serving on the Western Front. One of the reasons for such large numbers 
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being awarded may well have been to boost morale among the troops after suffering 
years of misery fighting in the trenches. Such honours were generally not easily won 
and there was still a standard of gallantry for individuals to have displayed before such 
awards were bestowed. It is almost certain that Victoria Crosses would have been won 
by New Zealand officers during the conflict had General Russell not taken such a hard-
line approach towards the gallantry displayed by his subordinates. An obvious example 
was that of Colonel William Malone on Chunuk Bair at Gallipoli, whose gallantry in 
leading and holding the position under extreme adverse conditions should have resulted 
in him receiving a posthumous high honour when comparing his actions to those who 
were later to receive VCs and MCs. The subsequent loss of the position which was 
partially blamed on Malone and his fractured relationship with his brigade commander, 
Brigadier-General Johnston, was the most likely reasons Malone did not receive the 
official recognition he deserved.  
Although Godley and Russell did not consider it appropriate for their officers 
to be worthy of receiving Victoria Crosses, some of their other ranks certainly did. 
William Anderson, who served in the Otago Infantry Battalion at Gallipoli, wrote that 
the actions of one officer in his unit during the attack on Chunuk Bair were most 
deserving: 
 
Presently a move was made up the hill when there was a flurry of rifle fire. The column 
approaching from another quarter got there just before us and already had the Turks surrounded and their 
rifles discarded in a heap. After that Major Statham took the lead and we followed him over exceedingly 
broken country…Major Statham called for 10th Company to follow him. I was thankful I belonged to 8th 
for I knew we were destined to be casualties to a man. At any time as he led the column there was the 
expectancy of sudden fire from a concealed position when the leader of the column would be the first to 
fall. I was hanging back for all I was worth but still finding myself in front. Major Statham continued on 
till the inevitable contact ended his sacrificial leadership. He earned and should have been awarded the 
Victoria Cross.’959  
         
The level of gallantry shown by the officers of the 2nd New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force in World War Two paralleled that of their predecessors in the 
Great War. This is borne out in personal diaries and letters, as well as the histories of 
the combat formations that were produced after the conflicts that relied not only on 
official reports but also written and verbal evidence provided by officers and men who 
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fought in the actions. A comparison of the honours and awards given to those officers 
who served in the Great War compared to those of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary 
Force of the Second World War is not a true reflection of equal gallantry. In World War 
One 141 DSOs were awarded to New Zealand officers, with eight receiving bars to 
their medals, while 530 received the Military Cross.960 In comparison, during the 
Second World War up to 31 May 1945 only 87 officers of 2NZEF received DSOs, with 
fifteen being awarded bars, while only 214 officers received Military Crosses, along 
with eleven receiving bars.961 Similarly, there was a large variation in the number of 
DCMs and MMs awarded to other ranks in both conflicts, with many of the recipients 
later being commissioned.962 In the First World War there were 393 DCMs, including 
four bars, and 2,066 MMs, including 62 bars, awarded to members of the New Zealand 
Expeditionary Force.963 In comparison, during the Second World War there were only 
95 DCMs, including only one bar, and 488 MMs awarded to soldiers within the ranks 
of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force.964  
There are several reasons for the variation in these numbers. The tactics used by 
the adversaries in both conflicts were significantly different. In the Great War static 
trench warfare on the Western Front and Gallipoli, dominated by the use of machine 
guns and artillery, ensured that commanders were limited to a war of attrition where 
large-scale infantry assaults and probing small-scale patrols into ‘No Man’s Land’ 
remained the general tactics for almost four years of fighting. Officers and NCOs were 
expected to lead their troops in advances across open ground under heavy enemy fire 
with almost impossible chances of success. This led to unprecedented casualties on both 
sides, resulting in the average service of junior officers of the British Army in the 
trenches at the height of the war on the Western Front being limited to only six weeks 
before they were killed or wounded.965 Platoon commanders, known as subalterns, were 
also expected to be the first ‘over the top’ and to lead their men out of the trenches to 
advance in the face of the enemy. These expectations seem suicidal, but the extensive 
and well-defended trench systems left almost no ability for any outflanking movements, 
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ensuring costly frontal assaults remained the standard offensive tactic.966 The bravery 
and stoicism shown by such officers and their troops needed to be acknowledged, 
resulting in the extensive number of medals awarded. As the Great War progressed 
more such awards were presented than earlier in the conflict in an effort to boost morale 
for the troops as well as the civilian populations who were questioning the human cost 
of the war. 
Experiencing some degree of fear was a natural emotion of all soldiers. Few 
New Zealand officers who served in the Great War ever wrote of such feelings in their 
letters home or in their diaries. Many wanted to spare their families any worry and at 
that time it was certainly considered unbecoming of an officer to express such fear in 
any way. However, officers of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force in the post-
war years were more candid about their experiences. In 1986, William Brown 
conducted a survey of twenty one veteran World War Two officers. The range of 
officers included lieutenants through to brigadiers, with all the officers surveyed 
agreeing that they had experienced some fear prior to battle, and to a lesser extent during 
combat.967 Charles Caldwell stated: ‘I am sure we all experienced fear at some stage 
during battle. The greatest amount was probably before and when moving into action. 
When we became involved one was often too busy to have such thoughts. When one 
had time to think then fears could recur.’968 Ian Burrows was an officer with the 3rd 
New Zealand Division who saw action fighting against the Japanese in the Solomon 
Islands. He was of the opinion that everyone experienced fear, but that the question was 
to what degree the officers and men were able to conceal it.969 Lieutenant-General Sir 
Leonard Thornton was a captain of the New Zealand Staff Corps when war was 
declared in 1939 and fought with the 2nd New Zealand Division in the Mediterranean 
throughout the whole conflict. He believed that the great majority of officers and other 
ranks could manage to master their fear if they were well led.970 He argued that a very 
few became so stimulated by anger that for a time they completely disregarded the 
question whether they would survive.971 Upham and Ngarimu are classic cases that 
support such an argument; Upham stated that he became angry when he saw his men 
                                                 
966 Ibid. 
967 W.F. Brown, ‘Going to War and Battle Experience: Views of 21 Officers of the 2nd New Zealand 






mown down by enemy machine gun fire during the counterattack on Maleme airfield, 
while Ngarimu showed a similar attitude with the loss of so many of his platoon while 
defending his exposed position at Tebaga Gap.972  
Anger also played a part in the behaviour of other officers of the 28th (Maori) 
Battalion. Arapeta Awatere was the commander of C Company at Tebaga Gap where 
he won a Military Cross. His brother Tom also served in the battalion and was killed 
after some Germans used a ruse of a white surrender flag to lure him from cover. 
Hearing this, Awatere led an immediate frontal attack on the enemy position and 
personally shot dead the German soldier who had killed his brother, while ordering his 
men to shoot the rest of the defenders.973 In this incident any sense of self- preservation 
was superseded by a greater need and responsibility for utu: revenge for the death of 
his brother by a dishonourable enemy.974 Another such example is that of Sir Fred 
Allen, later All Black captain and the most successful selector-coach of the All Blacks 
to date. After being promoted in the field, as a young lieutenant leading a platoon in 30 
Battalion of the 3rd NZ Division during the Nissan Island operations he led a rescue 
mission to support a besieged unit commanded by his friend, Baldy Hewitson, that was 
surrounded and was short on ammunition.975 While his superiors were frustratingly 
procrastinating in deciding what action to take, Allen realised immediate action was 
required and led a section of his men through a mile of dense, Japanese invested jungle 
to reach the beleaguered force. When questioned about his motivation for such action 
in later years, Allen stated, ‘Well, Baldy Hewitson was a friend of mine,’ and that he 
was not going to sit around and wait to hear that he had been killed.976              
 
 
 Ability to Maintain Psychological and Morale Strength  
 
The ability for combat officers to maintain psychological and morale strength 
under extreme circumstances was crucial in leading their men into battle, especially at 
platoon, troop and company level. How the junior officers of the New Zealand 
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expeditionary forces attempted to do this was not unique. The steps they took, whether 
consciously or subconsciously, were most likely universal for officers and other ranks 
throughout all the military forces involved in the two world wars, including the enemy. 
The conditions these soldiers served under were not only physically taxing but also 
psychologically and emotionally taxing as well. Major James McCarroll of the 
Auckland Mounted Rifles, who had been wounded at Gallipoli and evacuated to 
hospital in England, wrote of what happened to those officers who proved 
psychologically unfit for combat: 
 
I have seen most of the patients aboard [the ship heading to England], also the hellish side of 
war. Fine strong men maimed for life while the rest are being made fit again to have another go. They 
take their misfortunes splendidly. Several officers are aboard, although not wounded are quite broken up 
and had to be sent home.977 
 
  The ways in which the New Zealand officers coped with the stresses of 
overseas service varied through individual choice, but there were certain trends that 
showed commonality in both conflicts. Personal letters and diaries provide the greatest 
source of evidence of how the combat officers and their men coped with the stresses of 
trench warfare and continued to carry out their duties in the face of imminent death 
after months and years of campaigning. Lieutenant Cecil McClure, MC and Bar, who 
had been studying to be a Presbyterian minister in 1914, served in the Otago Infantry 
Regiment and fought and survived the major actions at Ypres, Passchendaele, 
Rossignol Wood and Bapaume on the Western Front, after he had already served as an 
enlisted medical orderly at Gallipoli. His letters home prove that the experiences of war 
had changed him as a person as he reflected:  
 
Where or when could any human being see his men hit with explosive shells and yet deliberately 
march on with the remainder, leaving the wounded to their fate? What kind of man would pass wounded 
men crying for water ignoring them apparently as if it were no concern of his? How can men walk 
deliberately into a hail of bullets and showers of shrapnel seeking only the lives of others? Why do men 
choose such hell as battle? Yet all these things have been my experience. To anyone, except those who 
have been in battle, they have no meaning, no matter how vivid the imagination.978   
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The officers and men certainly had weeks and months of inaction and boredom 
during the winter months on the Western Front to contemplate their fate. Harold Bell 
was a lieutenant in the New Zealand Rifle Brigade in 1917 after enlisting as a rifleman 
in 1915. He described how the toll of serving at the front and of probable death led to 
a change in personality, even though he remained determined to do his duty: 
 
This experience has been almost too much for me as it has proved overwhelming for many poor 
fellows. Never, I suppose, has there been such sudden revolutions in men’s natures as under the holocaust 
here. I have lost buoyancy and joy and lightness, I feel hardened always, a sadness and seriousness has 
entered my soul that I have never known before. I feel now that I shall never lose this repression, this 
sombreness, the funereal tint, it shall follow me to life’s end, a shadow and weariness.979   
 
Other officers argued that the only way to deal with the stresses was to take a 
fatalistic approach. This acceptance of imminent death took away the expectation of 
surviving the war and enabled the officers to continue to carry out their duties. They no 
longer had to worry about death, leaving it to fate as to when and where it would 
happen. Some argue that it was fatalism that inspired some officers, NCOs and other 
ranks to take aggressive actions in combat that they might not necessarily have done if 
they were trying to survive the conflict. This sense of fatalism, that appears to be 
prevalent towards the end of the Great War, was especially strong among those who 
had served at Gallipoli and during the early campaigns of the war, and who had 
experienced many friends and comrades being killed beside them. 
 This sense of fatalism was also prevalent within the 2nd Expeditionary Force 
during World War Two. Watty McEwan, who was Freyberg’s personal radio operator 
during the battle of El Alamein through to the Axis defeat in Tunisia, believed that most 
soldiers accepted that when they put on their country’s uniform that they handed over 
their lives, stating that ‘…the easiest way to accept death is to acknowledge to yourself 
that you will die. If any proof of this statement is required, my recommendation is to 
spend time with an infantry unit that has seen action and is about to see some more.’980 
The same attitude was expressed by Denver Fountaine when he wrote after hearing of 
the death of an acquaintance: ‘I’m afraid death doesn’t mean or convey as much to us 
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as it did before the war, and although one regrets the passing of anyone we know well  
it doesn’t affect us to the same extent.’981  
For some officers, smoking remained the simple coping mechanism that got 
them through while at the front: ‘Nerves all ajar, a restless, jumpy brain, a philosophy 
gone bankrupt – all are healed and comforted and soothed by the gentle lady 
(Nicotine).’982 Denver Fountaine stated in a letter to his future wife that on Crete he had 
been without his pipe and that when he returned to Egypt he swore he would never be 
without one again.983 However, in the same letter he complained that when he next went 
into battle in North Africa that he bit the stem of his pipe during a particularly ‘rough 
ride’ and was forced to smoke cigarettes for three weeks.984 Alcohol also seemed to be 
a sought after commodity by all ranks when out of the frontline, with Fountaine going 
as far as describing in his letters the brands and amount of alcoholic drinks he and his 
fellow officers regularly consumed in the officers mess and hotels, as well as regularly 
getting together with his enlisted mates from his home town for drinks.985         
     
 
  Comparison of Experiences: WW1 and WW2 
 
The military strategies of the Second World War were determined by the 
advances in mechanical warfare, leading to less costly tactics. The German tactic of 
Blitzkrieg (Lightning War), first used in the invasion of Poland in September 1939, was 
the first major example of the combined use of mobile armoured formations, backed 
with infantry support and aerial bombing provided by the Luftwaffe, to isolate and 
quickly overrun enemy positions. Such revolutionary tactics were in contrast to those 
used in the First World War, providing opportunities for outflanking operations and 
less reliance on costly frontal infantry attacks. Platoon officers were still expected to 
lead from the front, but they found themselves more likely to be exposed to heavy aerial 
and artillery bombardments rather than leading unsupported bayonet charges. However, 
these still occurred, with the most famous involving the 2nd New Zealand Division in 
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the counter-attack at Galatas on Crete on 25 May 1941 and at Ruweisat Ridge at El 
Alamein on 16 July 1942. 
The improved training in leadership for the New Zealand commissioned officers 
and NCOs during the Second World War was reflected in how they led their men into 
battle compared to those in the Great War. Captain Boord of 24 Battalion wrote in his 
1948 survey response that the psychological approach to training and battle was entirely 
different from the First World War, being more logical and sensible.986 He argued that 
New Zealand officers were told in the Second World War that it was not their job to 
die a hero for their country but to live and continue to be effective leaders.987 He 
believed this was achieved by officers having a full knowledge of their own and the 
enemy’s methods, tactics, weapons and supporting arms, as well as focussing on team 
work.988 According to Boord, emphasis was placed on both the officers and other ranks 
not to let their mates down and that everybody had to learn their own job in the team.989 
Colonel Bill Thornton’s view in response to the same survey was that it was only 
through proper training and experience in combat that the officers and their NCOs were 
able to gain the confidence and maintain the morale of their men to work effectively as 
a team.990 All those surveyed agreed that it took a good officer who knew his job and 
responsibilities within his unit to make a good team, and that it was the philosophy of 
promoting teamwork that was influential in the successes the New Zealand divisions 
achieved during that war.    
The officers and troops of the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force also had 
fewer combat opportunities than their predecessors in the Great War. In the First World 
War the New Zealand troops entered their first major campaign, Gallipoli, only eight 
months after the force was created. In comparison, 2NZEF did not see action until the 
Greek campaign in March 1941, eighteen months after its formation. On the Western 
Front the New Zealand Division was used as part of a rotation system for infantry 
divisions that saw the New Zealand troops stationed at the front line about a third of the 
time from April 1916 until the end of the war in November 1918. When not at the front 
the Division was either held in reserve or sent to rest and training areas in the rear.991 
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The New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade was also at the forefront of the campaigns to 
capture the Sinai and Palestine, where the troops were rotated in and out of the front 
line similarly to those serving in France, although not as regularly.992  
Senior commanders, especially in the latter stages of the conflict, were fully 
aware that the rotation system was essential in attempting to maintain the morale and 
fighting fitness of their troops. Corporal Jim McMillan, a Gallipoli veteran in the 
Canterbury Mounted Rifles, wrote in his memoirs after the war that, ‘had it not been 
for these periodical brief spells, it is doubtful that many of the troops could have been 
able to carry on.’993 Terry Kinloch argues that by mid-1918 the Anzac troops in 
Chaytor’s division were near exhaustion and in a similar condition to the troops at the 
end of the Gallipoli campaign. He states that by this time the cumulative strain of two 
years of continuous campaigning in desert conditions with a few short rest periods was 
not enough to maintain health and morale.994 In theory, the New Zealand troops were 
only expected to serve periods of about one month at a time on the front line in the 
Jordan Valley in 1918 before being rotated out to rest camps; however, operational 
requirements ensured that they only received two rest periods of a fortnight each in June 
and August.995  By this time many of the Main Body veterans, including officers, were 
near their limits of their endurance, leading to an increase in the sick rate.996       
In contrast, during the Second World War the two New Zealand divisions had 
more rest periods away from the front line. After the operations in Greece and on Crete, 
the 2nd New Zealand Division was a spent force and needed an extended period of 
months to rebuild as an effective fighting force. Replacement battalion officers were 
required to fill the vacancies left by those killed, captured or wounded in the previous 
campaigns, as well as reinforcements for other ranks to bring the units up to operational 
strength. This meant that the division did not see action again until November 1941 
when it took part in ‘Operation Crusader’ in the relief of Tobruk. Although this 
operation was successful, it proved somewhat ill-fated for the 2nd New Zealand Division 
in that it suffered more than 30 per cent of the total British casualties in this operation, 
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which included 879 killed, 1,699 wounded and 2,042 missing.997 Glyn Harper argues 
that the losses were more than any other division within the Eighth Army, being 1,000 
more than the losses on Crete, twice the numbers lost in Greece and three times more 
than sustained in the Cassino battles.998 Again the Division had to be withdrawn from 
the front for seven months to rebuild and train before being built up to operational 
strength. Those officers of the short-lived 3rd New Zealand Division in the Pacific had 
even fewer opportunities to excel in combat, with operations limited to the capture of 
the island of Villa Lavella in September and October 1943, and an amphibious landing 
operation in the capture of the Treasury Islands of the northern Solomon Islands later 
in October the same year.  
  The number of honours and awards issued to officers of the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces was also dictated by their superior commanders. As previously 
mentioned, during the Great War Major-General Sir Andrew Russell refused to endorse 
any recommendations for Victoria Crosses for any New Zealand officer no matter how 
deserving the officer’s actions may have been. In contrast, Brigadier-General Herbert 
Hart fully supported those officers and men whom he thought should receive 
recognition for actions above and beyond the call of duty. As a battalion commander 
on the Somme in September 1916, after the successful but costly capture of the Flers 
trench system, he recommended six out of 25 officers in his battalion for honours; two 
being mentioned in despatches and three recommended for the Military Cross.999 
During this action ten officers of Hart’s Wellington battalion became casualties; six 
were killed, including a major, a captain and four lieutenants, while four others were 
wounded, including three lieutenants.1000 The high percentage of casualties sustained 
by the junior officers of this unit is comparative to casualties suffered by other infantry 
battalions of both the New Zealand Division in the First World War and the 2nd New 
Zealand Division in the Second World War. At Passchendaele in October 1917, 13 of 
the 25 officers (52 per cent) of the 1st Battalion of the Otago Infantry Regiment became 
casualties, including seven killed; of the 13 officers, nine of them were second 
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lieutenants.1001 In some instances the casualty rates were even higher; an example being 
20 Battalion during the fighting in Greece and Crete, where 22 of the 25 officers of the 
battalion had become casualties.1002 All four previous company commanders had 
become casualties or prisoners of war as a result of the two operations.1003 Kippenberger 
states that, when his battalion was reorganised, of his four company commanders only 
Captain Denver Fountaine had served in Greece and Crete, where he had initially been 
a platoon commander.1004 It was Fountaine who recommended Second Lieutenant 
Charles Upham for both his VCs as a result of his actions on Crete and at Minqar Qaim 
and Ruweisat Ridge.1005  
 
It was how the New Zealand citizen-soldier junior officers performed in the 
extremes of battle, as well as preparing their troops during the long periods of inactivity, 
that ultimately determined the overall performance of the expeditionary forces during 
both major conflicts. What has also become clear through this study is that there was a 
somewhat unique and preferred style of leadership, at least at platoon and company 
level, that developed within the New Zealand expeditionary forces, compared to that of 
the British Army and other larger forces within the Empire and Commonwealth, where 
a sense of professional and determined leadership was combined with the national 
tradition of achievement through a team effort. It was this style of command and 
leadership, especially in the 2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force during the Second 
World War, that many experienced officers argue proved most successful in leading 
New Zealand troops in war.1006 The neighbourliness and community spirit, along with 
the team or ‘crew’ ethos that were important features of colonial New Zealand society, 
were reflected in the relationships forged between officers and other ranks within the 
expeditionary forces. The shared experiences in war, especially in combat, not only 
confirmed, but strengthened these older social values, and it is a legacy that has 
permeated throughout our society since that time. 
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            Chapter 9 
 
    Officers and Other Ranks: A New Zealand Comradeship 
 
 Little has been written by historians regarding the relationships between the 
officers and the enlisted men of the New Zealand military forces during the First and 
Second World Wars. From the reading and research conducted for this thesis it appears 
the New Zealand combat soldiers who served in the Great War, including the officers, 
generally wrote little in their diaries and letters that indicate a familiarity between the 
ranks unless they were related or friends in civilian life. The evidence suggests that 
during the First World War the traditional military boundaries of rank within the British 
Army remained evident in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force, more so than in the 
2nd New Zealand Expeditionary Force of the Second World War. However, it is 
generally accepted that, in the last years of both conflicts, these boundaries became less 
defined due to the increased number of men commissioned from the ranks. John 
McLeod created some heated debate among World War Two veterans when he 
challenged some of the perceptions about the egalitarianism pervading 2NZEF. His 
argument was that, although he accepted that there were closer relationships between 
the ranks than in the Great War, there was never the level of familiarity and equal 
comradeship that the soldiers believed or wished there to be.1007 He argued that a 
military organisation structured on the principles of egalitarianism and democracy 
simply could not function effectively.1008 This chapter builds on McLeod’s work by 
contending that a strength of the New Zealand forces was to maintain a formal military 
hierarchy while developing a degree of close comradeship between officers and men, 
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    Close Comradeship  
         
 There was a perception of a limited egalitarian ethos within the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces compared to the British Army, especially in 2NZEF during the 
latter part of the Italian campaign in the Second World War. This ensured that most 
soldiers, no matter what their rank, were generally treated well. An example occurred 
early in the Great War when both officers and enlisted New Zealand soldiers ate at 
Shepheards Hotel in Cairo, which remained affordable due to the New Zealand rank 
and file receiving a higher rate of pay than their British compatriots. Although during 
the Second World War, Freyberg, in an effort to maintain military protocol and 
discipline, argued that it was inappropriate for officers and enlisted men to eat and drink 
together at the same table, at times this did occur due to the close relationships of many 
within the expeditionary force, where brothers, cousins, school friends and newly 
commissioned other ranks took the chance to socialize together when off duty. He was 
especially concerned that drunkenness among young junior officers would have a 
detrimental effect on discipline within units.1009 However, Freyberg was also insistent 
that all his men had a place where they could afford a decent meal, resulting in New 
Zealand Clubs being established in all the main cities where the 2nd New Zealand 
Division had a presence. These clubs were mostly established in hotels that also 
provided accommodation for all ranks, although the officers had preference for the 
better rooms, while the enlisted men generally had to share their rooms with a number 
of others.1010  
 The most obvious privilege provided to commissioned officers was the 
appointment of a soldier-servant, known in the Second World War as a ‘batman.’ As in 
the British Army, New Zealand officers either were allocated or selected a private from 
within their battalion or regiment to act as a personal servant to attend to their needs. 
Their duties included acting as a valet to maintain the officer’s uniform and personal 
equipment, attending to the officer’s horse or driving his vehicle if he had one, acting 
as a ‘runner’ in conveying orders, acting as a personal body guard to the officer in 
combat and other miscellaneous tasks that the officer determined.1011 However, unlike 
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the British Army where it was not uncommon for batmen to become domestic servants 
for their aristocratic officers after their military service, New Zealand enlisted men 
tended to return to their previous civilian occupations if they could. Officers placed 
great trust in their batmen who fought beside them in combat where often strong lasting 
relationships were formed if they both survived the war. Many batmen were killed 
alongside their officers, especially in the First World War, with an example being that 
of the batman to Lieutenant Ray Lawry of the Canterbury battalion who was killed 
beside his officer while Lawry was directing the defence of a trench at Quinn’s Post at 
Gallipoli on 1 June 1915.1012  
 Most of the volunteer New Zealand officers tended to select batmen whom they 
had known from civilian life. When 20 Battalion was forming at Burnham camp in 
October 1939 Denver Fountaine chose Private Hugh Hawes, a local from Fountaine’s 
home town of Westport, to be his batman.1013 In February 1941 Fountaine selected 
another Westport man, Private Russell “Rusty’ Roberts as his batman, who served him 
until he was subsequently captured.1014 Fountaine and Roberts knew each other before 
the war and remained firm friends after the conflict, despite the differences in rank, 
when they returned to civilian life in Westport and where they remained friends until 
their deaths in later life. This indicates that their relationship was based on mutual 
respect rather than subserviency.               
  The relationships between the officers and other ranks within the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces were generally less formal than those in the British Army. The 
emerging perception of New Zealand as a more egalitarian society than Britain, that 
had developed throughout the colonial era of the late nineteenth century and grew in 
the first half of the twentieth century, was reflected in the military forces that served 
overseas during the two great conflicts. Leading up to the Great War New Zealanders 
saw themselves as being ‘Better British’ and the colony as a ‘working man’s paradise,’ 
free from aristocratic dominance and Britain’s urban squalor, and where reasonable 
wages and land could be acquired by the lower classes.1015 The small population and 
the regional-based formation of the infantry battalions, as well as the mounted rifle 
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regiments in the Great War, ensured that many officers and other ranks had volunteered 
or were conscripted from the same towns and districts, and either knew each other well 
in civilian life or had mutual acquaintances. In some cases fathers, sons, brothers, 
cousins, brothers-in-law, close friends, school mates and sporting team mates either 
enlisted or served together. Examples of this are many and varied, including some high 
profile officers, as well as lesser known platoon commanders. In the Great War 
Lieutenant-Colonel Charles ‘German Joe’ Mackesy who commanded the Auckland 
Mounted Rifles had three sons who served under him in the same unit, along with a 
number of other close relatives, resulting in the squadron which included the North 
Auckland Mounted Rifles contingent of the regiment being known as ‘Nearly All 
Mackesy’s Relations.’1016  Lieutenant-Colonel William Malone who commanded the 
Wellington Infantry Battalion in 1915 also had two sons who initially served in the 
ranks of the unit.1017 In the Second World War, General Freyberg’s son, Paul, served 
as an enlisted man in 23 Battalion before later being commissioned, even though his 
father commanded the whole expeditionary force.1018 Harold Todd recalls serving in 
the same company as Paul Freyberg when the battalion was training in Egypt, stating 
that he certainly was not treated any differently from the other enlisted volunteers.1019 
Another example is that of Denver Fountaine, who entered Burnham Camp in late 1939 
with his friend and fiancée’s brother, Sid Wood.1020 Both were commissioned when 20 
Battalion was originally formed, while Fountaine’s brother, Ray, initially served as an 
enlisted man in 26 Battalion, another South Island battalion, before being 
commissioned when serving overseas.1021 It was not unusual for brothers to command 
brothers within platoons or companies, especially during the First World War. The 
Morpeth brothers of Waihi were such an example with six brothers serving in the 
Auckland Infantry Regiment during the Great War. Three of them enlisted and served 
together at Gallipoli, with Nick Morpeth being the platoon commander of his older 
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brother, Gerald, who served as a private.1022 Ironically, from the letters of Gerald 
Morpeth, it appears his younger brother was determined to show no favouritism to his 
older sibling in regard to discipline, even though they had a close relationship.1023 
Likewise, Gerald had a great respect for the rank his brother held and was determined 
not to take advantage of him.1024  
 One important primary source that provides key evidence of the close 
relationships between commissioned officers and enlisted men within the province or 
regional-recruited battalions and regiments of the New Zealand expeditionary forces is 
the Southland Soldiers and their Next of Kin Roll of Honour, compiled by Robert Troup 
in 1920. By comparing the recorded names and addresses of soldiers’ next of kin to 
men with the same surname it is possible to establish that many officers either 
commanded brothers and/ or cousins in the same unit, or served in other units that 
fought alongside each other. One noted example is that of Lieutenant James Hargest 
(later Brigadier Hargest of 2NZEF) who originally served in the Otago Mounted Rifles 
during the Great War but later transferred to the Otago Infantry Regiment on the 
Western Front where his brother served as a private in the same regiment.1025 Another 
example is that of the Domigan brothers from Gore in Southland; William Domigan 
embarked with the 5th Reinforcements as a captain in the Otago Infantry Battalion, 
while his brother Arthur left New Zealand with the Main Body as a sergeant in the same 
battalion.1026 There are other examples of brothers embarking together but in different 
units, such as Second-Lieutenant John Hewat and Bombardier Ralph Hewat of 
Invercargill who both embarked with the 5th Reinforcements; John in the Canterbury 
Infantry Battalion and Ralph in the New Zealand Field Artillery.1027 A notable example 
of cousins serving together in the same corps is that of Captain William Cuthbert 
McCaw and Private William Armstrong McCaw of Invercargill, who both served in the 
New Zealand Medical Corps.1028 What such evidence indicates is that many 
commissioned officers within the New Zealand expeditionary forces had strong 
established relationships with brothers and extended family members who served in the 
                                                 
1022 Allan Morpeth, The Waiheathens at Gallipoli: Diary and Letters of a Waihi Soldier, Gerald (Tad) 




1025 Robert Troup, Southland Soldiers and their Next of Kin Roll of Honour (Invercargill, 1920), p. 25 
1026 Ibid., p. 22 
1027 Ibid., p. 26 
1028 Ibid., p. 28 
 273 
ranks, and that such relationships had an effect on the style of command and leadership 
the New Zealanders developed throughout both wars.    
 It was the close relationship between the officers and the troops, based on 
mutual respect and trust, which fostered the eventual fighting abilities of the New 
Zealand divisions. The local provenance of the infantry battalions that made up the bulk 
of both expeditionary forces certainly helped in fostering these relationships. The 
majority of the officers of these battalions came from the same communities as the 
enlisted men and they shared great pride in their units. Both Sandy Thomas and Haddon 
Donald state that, as in the British Army, the loyalty of officers and other ranks was to 
their battalion or regiment first.1029 Donald’s loyalty to 22 Battalion was so strong that 
he only accepted promotion if it meant that he could remain with the unit.1030 Although 
both he and Thomas were able to remain with their battalions throughout the war, with 
both going on to command them by 1945, others reluctantly accepted promotion into 
other battalions. Denver Fountaine was typical of most experienced officers promoted 
to command battalions in that they were required to fill vacancies in other battalions. 
In August 1942 he was a major and second in command of 20 Battalion, but by October 
the same year he was promoted to lieutenant-colonel of 26 Battalion, which he 
commanded at El Alamein through to the end of 1944. Fountaine described a sense of 
loss at having to transfer from the battalion in which he had fought and served 
throughout Greece, Crete and the early North African campaign, with the only 
compensation being that he was now to command another South Island unit that 
included many men he knew from his home town.1031  
 
 
    Identities of Place and Race 
 
Patriotism and a sense of duty were qualities exhibited by all those officers who 
volunteered for the Main Bodies of both World Wars. Loyalty and support for the 
British Empire was strong in New Zealand throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century and especially in 1914, during a period when Pugsley argues New Zealanders 
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proudly called themselves ‘sons and daughters of the Empire’.1032 This was evident by 
the vast majority of those enlisting during the First World War who wrote their 
nationality as ‘British’ on their attestation papers.1033   
However, the attestation papers from those serving in the Second World War 
also provide evidence of a significant change in social perception of identity. The sense 
of duty of the officers, and those who were to become officers later in the war, was still 
obvious through their volunteering to defend the Empire. But almost all recorded their 
nationality as ‘New Zealander’ instead of British.1034  John McLeod makes the point: 
‘There can be little doubt that war has played a significant role in the evolution of New 
Zealand society and values as well as its quest for both national identity and status’.1035 
It is now accepted by most historians that it was through the experience of extensive 
active service overseas as part of a homogenous British Army that a strong sense of 
New Zealand identity was forged where many soldiers from the small dominion 
realised that as a whole they had unique social behaviours and attitudes that set them 
apart from troops from Britain.  
This New Zealand nationalism was further enhanced by the increasing anti-
British attitude of the New Zealand soldiery, and within other British dominion forces, 
from the failure of the Gallipoli campaign in 1915. Glyn Harper, argues that after the 
campaign most New Zealand soldiers lost faith in their commander, Major-General  
Godley, who was seen as being severe, incompetent and foreign, ‘a true-blue British 
officer in command of a division that by 1917 was largely anti-British’.1036 Such 
attitudes were further fostered by exposure to the British class system that many soldiers 
themselves, or their parents or grandparents, had immigrated to New Zealand to escape 
from, as well as the perceived failure of military strategy on the Western Front that led 
to unprecedented casualties blamed to some extent on the British High Command.1037     
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 Loyalty and camaraderie was generally strongest within specific companies 
within infantry battalions, where the officers and their men had been recruited from the 
same locality. This fostered a sense of identity similar to that of the ‘Pal Battalions’ of 
Kitchener’s British volunteer army of the First World War. An example of this were 
the C companies of 20, 23 and 26 Battalions that comprised South Island men, mainly 
from Buller, Westland and North Canterbury. Most were of Irish Catholic or Protestant 
Scots lineage, while many were coal miners, sawmillers, farmers, bushmen, shearers, 
stockmen and labourers who prided themselves on having a rugged durability to cope 
with the rigours of life, including war. They were men who often worked in gangs or 
crews and who valued mateship and ‘team’ priorities. In the army this ethic was easily 
translated into loyalty to one’s comrades, mates, their officers and their company first, 
then to the battalion. Denver Fountaine, a West Coaster himself, was a second-
lieutenant in C Company when the battalion was first formed. He described with pride 
how several Buller and Westland enlisted men from the company had written their own 
‘West Coast National Anthem,’ (a variant of the Anzac Army which had been composed 
and sung by Australian soldiers in the First World War) which the whole company, 
including officers, sung on route marches: 
 
 ‘The West Coast Infantry’ 
 
 We are Mick Savage’s soldiers, 
 The West Coast Infantry - 
 We cannot fight and will not drill. 
 So what Bloody use are we? 
  
We’ll fight for King and Country, 
 And the girls we used to know, 
 And all the other Bastards, 
 Who haven’t got the guts to go. 
 
 And when we get to Berlin, 
 Herr Hitler he will say: 
 Oh, Ich Mein Gott 
 You’re a Bloody Fine Lot, 
 The West Coast Infantry. 
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 And when the war is over, 
 We’ll come home safe and well, 
 The boys will go with the girls they know, 
  And the rest can go to Hell. 
 
 We’ll drink our beer in schooners, 
 And have a damned good spree. 
 Oh, Ich Mein Gott, 
 What a Bloody Fine Lot, 
 The West Coast Infantry.1038 
 
Prior to the Greek campaign Charles Upham eventually accepted a commission and 
took great pride in leading a platoon from C Company of 20 Battalion, whose 
ruggedness and determination matched his own.1039 Kippenberger, who was the 
commanding officer of 20 Battalion at the time, recognised that Upham’s ‘innocent 
indifference to many of the traditions and formalities of military life’ matched the 
attitude of the ‘Coasters,’ making him the ideal officer to lead them.1040 Upham 
eventually commanded the whole company until he was wounded and captured at 
Ruweisat Ridge in 1942.  Another highly decorated veteran of C Company of 23 
Battalion, Sergeant Eric Batchelor, who was awarded the DCM twice in Italy, stated in 
a post-war interview that he refused a commission simply because he wanted to stay 
with his West Coast mates in C Company.1041  
 The unique relationship between the officers and other ranks within 28 (Maori) 
Battalion is another obvious example. The companies of this battalion were recruited 
within specific tribal areas, dominated by the largest tribes: A Company from Nga Puhi 
and Aupouri in Northland, B Company from Te Arawa in the Bay of Plenty, C 
Company from Ngati Porou on the East Coast of the North Island and D Company from 
Ngati Toa and Ngati Kahungunu from the lower North Island and Ngai Tahu from the 
South Island.1042 Initially, the company grade officers from this battalion were 
nominated from the traditional chiefly families within each tribe, with many such 
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officers being closely related to enlisted men within their company and platoons.1043 As 
a warrior race, young Maori men who volunteered for overseas military service were 
given an opportunity to attain mana (honour) through combat. The mana they gained 
also reflected on their iwi (tribe), giving them greater incentive to fight well in battle.1044 
Officers were expected to lead by example and those who proved to be aggressive 
leaders in battle gained the respect of their fellow tribesmen who followed such leaders 
without question.1045 Unlike their comrades in the infantry battalions raised from within 
the four military districts (Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago) that were 
predominantly recruited from men of European descent, both the officers and other 
ranks within the separate companies of the ‘Maori Battalion’ had a greater incentive to 
successfully perform in war to collectively maintain the honour of their whanau 
(family) and tribe, which each company jealously guarded.1046 It was this ethos that led 
to the battalion quickly gaining a reputation, especially with the enemy, as fearsome 
and determined. 
 The relationships between the officers and other ranks within the Maori 
Contingent of the First World War and 28 (Maori) Battalion of the Second World War 
were even stronger than those of other New Zealand combat units. Monty Soutar argues 
that this was certainly the case for members of C Company of 28 (Maori) Battalion, 
which he asserts came about through the shared ancestral links and inter-marriage 
between tribes within the Tairawhiti region on the east coast of the North Island.1047  
The responsibility of deciding the composition of the battalion in 1939 was mostly left 
to MP Sir Apirana Ngata and former Prime Minister Gordon Coates. They decided that 
forming the rifle companies along tribal lines would allow platoon officers to lead their 
own kinsmen, while company commanders would lead men from within their own 
tribes. This followed the view of tribal leaders who believed that officers who led their 
own kinsmen into battle would be less likely to risk their lives unnecessarily.1048 
However, the attempt to influence the selection of officers within the battalion by tribal 
elders through Ngata’s political influence frustrated the original battalion commander, 
Great War veteran, Lieutenant-Colonel George Dittmer, with his superior complaining 
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to the Minister of Defence that, ‘It is impossible for Lt. Col. Dittmer to carry out his 
duties efficiently if this constant interference by Sir Apirana Ngata goes on.’1049  When 
the battalion was being formed in November 1939 Dittmer assessed that only one of 
the original nominated Maori officers was competent and experienced enough to 
command a company and that it was essential for battalion efficiency that experienced 
officers, whether Maori or Pakeha (New Zealanders of European descent), be initially 
enlisted to command companies.1050  However, Maori elders maintained political 
pressure to ensure the battalion companies and platoons were led by Maori officers 
despite Dittmer’s continued frustration. 
The relationships between the Maori officers and other ranks within the 28 
(Maori) Battalion, as well as those of the Maori Contingent and the NZ (Maori) Pioneer 
battalion during the First World War, proved pivotal in the efficiency of the units. The 
most obvious benefit was that the officers could speak Maori, which was the first 
language of the majority of the soldiers, and that they could understand Maori attitudes, 
beliefs and the traditional ways things were done, which at times was in contrast to the 
traditional British Army protocol. An example of this was provided in a letter from 
Henry Ngata, a junior officer within 28 (Maori) Battalion and son of Sir Apirana Ngata, 
regarding some disciplinary problems within C Company while the unit was stationed 
in Britain in November 1940: 
 
We’ve been having a spot of bother with the chaps lately, for they have been inclined to play 
up a little more than usual. Captain Scott had spoken to them, but it wasn’t till Arnold [Lieutenant Arnold 
Reedy] spoke to them in Maori, that we had the response we wanted. It isn’t merely that Arnold spoke 
to them in Maori, it was mainly because he expressed conceptions like ‘discipline’ in a Maori way and 
quoted old Maori ideas on the subject.1051       
 
     The responsibility and expectations on Maori officers towards their men also 
differed to some extent from the officers within the provincial rifle battalions. Family 
and tribal links, together with traditional warrior protocols meant that some officers 
acted differently and beyond the duties expected of officers within the British Army. In 
combat Maori company and platoon officers tended to lead their men from the front as 
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tradition dictated, and it was this act of personal courage that was thought essential in 
inspiring their men to follow. Although this led to high casualty rates among the 
officers, this tendency for Maori to engage in close–quarter fighting, where they 
excelled, helped to forge a reputation of the whole 28 (Maori) Battalion as tenacious 
and ferocious fighters. Some Maori officers also fought under the traditional Maori 
concept of utu (revenge) for the loss of family or tribal members. Pita Awatere, who 
was rose from the ranks to eventually command the battalion in 1945, wrote after the 
war that he personally led a bayonet charge on an attack on Sollum Barracks during 
Operation Crusader in November 1941 specifically to seek utu for the death of his 
brother, Tom: 
 
…with my pistol I shot the fellow who fired the gun. I then ordered my lot to shoot. The prisoners were 
mowed down like ninepins…I went over, saw my brother’s body and swore that until the end of the war 
I will kill every man of the enemy that opposed me anywhere at any time as utu or Ngaki mate for my 
brother mainly and then the rest [of his slain men]. I turned cold and ruthless until the end of the war…1052                
  
However, Awatere was not typical of all Maori officers. Monty Soutar argues that he 
had an unorthodox approach to discipline and was known by his men in D Company as 
‘the Muktar,’ often challenging his subordinates in the ranks to a fight as a way of 
maintaining discipline and boosting morale based on traditional warrior values .1053 
Such responsibilities on Maori officers also extended to the retrieval of kinsmen 
killed in battle. An example of this was the retrieval by Lieutenant Hone Green and 
others of C Company of the body of their company commander, Captain Tureia, from 
‘no man’s land’ after he had been killed leading an attack at Sollum. These men were 
from the same pa (village) as Tureia, and as his kinsmen it was their responsibility to 
put their elder and leader to rest if they could. In essence, the responsibilities and 
expectations placed on Maori officers leading their tribesmen in combat in the 
expeditionary forces of both world wars can be compared to a comment made in a letter 
by a soldier to his parents in 1943 regarding the responsibility placed on the 
commanding officers of the 28 (Maori) Battalion: 
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As one officer…put it, when you take charge of the Maori Battalion you have a duty to your 
race; your life is not your own and you now belong to the Maori people.1054   
 
 
        Influence of Shared Experiences 
 
Officers of the New Zealand expeditionary forces, especially platoon and 
company commanders, generally established and maintained the mutual trust and 
respect of the other ranks through shared experiences. During both major conflicts the 
junior officers accompanied the enlisted men in the trenches, dugouts and fox holes, 
suffered the terror of receiving artillery bombardments, shared the discomforts of 
serving in the front line, shared the chance of being killed or seriously wounded, while 
having to witness others being killed beside them. However, the officers, some much 
younger than the soldiers they led, were burdened with the responsibility of leading 
their men by example. Those officers who proved proficient and showed genuine 
concern for the welfare of their men by not wasting their lives unnecessarily gained 
reputations as good officers whom their men would follow even though there was 
likelihood they would be killed. This could be expected of professional regular soldiers, 
but it does leave a question as to why volunteer or conscripted citizen-soldiers, such as 
those of the New Zealand divisions, would follow their officers into combat. 
 A survey of fifty prominent New Zealand officers conducted by Major- General 
Kippenberger in 1948 has helped to answer this question. The survey was in response 
to the publication of a book by an American military historian, Colonel S.L.A. 
Marshall, Men Against Fire, that tackled the American experience of combat 
leadership. In his reply, Charles Upham argued that in his experience no person could 
make another fight, but that men would follow a leader and do as he ordered, only 
because they seemed to want to do so.1055 Brigadier George Dittmer, MC & DSO, a 
Great War veteran who originally served in the ranks at Gallipoli before being 
commissioned in the field, who became a regular Staff Corps officer during the inter-
war years and who later commanded the 28th (Maori) Battalion in the Second World 
War, argued that it was the training of the officers and men that produced the positive 
results: ‘We in New Zealand train our soldiers to fight by making them really efficient 
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in the use of their arms. This creates confidence and the desire to get on with it. If a 
soldier has confidence in himself and his leaders he will fight.’1056 He further stated that 
there were examples of New Zealand officers who lacked discipline and a sense of 
responsibility that affected the efficiency of their units, which he blamed on faulty 
training.1057 Several of the surveyed officers argued that such ill-discipline was 
demonstrated by battalion officers by either turning a ‘blind eye’ or actively partaking 
in the pillaging and looting that the 2nd New Zealand Division became notorious for 
during the campaigns in Italy, especially after the defeat at Cassino.1058   
The consensus of those surveyed was that the examples of poor discipline by 
officers only related to behaviour out of the front line and not when in combat. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Fred Baker of 28 (Maori) Battalion stated that such behaviour 
included too much drinking of alcohol, gambling, avoidance of parades and training, 
and lack of attention to assigned duties.1059 From comments in the survey it also appears 
that most agreed that there was not a constant state of discipline amongst battalion 
officers throughout the Second World War. Brigadier Monty Fairbrother identified 
three distinct periods; he claimed that up to the end of the Crete campaign some hastily 
selected officers showed poor discipline and had to be weeded out or retrained; post-
Crete and up to the battle of Cassino the discipline was good throughout, but that after 
Cassino there was a steady drop in discipline owing to poor selection, insufficiently 
vigorous OCTUs (Officer Cadet Training Units), the absorption of untried officers from 
New Zealand, and the commissioning of NCOs in the field who were left with their 
units, leading to a free and easy approach towards the enlisted men in an effort to 
maintain popularity.1060    
 Ultimately, it was combat experience that created effective and efficient 
leadership from officers and NCOs within battalions, regiments and batteries of both 
expeditionary forces. That experience convinced many front line New Zealand officers, 
both within the high command and at lower levels, that they could only achieve their 
military goals through effective team work. Such practice was not foreign to the New 
Zealanders where many had been raised in rural areas that relied on communal input to 
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maintain prosperity and handle adversities. Helping one’s neighbour in their hour of 
need had become an expected duty in colonial New Zealand society where individuals 
within communities often rallied together for the common good.1061 James Belich 
argues that led to a ‘crew’ mentality among male-dominated industries such as mining, 
sawmilling, farming and construction, where men knew their workmates and sub-
cultures developed because they shared the same experiences, manners, customs, slang, 
prejudices, dress, leisure habits, virtues and vices.1062 These crews were prefabricated 
communities which were constantly reshuffling and into which new members were 
quickly indoctrinated and encouraged or pressured into conformity for the greater good 
and effectiveness of the work crew or team.1063 This ethos of team work permeated 
civilian society, especially within industry and sport. The New Zealand citizen-soldiers 
accepted that every industry needed a boss and every sports team a captain. 
 In the military context platoon and company commanders were seen by some 
as team captains. Sandy Thomas and Haddon Donald both agree that it was because of 
this unique sense of individual responsibility and team work that most experienced 
NCOs were comfortable and competent to take over command of their platoon when 
their officers had become casualties. Colonel Bill Thornton was of the view that combat 
experience gave officers and NCOs a great advantage as the enlisted men had greater 
confidence in them and would follow them:  
 
The seasoning effect of battle is of benefit to all since it increases self and mutual confidence 
and develops the team spirit…Experience and confidence are thus the essentials of good units and good 
soldiers…Generally, the feeling of nervousness will be reduced if officers are in firm control of their 
units, and if clear and definite orders have been issued, whether in attack or in defence.’1064  
 
It was his opinion that those competent officers with whom he served under and 
above were disciplined, had a clear sense of purpose, were self-confident, but also had 
confidence in their superiors and subordinates, conscious of being a member of a 
fighting team and determined not to let the team down in any circumstances.1065 It was 
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the battalion officers who displayed these attributes that helped forge the reputation of 
the New Zealand divisions as elite fighting formations. 
 Compared to British and Canadian officers, it appears New Zealand platoon 
commanders generally allowed less formal relationships to develop with the enlisted 
men while at the front. This was certainly the case during the Second World War, but 
to a lesser extent in the Great War. Haddon Donald states that from his experience the 
Australian officers were similar to the New Zealanders in having close working 
relationships with their men, while the British and Canadians were a bit more 
remote.1066 In response to Kippenberger’s 1948 survey of 2NZEF officers, Major Colin 
Armstrong went as far as to say that he thought the New Zealand officers were probably 
closer to their men than any other division that he had observed during the Second 
World War, stating that they still managed to keep the respect of the other ranks through 
a high degree of self-discipline.1067 He further argued that the bonds forged in war, 
including those between officers and other ranks occurred because; ‘life never seems 
so desirable as when you are about to lose it. Undoubtedly the experience of facing a 
common danger produces friendships which cannot be made in civilian life.’1068   
 When reading the diaries and letters of those who served in the Great War, 
almost all of the writers referred to their officers in their entries either by their rank or 
used the title ‘Mr.’ In contrast, many Second World War servicemen referred to their 
officers by their first names or nicknames. However, this is to be expected when 
considering that many platoon and company commanders were leading enlisted men 
whom they had known well in civilian life. It also reflects the changing attitudes of 
New Zealand society during the inter-war years, with the growing perception of 
egalitarianism fostered by the growth of trade unions that led to the first elected Labour 
government in 1935, and which encouraged a sense of equal worth amongst citizens.1069  
 However, egalitarian New Zealand was more of a myth than reality. Colonial, 
and later, domestic political rhetoric emphasised opportunity and egalitarian ideals that 
were absorbed into the mindset of New Zealand society. Belich argues that New 
Zealand egalitarianism emphasised equality before the law, ‘the proud birthright of 
(adult male) Britons’; it disliked very overt or oppressive class distinctions; it demanded 
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abundant, though not equal opportunity for promotion across class lines and rejected 
class antagonism, while insisting on harmony between classes.1070 This represented a 
social ideal in which bosses did not exploit their workers, that every man had the 
opportunity to own his own home, and that the poor, sick and elderly were looked after. 
The social policies introduced by the Liberal governments prior to the First World War, 
and those of the first Labour government from 1935, came about from these ideals and 
reinforced the perception of an egalitarian society compared to Britain, even if the 
realities of social difference and achievement were considerably bleaker than believed. 
It was these egalitarian values that New Zealand soldiers took with them when serving 
overseas and which inevitably was conceived as part of their ‘New Zealandness,’ 
especially when they compared themselves to British Army soldiers. This sense of 
egalitarianism, shared over all levels of New Zealand society, was certainly reflected 
in the relationships between officers and other ranks in the expeditionary forces.1071            
The use of non-offensive nicknames for New Zealand officers was generally 
considered by all as a sign of respect and acceptance of the individual by fellow officers 
and the enlisted men within units. This was a reflection of New Zealand society at the 
time and it is a legacy that has continued to the present. Haddon Donald recalled that 
both the men in his platoon, when he was a platoon commander, and his subordinate 
officers, when he held higher rank, ‘Generally…called me boss, sometimes my initials, 
H.V, rarely ‘Sir’, and who knows what when out of ear-shot.’1072 Denver Fountaine 
explained in an interview with his local newspaper in 1992 that his fellow officers 
referred to him as ‘Spout’ because of his surname, while the enlisted men called him 
‘The Old Man,’ a common term used to describe commanding officers and also due to 
his youthful age when he became a lieutenant-colonel.1073 In the letters that he sent to 
his fiancée, it is clear that both the commissioned officers and enlisted men he knew 
from Westport simply referred to him as ‘Den’ during their many informal social 
gatherings in Egypt. Bob Bonisch, a train driver in the NZ Engineers recalled to his 
sons how Fountaine, then a lieutenant-colonel in command of 26 Battalion, arranged 
for a number of his enlisted mates from Westport to gather in a side room of the New 
Zealand Club in Cairo so that they could have a few beers together where rank was 
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ignored and everyone was addressed by their Christian names or nicknames.1074 
Another example of such socialising between mixed ranks during the Second World 
War is provided in an undated letter by Private Arthur Kerrison of C Company, 25 
Battalion. He recorded that before his platoon commander, a Lieutenant Mace, was 
shipped back to New Zealand, the platoon, together with the officer, had a ‘send off’ 
that involved the lieutenant supplying the whiskey for his men.1075 Kerrison further 
stated that Mace was highly thought of by his men and that they were disappointed he 
was leaving.1076  
 Sandy Thomas argued that some officers struggled with getting used to being 
an officer and having the troops call them ‘Sir’ or by their rank, especially those who 
had been commissioned from the ranks. He believed that a hierarchy needed to be 
maintained to gain respect of the men and to make the unit effective.1077 Charles Upham 
was a classic example of a rugged civilian soldier who struggled with the traditional 
British Army protocols that the New Zealand forces attempted to follow. When he was 
commissioned from the ranks, he openly encouraged his men in his platoon, especially 
his batman, Le Gros, to call him ‘Boss’ instead of ‘Sir’ when on active service and only 
demanded they use a more formal title when on parade or in the presence of more senior 
officers.1078  
 The bond between officers and their men was forged in combat. This first 
occurred at Gallipoli where they shared the experiences of modern trench warfare. Both 
the battalion officers and those in the ranks quickly realised that civilian class 
boundaries meant nothing while suffering the horrors of war and that every man had to 
play his part to achieve success. The conditions at Gallipoli meant that very quickly 
strict military dress, barrack room standards and protocol were abandoned; officers and 
ordinary soldiers could now adjust their attire to suit the harsh climate, while saluting 
in the trenches was abandoned as it brought the attention of Turkish snipers. The 
officers and enlisted men also shared the same living conditions. Major Dr Percival 
Fenwick claimed that the fleas at Gallipoli had no respect for rank and that with the 
amount of shrapnel to which all were exposed that one never knew who was going to 
                                                 
1074 Michael Bonisch, Interview, 18 January 2012  
1075 Arthur Kerrison, Letter to female work mate, undated, MS-1992.2292, KMARL 
1076 Ibid. 
1077 Thomas, Interview, 6 June 2010 
1078 Sandford, pp. 47-50 
 286 
be next.1079  Fenwick also described how poor the sanitary conditions of trench life were 
for all by recording the comments of a young lieutenant who stated in a conversation 
with him: 
 
 We are all getting shockingly callous. I was in the trenches and invited to share some food. A 
few feet from me was a corpse torn to bits. The ground was simply blood and mud;  I ate the food with 
real gusto and could not get any feelings of horror in my mind.1080 
 
Another interesting comment Fenwick made in his diaries was that at Gallipoli the New 
Zealand battalion officers joined the enlisted men in digging the dugouts and caves into 
the hillsides, as well as filling up sand bags.1081 This sharing of manual work would 
have been a foreign concept to professional officers, especially British ones, but this 
example provides evidence of the shared responsibility and team work that emerged as 
a character of colonial New Zealand society that was reflected in the expeditionary 
forces.    
     The New Zealanders displayed the same behaviour in adjusting to combat life 
during the Second World War. Jack Collins stated that in his experience as an enlisted 
soldier in C Company, 26 Battalion, officers actively discouraged enlisted men saluting 
them anywhere that the enemy could see them as it was a sure way of attracting 
unwanted attention. During the fighting at Cassino his platoon was led by Lieutenant 
Bruce Hay MC who encouraged his men to address him by his name when senior 
officers were not present.1082 This seemed natural to the troops as Hay was of a similar 
age to his men and knew some of them from civilian life. Collins stated that Hay was 
the best combat officer that he ever served under and that the men in his platoon had no 
hesitation in following him during repeated attacks into the rubble of the town, even 
after the battalion had suffered heavy casualties.1083 He believes that it was Hay’s ability 
to inspire his men through leading by example, displaying confidence in himself and 
his troops that he was able to build and maintain a sense of shared responsibility within 
the platoon that resulted in a more determined approach to fighting.1084 Collins had 
                                                 
1079 Lieutenant-Colonel Dr Percival Fenwick, Gallipoli Diary: 24 April to 27 June 1915 (Auckland 
War Memorial, Auckland, n.d.), p. 14   
1080 Ibid., p. 29 
1081 Ibid., p. 30 




served under platoon commanders who had adopted a more formal style of leadership 
that only tended to alienate the officers from their men.1085  
 This common sense approach to front line life and behaviour attracted some 
criticism from British officers who saw this as disrespectful to officers and as a break 
down in military discipline. Watty McEwan recalled an incident that he witnessed 
during the North African campaign when the 2nd New Zealand Division was playing a 
critical part in driving the Afrika Korps back into Tunisia; on this occasion the Division 
was moving towards Tripoli and passing Freyberg and his British Corps commander, 
Sir Oliver Leese. When the tanks of the Scots Greys passed the two generals standing 
on the roadside, Leese acknowledged the salute of the tank commanders. When the 
New Zealand troops followed, instead of saluting, McEwan claims they gave Freyberg 
a fine reception with waves and shouts of ‘G’day Tiny.’1086 When Leese exclaimed that 
the New Zealand troops did not salute very much, Freyberg replied that if he waved at 
them they would wave back.1087  The rank and file from both New Zealand 
expeditionary forces were notorious for not saluting officers when not on parade or in 
the field. British officers, more used to the regimented behaviour of British troops, saw 
this behaviour as a lack of respect and ill-discipline on the part of the Kiwis.  
 However, this was not the case and the New Zealand officers generally took a 
different perspective. Apart from the few regular officers of the New Zealand Staff 
Corps and enlisted men from the Permanent Force, the New Zealand expeditionary 
forces comprised volunteers and conscripts who would only be in the army for the 
duration of the wars, after which they would resume their civilian lives. They were there 
to do a job as members of a large team and there was a sense of mutual respect between 
the company officers and the other ranks, even if there was some envy over the 
privileges officers received. As previously mentioned, many junior officers felt 
uncomfortable about enlisted men whom they were either related to or friends with in 
civilian life having to salute them, with some actively discouraging it. The familiarity 
that developed between the platoon officers and their men through training and combat 
generally proved more beneficial to the combat efficiency of the unit. Platoons, 
companies and battalions became families to the troops. Sandy Thomas claimed that 
for him and his men the 23rd Battalion became the absolute centre of existence, and the 
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focus for everything to do with living, training and fighting.1088 Comradeship remained 
important to those who returned from the conflicts, especially the Second World War 
veterans, with battalion reunions remaining a focal point of post-war life for decades 
afterwards.  
 The difference in leadership style of New Zealand officers was apparent early 
in the Great War. When compared to officers of the British Army who generally came 
from universities and public schools, and who maintained a certain distance from their 
enlisted men, the New Zealander officers were perceived by their subordinates as 
generally showing more care for their troops than their British counterparts. An 
example of this is provided by Private Gordon Cunningham of the Otago Infantry 
Regiment who recounted after the war an incident in February 1915 when he was 
operating a ferry across the Suez Canal prior to the Gallipoli campaign: 
 
Colonial officers treated us well and would yarn while we were running up or down the canal. 
Most of the British staff were more reserved, a few being offensively so. On one happy occasion we were 
tied up at the opposite wharf waiting arrival of a staff officer. The wharf was quite ten feet above our 
decking, and as no ladder was available, the passage down was somewhat difficult. Presently our man 
arrived, a three-starred red-tabbed man of the general staff. Boots and uniform were spotless and an eye 
glass gleamed in one eye. Standing on the wharf edge he plaintively asked how he was to get down to 
our deck. I offered suggestions about placing the right foot on one tie beam, the left on a projection, but 
it was no use, he baulked. Finally one of the crew, Bill Wilson, called out to him, ‘Jump into the bloody 
ditch and I’ll fish you out with the boathook.’ Commanding me to place Bill under arrest, our wart 
managed to clamber down until he was about a yard above the deck. With an effort he placed one 
immaculate hoof on the boat edge. With his weight on this he began to loosen his hand hold. The boat 
naturally swung away from the wharf, further and further and stretched him, until with a mighty splash 
he fell into the canal. Bill, as promised, secured him with the hook and we dragged the blighter over the 
bow and left him to drain while we ran the launch over to our jetty. Without a word he walked ashore, 
presently to return with our captain. The latter, an old friend of my father’s, called us to attention, then 
proceeded to give us a hell of a dressing down. At the height of his peroration he winked, which let us 
know that all was but words…The sequel came when late that night Captain Smith called us to his tent, 
where he handed me a bottle of beer as reward for ‘Keeping cool under fire.’1089  
 
This extract provides evidence that New Zealand other ranks had a low opinion of 
British officers even prior to the Gallipoli campaign, primarily due to their attitude and 
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behaviour towards the colonial troops; and that close social connections and limited 
class distinction within New Zealand society helped the Dominion’s officers to have a 
greater understanding and respect for those serving under them than their British 
counterparts.  This perception of the other ranks from within the expeditionary force 
regarding British officers went some way in reinforcing an egalitarian ethos of New 
Zealand society after the conflict. An example of this was provided in a letter written 
by Private Edward (Ted) Millar of Papanui, Christchurch, to his father in August 1917 
while he was training at Sling Camp in England before being sent as a reinforcement to 
the 2nd Battalion, Auckland Infantry Regiment: 
 
The tucker here is real good, far better than we got in NZ, the Tommies in the camps close to 
us get rotten stuff though, they are treated just like dogs, rotten tucker and pay and rotten officers too. 
The Tommy officers have got absolutely no time for us colonials because we don’t salute them, they 
would give us hell if they could get us under them.1090   
 
  
The superior attitude of British officers towards colonial soldiers could also extend to 
officers. Major James McCarroll, an Irish immigrant serving in the Auckland Mounted 
Rifles, wrote of an experience he had while recovering in London from wounds he had 
received at Gallipoli: 
 
I went to the War Office to enquire re my kit and after a lot of trouble found an officer that 
accepted some responsibility. He was very haughty, so I told him what I thought of him. He was a bit 
surprised and he agreed to look after it. Some of these fellows put a halo around themselves but that does 
not go down well with the colonial.1091 
      
It is possible that the attitude of the British officer toward McCarroll, who was clearly 
superior in rank, may also have been due to his Irish accent. However, what is clear is 
that McCarroll considered himself a colonial and of having the characteristics and 
beliefs of such, even though he had been born and bred in Belfast. 
   
                                                 
1090 Private Edward Millar, Letter to Father, 4 August 1917 (Tim Clyne Collection) 
1091 Lieutenant-Colonel James McCarroll, Diary, May 1915-July 1916, entry 6 July 1915, MS- 
2005/381/2/3, KMARL 
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Arguably, it was personal qualities and the style of leadership, together with the 
relationships battalion officers formed with those under their command that had the 
greatest influence on the fighting effectiveness of their units. Gary Sheffield argues that 
a British officer’s relationship with his men was not determined by his social class, or 
by his previous service in the ranks, but rather by his leadership skills, competence, 
courage and paternalism.1092 This was also the case in the military forces of the British 
dominions. The New Zealand citizen-soldiers of both expeditionary forces were trained 
to a proficient level before entering combat, but it was how those men were led in battle 
that determined the morale and fighting effectiveness of the New Zealand forces. Those 
platoon and company commanders who inspired their men to fight alongside them 
during desperate offensive and defensive actions during both wars helped to forge an 
international military reputation of efficiency and determination in war. Evidence 
shows that not all officers were of the same calibre. However, the most effective 
officers were those who genuinely cared for the welfare of their men, who had the 
ability to relate to their subordinates through shared experiences, and who led by 
example. War proved that although the New Zealanders shared some characteristics of 
others of British stock, especially the Australians, the New Zealand soldiers, whether 
commissioned or enlisted, quickly concluded that they had unique attributes as soldiers 
compared to those from Britain. This was summed up in the extract ‘The Mounted 
Riflemen’ published in the Anzac Magazine, The Kia Ora Coo-ee, in August 1918: 
 
Resemblance and difference in appearance can be seen most clearly on a full dress parade, or in 
Cairo. His island climate and colonial life made the New Zealander a bigger edition of the Home Stock, 
with an added resource and self-reliance that are inbred in the present generation. Quiet and self-
contained, and a little self-conscious, he is quick to resent any apparent injustice to himself and others. 
Care for his mate precedes care for himself; care for his horse and abiding respect for, and instant 
obedience to, proven leaders, an every-ready intelligent initiative, cool, determined valour, and the 
practice of sound team play go to the make up of no mean soldier.1093         
 
Those New Zealand battalion and regimental officers of both expeditionary forces who 
understood such national characteristics in themselves and their men were able to 
                                                 
1092 Gary Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the 
British Army in the Era of the First World War (Basingstoke & London, 2000), p. 114 
1093 ‘The Mounted Riflemen,’ The Kia Ora Coo-ee: The Official Magazine of the Australian and New 
Zealand Forces in Egypt, Palestine, Salonika & Mesopotamia, Second series, No. 2, Cairo (Egypt), 
August 15th, 1918, p. 16, New Zealand Electronic Text Centre, Victoria University, Wellington 
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provide the necessary strong leadership, within the boundaries of the British Army, in 
both victory and defeat. It was the relationships based on mutual respect, forged through 
shared experiences, that many officers of the expeditionary forces had with their men 
throughout both conflicts that helped to foster the egalitarian ideal within New Zealand 
society in the first half of the twentieth century. More importantly, such relationships 
played a crucial role in maintaining morale and fighting spirit within the combat 
battalions and regiments of both New Zealand expeditionary forces throughout years 




























               Conclusion 
 
 
 The subject of this thesis is most worthy of analysis, something which is 
overdue. In the writing of New Zealand military history, over many years most interest 
has focused on generalship, which has led to the publication of numerous biographies 
and memoires of senior officers. This interest has continued with Harper’s and 
Hayward’s book, Born to Lead? and the recent biography of Major-General Sir Andrew 
Russell. Such recent writings are examples of an interest in the history of New 
Zealand’s military operations that began with the writing of regimental histories after 
the First World War, followed by the Government-funded Official War Histories that 
were produced after the Second World War. Even so, it is interesting to note that until 
recently most work of this kind has focused on Gallipoli and the ‘Desert War’ of 1940-
1943. It is only in the last twenty years that battles and campaigns involving New 
Zealanders in Egypt and Palestine and the battles on the Western Front in the First 
World, and the Italian campaign and experience of the 3rd NZ Division in the Pacific 
during the Second World War are starting to receive close attention. 
As a country, New Zealand has developed a great pride in its military reputation. 
This reputation initially emerged from the Dominion’s volunteer contingents that 
served in the Second Anglo-Boer War, but was cemented through the combat service 
of the New Zealand expeditionary forces that served overseas during the First and 
Second World Wars. A key question to consider when analysing this reputation is how 
did these forces, which in affect were citizen armies, achieve this, since the reputation 
seems well-deserved and acknowledged by allies and foes alike. This thesis attempts to 
provide part of the explanation by studying the battalion and regimental officers who 
physically led the New Zealand citizen-soldiers into battle. 
From the 1960s there was a historiographical shift in the study of military 
history. Historians began a new focus of study towards ‘war and society’ and ‘army and 
society’ to gain a greater understanding of the mass civilian-soldier armies that were 
used in the First and Second World Wars. More attention was given to the study of the 
‘home fronts’ in the age of total war, where all sectors of society were affected by these 
major conflicts. Such studies include the examination of the volunteer and conscript 
citizen-armies that nations raised to defend their interests. Another related question in 
such a study must be to ask how these ‘amateur’ forces maintained their cohesion and 
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efficiency when suffering terrible ordeals. This is particularly relevant to the 
experiences of the New Zealand expeditionary forces during both world wars, were 
they suffered significant defeats in their first campaigns; Gallipoli in 1915 and Greece 
and Crete in 1941.  
 Leadership was crucial in the New Zealand expeditionary forces for 
maintaining cohesion and efficiency, and this makes the study of the officers of these 
citizen-armies a worthy and useful project. The rank and file of volunteer and conscript 
armies are representative of the whole population of a country, but the officers of such 
forces in a real sense have to be ‘made.’ The prosopographical method of analysis of 
statistically significant samples employed in this study enabled the establishment of 
definitive ‘social types’ that officers could be identified with. An interesting point that 
this thesis makes is that as the wars went on and promotion from the ranks increasingly 
occurred, the officer corps became more ‘democratised’ in the sense of better 
representing the under-society of New Zealand, beyond the educated, professional 
classes. This was especially true in 2NZEF during the Second World War. Although 
the expeditionary forces suffered substantial reversals in the first years of both wars, 
they recovered relatively quickly. This provides good evidence that these formations 
were well-organised and well-led, especially in the rebuilding phases, where effective 
training and the selection and promotion of officers by generals and other senior officers 
proved crucial to future success.  
Also crucial to the ultimate success of the expeditionary forces was the 
relationships between the officers and the other ranks. This can be seen in the ‘culture’ 
that developed within the New Zealand divisions and brigades during the years of active 
service overseas. This culture was based on the identities, relationships and values of 
the wider society of the Dominion and involves consideration of such matters as its 
New Zealandness, its relative classlessness and the importance of mateship and ‘the 
team.’ The close comradeship of officers and their men was drawn out of the colonial 
society originally, but was further strengthened by the shared experience of battle and 
by the democratisation which led from the eventual opportunity of promotion on merit, 
regardless of previous civilian social status. It was this culture that helped to give the 
New Zealand citizen-soldiers a sense of identity while serving as elements within the 
British Army.    
One aspect that became apparent in researching this work is that of the external 
political and economic influences that directly affected the performance of the New 
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Zealand officer corps in both major conflicts. British imperialism and nationalism 
played a significant role in promoting the expansion of the volunteer forces in the 
Dominion prior to the Great War, which directly led to the increase in training provided 
to the Territorial Force. This ensured that the majority of medically fit men of military 
age in New Zealand from 1910 until after the Great War received some form of military 
training. Compulsory military training helped to partially prepare the 100,000 citizen-
soldiers of the Dominion who served in the First World War for military life, including 
over 5,000 who were to serve as commissioned officers.1094 It was compulsory military 
training that proved essential in preparing them for life in the army.  
Continual training proved crucial to success. The training received by the 
officers and other ranks of the expeditionary forces, as well as those of the Dominion’s 
Territorial Force, primarily followed the British Army curriculum. The introduction of 
compulsory military training was integral to the reforms that came about through the 
1909 Defence Act. This directly led to the establishment of a more effective and 
structured training regime for New Zealand’s military forces, which replaced the 
antiquated volunteer militia system. This was in keeping with measures introduced in 
Britain, as well as Australia and Canada. The War Office in London had determined 
that all the forces within the British Empire would receive the same training, weapons 
and equipment to provide for a large homogenised force when the need arose to defend 
the empire. Such training and systems meant that regular officer cadets would receive 
the same training and sit the same examinations at the Royal Military Colleges in 
Australia and Canada as those at Sandhurst and Woolwich. Likewise, officers and 
officer candidates within the New Zealand Territorial Force were exposed to the same 
training syllabus and sat the same promotional examinations as Territorial officers in 
Britain. Such measures increased the proficiency and professionalism both in the staff 
corps and the Territorial regiments, ensuring that when the expeditionary forces were 
formed there was a core of proficient battalion and regimental officers from which 
trained combat formations could be created. 
Although such pre-war training provided the basic foundations for overseas 
military service for the Dominion’s citizen-soldier officers, both in the First and Second 
World Wars, the expeditionary forces were unprepared for the type of warfare they 
                                                 
1094 Lt. Col. John Studholme, Some Records of the New Zealand Expeditionary: Record of Personal 
Services During the War of Officers, Nurses, and First-Class Warrant Officers (Wellington, 1928) 
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were initially exposed to. The four months of training the officers and other ranks of 
NZEF received in Egypt prior to the Gallipoli campaign was beneficial in building 
cohesion within units and hardening the men to the rigours of army life. However, the 
continuous route marches and mock bayonet charges in the desert did not prepare them 
for the terrain and fighting tactics they were exposed to at Gallipoli. Likewise, apart 
from a focus on musketry, the pre-war training provided by the British Army 
curriculum did not prepare citizen-soldiers throughout the empire for trench warfare.  
The fiscal constraints and anti-war feelings that dominated the inter-war years 
had a dramatic effect on the training provided to New Zealand’s military forces leading 
up the Second World War. Defence budgets were continually reduced throughout the 
1920s and early 1930s that led to limited opportunities for staff corps officers to attend 
courses overseas, while the number of officer cadets sent to the Royal Military College 
at Duntroon declined to a point where no candidates were sent for a number of years. 
Limited opportunities for professional development and promotion within the staff 
corps led to resignations of experienced Great War veteran officers and a reduction in 
the number of young regular officers needed to administer and train the Territorial 
Force. The limited funding available directly led to the end of compulsory military 
training in 1931, with the Territorial Force training restricted to paper exercises for 
officers and NCOs; measures that had a detrimental effect on the ability to provide 
sufficient experienced trained junior officers when 2NZEF was being formed in 1939. 
Such fiscal constraints also occurred in Britain, Australia and Canada, with similar 
outcomes; although unlike the others, Britain had a sizeable professional army to draw 
upon for defence.  
In contrast to the experience at the beginning of the First World War, the New 
Zealand military forces were totally unprepared at the outbreak of the Second World 
War. Although the Defence budget had dramatically increased as war seemed 
imminent, the drastic reduction in training provided to regular and Territorial officers 
and other ranks during the inter-wars ensured that the newly formed expeditionary force 
would require eighteen months of intensive training before Freyberg agreed his troops 
were ready for combat. Even then, much of the tactical training received was based on 
the First World War experience of trench warfare, leaving them totally unprepared for 
the mobile warfare of Blitzkrieg. Likewise, the British Army training curriculum did 
not prepare the officers and men of the short-lived 3rd NZ Division for their combat role 
in the Pacific. Jungle and amphibious warfare had not been considered as essential pre-
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war training as New Zealand troops were expected to be fighting in Europe or the 
Mediterranean in any future war. However, Barrowclough was determined that his 
force was to have an active combat role, and to that end he introduced a training regime 
based on the experiences of the United States Marines at Guadalcanal and the 
Australian forces in New Guinea to ensure his officers and men became proficient in 
jungle and amphibious warfare.               
 The drive for such competent leadership at all levels of combat command 
initially came from the top. New Zealand was generally well-served by competent 
divisional and brigade commanders, whose professionalism and leadership proved 
essential in attaining a certain level of proficiency of the expeditionary forces prior to 
going into battle. Generals Godley, Russell, Chaytor, Freyberg and Barrowclough all 
heavily influenced the officer selection and training policies and initiatives for the 
formations they led. They also knew that the development of effective leadership and 
the fostering of officer-man relationships was, and is, crucial in any combat force, 
especially those based on volunteer or conscripted citizen-soldiers. Such relationships 
are determined by effective leadership, especially in combat units. Battalion and 
regiment commanders and their subordinate officers were responsible for developing a 
military culture where none really existed in the newly formed civilian armies, such as 
the expeditionary forces of Australia, Canada and New Zealand.  
 The leadership styles of the New Zealand divisional commanders proved 
examples for battalion and regiment commanders to follow, although their varying 
personalities determined they had different strengths and styles of command. In the 
First World War Godley proved an outstanding administrator and his preparation of the 
New Zealand military forces prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 has remained 
overshadowed by his perceived lack of empathy for his troops and his mediocre 
performance as a combat commander at Gallipoli. Russell’s drive for excellence in 
leading the New Zealand Division on the Western Front directly led to the formation 
being forged into a numerically strong elite fighting force, although his expectation of 
perfection and perceived lack of empathy for the plight of his subordinate officers did 
not endear him to them. Chaytor, on the other hand, was a regular officer who had 
received his professional training under the rigid and formal system promoted by the 
British Army, but whose personality and understanding of the strengths and limitations 
of his colonial civilian-soldiers led to a more relaxed style of command in Egypt and 
Palestine, which was well received by those who served under him.   
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 The New Zealand divisions of the Second World War were also well led.   
Freyberg displayed the same approach as Chaytor when he commanded the 2nd New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force in the Second World War. Although serving as a regular 
officer in the British Army during the inter-war years, the New Zealanders considered 
him one of their own and, in comparison to Blamey, the Australian commanding 
general, he remained a popular and inspiring leader throughout the conflict.1095 His 
dedication to maintaining the 2nd New Zealand Division as an independent national 
fighting force within a British Commonwealth army ensured that the New Zealand 
government and Freyberg kept a certain level of autonomy over their troops by invoking 
a government charter, similar to that provided to Australian Imperial Force during the 
Second World War. And although the Division suffered heavy casualties while serving 
in the early campaigns of the war, Freyberg was able to ensure such losses were limited 
through his ability to withdraw the force from high risk operations. In contrast to 
Blamey, he proved capable of building and maintaining working relationships with his 
superior and subordinate officers, even with those few who proved disloyal to him after 
the battle of Crete. Freyberg showed great faith in the officers under his command, 
although at times the flexibility he allowed them had negative results on the battlefield. 
He led by example and shared the rigours and dangers of battle with his troops, while 
his steadfast concern with their welfare made him a popular commander. Likewise, 
Major-General Sir Harold Barrowclough led the 3rd New Zealand Division with 
distinction in the Pacific theatre. Although frustrated at the lack of resources and 
available manpower, as well as the limited combat opportunities for his force, he 
ensured that his officers and troops received essential jungle and amphibious warfare 
training to prepare them for the roles they were allocated. It is due to the limited role 
that the 3rd New Zealand Division had in the Pacific that the leadership skills of 
Barrowclough and the service of his officers and enlisted men have remained relatively 
unknown or forgotten by the general public of New Zealand. 
 The influences and experiences of the combat officers within the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces were similar to those of the Australian and Canadian expeditionary 
forces. The officer corps within the two expeditionary forces in these two major 
conflicts was a reflection of New Zealand society at the time. Unlike Britain, there was 
no significant pre-existing professional military culture of any consequence. This 
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ensured that the New Zealand expeditionary forces were relatively free of the bias 
shown towards Territorial officers by regular officers that prevailed in the British Army 
throughout the period.1096 With only a cadre of a professional army, the expeditionary 
forces were recruited from the civilian population, with most officers generally having 
had some form of prior military training. However, it was in combat that their martial 
leadership skills were honed. After considerable training these citizen-soldier officers 
achieved a sufficient level of professionalism in their various corps that allowed them 
to carry out the expected duties and leadership required of platoon, company, troop and 
battery commanders. However, it was only after they had experienced combat that they 
gained the level of confidence and proficiency required of effective frontline officers. 
Gallipoli had been the baptism of fire for the inexperienced New Zealander and 
Australian civilian-soldiers, with those who survived the rigours of the failed campaign 
gaining combat knowledge that proved beneficial in establishing fighting efficiency of 
the divisions of the two dominions on the Western Front.     
 Not all officers reached the required standard. Generally, most proved able once 
they had gained experience, but some lacked the personal discipline or moral and 
physical courage expected of commissioned officers. Those who proved unable to 
improve their performance or who broke down under the mental strain of combat were 
weeded out, ranging from platoon commanders through to brigade commanders. There 
were examples of this in both expeditionary forces, where Russell and Freyberg were 
aware that the level of responsibility placed on officers, especially battalion 
commanders, over an extended period was a strain on themselves and their 
subordinates, and that the removal of those who showed signs of suffering under such 
pressure was beneficial to the fighting efficiency of their commands. 
 Such men were a liability to the fighting effectiveness of the New Zealand 
battalions, brigades and supporting frontline units. Most were transferred to non-
combat units or sent back to New Zealand to perform administrative roles. Very few 
officers were ever court-martialled, especially in the Second World War. In the New 
Zealand Expeditionary Force during the First World War the most common charge laid 
against battalion officers was that of being drunk on duty. For this and other minor 
offending, these men were either demoted or cashiered from the army. It was considered 
that the shame attached to these punitive measures was sufficient for officers. However, 
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there certainly was a double standard approach in dealing with such offending, with 
enlisted men receiving more severe punishment. 
 The official officer selection process was in keeping with policies promoted in 
the British Army, as well as the Australian and Canadian military forces. By examining 
the attestation papers of over 600 junior officers covering both expeditionary forces, 
along with personal details obtained from embarkation rolls, an analysis of the officer 
selection policy was made. Certain patterns were repeated when the expeditionary 
forces were formed in 1914 and 1939. With less than 100 Staff Corps officers available 
to lead the force, the majority of the original officers of the main bodies were Territorial 
officers who had volunteered for overseas service. Most had a high level of education 
relative to the time, came from middle-class or prosperous working-class backgrounds 
and had some form of military experience, predominantly in the Territorial Force or 
School Cadets. 
 The nature of the New Zealand society and its expeditionary forces meant that 
such selection criteria used at the beginning of both conflicts were unsustainable. 
Unlike Britain, Canada and Australia, the small dominion lacked a sizable middle-class 
population from which officer candidates were traditionally selected. As the wars 
progressed and casualties increased, commissioned officer vacancies were increasingly 
filled from the enlisted ranks, although not entirely. Both Godley and Freyberg had 
outlined when the expeditionary forces were being formed that they intended to 
promote suitable candidates from the ranks to fill commissioned officer vacancies as 
they occurred and once such candidates had gained experience and had shown 
leadership ability. The limited pool of available highly-educated Territorial officers 
from New Zealand could not continue to provide the required number of replacements, 
especially during the Great War. Those experienced non-commissioned officers from 
within the expeditionary forces who had proven leadership in combat became the main 
source of replacement officer candidates, although this was to a lesser extent in the First 
World War where only approximately fifty percent of replacement junior officers came 
from the ranks. In comparison, Freyberg made it a policy as the Second World War 
progressed to promote combat experienced non-commissioned officers within the 2nd 
New Zealand Division in preference to untested reinforcement officers sent from the 
Dominion. By 1945 almost all replacement junior officers of combat units were 
promoted from the ranks. Although there has been some debate as to whether the 
promotion of enlisted men reduced the overall discipline of the forces, especially during 
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the Italian campaign in the last year of the Second World War, experienced soldiers 
who were commissioned from the ranks generally proved proficient officers and 
combat leaders. 
 A myth emerged in post-Second World War New Zealand society that the 2nd 
New Zealand Expeditionary Force was an egalitarian reflection of the Dominion.1097 
True egalitarianism could never be achieved in the formal structure required of a 
military force, but there was a strong sense of equality, based on opportunity through 
merit, especially within the officer corps of the both New Zealand expeditionary forces. 
As John McLeod has pointed out, in contrast to larger allied armies, the officers and 
non-commissioned officers of the New Zealand divisions focused on the individual 
skills and attributes of their men, which promoted efficiency and encouraged a feeling 
that everyone had their part to play in achieving success in combat.1098 In comparison 
to the British Army of both major conflicts, there was no significant social divide 
between ranks within the New Zealand forces, especially in the final years of both wars, 
which perhaps encouraged greater communication within the combat units and fostered 
strong feelings of shared experiences which remained in the memories of the surviving 
veterans when they returned home.  
Perceived opportunities for promotion, especially for non-commissioned 
officers to commissioned rank within the New Zealand expeditionary forces in the later 
years of both wars, could have also influenced the myth. As within the British, 
Australian and Canadian forces, the education levels of prospective officers played a 
significant part in determining their suitability for a commission. Those with a tertiary 
education and qualifications were more likely to be selected as candidates due to their 
proven ability to absorb, analyse and report information to a high level. Equally, those 
who had received an education to such levels, especially during the First World War, 
were more likely to have come from the same level of society as their superior officers, 
having similar attitudes and aspirations. However, unlike the Canadian selection policy 
of the Second World War, the selection of officer candidates was not solely based on 
education, nor was it ever intended to be.  
Combat experience and proven ability to lead became the most crucial aspects 
in determining the selection and promotion of officers within the New Zealand overseas 
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forces as the wars progressed. Promotion at all levels was based on merit; some men 
who had enlisted as privates became platoon, company, and even battalion 
commanders, while a number who had been commissioned as lieutenants when war 
broke out in 1914 and 1939 were serving as brigadiers-generals when peace was 
declared in 1918 and 1945. Arguably, many of those commissioned from the ranks 
during the First World War were educated men from the middle-classes of New Zealand 
society who would have been considered suitable for a commission on enlistment in 
numerically larger armies, but were required to serve in the ranks due to the relatively 
small size of the expeditionary force. This had a positive affect in that those enlisted 
men who were later commissioned had empathy with those serving in the ranks, 
generally leading to a greater sense of duty and responsibility of officers towards their 
men, making them better combat leaders. This signified that once on active service, the 
performance and leadership of an individual determined his opportunity for promotion 
rather than his social status or previous occupation in civilian life. For some officers 
commissioned from the ranks, service in the expeditionary forces provided them with 
opportunities that they would not necessarily have had in civilian life. Perhaps for this 
reason it can be argued that the army proved more egalitarian than New Zealand society 
in the first half of the twentieth century. 
 The relationships that developed between the platoon, company, troop and 
squadron commanders with the enlisted men who served under them proved 
fundamental in the performance of the New Zealand battalions and regiments. The 
small population of the Dominion, along with the regional-based recruitment of infantry 
battalions, and the mounted rifle regiments in the Great War, ensured that there was a 
certain familiarity between the officers and ranks generally found in civilian-volunteer 
based forces of that era, such as the Australian and Canadian expeditionary forces, but 
much less so in the British Army. The senior and junior volunteer and conscript officers 
were home-town people, many from small country communities, who were often 
closely related to those serving under them. It was common for officers to have been 
neighbours or school, church, sporting or work mates with enlisted men from their 
units. This was in contrast to the class separateness of the British Army where the 
middle-class officers were less likely to have associated with the working-class 
population. Some New Zealand officers led their brothers, sons, cousins and brothers-
in-law into battle. This promoted a strong sense of duty and responsibility towards their 
troops, with many officers feeling personally responsible in limiting the casualties 
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amongst their men. The fear of failing them and then returning to face their 
communities at the end of the conflicts made most officers determined to succeed in 
leadership while ensuring the welfare of their men. 
 The strong sense of local and national belonging was not unique to the New 
Zealanders, but they did help to foster a team ethos which was a main characteristic of 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces in the two wars. Both Freyberg and 
Barrowclough were aware of this and promoted it through sporting competitions within 
their divisions and against British, Canadian, Australian and South African forces. This 
team ethos, which had its foundations in New Zealand colonial society, began at platoon 
level and it was those officers who embraced the team approach to combat who proved 
the most effective. Every member of the team had a responsibility to each other, while 
the officer was seen as the team captain. 
 The team ethos proved successful and was in keeping with the leadership style 
preferred by New Zealanders. During the First and Second World Wars Kiwi soldiers 
performed at their best when commanded by combat officers who led by example with 
personal and moral courage; who displayed a professional and practical approach; who 
shared the hardships of campaigning; who knew and cared for the welfare of the men, 
and did not waste their lives unnecessarily. As in any large organisation, not all officers 
had these attributes. However, the majority who did ensured that the New Zealand 
expeditionary forces were able to initially endure defeat, especially in the early 
campaigns of the Second World War, learn lessons from them, and implement those 
lessons and new combat tactics required to defeat the enemy in battle. It was the 
collective ability to achieve this that led to the New Zealand expeditionary forces being 
forged into elite veteran fighting formations. 
 The experience of leadership within the New Zealand expeditionary forces was 
not unique. There were many similarities to the Australian and Canadian expeditionary 
forces, and to the British Army to some extent. Officers of all these forces were trained 
under the curriculum provided within the British Army, and as Lord Beaverbrook 
argues in his history of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in the First World War, the 
Canadians, Australians and the New Zealanders were almost entirely led by semi-
trained volunteer officers whose initial lack of professionalism was compensated by 
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examples of courage, steadiness and co-ordinated discipline.1099  His description of the 
strengths he perceived that made effective colonial volunteer officers, ‘training and 
discipline combined with intense patriotism, high physical courage and endurance bred 
of past times,’ might be seen simply as British imperial rhetoric during a time of war. 
However, there is a strong element of truth in this. The population of all three young 
dominions generally wanted to play their part in defending Britain and the Empire, 
through a sense of duty fostered by an engrained British tradition of reliance on 
auxiliary forces for national defence, while the rigours of colonial life had gone some 
way in helping them endure modern warfare.1100 Another similarity is that by the end 
of both conflicts there was a tendency for the experienced senior regular officers to be 
placed in command of brigades, as opposed to the Territorial or militia officers 
preferred when the expeditionary forces were being formed.   
The most significant difference between the New Zealand expeditionary forces 
and those of Australia and Canada was their size. Apart from the establishment of the 
temporary and under-strength 3rd New Zealand Division during the Second World War, 
the New Zealand expeditionary forces serving overseas during both conflicts primarily 
comprised of a single large division. An exception to this was the Mounted Rifle 
Brigade, which served with the Anzac Mounted Division in Egypt and Palestine from 
1916 after the NZ Division was transferred to the Western Front. Unlike the forces of 
the other two dominions, these numerically strong single divisions, in effect, became 
national armies. In comparison to the much larger contingents of their allies, the New 
Zealand divisions were able to retain almost all of their experienced combat 
commanders for the duration of the conflicts. Officer casualties were replaced from 
within the same battalions, regiments and brigades within the divisions, ensuring an 
established system of promotion based on seniority, experience and merit from within 
the ranks through to the divisional commanders. This proved beneficial in ensuring the 
divisions retained their experienced and trusted senior and junior officers, in contrast to 
those of the Australian and Canadian forces who were transferred within various 
divisions serving in several different theatres of operation.  
Combat experience was another important difference between the New 
Zealanders and Canadians. The officers and men of the 2nd New Zealand Division, 
                                                 
1099 Lord Beaverbrook, Canada in Flanders: Volume II of the Official Story Expeditionary Force 
(London, 1917), pp. 9-10 
1100 Beckett, p. 2 
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together with the Australians serving in the 6th and 9th Divisions, were fighting against 
the Germans and Italians from as early as 1941, while the bulk of the Canadian divisions 
were still being organised and trained in the United Kingdom and, except for several 
large scale raids, did not serve in a campaign until the invasion of Sicily in 1943. Prior 
to this the inexperienced and under-resourced New Zealand and Australian divisions 
were forced to fight the more experienced and better equipped Germans in Greece, 
Crete and North Africa. And although the Canadians went on to play a significant role 
in the liberation of Europe and had served alongside the Kiwis in Italy, in 1943 their 
officers were not experienced and battle-hardened veterans that the combat officers of 
the 2nd New Zealand Division had become.          
 The international military reputation of New Zealand was cast in the First and 
Second World Wars. The New Zealand expeditionary forces began as relatively small 
amateur formations but they punched above their weight when it came to determination 
to succeed in combat operations. Almost exclusively consisting of volunteers and 
conscripts, it remains incredible that these citizen-soldier forces became renowned as 
first-class fighting formations in such a short time. Without doubt, this can be attributed 
to the leadership shown at all levels of command. However, it was only through 
experiencing combat that an essential degree of professionalism was achieved by those 
officers of fighting units. It was the high standard of leadership that the officers 
provided at battalion, regiment, company, squadron, troop, battery and platoon level, 
which ensured the New Zealand divisions achieved success. One crucial aspect that 
attributed to this success was the effective relationships between the officers and other 
ranks that stemmed from engrained colonial egalitarian values of opportunity through 
merit, mutual respect, team work and collective responsibility, together with a 
proficiency forged through shared combat experiences. Cultural and racial factors also 
determined the styles of leadership used by officers, especially where traditional Maori 
martial values combined with British imperial and colonial attitudes towards valour in 
times of adversity. It is hoped that this study helps to provide a greater understanding 
of the development of combat officers within the New Zealand expeditionary forces 
during the two major conflicts of the twentieth century and an appreciation of the 
experiences and sacrifice of those who provided essential combat leadership for their 
country in times of war. As New Zealanders are growing more aware of their military 
past and experiences in war that became defining features of nationhood, it is timely 
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that the untold story of the men responsible for physically leading the nation’s troops 
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      Appendix 1: World War I Officers Sample (source- Personnel  
















Abbot, GM 23   21 Pres Bank Teller  
Abbott, HW 26   48 Pres Mercer  
Abercrombi
e, TR 
22 yes  48 COE Bank Officer  
Ackhurst, 
G 
36 yes  22 COE Engineer KIA 
Adams, C 21 yes  24 RC Miner DOW 
Adams, GJ 25 yes  11 COE Seaman DOW 
Adams, TG 19 yes  48  Labourer  
Adamson, 
HGK 










34   58 Pres Decorator  
Algie, CS 25   23 COE Teacher KIA 
Allan, W 27 yes  48 Pres Farmer  
Allen, HG 21   8 Weslyan Farmer DOW 
Allen, LH 25 yes  46 COE Accountant  
Amohanga, 
Te R 
22 yes  55 COE Farmer yes 
Andrews, 
JW 
24   30 Meth Joiner yes 
Armitage, 
FL 





22   14 COE Clerk KIA 
Armstrong, 
H 
21 yes  60 COE Farmer yes 
Austin, LR 24   34 COE Bank Teller  
Baddeley, 
HS 
23   8 COE Solicitor KIA 
Bailey, AS 25   19 COE Salesman yes 
Barclay, G 54   53 Pres Railway 
Officer 
 
Barker, TD 26 yes  50 COE Engineer yes 





22 yes  50 COE Engineer yes 
Begg, CM 34   54 Pres Surveyor yes 
Bell, WHD 30   3  Lawyer  
Berryman, 
S 
24 yes  42 COE Farmer KIA 




24 yes  50 Pres Boilermaker  
Billows, 
FW 
35 yes  41 COE Jeweller  
Birkby, JS 
d'H 
37 yes  28 COE   
Bishop, JJ 22 yes  22 Pres Teacher KIA 
Bishop, 
WGA 
21 NZSC MC 58 COE Student yes 
Black, J 25 yes  53 Pres Miner yes 
Blomfield, 
EH 
28  MC 58 COE Seaman yes 
Boeufre 
AECHE 
24 yes  45 COE Lawyer  
Bongard, A 19 yes MC 49 COE Student yes 
Brunt, JW 32   32 Pres Engineer yes 
Buchanan, 
RO 
43   40 Pres Teacher yes 
Buck, PH 34  DSO 52 COE Doctor yes 
Buckeridge
, EH 
20   52 COE Civil 
Engineer 
yes 
Buddle, HD 33   37 Meth Solicitor yes 
Bush, GA 35   48 COE Accountant  
Butler, GE 40   3 Pres Artist  
Carpenter, 
DR 
20   9 COE Clerk KIA 
Chilcott, 
CW 
 yes  53 COE Clerk  
Childs, AJ 37   21 COE Blacksmith KIA 
Chisholm, 
JH 
34   24 Pres Farmer yes 
Chisholm, 
P 
30  MBE 36 COE Surgeon yes 
Clarke, E  yes   Meth Builder KIA 
Cook, CFD 31  DSO 45 Meth Barrister DOS 
Cook, HL 28 yes  36 COE Solicitor  
Cook, PR 47   42 COE Doctor  
Corbett, IP 26 yes  54 RC Labourer yes 
Corbett, 
JM 
21   6 COE Metallurgist KIA 
Cowie, AJ 29   24 Pres Brewer  
Crampton, 
JW 
32   33 COE Soldier yes 
Cunningha
m, A 
23 yes  46 Pres Farmer DOW 
Daniel, GE 24  MM 24 COE Soldier KIA 
Dartnall, 
CA 





22 yes  27 COE Clerk DOW 
De La 
Mare, FA 
38 yes  47 Unitarian Barrister  
Deans, A 25   17 Pres Farmer KIA 
Deans, D 21 yes  61 Pres Farmer yes 
Dee, GK 22   25 COE Clerk DOW 
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Devereux, 
G De B 









 yes  43 COE Civil Servant yes 
Dodson, 
FH 
24   8 COE Auctioneer KIA 
Dougall, 
WK 
24   25  Farmer DOW 
Duggan, J 28   32 RC Teacher yes 
Fergus, T 35   54 Pres Doctor  
Ferguson, 
D 
29 yes MC 50 COE Solicitor  
Foster, HG 27 yes  49 COE Land Agent yes 
Frater, RA 24 yes  9 Pres Clerk DOW 
French, 
WA 
23 yes  38 Pres Farmer KIA 
Galloway, 
G 
29   28 COE Solicitor yes 
Gilmore, 
AF 
20 yes MM 53 COE Telegraphist yes 
Glanfield, 
D 
23 yes  54 Pres Clerk yes 
Goodwin, 
E 
35   37 COE  DOW 
Grace, LW 
Te H 
28 yes  41 COE Solicitor  
Grant, SA 34 NZSC  12 COE Soldier DOW 
Gray, CG 35   25 COE Dentist  
Gray, RN 24 yes MC, 
MM 
46 Baptist Clerk yes 
Greenhoug
h, PB 




Hall, A 23 yes MC 44 COE Secretary KIA 
Hall, HJ 27   15 COE Soldier KIA 
Harper, PT 44   13 COE Doctor  
Harston, 
ES 
21   34  Student yes 
Herrick, AD 34 yes MC 28 COE Farmer KIA 
Hewlett, 
HS 
42   35 COE Expert 
Maltster 
yes 
Hill, CC 24 yes  53 COE Clerk yes 
Hill, RJ 28 yes MC 40 COE Clerk DOW 
Hodgson, 
FJ 
27 yes MM 57  Engineer yes 
Holdgate, 
EAG 





21 yes  22 Pres Clerk KIA 
Houlker, J 34   12 COE Solicitor DOW 
Hulbert, W 28 yes  57 COE Marine 
Engineer 
yes 




Insley, GW 34 yes OBE 51 COE Bricklayer yes 
Izard, AW 37   58 COE Surgeon yes 
James, TP 29   12 COE Accountant DOW 
Jenkins, 
WG 
26 yes  61 COE Wool Buyer yes 
Jennings, 
LS 
27   25 COE Teacher KIA 
Joll, BL 22 yes  55 COE Clerk yes 
Joll, WT 43   22 COE Farmer  
Jones, NW 40 yes  50 Pres Clerk yes 
Jones, VG 35 yes  35 COE Soldier  
Jordan, JB 20 NZSC  30 COE Soldier yes 





27 yes  36 RC Licensed 
Interpreter 
KIA 
Karauria, R 26   18 COE Farmer yes 
Karauti, H 37   43 COE Farmer  
Knightsbrid
ge, TW 
23 yes  49 COE Farmer & 
Butcher 
yes 
Lang, H 24   10 COE School 
Master 
KIA 
Little, GC 21 yes  67 COE Farmer yes 
Lockie, 
CJW 
29   40 COE Bank Teller  
Loomes, V    58  Farm Hand yes 
Luxford, JA 30  CMG 69 Meth Clergyman yes 
Lyons, MJ     RC Grocer  
MacDonald
, A 
26 yes  46 COE Civil Servant yes 
MacKenzie
, J 
24 yes  30 Pres Teacher DOW 
Mackie, C 45 no  5 Pres Accountant  
MacLean, 
JC 
38  MC & 
Bar 
51 COE Farmer yes 
Marshall, A 
McP. 
23   53 Pres Doctor  





24   26 COE Farmer yes 
McAra, W 36   17 Pres Surgeon  
McArthur, 
AD 
19 yes  39 Pres Teacher  
McClelland
, CH 
20 NZSC DSO 55 COE Soldier yes 
McKeefry, 
JHA 
25   36 RC Accountant yes 
McKeefry, 
MJA 
23   26 RC Civil Servant KIA 
McLennon, 
LS 
23   12  Clerk KIA 
McLeod, 
MK 
25 yes  19 Pres Architect DOW 




22   14 Pres Doctor  
Merrington, 
AR 
23   18 COE Teacher  
Miller, 
Hugh 
29 yes MC 53 COE Grocer yes 
Milne, MC 21   52 Pres Stock Agent yes 
Moir, PT 21 yes MM, 
DCM 
48 Pres Cleaner yes 
Molloy, CH 25 yes  31 RC Clerk KIA 
Montgomer
y, HS 
40 yes  57 Pres Soldier yes 
Mooney, R 24 yes  12 RC Soldier KIA 
Moore, S 29 yes  9  Physical 
Instructor 
DOW 
Moreton, C 27 yes  52 Atheist Coal Miner yes 
Morgan, H 34   8 COE Estate 
Agent 
KIA 
Munro, DA 25 yes  63 Pres Stevedor yes 
Murphy, J 35   34 Pres Warehouse
man 
yes 
Napier, DG 24   24 Pres Clerk KIA 
Natusch, 
GP 
21 yes  28 COE Reporter  
O'Brien, 
DQ 
40 yes  41 RC Coal Miner  
O'Connor, 
D 










26   52 RC Farmer yes 
Ongley, PA 26 yes  25 RC Teacher KIA 
Orr, A 30 yes  40 COE Shepherd yes 
Oxley, JV 27 yes  39 COE Clerk yes 
Park, KR 22 yes  9 Pres Purser  
Parkin, VG 20 yes  41 COE Clerk yes 
Parkinson, 
L 
36 yes  42 COE Farmer yes 
Paterson, 
D 
23 yes  48 Pres Farmer KIA 
Patterson, 
HM 
25 yes  48 COE Mercer yes 
Pederson, 
H 





37   37 COE Doctor  
Polson, C 37 yes  25 Pres Carpenter yes 
Poppelwell, 
GXB 
25   25 RC Accountant yes 
Popple, GL  yes  55 COE Surveyors 
Assistant 
yes 
Porritt, EE 46   42 COE Doctor  
Powley, AJ 28 yes MC 25 COE Clerk DOW 
Preston, 
AH 




Prior, NH 33  MC 41 Meth Doctor yes 
Pryce, JS 22 yes  45 COE Farmer KIA 
Raynes, JJ 39   18 COE Farmer  
Ready, WH 26 yes  31 Meth Solicitor yes 
Reid, SGT 31 yes  9 COE Accountant KIA 
Richards, 
RJ 
23   20 COE Student yes 
Richardson
, HG 
23   8 Congregatio
nal 
Importer KIA 
Ritchie, TR 27   53  Doctor yes 
Roache, 
JG 
39  DSO 54 RC Civil Servant yes 
Roy, JA 
McL 





36   33 COE Sharebroker  
Russell, 
PD 
33 yes  55 COE Farmer yes 
Saunders, 
CW 
30 yes  40  Engineer yes 
Savage, 
TC 
41    COE Surgeon DOS 
Screaton, 
TGN 
22   9 COE Book 
Keeper 
KIA 
Seed, WS 30 yes  36 Meth Dentist  
Shepherd, 
NF 
24 yes DSO 61 Pres Bank Clerk yes 
Sherrard, 
SC 
20 yes  37 Pres Draper yes 





26 yes  51 COE Teacher yes 
Sloane, AD 34   50  Chemist  
Somervell, 
EE 





22   30 COE Grocer yes 
Stainton, 
WN 
24 yes MC 57 COE Teacher  
Standish, 
IT 
30 NZSC DSO 56 COE Soldier  
Starnes, F 26  DSO 66 Pres Farmer yes 
Stewart, 
JG 
24  MC 56 Pres Student yes 
Stout, WG 32   57 Protestant Surgeon  
Stuckey, F 35   8 COE Teacher DOW 
Studholme, 
J 
52  DSO 60 COE Farmer  
Tate, CH 23 yes  50 Weslyan Town Clerk yes 
Thompson, 
RJL 



















20 yes  51 COE Motor Car 
Driver 
yes 
Walker, JV 23   63 COE Labourer yes 
Wallingford
, JA 
42  MC 31 COE Soldier yes 
Ward, RF 22 yes  48 COE Mill Hand yes 
Whetter, 
LH 
32   30 COE Doctor yes 
Wilson, 
FJC 
22 yes  51 COE Auctioneer yes 
Wilson, FR 29 yes  18 COE Teacher DOW 
Winder, HE 26   12 COE Clerk KIA 
Woodrow, 
TM 
25 yes  48 Pres Engineer  
Woodward, 
CB 
26 yes  43  Draper yes 
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